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For Ma and Abba, thank you....
When the snow comes to the high mountains,
When the nightingale is sad,
I can feel freedom and see freedom,
But cannot catch it - I can only drink the water
That comes from the mountains,
And then I think I touch freedom.
Kurdish Folk Song
ABSTRACT
Fresh water is vital to the economies and societies of countries, especially to those in the
arid realm. The issue of scarcity in certain regions of the world, notably the Middle East,
has led to an expectation of international conflict, even war, based upon increasing
competition for shared water. However, what is emerging is the improbability of this
expectation. In fact what is becoming ever more apparent is evidence to support
international cooperation as the norm, even between hostile countries.
One example of such international cooperation over shared water is the Indus Waters
Treaty, signed in 1960 by India and Pakistan. It is an international water treaty signed by
two enemies, and that has lasted through two Indo-Pakistani wars to the nuclear era, in
1998, in the Indian Subcontinent. The intervention of the World Bank, as good officer,
was critical to the process that finally led to the Treaty.
One explanation for such international cooperation is water rationality. This concept,
coined in this thesis, expects cooperation because war does not lead to long term
national water security. Such security is only possible through good water management
at the national and international levels. And such is the need for fresh water, that
countries will cooperate with their co-riparians whatever the public rhetoric used by the
politicians.
The most important factors leading to the Treaty are the fact that the disputants had the
space to explore cooperative measures safely, and the governments' political will to
compromise and reach a settlement. Obviously, if the governments in question are
willing to explore ways to cooperate, then cooperation will be more likely. Technical,
legal and environmental factors are second to political will.
Furthermore, if direct bilateral negotiations are proving unsuccessful, the intervention of
an impartial mediator can assist communication between the disputants. Lastly, even
enemy countries are more likely to enact policies that are 'water rational' than go to war
with their co-riparians in an effort to make their water dispute more manageable.
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PREFACE
Interest in hydropolitics was sparked by a number of talks on the importance of fresh
water in the Middle East given at the EURAMES conference, in July 1993, at the
University of Warwick. Intrigued that a resource of such little, apparent, value could
prove so contentious led to the author making further inquiries into the topic. The result
was a growing awareness of the importance of fresh water in every facet of human life,
including economic development.
Initial focus lay with the international basins of the Middle East: the Jordan, Nile and
Tigris and Euphrates. It soon became apparent that considerable work had already been
done on these basins, but by comparison very little had been done on the Indus Basin
and its historic treaty. Interest amongst researchers and practitioners in hydropolitics
was growing in the Indus Waters Treaty as an example of cooperation that may be
replicated in other international water disputes.
The Indus Waters Treaty's characteristics appeared to be rather unusual given the
expectancy of war and international conflict between co-riparians. Not only had two co-
riparians signed and implemented a treaty under the mediation of the World Bank, but
these co-riparians were enemies. It would be fair to state that India and Pakistan each
regarded the other as their principal enemy. If India and Pakistan could reach agreement
over water allocations despite their mutual enmity could other co-riparians, with similar
mutual hostility, also reach agreements over allocative arrangements?
The initial inquiry into the Indus Waters Treaty encompassed a broad look at the
negotiation and implementation stages, with questions related to the present-day
situation. However, the emphasis was narrowed considerably with the availability of
material. Not only does the thesis focus upon the negotiation process, but it also views
that process from the third party's perspective. The material gained from access, by this
author, to the World Bank's archives shed light on the negotiations, and in particular the
role of the Bank as a mediator.
Access was, finally, given to the World Bank's archives, and the Indus Basin Files held
therein, after over a year of communications. The Assistant Archivist of the Bank
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described this access as unprecedented since the archives are not open to the public.
Naturally, gaining access also carried certain conditions. Though the material could be
quoted in the text, it could not be shown en masse to other parties, and specific reference
to individual members of the Bank's delegation could not be made.
The World Bank's Indus Basin Files contain all the papers the Bank had received,
generated and used during the length of its involvement with the Indus Basin dispute.
Thus these files contained correspondence from India and Pakistan to the Bank, and
gave new insights into the Indus Waters Treaty. As the World Bank material was
analysed it became apparent that visiting the Indian Subcontinent was superfluous to the
needs of the thesis. This was mainly because the approach adopted in the thesis was
from the perspective of the third party.
Simultaneous applications for access to all the archives, that were considered to be
important, had been made early on in the research process. Thus, applications were also
made for access to archives in India and Pakistan. India had given a blanket refusal
citing water's status as a national security issue. Pakistan, however, was more
accommodating and offered access to its archives. As the data analysis progressed and
the wealth of information available became apparent, the need to visit India and Pakistan
receded. When this was coupled with difficulties and delays in getting the appropriate
visas, the intention to visit the countries and their archives was relegated further.
The principal questions that fuelled the research asked why and how international
cooperation was possible in the Indus Basin. And what lessons, if any, could be learned
from the Treaty for use in other international conflicts over fresh water. International
relations theory was first searched for an explanation as to why India and Pakistan,
despite being enemies, would choose to cooperate over this question of fresh water.
Unfortunately, realism, neo-realism, game theory, geopolitics and international law all
failed to give a satisfactory answer that took measure of all the specific characteristics of
Indo-Pakistani cooperation. Using a concept coined in this thesis, "water rationality", an
alternative explanation is given.
The manner by which cooperation was courted was simpler to pinpoint and describe.
Mediation proved successful in settling the dispute after bilateral negotiations had
reached an impasse. The literature on mediation, its theory and practice, is extensive.
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Nonetheless, it was felt that further insights would be gained from training as mediator
and, therefore, this was undertaken with UNITE, under the auspices of Sunderland
Mediation.
Role playing the mediator and the disputants, during the training sessions, led to a better
understanding of the inherent difficulties and emotions involved in a dispute and a
mediated solution. The scale of focus in the training and the thesis were different. The
former sought to mediate between neighbours on a housing estate, and the latter looks at
international mediation. Nonetheless, the framework UNITE proposed - engaging,
issues, options, agreement - appears to be universally applicable.
The perspective during the training was, naturally, that of the mediator rather than the
disputants. Seen from the mediator's vantage, the mediated process follows a four-step
cyclical pattern. Firstly, the third party engages in resolving the dispute if the disputants
are willing to allow such intervention. Secondly, the issues in dispute are put on the
table. Thirdly, all possible options are explored. And fourthly, agreement is reached
wherever possible. This pattern is repeated at different times, and at different scales
throughout the mediated process. The basic mediation framework was used to describe
the cooperative process in the Indus Basin because it was regarded as following the
same cyclic pattern of engagement, issues, options and agreement.
Interest in the results of this thesis has already been expressed amongst academics and
practitioners. Over the duration of this study, the Indus Waters Treaty has gained
considerable attention for its durability as an international water agreement and its
potential lessons for other international basins. Applicability of the points will depend,
obviously, upon the specific characteristics of the case to which it is being applied. The
points that have been important in the mediation of the Indus Waters Treaty appear to
fall into two groups: conceptual and procedural. This distinction, though, is not without
overlap. The principal lesson that appears to be forthcoming is that cooperation over
water appears to be the norm. War, though it may arise out of other political needs, is
not the most likely outcome as it does not enhance a nation's water security.
Original Contributions
Literature on the Indus Waters Treaty is limited. Most of the material that does exist
treats the Treaty superficially and relies heavily upon two detailed sources, namely:
Gulhati [1973] and Michel [1967]. One of this thesis's contributions is the use of
primary material from the World Bank's archives to detail the negotiation period.'
The World Bank is given considerable credit for achieving the Treaty in most of the
literature. As an institution of technical expertise, and neutrality, the Bank is thought to
have had some leverage. However, it is to the Bank's financial capability to raise funds
that most credit is given [Ali, 1967; Bingham et al, 1994; Biswas, 1992; Garretson et al,
1967; Graves, 1963; Kally, 1993; Kirmani, 1990; Kirmani and Rangeley, 1994; Kliot et
al, 1997; Lepawsky, 1963; Mehta, 1988; Morris, 1963; Nakayama, 1997; Nijim, 1969;
Postel, 1992; and Rausching, 1983]. Afroz points out that the USA provided most of the
funds to the IBDF, and therefore attributes the success of the Treaty to this American
support [1983]. The literature appears to argue that the availability of finances is the
primary 'lesson' to be learnt from the Indus Waters Treaty.
Though the financial argument is an important one, this thesis argues that there are other
'lessons' to also be learnt. The significance of financial availability was understood by
the World Bank from the outset of the negotiations. The Bank had made it clear to India
and Pakistan that it would be willing to consider financing any possible outcomes from
the negotiations. In addition, Pakistan was to prove a reluctant negotiator principally
because it was concerned about the loss of the eastern rivers to India without having the
infrastructure to replace that water. To build this infrastructure Pakistan would need
large sums of foreign aid. It is this latter point that the Indus Basin Development Fund
was able to address. However, the need for finances to implement the Treaty could only
be realised if there was a treaty to implement. Agreement to the Treaty was, this thesis
contends, dependent upon the political will of the disputing Governments.
Rausching believes the Indus Waters Treaty contributed to the development of
international law on watercourses by influencing the International Law Association's
1967 Helsinki Rules [1983]. The Treaty is regarded as encapsulating the principle of
' Gulhati, Head of the 1954 Indian delegation, did use some of the World Bank's Indus
Basin Files in his book.
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equitable allocation [ibid; Garretson et al, 1967] rather than the principle of appreciable
harm. Shivananda [1961] and Alvi [1962] rightly argue that the strict confines of
international water law cannot alone resolve an international water dispute, as economic
and political issues often dominate the dispute.
Kirmani and Rangeley believe that the longer the negotiations dragged on the harder it
was, politically, for either disputant to walk away [1994]. Lowi believes that the political
structure of each country added to its strength at the negotiating table [1993]. In
addition, by virtue of geography India could afford to take its time whereas Pakistan was
under pressure to complete an agreement [ibid; Graves, 1973]. This thesis suggests that
a combination of geography, financial concerns deriving from the potential loss of the
eastern rivers, and political instability made Pakistan extremely cautious in its
negotiations.
The primary criticism of the Indus Waters Treaty is that it is a sub-optimal agreement
[Kliot et al, 1997; Lowi, 1993; Mehta, 1988; Postel, 1992]. The division of the Indus
basin which is also credited with being one reason for its success [Lowi, 1993; Kirmani,
1990; Nakayama, 1997], contravenes the concept of developing the water as part of an
integrated basin management approach. In addition, the duplication of irrigation works
has focused the use of resources (hydrological and financial) away from the task of
optimising the situation faced throughout the basin - delivery and application of water.
Though the Treaty is recognised as sub-optimal it is also recognised that this particular
treaty was the most feasible politically given Indo-Pakistani relations [Bingham, 1994;
Mehta, 1988; Michel, 1967; Nakayama, 1997]. This thesis agrees that the Indus Waters
Treaty is a political optimum though a hydrological sub-optimal solution to the Indus
Basin dispute.
An additional criticism made mainly by Mehta [1988] and echoed by Kliot et al [1997]
is that the Indian and Pakistani negotiators carried insufficient weight within their own
political structures. The result was, Mehta claims, a less flexible negotiation process
than would have occurred had politicians or more senior bureaucrats been involved. Yet,
politicians from both sides were periodically involved in the talks, most notably the
Indian Prime Minister, Nehru. As Gulhati also points out the involvement of politicians
also entails a risk of the negotiations being rendered a footnote in a larger political tussle
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[1973], as was demonstrated by weakness of Pakistan's Central Government prior to the
1958 coup.
The contribution of this thesis to the field of hydropolitics is in the main principle it is
promoting - water rationality. This concept has been used to offer an explanation for
water-related cooperation between countries, even those involved in hostilities over
other issues. This type of cooperation, though prevalent, has been ignored by the
sensational water war concept because it expects conflict over this precious resource.
Linked to water rationality are two other concepts that are also coined in this thesis -
water irrationality, and the neo-security dilemma. These concepts offer an explanation
for the short-sighted policies that so often characterise national water management.
These three inter-linking concepts arise from studying an international water treaty
between India and Pakistan.
The Indus Waters Treaty, as an example of a successful water treaty, is being examined
by other researchers [e.g. Biswas, 1992; Kliot et al, 1997; Wolf, 1997b] to see what
lessons it has for other international water disputes, either existing or expected. Thus,
this thesis examines the negotiation period of the Indus Waters Treaty and draws
together some 'lessons' that may have selective application in other water disputes. One
of the main points that has emerged is the issue of a political optimum in resolving
international water disputes, to which the 'optimal' plans of integrated basin
management may have to defer.
In looking at the negotiation period, and the actions of the three participants, material
from the World Bank's archives was used that had hitherto been unavailable. The Indus
Basin Files contains material from the actual negotiations undertaken with the Bank's
good offices. As such the Files contain correspondence between the disputants and the
Bank, internal Bank memos and other material that was used by the institution to
understand the Indus Basin situation better. Material from the Indus Basin Files was
used to understand the procedures the third party undertook in pursuit of the Treaty.
To supplement the literature on mediation theory, it was decided to train to be a
mediator under the auspices of Sunderland Mediation. This training provided a better
understanding of the mediation process, and all the participants' perspectives, in
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particular, the mediator's. The framework used by the trainers (UNITE) was used to
describe the mediation process in the Indus Basin. The combination of unused archival
material and this mediation framework has not, previously, been applied to the Indus
Basin. This combination, therefore, is an unique contribution to the understanding of
international water treaty negotiations.
Thesis Structure
The structure of the thesis does not reflect the exact evolutionary route taken during
research. If that route was taken, it would entail a more complicated telling of the story
and arguments developed. Therefore, for the sake of clarity and simplification the
theoretical aspects have been dealt with first. This is followed by the case study, and
then the points that have been drawn from this particular case study.
Therefore, chapter 1 introduces the general topic of hydropolitics. Fresh water and its
management have become more politicised as awareness of the resource has increased.
With this awareness has come the realisation that it can no longer be taken for granted,
and inadequate supplies of fresh water can impede development. Another consequence
of this growing awareness has been the linking together of war and fresh water. The
Indus Waters Treaty is studied to see the process and techniques involved in stopping
enemies from fighting over water, and getting them to settle their dispute peacefully.
The expectation of war and conflict is considered, as is the issue of international
cooperation. In addressing the latter issue international relations theory, game theory,
geopolitics and international water law were examined to explain cooperation in the
international arena. The unsatisfactory explanations that emerge do not illuminate the
distinct characteristics of cooperation in the Indus Basin. It is left to the concept of water
rationality to suggest an alternative explanation. Mediation explains, in turn, the manner
in which cooperation took place regarding the Indus Basin dispute. Finally, this chapter
outlines the methodology used in conducting research for the thesis.
Chapter 2 describes the Indus Basin's physical and political environment as a
background to understanding the conflict that arose between different users. An arid
environment coupled with an uneven distribution of water has led to a reliance upon
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irrigated agriculture for over 5,000 years. However, the extensive expansion and
modernisation of the irrigation system in the Indus Basin that occurred under British
rule, did not happen as part of an integrated scheme. Separate provinces developed their
works unilaterally, and only came to notice each other's schemes when they began to
compete for water.
Thus before partition, the British-ruled provinces of Punjab and Sind had a dispute
regarding water allocations. After partition in 1947, the position of the international
boundary led to further difficulties regarding water allocations. This time the dispute
was internationalised and involved the sovereign countries of India and Pakistan.
Bilateral attempts to resolve the dispute failed, leaving each side more entrenched in its
adopted position. This set the scene for the World Bank to intervene and offer its good
offices.
In preparation for the World Bank's intervention in the Indus Basin dispute, Chapter 3
addresses the general 'theory' of mediation. Mediation can be defined in many different
ways, some of which are examined in this chapter. A working definition of mediation is
then selected for the purposes of pis thesis. Since the research has been conducted from
the perspective of the mediator, the role of the mediator is also considered.
Then most importantly, the mediation process is examined. A particular framework is
used to breakdown the process, as determined by the training programme that was
undertaken to become a mediator. The mediator's activities and concerns are seen at the
different stages of engaging in the resolution process, determining the issues involved,
exploring the options available and finally reaching agreement - if it remains a
possibility. The mediation process is not without its 'pitfalls', so these are also
considered, most notably the difficulties of a power imbalance between the disputants.
Chapters 4 and 5 look, in detail, at the process by which the Indus Waters Treaty was
negotiated under the auspices of the World Bank. Using the framework outlined in
chapter 3, the process is segmented into four sections. In looking at the engagement
stage, the actors are briefly introduced before going on to see in more detail the start of
the World Bank's involvement. The issues involved in the dispute are examined before
looking at the options that were explored by the parties.
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Efforts by the World Bank to comply with its original intention and help India and
Pakistan develop a comprehensive plan continued throughout the negotiations. Initially,
it had left the matter entirely in the hands of the disputing parties. When it became
apparent that such an approach would not work, the Bank started to make its own
proposals. Nonetheless, the decision to accept or change these proposals remained with
India and Pakistan. An alternative short term course of action that postponed the conflict
was discovered with the use of ad hoc transitional agreements. But a long term solution
was still needed.
Mediation is a cyclical process, with agreement required at different stages and on
different levels. Therefore, though agreement is addressed last in this framework, it is in
fact a thread running through the whole process. Nevertheless, agreement, especially in
a resolution process lasting over twelve years in two phases, is fraught with difficulties.
Most of the obstacles that arise are of a political nature, rather than resulting from more
technical matters. This is apparent even as the final period is entered, and a permanent,
binding agreement is within sight with the drafting of the Indus Waters Treaty.
Chapter 6 suggests an alternative explanation for the international cooperation between
enemy states over shared water resources. Termed 'water rationality', this explanation
draws on the idea of water security, and how states wish to achieve this safeguard. The
opposite side of the coin is also explored in 'water irrationality'. Coupled to water
irrationality is the idea of a `neo-security dilemma' which is also coined in this thesis,
and draws on the security dilemma associated most famously with the superpower arms
race during the Cold War. Examples of water rationality and water irrationality are also
provided.
Chapter 7 returns the focus to the particulars of the Indus Basin case. It starts with an
examination of the events in the Indus Basin dispute with respect to the water rationality
explanation. The chapter continues by looking at the lessons that can be drawn from the
mediation process. These lessons, or points, are divided into two sections even though
there is some overlap between them. The first section deals with points that are
conceptual and can influence the approach of the parties before they sit at the
negotiating table. The second section deals with the points that are more procedural in
their nature, and can influence the parties during the mediation process.
xix
Chapter 8 draws together the conclusions that are made in this thesis, and suggests
further work.
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INTRODUCTION
Sensational headlines are being written about the scarcity of fresh water in the Middle
East, and how matters may result in war. Such dramatic news has attracted attention to
the field of hydropolitics, and the means of alleviating competition for fresh water in
that region. Fanciful dreams, doom-laden prophecies and practical water management
suggestions all intermingle in the bazaar that is hydropolitics. Methods are also being
sought that, if they do not prevent conflict, can help manage or resolve any forthcoming
international water disputes. One method has been to study the successful resolution of
past disputes.
Of the examples that exist of international agreements over shared water resources, the
Indus Waters Treaty stands out as an interesting case. Negotiated by India and Pakistan
during the 1950s with the good offices of the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty has
been maintained by the signatories since 1960. Yet relations between India and Pakistan
have see-sawed considerably in the time since the signing in 1960. Though relations
have never been warm, on occasions they have thawed a little. But for the most part,
there is considerable animosity with the conflict over Kashmir acting as a constant
thorn. War was waged twice, in 1965 and 1971, and in 1998 the rivalry formally entered
the nuclear era.
The tenacity of the Indus Waters Treaty is therefore intriguing in light of such hostile
Indo-Pakistani relations. Adherence to the Treaty by its signatories has continued even
as they have positioned their troops at their shared border, bombed each other's
territory, and now meticulously striven, and succeeded, in developing and detonating a
nuclear device for 'defence' against aggression by the other. It has been reasoned in this
research, and by other interested scholars, that if enemies in South Asia could reach
such an enduring international water agreement, perhaps lessons could be learnt from
the negotiation process for application elsewhere, notably in the Middle East. Thus the
means by which the Treaty was arrived at is examined in this thesis, and in particular the
role of the third party, the World Bank, in assisting the disputants' search for a solution.
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1.1 HYDROPOLITICS: THE POLITICS OF WATER
'Water is the true wealth in a dry land; without it, land is worthless
or nearly so. And if you control water, you control the land that
depends upon it' [Stegner in Gleick, 1993a: 9].
Hydropolitics as a field of research is relatively new, with interest in it mushrooming
through the late eighties and continuing into the nineties. As such there is no exact
definition that can be applied to the field, other than that it deals with the interaction of
politics with the use and management of fresh water, at a national and international level
throughout the world. 1 One geographic area, however, that has probably had most
influence in shaping the field, as it presently stands, is the Middle East.
The aridity of the climate in the Middle East is matched by a finite supply of fresh water
in the region, and increasing demand for the resource. Overlying the physical constraints
imposed by the environment, are the political constraints imposed by long-standing
hostility between the different countries and actors comprising the Middle East. Thus,
with fresh water regarded as a scarce, and strategic, resource headlines have been
predicting, since the mid-1980s, that the next war in the Middle East will be over water.
This has led, unsurprisingly, to considerable interest and attention to the water problems
faced by the region, and an expectation of conflict.
The water scarcity that is witnessed so dramatically in the Middle East, is only part of
the problem users throughout the world face with their supply of fresh water. Another
part is the quality of the water being supplied. Therefore, the water issue, or problem
with fresh water can be stated as being the difficulty in getting, and sustaining, an
adequate quantity of water of an adequate quality. An enduring solution to the water
issue rests with the way in which water is managed nationally. This, in turn, can
influence how riparian countries interact with one another.
1 Hydropolitics is largely concerned with the availability of fresh water for human use
and consumption, and is therefore limited, generally to inland international
watercourses. There is an abundance of saline water in the form of the oceans and
seas that surround the continents, but it only features in hydropolitics in two broad
cases. Firstly, regarding the production of fresh water from saline water via
desalination, and secondly, regarding the pollution of fresh water coastal aquifers by
saline water intrusion. Fresh water, here, does not refer to a particular quality of
water, but merely to distinguish water available on land from that of the surrounding
oceans.
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1.1.1 Demand for Water
"Although the Indus rivers support the world's largest irrigation
system, the unused waters of the rivers, which now go to waste into
the Arabian Sea, have an equally large useful potential. These could
reclaim from the desert an area equal to that already developed.
Another 26 million acres could be turned into smiling fields of
wheat and rice and cotton - food for hungry and work for the
unemployed" [Shivananda, 1961: 4-5, emphasis added].
As Gleick points out, Ifiresh water is a fundamental resource, integral to all
environmental and societal processes" [1993a: 3]. Dinar and Wolf point out fresh
water's importance to, also, the survival of an individual human being [1994c: 69].
Industry, agriculture and domestic uses all rely heavily upon the resource. This is a need
that, as a principle, is uniform across the world. This reliance which had hitherto been
ignored is now coming to the fore, especially in the arid regions of the world. As
Caelleigh points out, for the Middle East "the industrial development and social
modernization these societies seek, which in some cases is made possible only by oil
exploitation, put the greatest strain on water supplies and pose the gravest threat to
future water sufficiency" [1983: 122].
The demand for fresh water is driven by the consumptive needs of the populations of
these regions. Demand in industry, agriculture and domestic uses is increasing due to
urbanisation, industrialisation, increasing populations, consumerism and irrigated
agriculture [Gleick, 1993a; Postel, 1992; Falkenmark and Lindh, 1993; Biswas, 1997;
Richards and Waterbury, 1996] and in turn affecting water quality [Nash, 1993]. Morris
points out, that though irrigation accounts for most water use, it is urban demand that is
expanding most rapidly in the Middle East [1998: 4].
An increasing demand for fresh water is, in itself, not an issue if there is adequate supply
to meet the requirements. But in the arid realm demand is reaching the limits of supply
[Agnew and Anderson, 1992]. "Water is a scarce resource, primarily because it is
usually in the wrong place or available at the wrong time relative to demand" [Easteret
al, 1997: 579].
This development is due in part to the actual quantity of fresh water required, as well as
the pollution of existing accessible fresh water sources. Fresh water is beginning to
show itself as a significant constraint to further development. Furthermore, and as
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Newson points out, most of the less developed countries of the world are situated in
areas of arid or semi-arid climate [1992: 139].
In terms of quantity, agriculture in the Middle East is the largest consumer of fresh
water. Estimates place consumption between 70% and 90% of available supplies [Allan,
1994; Wolf, 1995a; World Bank, 1994; Biswas, 1997; Serageldin, 1997]. Such high
figures are due principally to the use of irrigation to grow crops in an environment of
high temperatures and evaporation rates. The quantity is also determined by the
techniques used to apply water to the land. Inefficient techniques, such as flood
irrigation, require large amounts of water. In comparison more efficient techniques, such
as micro-irrigation, consume less water per area of land irrigated.
Overlying the physical dimensions of problems with distribution and overall supply, is
the attitude of the users. Surprisingly, even in areas of scarcity where war is being
predicted, fresh water is still being squandered. This is due in part to the attitude of the
political structure with regard to its water supply. In the push for economic development
many techniques and strategies were adopted from more developed countries. But these
policies were developed in temperate zones, and did not account for the different
environmental constraints faced by arid or semi-arid countries [Falkenmark, 1989: 112].
This, in turn, has led to additional burdens being put upon existing fresh water supplies
[Newson, 1992: 187].
The place of agriculture in the political framework has also led to the supply of fresh
water to this sector at subsidised rates, if not free [Shapland, 1997]. Wolf places the role
of agriculture in politics within a larger concept of water ethos, which determines "how
a nation 'feels' about its water resources" [1997b: 353]. This has led to fresh water
being treated as if it is an inexhaustible resource, and squandered through misuse. This
attitude exists at different levels and is found at the individual farmer level, the
provincial level and also the national-international level.
In Israel, agriculture's political significance comes from its close links to the Zionist
movement and, subsequently, the Israeli identity. In Saudi Arabia, agriculture was
expanded as part of a conscious effort to become self-sufficient in food. Similarly, in
Egypt, irrigated agriculture has a firm historical basis as shown by evidence of irrigated
agriculture being practised along the Nile in 3,400 BC [Gleick, 1993a: 6]. Yet as
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Frederiksen et al generously point out, "[a]ll government sponsored water resource
related developments have the intention of creating benefits for society" [1993: 109].
Shapland illustrates the allure of the agricultural sector in the Middle East with the
example of Jordan:
"Jordan has wished to expand its irrigated agriculture for a number of
reasons. Obtaining foreign exchange by exporting agricultural produce,
saving foreign exchange by growing food for domestic consumption,
maintaining a degree of food security, avoiding dependence on aid from
abroad, preventing rural depopulation and providing employment at lower
capital cost than in industry" [1997: 53].
"Water projects, like all other large development projects, contribute both positive and
negative benefits" [Biswas, 1986]. One of the more dramatic examples of large-scale
irrigation's negative impact upon the environment is the Aral Sea [Kobori, 1997: 8; The
Economist, 1994: 88-91]. During the communist era in the Soviet Union, almost the
entire flow of two rivers, the Amu Dar'ya and the Syr Dar'ya, that fed the Aral Sea were
diverted for irrigation.
The inflow into the Aral Sea has dropped dramatically from 55.5 bcm (45 MAF) in 1960
to just 5 bcm (4 MAF) in 1989 [Kirmani and Rangeley, 1994: 10]. Since 1926 the Aral
Sea has shrunk by approximately 40% in surface area, and 65% in volume [Gleick,
1993a: 5]. This has led to the "desiccation of the Aral Sea, the destruction of the
fisheries there, local health problems, and the economic collapse of the region"; the
salinity of the water has tripled, and all 24 species of fish native to the Sea have died
[ibicl]. International efforts are being made to resuscitate the Aral Sea [Bedford, 1996;
The Economist, 1994].
Hydropolitics tends to focus on the question of providing sufficient quantities of water,
with scant regard paid to the water's quality. This Nash believes is misguided as the
"crux of the problem lies with water quality rather than water quantity" for most
countries, with the exception of a few highly arid regions such as the Sahel and the
Arabian Peninsula [1993: 251.2 Richards and Waterbury, also, believe that water
quantity will be exacerbated by the issue of inadequate water quality [1996: 161].
2 See Nash, 1993, for details of the different types of pollutants decreasing the quality
of available water, and the consequences upon human health, and the environment;
McDonald and Kay, 1988, for general aspects on water quality. Chapman, 1997,
discusses the need and difficulty of water quality monitoring.
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The 'quality' of water in itself is meaningless, but as with other aspects of water, it is the
anthropogenic uses that define the characteristic. "The highest quality water is required
for drinking" [Nash, 1993: 25]. Fresh water of 'good quality' is defined as having a low
saline and pollutant content. Water with a high saline content is of limited, if any,utility
for agriculture, industry and domestic uses. Thus, without desalination, the vast oceans
and seas can do little to ease the difficulties of water supply.
Therefore, having large amounts of water of the 'wrong' quality for a particular use,
does not ease the problem of supply. Tajikistan, for example, has sufficient water, but it
"is filthy" [The Economist, 1998b: 77]. Furthermore, as a consequence of management
decisions, fresh water bodies above and below the surface are also being polluted,
thereby, reducing further the quantity of available sweet water [Biswas, 1997: 12-13].
Surface water is often used as a drain to remove effluents from industry, agriculture, and
domestic uses [Gleick, 1993a: 5].
Najlis puts the figure as high as 90% of waste-water, in some developing countries, is
discharged without treatment [1997: 18]. This is problematic because, as Chapman
points out, in many regions "water resources serving as a waste-disposal facility for one
activity are the source of water for another activity" and thus the need for effective
monitoring of quality [1997: 209].
Aside from these forms of pollution, ground water aquifers are also subject to damage
caused by overpumping i.e. extracting the water at a rate higher than that of recharge.
Examples of overpumping can be found world-wide in China, India, Mexico, Thailand,
the western USA, the Middle East and North Africa [Postel, 1992: 31]. Coastal aquifers
in such situations are especially vulnerable as high extraction rates can lead to saline
intrusion, and further deterioration of the water's quality.
The scarcity of fresh water is not contested in this thesis. It is suggested here, however,
that it is rare to find absolute scarcity on a national and international level. What appears
more usual is the perception of scarcity based upon a disparity between demand and
supply. This perception can be alleviated through a number of practical water
management measures that can augment existing supplies, such as recycling waste
water.
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Efforts to meet this demand by increasing the amount of water supplied are thwarted by
the lack of new sources to tap. Falkenmark has coined the term 'water stress' to
distinguish between those countries that have the capacity to meet the water
requirements of its users, and those that cannot [1989]. 3
 Countries of high water stress
are generally in the arid realm and already fully utilising their existing fresh water
supplies to meet demand. In lieu of the demand for fresh water, what options exist to
manage and maintain the supply? There appear to be two broad approaches to supply
augmentation: war, and national management.
1.1.2 Options to Manage Supply and Demand
Water is in abundance on this planet as the blue of a satellite image of the world would
testify. But most of this water is saline, with fresh water comprising just 2.5% of the
total supply [Shiklomanov, 1993: 13]. But as Gleick points out, even if only the fresh
water resources of the world were spread out evenly over the surface of the earth, they
would still form "a layer 70 m thick" [1993a: 3]. Matters, however, are complicated by
the difficulty in accessing fresh water since accessible supplies of the resource comprise
an even smaller quantity.
Fresh water is mainly stored in the solid state, as ice. Fresh water in the liquid state is
estimated to be less than a third of the world's fresh water and is stored mainly as
ground water.4 As is becoming apparent, the equation leaves very little liquid fresh
water to flow as surface water. Therefore, the amount of fresh water that exists as
surface water is estimated to be less than one percent of all liquid fresh water. In other
words, of all the water on Earth, only 0.008% is estimated to be fresh surface water.5
Not only is the actual amount of fresh surface water small compared to the actual
volume of global water, access to this water is not uniform, as the supply is distributed
over hundreds of river basins, of which 268 are international basins [Hamner and Wolf,
1998]. And as Vlachos points out, approximately 40% of the global population depends
3 Falkenmark estimated that a country was water stressed if it had less than 1,000 m3
of available fresh water per capita per year [1989: 115].
4 See Das Gupta, 1997, for a discussion on ground water.
5 For figures estimating water quantities see, for example, Oudshoorn, 1997;
McDonald and Kay, 1988; and Shiklomanov, 1993. Gleick, 1993b, gives a
comprehensive list of data regarding the world's fresh water resources.
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upon these international rivers [1990]. If competition for these waters was to increase it
could, potentially, involve a large percentage of the total global population. Though the
quantity of fresh surface water may appear infinitesimally small as a percentage of the
total amount of water on Earth, it is enough for most human uses. However, difficulties
do exist and are generally due to problematic distribution of fresh water. Falkenmark
and Lindh have estimated that approximately 40% of the global population experience
serious water shortages annually as a result [1993: 80].
Distribution can vary over space, leaving areas of the world without an infrastructure of
surface flow. Even where rivers exist, the distribution of fresh water can change over
time, either seasonally or yearly. One example of the temporal difficulties with
distribution is the Indus Basin. Though the Indus system of rivers sends more water
overall, each year, to the Arabian Sea than the Nile sends to the Mediterranean, water
availability in the Basin is dependent upon the summer monsoons. Over 50% of rain
falls in just two months during the summer. Coupled with snow melt from the
Himalayas, the amount of water flowing through the Indus Basin during the summer is
substantial. However, during winter, water availability falls off dramatically. Even the
mighty River Indus shrinks from being a vast ocean-like river to a large and long series
of interconnected puddles.
The focus of hydropolitics upon water scarcity reflects an attitude dominated historically
by supply management, whereby the supply was increased to match demand. The water
wars concept continues this approach, with the belief that supply can be increased by
going to war with competitors. However, as Allan points out, the era of supply
management is coming to an end [1994].
With accessible water supplies already allocated, if not to the point of exhaustion,
increasing supplies in the traditional fashion of supply management is a limited option at
best. Postel adds that global population increases have outstripped the increase in new
irrigable land available, per capita, to grow agricultural products [1993: 57].
Unfortunately, this "trend of declining irrigated land per person is historically new, and
political leaders and development specialists have not yet fully grasped its
consequences" [Postel, 1992: 511.
This ushers in a new era, of demand management, whereby the demand for fresh water
is reduced to meet the supply. One of the most effective tools available to water
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managers, and users, is efficiency. The efficiency with which water is supplied, and
used, can stretch existing supplies to meet new demands. Meeting the challenge of this
new era will be a testimony to the inventiveness of human beings, and a reminder of the
global nature of interdependence.
1.1.2.1 Water Wars
"'Water Wars' are, unfortunately, likely to be of more and more
common occurrence in the future." [Young eta!, 1994: 201.
As the quote demonstrates, the water war concept expects conflict to occur over water,
and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water
supplies. The concept is shaped by the location and subject in focus. A common
perception of the Middle East is of a region that is fragile and temperamental, with little
needed to trigger conflict. After all, conflicts have raged since the British and other
European countries gave up the reins of control, abandoning the region to deal itself
with the tangled affairs that remained.
Present day Middle Eastern politics still suffers the consequences of colonial action
regarding land allocation, and the division of watersheds in the pursuit of imperial
interests, for which little official apology has been forthcoming. Since decolonisation
tensions, if not war, have surrounded resources that have been scarce both on a physical
plane and a perceptual level. This includes the physical attributes of land and oil, but
more importantly and most consistently, at the perceptual level a sense of security. As
Caelleigh points out, the existing tensions, and countries, in the Middle East are also
"under the scrutiny of Western nations anxious about oil supply and fearful of global
confrontation spreading from local disputes" [1983: 121].
As focus has come to rest upon the region's fresh water supply, the issue of scarcity has
appeared yet again. With it, the full extent of water's unique characteristics have hit
observers as catastrophic [Haddad and Mizyed, 1996; Starr and Stoll, 1988; Bulloch and
Darwish, 1993; Anderson, 1994; Gleick, 1993c; Naff, 1994]. Water is a primary
resource, more important than food and certainly of greater importance than oil, in
matters of basic survival. After all, "[w]ater, not oil, is the Middle East's most precious
resource" [Caelleigh, 1983: 122].
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Therefore, the water war concept reasons that if this resource is not only in short supply
but used competitively by enemy countries, then each riparian will attempt to secure
more water for itself. This increased competition, based upon increasing national water
needs, will exacerbate the existing animosity and competition, and lead most likely to
war [Gleick, 1993a: 9].
In other words, it is because water is scarce, vital, expensive, a security issue, and
demand is outstripping supply that states are expected to go to war with their
competitors to secure supplies. Or at least this is the train of logic inherent in the water
war concept. (It is worth noting that the concept appears to focus upon the quantity not
the quality of water involved.) Disputes over water use do exist at an international level
but they are more common at the national or local level [Homer-Dixon, 1994: 20].
Therefore, within a country, one province may contest the allocation of water to another
province; different sectors may compete for more water; and local farmers may
challenge each other for fulfilment of their water rights.
The Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1967, is often cited as an
example of a modern day water war. [Gleick, 1993a: 9; Beaumont, 1994: 18; Naff,
1994]. Another example cited is the invasion by Israel of Lebanon in 1982, and the
subsequent annexation of southern Lebanon [Beaumont, 1994: 17]. But opinion is
divided on both cases as to the cause of hostilities, and whether water was a key
imperative.
Wolf dismisses the hydrologic imperative behind both these cases. Regarding the 1967
war, he points out that there was a year-long gap between Israel bombing Syria's
planned works and stopping any further construction, and the actual start of the war
[1997a]. However plausible the geographic argument linking the proximity of the Litani
River in Lebanon to the Israeli border, and the site of the occupation since 1982, Wolf
contends that water was not a primary motive [1995a]. He argues that a number of
desalination plants could have been built for the cost of the invasion and occupation.6
6 Wolf, in discussions with the author, based his argument on interviews with the
Israeli generals involved in the invasion. The generals dismissed the water imperative
argument stating that for the military cost involved, not only could desalination
plants be built, they could be operated safely within Israeli territory.
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If and when water does have a role in war, it is usually as a weapon [Anderson, 1994;
Gleick, 1993c]. As Bar-Siman-Tov explains, "[c]onflict management in protracted
conflicts is necessary to prevent undesired escalation, but it is not sufficient to prevent
deliberate escalation" [1994: 76]. Thus, in 1993, during the war in the former-
Yugoslavia, the Peruca Dam in Croatia was destroyed by retreating Serb Forces to
prevent water reaching towns and cities downstream [Klemencic, 1995]. During the
1991 Gulf War the coalition led by the USA is thought to have approached Turkey to
withhold water from Iraq. Turkey, as the upstream riparian on the Tigris and Euphrates,
refused to do this.
Hydropolitics has come to be regarded, in the literature, as synonymous with the
problem of water scarcity in the Middle East, and its interaction with international
politics. This has to some extent cast a shadow over international watercourses in other
regions, and their specific problems. In addition, the focus on water scarcity and its
related concept of water wars, has ignored the more mundane issue of water
management and potential international cooperation.
Prudent water management at the local and national level, can ensure sufficiency of
supply and quality to the different users that make demands upon a watercourse.
International cooperation can be regarded as a form of conflict management, which can
be lost if "the common belief in a protracted conflict is that military means are the only
means of resolving the conflict" [Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 76]. These alternative
perspectives could, possibly, forestall armed conflict over water.
1.1.2.2 Water Management
"Since the causes for these impending shortages are many and
strategies for tackling them are difficult to conceive and implement,
the next best thing (complementary to continuing efforts in that
direction) is to devise strategies for the rational use of the available
water resources of the planet. This task, unhappily, presents a host
of difficult problems, of a technical, economic, social, physical and
legal nature" [Caponera, 1981: 173].
Water management, in this thesis, is believed to be affected by four interlinking issues:
the attitude of the users, the water quality, supply management, and demand
management. Water management at its simplest is expected to ensure that sufficient
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supplies of fresh water of a particular quality are available at the time and place needed
by the different users. However, in providing such a service, water managers have to
overcome a host of constraints of an economic, technical and political nature.
An additional problem is of an administrative nature, in that "no single international
agency is responsible for water resources. Even at the national level, rarely is one
agency or ministry responsible for water; rather water issues are often distributed widely
among resource and mining agencies, agricultural agencies, or environmental protection
ministries" [Gleick, 1993a: 11]. Linked to this profligacy of agencies is the short-
sightedness of those government agencies in charge of irrigation. These agencies are
usually "intent on maintaining their large budgets" and "consider their ultimate mission
to be irrigation expansion, rather than to increase food output and raise rural incomes"
[Postel, 1993: 57].
There are a range of options being touted to increase supply, generally involving extra-
basin transfers [Shapland, 1997; World Bank, 1994; Wolf, 1992; Frederick, 1992]. For
example, pipelines going from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, the Mediterranean to the
Dead Sea, or the Peace Pipeline taking water from Turkey to Israel and Jordan. Medusa
bags are already being used to float freshwater from Turkey to northern Cyprus. But this
latter approach appears to have more to do with politics than sound economics, or
prudent water management, as Turkey is determined to protect its connection with
Northern Cyprus. Amongst the more imaginative ideas is that of towing icebergs to
supply water. Traditional water harvesting methods, used in the arid realm, are also
being considered [Agnew and Anderson, 1992; Kobori, 1997].
The main method, so far, of augmenting supply has been to desalinate seawater, but the
costs are prohibitively high for most countries. 7 The cost of production depends upon
the specific technology used, but ranges from $1 to $8 per cubic metre [Gleick, 1993a:
8; World Bank, 1994: 29; Abdulrazzak, 19971. 8 The oil rich countries of the Arabian
peninsula have been the exception and have been able to invest heavily in this
technology. Over 60-65% of all desalinated water is produced in the oil-rich states of the
7 See The Economist, for a small scale system that provides enough cheap, solar-
powered desalinated water to supply a small village or farm [1995b: 138].
8 Beaumont gives an example of the amount of water needed to grow wheat in Egypt,
an arid country [1994: 11]. Irrigated wheat, in Egypt, produces 4 tonnes of seed per
hectare, using 12,000 m3 of water per hectare. He estimates that the cost of water
being applied would have to be less than $0.02 per m3.
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Middle East [Gleick, 1993a: 8; Anderson, 1988: 4]. 9 Dabbagh et al argue that the true
cost of alternatives to desalination, such as extra-basin transfers, have not been
calculated. If an accurate calculation was made, then desalination would not appear to be
such a comparatively expensive option [1994].
Szesztay accurately predicted the three stages water development would take [in
McDonald and Kay, 1988: 103-1041. Stages I and II would entail increasing the supply
to meet the demand, but in stage III the demand would bend to the supply. This stage
would need integrated management of the water system because it would also affect the
socio-economic development of a country. The means of curbing demand would include
conservation techniques and pricing mechanisms, all of which harbour a political cost.
Allan points out that water management in the Middle East is now entering this stage of
demand management, having passed through the era of supply management [1994]. "As
the era of easy water development comes to an end, so do the rapid crop production
gains from global irrigation expansion" [Poste], 1993: 58]. In this new era water
managers will have to increase the efficiency with which they use existing water
resources, by curbing the demand for supply. Such efficiency will in other words entail
reducing losses incurred by transportation and use within the water infrastructure
[Shapland, 1997: 167; World Bank, 1994: 32].
As David points out, "implementation of the wise management of water resources in a
river basin is a long term activity" [1986: 310]. Therefore, national water management
schemes will, if they are to sustainably develop their supply, have to focus on matters
such as improving existing irrigation systems as well, rather than just expanding them to
reach new land [op cit: 57]. However, as Waterbury warns, governments, irrigation
agencies and donors prefer to start new projects rather than invest in the maintenance
old ones [1979: 243]. Sewell and Biswas concur that too often, an "overemphasis on
construction alternatives has deflected attention from such options as demand
management" [1986: 296].
9 The countries are: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar,
Bahrain, Oman, Libya and Iraq. The USA and Japan produce approximately 15% of
the desalinated water [Gleick, 1993a: 8]. For a discussion of the different types of
desalinating processes, and other related matters see Dabbagh eta!, 1994.
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Egypt is one example of such policies. Rather than modernising, and improving, the
existing infrastructure the Government is investing in two multi-billion dollar schemes
to increase land commanded by canals [The Economist, 1997a: 69]. The Al-Salaam
canal will irrigate the Sinai peninsula with waste water, and is regarded as an extension
of the existing infrastructure. The New Delta project in the south, however, will send
water to the desert direct from Lake Nasser, via a 500 km canal. This policy is seen by
critics to be especially questionable for two reasons. Firstly, it will be using 10% of
Egypt's primary, if not only, replenishable water reservoir, and secondly, it will attempt
to irrigate an area with very high temperatures and evaporation rates [op cit: 70].
Clearly, it will take time for water managers to realise that old supply management
techniques are simply no longer viable. As Frederick points out "[w]hen a resource is
scarce, the issue is not whether to engage in demand management, but how to do it most
effectively" [1992: 33]. Demand management, therefore, raises the questions of how
efficiently is water being used presently? And in what ways can it be improved?
After all, as Gleick points out, "[i]n many irrigation networks, less than half the water
actually benefits crops, and the rest is lost through seepage from unlined canals,
evaporation and runoff from poorly applied water, and poor management that fails to
deliver water to crops at the right time and in suitable conditions" [1993a: 6]. Postel
estimates the global efficiency of water used in irrigation to be less than 40% [1992:
100].
An additional factor is highlighted by Beaumont who argues that the quality of fresh
water should match the use it is being put to [1994: 11]. Thus, high quality, potable
water is only needed for drinking and domestic hygiene, for the remaining uses lower
quality water can used. He cites the example of Kuwait which has a dual-quality water
system. Potable water is reserved for drinking and hygiene, and lower quality water is
used for toilet flushing [ibid]. Though the example of Kuwait is of domestic use, the
principle of matching quality with use is clearly valuable.
There are four main ways to improve the efficiency with which fresh water supplies are
used. First, water can be reallocated from the agricultural sector to industry. Second,
better irrigation techniques can be used to apply the water to the land. Third, varying the
quality of water used by different users, for example by using recycled water for
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agriculture, and reserving potable fresh water for drinking. 10 And fourth, ensuring that
the infrastructure by which fresh water is transferred from the source to the point of use
is as close to being leak-free as possible.
The World Bank highlights other ways in which irrigated agriculture can improve its
efficiency through conservation techniques which include "improved water scheduling
and operations; modernization of irrigation networks and onfarm systems, modifications
in cropping patterns (e.g., through the use of less water intensive or salt tolerant crops),
and adoption of complementary agricultural practices" [1994: 56].
Another method being promoted to encourage, and quantify, efficiency is water pricing
[World Bank, 1994; Easter et al, 1997; Allan, 1996b; Allan and Mallat, 1995; and Dinar
and Loehman, 1995; Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992]. Easter et al, believe "[w]ater
prices, markets, and permits can all improve water allocation and give users a stronger
incentive to conserve water" and deal with water quality problems [1997: 612]. By
giving water an economic value it becomes a commodity and with that come certain
advantages. However, Richards and Waterbury warn, that "[e]conomic reform without
reform of the water system will exacerbate water shortages" [1996: 164].
Nonetheless, some of the advantages are that, first, water is no longer regarded as a free
resource which users can afford to squander. Second, the cost of using water in the
production of food or industrial goods can be measured in economic terms. Third, the
cost of providing water to produce a given product can then be compared intra-
sectorally and across sectors, usually agriculture and industry. This could encourage the
reallocation of water away from low value-water thirsty products either by changing
sectors or for example, within agriculture, by planting crops that demand a higher price
on the market.
Fourth, commodification could also encourage investment in better irrigation technology
such as micro-irrigation, by offsetting the initial high cost of such investments against
the long-term benefit of lower water expenses. Fifth, the high cost of producing certain
low value foods such as grains could encourage governments to buy the food on the
international market rather than produce it locally. Such imports would be akin to
10 See Asano, 1997, for an extensive discussion on waste-water reuse.
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importing water, and are as Allan describes it, 'virtual water' [1994]. 11
 Sixth, and
finally, water can then be traded between users on a national and international level.
As Dinar and Wolf recognise, "economics and politics play parallel roles, sometimes
complementary, sometimes contradictory, in the long-term evaluation of water basin
development; but neither paradigm is autonomous" [1994a: 350]. Thus, the issue of
economic efficiency entails difficult questions and decisions which political bodies are
often reluctant to face for fear of damaging their political power base [Postel, 1992:
168]. And this can be seen with the difficulties involved in attributing an economic
value to water [World Bank, 1994: 23]. These difficulties are most notable at the
implementation stage, as water cannot be separated from its socio-political status, and
since most of the "sectors susceptible to efficient restructuring are also those most laden
with emotion" [Wolf, 1992: 951].
For example, agricultural sector users would most probably need financial assistance to
improve their irrigation technology. In addition, what would become of the people
dependent upon agriculture to sustain their livelihoods, when water is taken from them
for reallocation to industry? Moreover, how willing are governments to relinquish the
notion of food security when political mileage can still be made from it? What restricts
water pricing implementation the most, though, is a government's political will
[Chalker, 1997: 47].
The financial implications and costs of implementing a water pricing strategy casts a
shadow over the latent advantages [Dinar and Wolf, 1994b]. One advantage is suggested
by Dinar and Wolf, who believe that while "water's relative scarcity may enhance the
potential for conflicts. Markets for water, if appropriately established, may help resolve
these conflicts" [1994a: 353; 1994b: 61]. Thus, if a government is willing to weather
any resulting political storm, then water pricing and efficiency may occur - as happened,
for example, in Israel. 12 However, if a government is unwilling, then water pricing will
11 Egypt imports almost 50% of its total wheat supply from the USA. Of their total food
supply, Israel imports 34%, Egypt 25%, and Morocco 20%, from the USA [Richards
and Waterbury, 1996: 147]. Using FAO figures, Beaumont points out that Egypt, in
fact, imported 6.6 million tonnes of wheat in 1990, but produced domestically only
4.3 million tonnes [1994: 20].
12 Despite considerable opposition from the agricultural sector with its strong lobbying
power, the Israeli government reallocated water away from agriculture in the early
1990s for use in other sectors. The government's hand was probably strengthened
against the lobbyists because the region was suffering from a drought [Shapland,
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join integrated basin development on the shelf of 'good ideas, problematic
implementation'.
Though water management appears to be the rational means to tackle the issue of water
availability, it houses many challenges for national governments. As Mehta points out,
"the impending scarcity of fresh water and the unknown implication of groundwater
pollution point to a recognition of joint interest in basin management and the need to
overcome the myopic notions of national interest" [1988: 77].13
After all, "[s]ustainable development of our water resources will require careful
management of the interactions among water, natural ecosystems, and society. The scale
of the problems makes it impossible to rely solely on the top-down solutions" favoured
by political and technical entities in the arid realm [Gleick, 1993a: 9]. The most difficult
challenges arise out of the political factors that would affect a government's standing
with its supporters. Therefore, though water management should be the principal
concern of the ruling bodies, it appears to be politically easier for these bodies to allow
matters to be subsumed by the concept of water wars and the expectation of conflict.14
1.2 EXPECTING CONFLICT
Armed with an assumption of conflict rather than cooperation over water, how can the
Indus Waters Treaty be explained? In looking at the situation in the Indus Basin, there
was an expectation of imminent war. Complete dependency upon a finite fresh water
supply, and challenges to that supply were coupled with existing tensions between India
and Pakistan. Yet the result, almost twelve years on, was an international water treaty.
1997: 51-52]. Dinar and Wolf estimate that the supply to agriculture was reduced by
as much as 30% [1994c: 78].
13 Jagat Mehta was formerly a Foreign Secretary in the Government of India. In his
discussion on the Indus Basin talks, he retains an interest in bilateral negotiations.
This matches a foreign policy objective that India has maintained for most of its
existence as an independent country, of holding only bilateral negotiations to resolve
any international dispute with its neighbours.
14 In the summer of 1957, while the difficult negotiations for the Indus Waters Treaty
were still underway, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, H S Suhrawardy publicly
stated that Pakistan would go to war with India, if it was to interfere with Pakistan's
water supply [IBRD-14/7/57]. In an era of political instability, such hawkish
behaviour was expected to gain favour with the Pakistani elite and public. It did little
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Under the expectation of conflict, the reality of cooperation in the Basin appears even
more unusual. What, therefore, is this expectation of conflict and war based on? Two
approaches are considered, based upon power and rights.
1.2.1 Power-Based Approaches
The following frameworks share an assumption, however reluctantly, that might is right
and that a powerful actor will be able to impose its will. How these frameworks differ is
in their definition of power. Liberalism regards the international system as highly
interdependent. Therefore, though an actor may not be individually powerful, by
cooperating with other state actors it can become so. Game theory defines power as wit
and time. So the actor that emerges stronger is the one which has been able not only to
outwit its opponent, but to do so first.
Geopolitics bifurcates with its treatment of power. Traditional geopolitics is very much
power politics as defined by realism, but with the focus upon the geographic
composition of the state's territory. Critical geopolitics, by contrast, questions the whole
make up of power. Rather than accepting the definitions paraded by other frameworks, it
attempts to unmask the assumptions and interests inherent in these frameworks. The tool
used by critical geopolitics is 'discourse'; whose discourse dominates and how politics,
both international and domestic, can alter with a changing discourse.
1.2.1.1 Realism
At the first instance, it appears reasonable to surmise that two enemy states would not
wish to cooperate with each other over shared water, each preferring to maintain full
control over the resource. Behind this assumption lies the issue of autarky in an anarchic
system, deriving from the realist analysis of the international system [Art and Jervis,
1985: 2; Waltz, 1985: 24]. Realism "explains the inevitability of competition and
conflict between states by highlighting the insecure and anarchical nature of the
international environment" [Burchill, 1996: 90].
to secure Suhrawardy's position as Prime Minister, as he was replaced a few months
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Yet, a clue is also given in the neo-realist perspective of international relations: states act
to gain benefit. Neo-realists regard the international system as having a hierarchy
[Waltz, 1985]. At the top are the most powerful states, and at the bottom are the weakest
states. Power is defined, traditionally, by military might and will. In between lie most of
the remaining states, which are all trying to improve their position vis-a-vis each other,
and especially with respect to their enemies. Therefore, neo-realists contend that in
deciding a path of action, a state weighs up the potential gains against incurred and
potential costs. The state will then follow the path that would lead to greatest gain
overall.
Another way of looking at this gain-loss balance, within neo-realism, is that states are
wary of losing what they already possess. Therefore, decisions are influenced not just by
what is potentially to be gained, but also by what is to be lost [Jervis, 1985: 86]. For
example, if by cooperating, a state makes some gains, but insufficient to compensate for
the loss of sovereignty over a resource, then cooperation will not occur. Therefore, the
balance sheet has to be particularly attractive in deciding a particular action.
The realist perspective of international relations, regards the international system of
nation-states with suspicion. The absence of a supra-national body with the capacity to
enforce decisions upon recaltriant states is seen as defining the system as anarchic.
Without the presence of such a governing body, any altruistic move by one state may be
taken advantage of by another [Jervis, 1985: 86]. Moreover, in the event of an
international agreement a 'rogue' state may renege upon its obligations after having
extracted full benefit from the agreement. The absence of a governing body in the
manner of a national government, may leave weaker states open to such unscrupulous
activity, unless they are able to protect themselves.
As Evans and Newnham point out, realism regards international politics as essentially
amoral [1990: 189]. It is only within the state that justice, equality and freedom are
possible. Therefore, in the anarchic atmosphere of international politics, self-help and
self-interest are the cornerstones of decision making and national security. More
importantly, to not follow up on one's own self-interests, and to act altruistically, is to
act irrationally - even foolishly. States thus create their own morality in the rarefied air
of international politics. The highest morality is 'national interest', and the guardian is
later in October 1957.
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the principle of sovereignty. What states believe are their national security interests "is
affected by their view of the world" [Halperin and Kanter, 1985: 440].
Realism views international politics as being about nation states and their struggle to
survive in an arena of power politics [Dalby, 1990: 88]. Those nations that survive do so
by imposing their will upon weaker states [Painter, 1995: 138]. A nation's strength
comes from being able to control its territory and the resources therein [Murphy, 1991:
126]. Independence is another criteria of strength, whereas cooperation leads to a
decrease in sovereignty and therefore in strength [Kliot, 1991: 4]. In other words, only
the weak cooperate, because the strong do not need to as they have all the resources they
need and are independent.
This issue of autarky (or self-sufficiency) and independence centred traditionally upon
key resources that came to be defined as 'strategic', or of national interest such as oil
and certain minerals. Strategic resources are those that are in demand but access to
which is limited. In other words, they are scarce and considered vital to national
security. The most important element is the perceived link between the resource and the
principle of national security. Should access to these resources be denied or restricted,
then the security of the nation and its interests would be put in jeopardy. Initially,
security was defined in military terms, but later came to include economic
considerations. Under the concept of water wars, security was extended to include water
resources.
Violence is regarded as a legitimate means, if not the primary means, to safeguard
national interests and sovereignty [Painter, 1995: 139]. As cooperation is regarded as a
sign of weakness, it is also regarded as an anomaly in ensuring a state's security. Waltz
makes a distinction between high and low politics. High politics is about international
matters, and relates to the external security of the state. Low politics, by comparison,
deals with the country's domestic political economy and social pressures [Barnett, 1992:
9]. Realism expects the greatest threat to a country to come from external forces,
because it assumes the state is internally unified. This decreases the role of non-state
actors and regards a government as objective and acting in the national interest [Painter,
1995: 138].
Barnett argues against the prioritising of a state's external security, suggesting state
officials and bureaucrats are at greater risk from domestic than external sources. Unlike
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Waltz, these officials do not distinguish between domestic and foreign policy which
influence each other. Most notably, when faced with an external threat, state officials
need to garner support for their policies and strategies to deal with the threat [1992: 7].
"Too often earlier studies have unnecessarily and inappropriately characterized state
managers as responding to one logic, be it domestic or international, economic or
political" [Barnett, 1992: 7].
1.2.1.2 Liberalism
The liberal perspective of international relations sees cooperation as the norm, even
though it does decrease state sovereignty [Kliot, 1991: 4; Lowi, 1993: 4]. Several factors
have contributed to the rise of one-worldism or interdependence, and an emasculated
state: [i] an independent global political economy; [ii] an increase in international
political cooperation; and [iii] the fragility of the global environment [Gilpin, 1985].
Prescriptive liberal analyses do not, however, explain the existence of disputes between
states. Liberal institutionalism does, though, try to explain why cooperation does not
occur. It suggests that asymmetrical information and uncertainty which often
characterise a conflict, act to impede cooperation [Lowi, 1993: 5]. But this, in turn, is a
repetition of the realist argument and does not explain why cooperation does happen
specifically on water. So it appears, to this thesis, that just as realism assumes blanket
conflict, liberalism expects blanket cooperation.
Drawing on the traditional theory of interdependence, institutionalists (also known as
functionalists) expect integration to grow organically from one issue to another [Wolf,
1995b: 142]. This spillover happens, it is suggested, from technical issues that are non-
political to matters that have a more political nature [Lowi, 1995: 123]. This 'spillover'
can lead to more and more cooperation till it reaches its final conclusion - peace.
Whereas, functionalism and neo-realism assume a division between 'high' and 'low'
politics, neo-functionalists dismiss the possibility of separating welfare issues from
national and international politics.
Lowi argues that cooperation is more possible if issues are 'de-linked' [1993]. The
implication is that proposed options should be acceptable to the ruling regime. This
acceptability is based upon the regime's perceptions of what is acceptable to its
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domestic audience. Proposals it appears should, also, be issue specific so that
cooperation, over water in this instance, does not bind the actors to cooperation over any
other issue. Blanket cooperation, like blanket conflict, appears to be unacceptable to the
disputants, and does not explain the specific instances of cooperation that occur amidst
war.
1.2.1.3 Game Theory
In legitimising violence, realism looks to game theory to understand the choices,
resources and decisions characterising international interaction [Painter, 1995: 139]. A
number of assumptions are made in game theory: [i] that actors have preferences; [ii]
that these actors will act rationally to satisfy these preferences; and [iii] that the actors
will try to maximise their utilities. Therefore, by knowing the order in which the
preferences fall, it is possible to determine which action will be chosen. The individual
preferences are unimportant, as long as the actors are sufficiently motivated to
consistently and rationally try to maximise their preferences [Hargreaves-Heap and
Varoufakis, 1995: 5; Bogdanor, 1993: 248; Jervis, 1985].
Game theory uses a limited number of games to represent patterns of social interaction,
and explore the possible scenarios that may arise out of any situation. To make such
comparisons, game theory follows its own logic, which is highly reductionist.
Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis suggest that game theory is rather like watching a card
game. It has two main components. First, the rules and therefore actions that are allowed
and second, how the players choose to act on the basis of the rules. The latter component
has further divisions: [i] each actor's motivation, whether playing to win or more
carelessly; and [ii] what each actor thinks the other will choose to do under certain
circumstances [1995: 4].
Three possible categories of outcome are envisaged: [i] zero-sum (or constant-sum)
games of pure conflict where one actor wins at the expense of another; [ii] games of
pure cooperation occurring mainly due to communication failures, where all parties
either win or lose simultaneously; and [iii] variable-sum games of mixed motive such as
chicken or the prisoners' dilemma (PD), which combine conflict and co-operation.
Chicken models instances of brinkmanship, especially confrontations involving nuclear
weapons. Whereas, prisoners' dilemma models problems arising from the need for
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collective action, for example with respect to pollution or resource depletion [Painter,
1995: 152; Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 1995: 35-37].
Game theory's reliance on its own logic allows it the facility systematically to
manipulate and replace assumptions, which in turn gives game theory heuristic value.
More complex and realistic analyses are possible in supergames where a set of players
undergo a sequence of games, the moves and outcomes of which are determined by
previous games. Nonetheless, though the outcome may be more realistic, it remains a
contrived scenario and one that is constrained by the theory's assumptions of rationality
and limited games [Bogdanor, 1993: 248-249].
As White and Neale point out, game theory predictions ignore the psychological factors
that go into the decision-making process. The prescriptive nature of game theory models
assume negotiators can set and implement reservation prices unhampered by the
negotiations. It ignores the fact the negotiators are, in fact, influenced by their
interaction during the negotiations [1991: 387]. Does game theory, therefore, explain
cooperation over water by enemies? Though cooperation is regarded as the optimal
outcome, it is not expected to occur. The theory also assumes that the outcomes are
known, and it is a matter of each actor selecting their own preference, which often is not
the case. It appears, furthermore, not to account for the intervention of a third party,
such as a mediator.
1.2.1.4 Geopolitics
Traditional geopolitics lies close to the realist school of international relations. It regards
states as spatial phenomena which derive their power from the geographic features
making up the state's territory. It is the study of the physical world's influence upon the
"conduct of foreign policy" [Agnew and 0 Tuathail, 1992: 191]. As with realism, the
reductionist approach of traditional geopolitics suggests an unresponsive, stagnant
foreign policy congruent with an "isotropic plain of strategic commitments"
[O'Loughlin and Heske, 1991: 53].
Security is defined in narrow militaristic terms, ignoring the economic developments
arising with the global international political economy and environmental factors that
demand a more creative and integrated approach to security. The improbability of
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international cooperation is implicit in traditional geopolitics. By contrast, critical
geopolitics seems to suggest an avenue to cooperation. Cox makes a broad distinction
between the approach of traditional geopolitics and its cohorts in international relations
(IR), and critical theory [in Dalby, 1991]. The problem-solving approach of IR theories
maintain the status-quo, whereas critical thinking opens the accepted paradigm to
changes and structural links by siting it in a larger context [Painter, 1995: 144].
Critical geopolitics looks at how power and its congruent discourse are formed, and
what assumptions are made in perpetuating a particular discourse [Dalby, 1990: 39].
Critical discourse theorists, from which critical geopolitics takes its lead, use discourse
not to mean language or social interaction, but social knowledge. Therefore, a discourse
is knowledge that both constrains but also enables communication and thought within
specific historical limits with respect to particular social objects and practices [McHoul
and Grace, 1993: 31-39].
If a prevailing discourse discourages cooperation, the subsequent occurrence of
cooperation may be the result of a change in the discourse. This does not imply that the
overall discourse has changed from conflict to cooperation, but that a means to
cooperate may have been adopted in the discourse. To understand this further, it would
be necessary to explore the internal politics of disputants and, in the event of mediation,
of the mediator and how it views the disputants.
1.2.2	 Rights-Based Approaches
The issue of sovereignty that power-based approaches defend so vigorously, is
embodied more soberly in international law. The preserve of nations, international law is
codified by two bodies: the United Nations' International Law Commission (ILC), and a
professional body, the International Law Association (ILA). The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) can be regarded as an executive body of sorts.
All three bodies assume a zero-sum situation regarding the legal standing of disputants
within an international dispute. Meaning, in effect, that one party's position will be
prioritised over the other's. Any ruling will determine this prioritisation by comparing
each party's case against the law, and then deciding which is 'more' right compared to
the other. There appears to be an assumption in international law that the legal process is
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objective and fair. Therefore, irrespective of the power balance between disputants, if a
matter has been put before the ICJ a decision will be made based only on the law.
Recourse to law has one advantage in particular: the dispute's simplification to a handful
of legal criteria. Unfortunately, there appear to be many more difficulties arising from its
use. If a dispute arises between two or more nations, to bring about resolution via the
international legal forum, all disputants must agree to submit the issue to the ICJ.
Moreover, they must agree to adhere to the final arbitrated judgement irrespective of
whether it suits their interests or not. States, mindful of their precious sovereignty, are
usually reluctant to agree to such definitive measures especially when there is little
guarantee of getting a desirable outcome. Cases have, however, been put before the ICJ
and the arbitrated result has been respected, most notably in international maritime
boundary disputes.
Once a dispute has been submitted, the legal criteria against which it is tested are,
generally, vague and ill defined. International law, and especially international water
law, appears to encode general principles very well. But to transfer the principle from
the abstract to the practical, is problematic. For example, what is an 'equitable'
allocation of water? And how is 'appreciable' harm measured? Even if judgement is
passed, the executive body has to rely upon the voluntary implementation and
enforcement of the decision by the disputants. This, in itself, is a risky option as the
disputants may still regard each other with hostility, especially if the ruling is
undesirable.
This is not to say that international law, and in particular international water law, do not
have a role to play. Though they may not illuminate the road to conflict resolution, they
signal a trail through the jungle that is autarky and encode desirable state behaviour,
rather like a book of state etiquette. It is of particular use when encoding what the
disputants have already agreed is fair and equitable in a treaty. International water law
plays a very specific role, but attempts to apply it generally to resolving conflict has, this
thesis would suggest, damaged its reputation.
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1.2.2.1 International Water Law
"Co-operation, however, must be established on such principles as
good faith, good neighbourliness, equality and reciprocity. All
basin states should keep in mind not only their own national
interests, but those of the basin community as a whole" [Caponera,
1981: 183].
There is an extensive literature on the history and principles of international water
law. 15 Unfortunately, despite such extensive coverage the key difficulty with
international water law remains intact - implementation. There are two areas that
obstruct implementation, that of prioritising one principle over another, and the
difficulty in assigning specific definitions to terms that are vague. The law governing
international watercourses revolves at present around two principles, equitable
utilisation (EU) and appreciable harm (AH). In defining a watercourse, the ILC have
united surface and groundwater into "a system of surface and underground waters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and flowing into a
common terminus" [Biswas, 1994: 199].
Defining the two principles appears to have posed a larger problem; nonetheless, the
ILA and ILC have established working definitions for these principles. Equitable
utilisation attempts to establish an equitable supply of water proportional to all the
riparians' needs. 16 Appreciable harm, by contrast, prioritises and therefore protects
existing uses. States are obliged to ensure that new developments do not put at risk those
uses that are already established. The international legal community has taken
'appreciable' to mean harm that is more than mere inconvenience, but less than
substantial.
15 For literature on international law see Naff and Matson, 1984; Caponera, 1981;
Turner-Johnson in Miller, 1987; Evans and Newnham, 1990; Bernharot, 1995;
Shaw, 1991. For international water law see McCaffrey, 1993; Naff, 1994; Hey,
1995; Kliot, 1994 and 1995; Wolf, 1995a; Biswas, 1994; Allan and Mallat, 1995;
Shapland, 1997; Lonergran and Brooks, 1994; Hillel, 1994; Garretson et al, 1967.
Originating in Islamic laws on water, shari'a now denotes laws attaining to all
aspects of Islam. Though the western-based international water law has not taken
regard of this ancient guideline, it remains a vital force in parts of Arab society; see
Mallat, 1995; and Naff, 1994.
16 Equitable utilisation (EU) is also known as equitable allocation (EA). However,
subtle differences appear to be implied which are perhaps unintended. Whereas
equitable utilisation suggests supplying water proportional to the need, equitable
allocation appears to imply dividing the available water equally according to the
number of users rather than according to need.
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The vagueness of the adjectives describing the terms for application, 'equitable',
'appreciable', 'substantial', are an additional problem when it comes to prioritising EU
over AH. Though the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses Commission was finally signed in 1997, after discussions that lasted 27
years, it does not clarify which principle is to be prioritised [Wolf, 1997a]. Shivananda
goes as far as to say that "[i]n view of this legal situation as well as of the complicated
technical implications of each water dispute, these disputes cannot be substantially
solved by resort to arbitration or adjudication." [1961: 72].
Matters are not helped by the internal struggle between the encoding bodies of
international law, the ILA and ILC. The ILA favours the application of equitable
utilisation; whereas the ILC prefers appreciable harm. In justifying their adherence to a
particular principle, each body claims the other's favoured principle falls short of
justice. Therefore, the ILC points out that "utilisation of an international watercourse is
not equitable if it causes other watercourse states appreciable harm" [McCaffrey, 1993:
99].
The ILA, in turn, emphasise the appreciable harm principle's protection of states that
were the first to develop their uses. These states are, generally, downstream and
therefore the principle harms upstream states' right to develop their own uses.
Shivananda believes, correctly, that "in international water disputes the application of
the doctrine of strict legal rights upon whatever basis it may rest, is an obstacle to any
policy of active development which involves the consent and cooperation of both
parties." [1961: ii].
With matters between the encoding bodies in gentle disarray what can co-riparians,
involved in an international water conflict, do regarding their rights? International water
law appears to offer little in the way of resolving a conflict. In fact, it may even go some
way to exacerbating the tensions. The co-riparians adopt the legal stand that is most
relevant to them depending upon the level of development each has undergone.
Generally, the principle a riparian chooses also correlates with a geographic position vis-
à-vis their co-riparian. Downstream states have usually developed the watercourse more
than upstream states. Therefore, states that have yet to develop their uses from the
shared watercourse will probably favour using equitable utilisation, so that they are not
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limited in their development attempts. States with existing uses will prefer any
resolution to stem from the appreciable harm principle.
Within the conflict, the difficulties of international water law can add to the issues that
need to be resolved. Shapland believes that international water law is used by riparians,
"less to resolve disputes than to dignify positions based on individual state interest"
[1997: 167]. For example, even if the disputants agree to apply the principle of equitable
utilisation, they still have to agree upon what constitutes an 'equitable' allocation
[Beaumont, 1994: 19]. (Dinar and Wolf, 1994c, believe that defining and measuring
equity is a problem with water cooperation and sharing as well). The intervention of a
third party under these circumstances usually entails the ICJ and a costly legal battle to
determine which principle, and therefore which riparian, is to be prioritised. 17 Does
international water law, then, explain why cooperation happens between co-riparians? It
would be suggested here that it does not.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank
appears to have met with more success in applying the principle of appreciable harm. It
favours this principle because it is easier to define and measure compared to equitable
utilisation [Goldberg, 1995: 156; Hillel, 1994: 274]. As a major financier of
international water projects, the World Bank implements a strict procedure of
notification, as outlined in its Operational Directive (OD) 7.50. When a riparian applies
for a loan to finance its planned development of an international watercourse, that
riparian must notify its co-riparians. This entails the sharing of any relevant data, and
fore-knowledge of potential damage to existing uses or shared water. The riparian is
exempt from doing this if the project is merely a feasibility study, or part of an ongoing
project which in the Bank's opinion does not affect co-riparian utilisation. Should the
riparian fail to or refuse to notify its co-riparians, the Bank would terminate the
application immediately [Goldberg, 1995: 157].
17 As Wolf points out the ICJ has only ruled on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam
dispute, between Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria, on the Danube
River [1997a]. For background to the dispute, see Assetto, Valerie J. and Hans
Bruyninckx, (1997), "Environment, Security and Social Conflicts: Implications of
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Controversy" in Blake, G.H., L. Chia, C. Grundy-Warr,
M.A. Pratt and C.H. Schofield, (eds) (1997), International Boundaries and
Environmental Security: Frameworks for Regional Cooperation. Kluwer Law
International.
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Though the process may appear harsh, it carries weight in that it is enforced along strict
guidelines. The Bank's policy tries to prevent investing in projects that involve a dispute
over water, because this could be detrimental to the project in the long term. Moreover,
the notification procedure allows all the affected riparians to respond to the proposed
project, either giving their approval or disapproval [Goldberg, 1995: 157].
The ILC of the United Nations has, by comparison, a lame notification procedure. The
riparian is asked to notify its co-riparians of its plans if, in its opinion, the project will
cause them appreciable harm. This procedure is highly subjective, and the emphasis on
self-regulation can open the door to future water disputes rather than close the door.
Dinar and Wolf sum up the problems with international water law stating it is
"ambiguous and often contradictory, and no mechanism exists to enforce principles
which are agreed-upon" [1994c: 79].
Despite the difficulties in encoding and implementing international water law can it
explain international cooperation over water, between enemies, as happened in the Indus
Basin? It appears not. Nor in fact can the power-based approaches. What the rights-
based approach of international water law shares with the power-based approaches of
realism, liberalism, game theory and geopolitics, is that they all expect conflict between
enemies.
None of these approaches can explain all the features of the Indus Waters Treaty.18
Though liberalism expects cooperation between nation-states, it cannot explain hostile
states cooperating specifically over water. Especially since this cooperation happened
despite the existence of other Indo-Pakistani disputes, and was maintained through two
wars. Realism and geopolitics expect conflict in an anarchic international system, but
cannot explain why enemies would be willing to limit their sovereignty over a key
resource such as fresh water.
Game theory makes provision for cooperation but predicts conflict on the basis of a
number of pre-decided outcomes. Though the Indus Basin talks had been conducted
18 When the author asked Ambassador John McDonald, Jr, whether international
relations (IR) theories had any influence on the actions of participants in
negotiations, he said no. What did matter, McDonald believed was the very thing
that IR ignores, personality - of the individual negotiators and the governments
involved. Furthermore, "practitioners never read, and academics never practice"
[McDonald interview, 25/4/96].
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under some principles, such as no-diminishing supply, there was not a set of pre-known
outcomes from which the Treaty was chosen. And finally, the application of
international water law pre-supposes a water dispute, unless a riparian is unilaterally
policing its use. However, though it may not explain international cooperation over
water, international water law does seek to protect cooperation once it has happened
such as the Indus Waters Treaty.
1.3 INDUS WATERS TREATY'S SIGNIFICANCE
Having deliberated over approaches that would suggest conflict is to be expected over
key resources, focus returns to an example of cooperation. The Indus Waters Treaty was
signed amidst considerable speculation, and fact, of rising tensions and is considered to
be a success [Nakayama, 1997: 368]. Thus, there are good reasons to look to the Indus
Waters Treaty for help with present day international water disputes [Biswas, 1992:
201]. The Treaty's value was recognised early on. In 1966, the World Bank was
considering the situation on the Ganges-Brahmaputra between East Pakistan and India,
and saw parallels with the Indus Basin situation [Lilienthal, 1976: 236].
The Treaty was achieved with the help of a third party, not though the formal legal
avenues open through the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but rather an institution
interested in the matter, the World Bank. This reflects the present situation in
hydropolitics with an array of organisations intervening in water disputes. For example,
efforts by the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in bringing
together the riparians of the Nile Basin. In fact as Biswas points out, "the negotiating
process of the Indus River Treaty clearly indicates the critical role of a third party in
facilitating such an agreement, provided it can play an impartial but active and
constructive role, and supplement it with potential significant financial aid on successful
completion of the negotiation" [1992: 209].
As Mitchell and Banks point out, conflict analysis is the first step in the conflict
resolution process [1996: viii]. And though scholars and other observers may illuminate
the issues involved, it is the disputants themselves who actually resolve the dispute.
Therein is the focus of the mediation process: the disputants decide the outcome, but the
mediator controls the process. The World Bank was fully aware where the decision-
making power should lie and made a concerted effort throughout the talks to maintain
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this balance. The result was not only the signing of an international water treaty, but its
implementation and endurance. This durability is one of the primary reasons for
studying its negotiation process [Biswas, 1992].
The Indus Waters Treaty's achievements start with the enemies being willing to talk.
Then, as differences mount and are faced, the talks break down. But the disputants come
back and keep talking. Eventually an outcome is agreed upon and a treaty drafted. After
its signing, and ratification, it is implemented. The implementation stage occurs within
the duration allotted to it. And even with the advent of war between the signatories, not
once but twice, India and Pakistan maintain their obligations to each other under the
terms of the Treaty. This was pointed out by the World Bank, with particular reference
to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war: "[e]xcept for two or three days when shots were fired
(and war appeared imminent), the agreement between India and Pakistan was carried out
without any interruption during their recent war" [Lilienthal, 1976: 236]. Finally, the
Indus Water Treaty has been maintained for almost forty years.
One of the reasons for the success of the Treaty, measured by its durability, is to be
found in the detailed agreement that was signed. For example, the third party clearly
recognised that the negotiations held on the Indus Basin dispute would not heal all the
wounds in the Indo-Pakistani relationship. Therefore, a detailed route was established to
deal with future disputes, so that they could be resolved without having to re-invent the
wheel, nor leaving them to escalate into a larger conflict.
Rausching believes the Indus Waters Treaty is an example "for the application of the
principle of equitable apportionment" [in Bernhardt, 1995: 964]. Though, India did
receive access to the Basin's water and this would suggest an equitable apportionment,
this was only possible after Pakistan had been assured that no appreciable harm would
be done to its existing uses. This in turn suggests that these principles in international
water law must be used together, and that it is not a matter of settling claims on the basis
of either equitable utilisation or no-appreciable harm. Therefore, first, ensure supply is
maintained at an acceptable level to existing uses and, then, apportion the water
equitably. This, however, is not without its own difficulties.
Criticism of the Indus Water Treaty centres largely upon what is regarded as its sub-
optimal outcome, and the large financial incentive needed to get this sub-optimal result.
Sewell and Biswas explain that "[o]ptimal use of the stream can only be attained if all
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the potential uses are considered simultaneously and a combination is chosen that
conforms to a selected criterion, such as the maximum net economic return or the
preservation of a particular ecological web" [1986: 297]. Therefore, Kliot argues,
partitioning an international watercourse is not an optimal arrangement. It is usually
inefficient, does not always increase the amount of water available and can, in fact,
encourage waste [1995: 195].
Though such criticism is valid there is generally a socio-political context within which
agreement is reached. For example, at present people in the West, and increasingly in
other parts of the world, are more aware of the need to safeguard the environment.
Kolars speaks of safeguarding the river itself, treating it as if it too has needs and a life
[1997]. This is in stark contrast to attitudes in the 1950s, and beyond, when water
flowing into the sea, unused, was regarded as 'wasted' [For example, Shivananda, 1961:
4-5 - quoted in Section 1.1.1, page 3].
In hydropolitics, the air is filled with the need to have integrated water management, and
plans for water use that optimise the amounts that are available. Lowi explains the
rationale behind integrated management: "Geography suggests that, by virtue of its
physical unity, a river basin should be developed as a single, indivisible whole,
irrespective of political divisions. This is because water binds land areas together as it
flows toward an outlet, and interference with the water and its movement at any point
has repercussions elsewhere in the basin" [1995: 125].
Interestingly, integrated management also implies participation by the end users - the
public. However, as Frederiksen et al point out, "[p]olitical leaders may be wary of
public participation and direct influence", this is abetted by the bureaucracies in South
Asia, which "oppose sharing management decisions" or being accountable [1993: 1111.
Forty years ago, however, international focus was on economic development, though the
costs to carry through such policies were unknown then. Yet, using hindsight, which is
cruel in its criticism, it has been suggested that the World Bank "gave up the optimal
solution too readily" [Mehta, 1988: 74]. This appears incredulous in the face of the long
and difficult negotiating role the Bank played with tremendous patience for
approximately nine years. Especially as Lowi is correct in pointing out that "states are
reluctant to relinquish control over land and other resources that lie, even partially,
within their borders" [Lowi, 1995: 126]. Therefore, if the Bank had persisted, how much
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more time would it have needed to spend to get an optimal plan? And would an optimal
plan ever be possible given that Pakistan and India in 1998, after 50 years of existence,
tested nuclear devices with each other in mind?
Yet Mehta admits that the Indus Waters Treaty gave India and Pakistan, "the freedom of
independent development of the waters flowing through their lands. Had the treaty not
been concluded, it would have remained another major contentious issue in the political
relations of the two countries, and the massive economic aid for subsequent
development might have been wholly or partially withheld" [1988: 69].
Moreover, talk of optimal outcomes is based upon an ideal. "It regards the river basin as
a single hydrological unit irrespective of international boundaries" [Kirmani, 1990:
204]. And involves looking at the geographic and hydrologic makeup of a basin,
superimposing the uses distributed across it, and letting a plan emerge that sanctifies a
particular ideal. However, as already stated, agreements are reached in a particular
context, usually defined by the political situation of the participants. Therefore, when
agreement is reached, though it may not be a geographic or hydrologic optimum, it is a
political optimum. It is, therefore, politics rather than technology that constraints the
management of water resources. Thus, Kirmani believes the notion of integrated
management to be "idealistic" [1990: 204].
Mehta appears to agree with this point:
"The agreement was a triumph, but a triumph of the lesser evil. Judged from
the point of view of optimum gains which could flow from the total waters of
the Indus basin, by treating the basin as an ecological and economic unity,
one must, at least hypothetically, recognize great opportunity costs in
repudiating the investment in the existing network of irrigation canals.
However, in the prevailing circumstances in the subcontinent, the agreement
is considered as the most which was politically feasible" [1988: 69-70].
In other words, the Indus Waters Treaty, as it stands, is the most India and Pakistan
could afford, politically, to agree to or be seen to agree to in 1960. Of course, in looking
at other international water disputes if it is possible then plans to satisfy the geographic
and hydrologic optimum should be pursued. But it is important to realise that such plans
may have to bend and incorporate aspects that make agreement possible.
It is true that the World Bank was able to finalise agreement between India and Pakistan
because of the financial incentive. Had the Bank not been able to raise the money from
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'friendly Governments' then the Indus Waters Treaty as it stands today would probably
not have been signed. However, this thesis believes that to emphasise the financial
element as being solely responsible for reaching agreement is to overlook the
circumstances of the Indus Basin dispute, and its resolution.
The World Bank, upon proposing to intervene in 1951, had made it clear from the outset
that if agreement was reached, the institution would be prepared to assist the parties in
raising the necessary finances [IBRD-8/11/51]. The Bank's philosophy is summarised
by Black, who was President of the institution at the time: "Money doesn't do any good
on earth, no matter how much it is, unless that money is well spent" [1961, emphasis in
original]. Therefore, once the talks started in 1952, it was up to India and Pakistan to
find an acceptable solution to their problem. This solution was to repeatedly elude the
two disputants, and at times the search was almost abandoned.
Black recalls the World Bank's reaction to the differences between the 1953 Indian and
Pakistani plans:
"I said to them all one day, 'We can make money but we can't make water.
There's just so much water, and both of your plans are unreasonable. The hell
with both of you; we'll make a plan of our own.' So we worked out our own
plan. Then we had to sell them on our plan and that was a terrible job. Then we
had to go out and raise a billion dollars. That wasn't half as hard as getting them
to agree, but we had to get a billion dollars" [1961].
Agreement, in principle, on an acceptable plan, when it finally came in 1958, was based
upon political factors. Notably, the change in Pakistan's government with Ayub Khan's
military coup. Once this agreement was in hand, the implementation of the agreement
involved the financial element. Pakistan wanted to be assured of supply to its existing
uses, and India did not want to undertake a large financial obligation to Pakistan.
Thus, once the political decision had been made to agree, the financial aspects sealed the
agreement. As Black points out, "the question between India and Pakistan over water,
which called for enormous expenditures for building irrigation systems and reservoirs,
this was a financial question in that not only you've got to get agreement on an over-all
plan that would be of benefit to both countries, but you've got to find out the way to
raise the money to do this" [1961]. This thesis would surmise that, naturally, in making
the political decision to agree Pakistan would have taken into account the availability of
finances to construct the resulting works, but that alone would not have convinced it to
agree.
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1.3.1 Expecting Cooperation: Water Rationality
"A leader's choice, contrary to the assumptions embedded in the foreign
policies of states who rely primarily on unilateral, coercive means, is not
obvious" [Princen, 1992b: 16].
If power-based approaches like realism cannot account for cooperation, though it can
creep in with the neo-realist's gains-loss balance sheet, does liberalism offer a more
satisfactory explanation for cooperation? This latter perspective on international
relations, after all, regards cooperation as the norm. Game theory, with its notion of
limited cooperation, is also looked to, as is geopolitics. A rights-based approach
examines international water law for an explanation of cooperation. It emerges,
however, that none of the existing frameworks satisfies all the different and specific
elements of the Indus negotiations, namely: enemies cooperating, specific cooperation
over water, involvement of an influential third party which regards cooperation as
possible, and unknown outcomes.
The primary objective in the Indus Basin talks, for all participants, was to secure the
long-term availability of a fresh water supply. It was for this reason that Pakistan and
India, signed the Indus Waters Treaty; and also why negotiations dragged on for so
long. Pakistan's concerns regarding its long-term supply had to be answered before it
was willing to agree to any proposals that altered the existing supply network. This
regard for secure long-term supplies appears to suggest that riparians will cooperate
over their shared watercourses.
The idea of water rationality, proposed in this thesis, suggests that countries will at times
act in ways to promote the long-term security of their fresh water supplies. This involves
pursuing prudent management of existing national water resources, and maintaining,
with specific reference to any shared water, good relations with co-riparians. Should an
international water dispute arise, water rationality still expects cooperation to persist
rather than war.
In the event that direct bilateral discussions fail to resolve an international water dispute,
the intervention of a third party may assist resolution. The nature of third party
intervention may vary, for example, from adjudication by the International Court of
Justice to mediation by an international organisation. Irrespective of the type of
intervention, the dispute process is influenced by the third party. Therefore, water
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rationality believes that any intervenor should also expect cooperation as an outcome to
the dispute.
The mode of intervention examined in this thesis is mediation, which is defined as
'assisted communications'. As a technique of resolving international water disputes,
mediation sits within the water rational approach of securing long term fresh water
supplies. The mediation framework does not attempt to predict events in a dispute, but
merely to guide disputant behaviour, and consists of four stages: engaging, issues,
options and agreement. A detailed discussion of the framework is outlined in Chapter
Three.
Drawing strength from a number of examples of international cooperation, water
rationality expects cooperation rather than conflict over water. This expectation of
cooperation stands in contrast to the power- and rights-based approaches described
earlier in this Chapter. The concept of water rationality is discussed in more detail in
Chapter Six.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICALITIES
It was clear from the outset that the material that was to be gathered would be
principally of a historical nature. The negotiations for the Indus Waters Treaty had taken
place during the 1950s, and usually involved the more senior engineers and bureaucrats
of all participants. Thus it was understood, that not only would material held in the
archives of all the participants, India, Pakistan and the World Bank, be the primary
focus of research, but that the number of interviews with actual representatives of these
parties would be limited.
Thus a concerted effort was made to gain access to the relevant archives: the World
Bank's archives in Washington, DC; the National Archives of India in New Delhi; and
the National Documentation Centre and National Archives of Pakistan in Islamabad.
Enquiries were also made as to the availability of people to interview. This included
those either with direct experience of the negotiations, or relevant experience related to
the interdisciplinary nature of this research were the primary focus.
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The World Bank, finally, offered access to the material it held in its Indus Basin Files,
under strict conditions. Access was limited to these files, and the material was only to be
used in relation to this research. Access to the World Bank's archives was seen by the
author, and the Assistant Archivist, as setting a precedent. On receipt of the list of
documents contained in these archives, it became obvious that a wealth of information,
relevant to the Indus Waters Treaty mediations, would be made available. Therefore, it
was decided to prioritise this archive over those in the Indian Subcontinent.
The authorities in the Subcontinent dealing with each country's archives were to take
different positions regarding access. Whereas Pakistan gave permission to use their
National Archives and National Documentation Centre, India refused access to its
National Archives. It is understood the Indian refusal was based upon water policy being
regarded as a matter of national security. Nonetheless, it was felt that a visit to India
would still be of some value in better understanding the Indian perspective. A trip to
Pakistan was planned, and with it the trip to India. But as the World Bank archives had
priority, the Indian Subcontinent trip would only take place after a visit to Washington,
DC.
The World Bank archives were to offer up a wealth of information as expected, detailing
the decisions and negotiations undertaken in finally reaching agreement and signing the
Treaty. The principal focus, considering it was the Bank's archives, was that of the
institution's role as the mediator. The material contained the correspondence between
India and Pakistan, and the Bank, and reports of meetings between the participants. In
addition, interviews were held with some people who had been directly involved in the
negotiations, and others with relevant backgrounds in water, negotiations, and South
Asia. Those with direct involvement were: Davidson Sommers, General Counsel of the
World Bank during the negotiations; Harold Graves Jr, Director of Public Relations at
the Bank; and Syed Kirmani, a member of the 1954 Pakistani delegation.
The success of the trip to the USA, based largely upon the material gathered from the
World Bank, rendered a visit to the Indian Subcontinent a secondary matter. The
material that had been collected would provide for an interesting insight into the third
party role of the Bank. Since this perspective had not be presented hitherto, it was
decided to focus further research upon this angle. Thus when delays and difficulties with
attaining the appropriate research visas for Pakistan and India threatened to consume the
better part of a year, it was decided to postpone that visit indefinitely.
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In the interim, the decision to focus on the third party role of the mediator had raised
interest in training as a mediator. It was felt this would provide additional insights into
the process, and allow the author a chance to put into practice, in the form of role-
playing, theory gleaned from the literature on conflict resolution. The opportunity to
undergo this training arose with an initiative by Sunderland City Council to set up a
scheme to provide neighbourhood mediators. The training was provided by the
mediation facility, UNITE, based in Middlesborough.
As a result of the training, not only was the perspective and role of mediator clearer, but
so was the position of the disputants. The depth of emotion and attachment to the
position taken by a disputant vis-à-vis the dispute was experienced through role-play.
Though the level of analysis was different since the focus was at a neighbourhood level
rather than international intervention, there appeared to be sufficient themes in common
to warrant the training, and its application to the Indus Basin mediations. The principal
transfer from the training was the use of the mediation framework as described by
UNITE and appearing to be common to all levels of mediation.
Secondary sources were also consulted throughout this research, using the considerable
literature on hydropolitics and mediation theory in particular. However, though there is a
wealth of information on the international basins of the Middle East, in particular the
Nile, the Jordan and the Euphrates-Tigris, and to a lesser degree on the Ganges Basin in
India, information on the Indus Basin is notable by its scarcity. Of the material that does
bear the Indus Basin name, a fair amount addresses the ancient Indus Basin civilisation
and not the modern-day Indus Basin dispute and Treaty. Therefore, it is with some
reluctance and hesitancy that certain texts are relied upon, repeatedly, to narrate the
Indus Basin dispute pre-1951.
SUMMARY
Hydropolitics is about the interaction of water management and politics. In areas of
aridity the disparities between supply and demand of fresh water have led to heightened
tensions between riparian countries. The water wars concept predicts these tensions, in
such regions, will lead to war because of the importance of fresh water to national
security and economies. This connection between control of important resources and
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security holds explicitly the expectation of conflict. However, this expectation appears
misplaced in the light of emerging evidence of cooperation over water.
Among the examples is the Indus Waters Treaty signed and ratified by India and
Pakistan under the good offices of the World Bank. The significance of this Treaty
stands in its durability since 1960, surviving for almost four decades and through two
Indo-Pakistani wars. The nature of the negotiation process, it is suggested here, has
contributed to its durability. This is because mediated talks emphasise the importance of
the disputants determining the outcome; the mediator is there merely to assist
communications between the parties.
The nature of the mediated talks regarding the waters of the Indus Basin highlighted a
number of lessons, including the expectation of cooperation. This expectation was
joined by the idea of securing fresh water supplies in the long-term. Together, the
expectation of cooperation and the notion of water security comprise the concept of
water rationality. This thesis suggests water rationality provides one explanation for the
cooperation witnessed in the literature of hydropolitics.
Tensions will probably continue to rise in areas of the arid realm over competition for
access to fresh water. But most of these disputes will be played out in the domestic arena
of countries, and at the local levels. International disputes that lead to war, caused and
sustained by fresh water, appear to be possible but not probable in light of cooperation's
reality. This thesis does not suggest there will never be an international war between
riparians over their shared fresh water supplies but that, surprisingly, it appears to be
more realistic to expect cooperation than conflict over this precious resource.
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2THE GEOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT IN THE INDUS BASIN, PRE-1951
The rivers in the Indus Basin send to the Arabian Sea approximately 238,000 million
cubic metres (mcm) of water each year, in comparison to the Nile's historic contribution
to the Mediterranean Sea of 84,000 mcm. 19 The River Ravi, even during the dry winter
months, has on average more water than the River Jordan; 1,500 mcm compared to
1,200 mcm respectively [Nijim, 1969: 38]. With such vast volumes of water passing
through the Indus Basin, why was the allocation of water disputed by intra-basin users?
The above figures denote the average annual water supply, but hide a crucial factor -
variability, both seasonal and between years. Despite all the water, the Indus Basin is
largely an arid or semi-arid area because of an uneven distribution of water. Most of the
basin's rain falls within two months during the summer, and is transported out of the
basin to the Arabian Sea. For the remaining ten months, very little rain falls in the basin.
Since rainfed agriculture is limited to a very thin ribbon stretching across the foothills of
the Himalayan range in the north, the principal mode of sustaining agriculture, and
human life, throughout the remaining basin is irrigation. Under the colonising British the
traditional irrigation system was expanded and modernised, covering areas in different
provinces and administrative bodies. The revenue resulting from irrigated land and sale
of produce was sufficiently attractive to provincial governments that they wished to
continue the development of their own irrigable land. As work progressed, these
provinces came to compete for the allocation of water.
After the partitioning of India, and its subsequent independence, the conflict for this
finite resource continued with Pakistan. The expression of this conflict became more
severe, with India stopping water flowing to canals from which Pakistani crops were
watered. The dispute, centring on the waters of the River Sutlej, became a tussle
19 With the advent of the Aswan High Dam, and increased withdrawals within Egypt
for agriculture, the amount of fresh water flowing from the River Nile into the
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between Pakistan, demanding an uninterrupted supply to its existing uses, and India,
claiming the waters for its own development. Despite a series of talks and an agreement,
a stalemate arose and persisted for a number of years, until it was broken by the
intervention of a third party.
2.1 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE INDUS BASIN
Whilst flying over Pakistan, heading north from the Arabian Sea in the south, a vast arid
plain can be seen to unfold below. Trapped by low mountains to the west, the plain
tumbles unhindered to the east into the Rajasthan Desert of India. The plain abuts the
Himalayas head-on in the north, stopping abruptly with the vertical ascent of the
concertina folds of the Himalayas and Sub-Himalayas. Transforming the arid plain, for a
short distance on either side, are the rivers of the Indus Basin. The green ribbons braid
into one, gaining strength in their battle with the desert determined to reclaim its
territory.
The Indus Basin drains the highlands of three countries, Afghanistan, India and
Pakistan; and the Autonomous Region of Tibet in the People's Republic of China
(PRC), covering almost 950,000 km2 . This is more than the total area of Pakistan which
covers approximately 800,000 km2 [Michel, 1967: 29; Nijim, 1969: 29]. The drainage
area is divided between the highlands of the neighbouring countries and the Indus plain
in Pakistan. Michel regards the Indus plain not only as "one of the most homogeneous
physiographic regions on earth" but "as one vast and fairly homogeneous aquifer, a sort
of vast sponge, capable of absorbing runoff from the foothills as well as rainfall and
seepage from the rivers and canals that cross them, and of transmitting this subterranean
flow downslope to the Arabian Sea" [1967: 30].
As the Indus plain comes out of the Himalayan range in the north, it is divided into two
halves. The Upper Indus Plain lies between the northern mountains and Mithankot in
Sind Province, and contains the Indus River's tributaries [Ahmad, 1964: 21]. The
tributaries have all joined the Indus by the time it reaches Mithankot, and the Lower
Indus Plain starts. The Lower Plain takes the baton at Mithankot and relays the Indus
River exotically to the Arabian Sea [Ahmad, 1964: 24]. The Lower Plain lying in Sind
Mediterranean Sea is now estimated to be approximately 30,000 mcm or 30 billion
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Province has been formed by the changing course and recent deposits of a single river
[Ahmad, 1964: 25]. By comparison the Upper Plain in the Province of Punjab in
Pakistan, has been formed by the changing course of several rivers [Ahmad, 1964: 22].
The prominent features of the Upper Plain are the interfluves, or `doabs', built up by
deposits from the unstable rivers, often only 6-18 metres above the river course [Nijim,
1969: 32].
With the exception of the coastal and montane zones, the Indus plain is a single climatic
unit that is semi-arid with low average rainfall [Michel, 1967: 37]. 20 The seasons are
divided between summer, or kharif, (April-September) and winter, or rabi, (October-
March) [Ahmad, 1964: 30]. Derived from the Arabic word, `mausim' meaning season,
the summer monsoon provides 50-75% of the total annual rainfall over a short period of
two months (July-August) [Ahmad, 1964: 33]. During the summer monsoons as much
as 25 mm can fall in one hour [Johnson, 1979: 55]. Any rainfall unrelated to the summer
monsoons is of little consequence in the face of high evaporation rates resulting from
high summer temperatures (32-40 0C). Surface water in the Indus Basin comes either in
the form of rainfall or from the snow which covers the higher peaks of the Himalayan
Range and melts in spring [Ahmad, 1964: 15].
The overwhelming feature of water in the Indus Basin is one of variability. Though the
actual supplies of water either as groundwater or surface flow are large, the availability
varies greatly with the seasons, between years and between locations. It is estimated that
groundwater reserves within the Indus basin are ten-fold the annual runoff of the Indus
River. Though the advent of large scale irrigation is believed to have raised the water
table overall, due to inadequate drainage, its proximity to the surface does vary with a
number of factors: distance from the foothills, rivers and canals; different soil;
seasonally; and year-to-year [Michel, 1967: 30]. Groundwater contributes to irrigated
agriculture through the use of tubewells, though it remains a small proportion relative to
that of surface flow irrigation.
The Indus basin rivers' seasonal discharge can vary dramatically. (See the hydrograph
in Figure 1, taken from Gulhati, 1973, showing the distribution of water supply in the
Indus Basin measured in cubic feet per second (cusecs) and starting in April, at the
cubic metres (bcm) [Gleick, 1993b: 158].
20 For more information on the climate of the Indus Basin see Spate 1954, Stamp, 1960;
Ahmad, 1964; Johnson, 1979 and Tayyeb, 1966.
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beginning of the kharif or summer period). The Indus basin comprises the Indus River
and its six tributaries, see Figure 2. These are the rivers Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab,
Jhelum from the left, and the Kabul from the right. The Indus plain is formed by the
action of the rivers from the left, and their contribution to the Indus River; see Table 2.1
for the discharge figures of the Punjab rivers.
Table 2.1 The Indus and the Punjab rivers.
River Rim Station
Length
/ km
Ave Annual
Runoff! bcm (MAF)
Catchment
Area! km2
Discharge/ bcm
Summer Winter
Indus Kalabagh 2,900 115 (93) 268,800 69.6 11.5
Sutlej Rupar 885 17 (14) 48,000 14.3 2.5
Beas Pong 400 16 (13) 16,800 12.8 3.0
Ravi Madhopur 700 9 (7) 8,000 6.4 1.5
Chenab Marala 970 32 (26) 29,500 24.4 4.6
Jhelum Mangla 725 28 (23) 33,400 22.3 5.6
Total 217 (176) 404,500 149.8 28.7
[Source: After Johnson, 1979]21
The average monthly and mean annual flow variations from year-to-year are also large.
For example, the Indus river at Attock discharges on average 115,000 million cubic
metres (mcm) per year, but can vary by 75-118% of the average. The Jhelum river's
discharge averages 28,000 mcm but can vary by a larger range, 65-135% [Johnson,
1979: 64]. The rivers start rising in March with snow-melt, by late June the monsoons
are augmenting the surface flow till peak flood levels are reached in July-August at the
rim stations. It takes approximately one month for the flood wave to travel downstream
to Sind Province and the Arabian Sea [Johnson, 1979: 65].
21 Shiklomanov gives different estimates of the Indus River's data. The runoff,
including the tributaries, is estimated to be 220,000 mem, and the length of the Indus
River alone is thought to be 3,180 km [1993: 16]. This discrepancy in the data is not
uncommon.
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Fig. 1 A Hydrograph of the Punjab Rivers. [Source: After Gulhati, 1973]
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Fig. 2 The Riparian countries of the Indus River and its tributaries. [Source:
After Michel, 1967]
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The 'Punjab' is designated the land through which the five (panj) rivers (ab) flow. These
rivers carry considerable amounts of eroded matter which leads to stream blockage, and
shifting courses. As the course of the rivers' shift, it can lead to the 'capturing' of one
river by one another. For example, the Beas used to flow into the Ravi, till it was
captured by the Sutlej at the end of the eighteenth century. Unless otherwise hindered,
the Indus basin rivers, following the pattern of other northern hemisphere rivers, shift
eastwards or to the right [Michel, 1967: 27].
Aryan invaders thought the Indus river was as so vast they called it Sindhu, meaning
ocean.22 This later became 'Indus' [Michel, 1967: 42]. The characteristic of variability
is best demonstrated by the Indus. During the summer the river is several kilometres
wide, and when in flood can change course [Ahmad, 1964: 24]. But by winter, the
Lower Indus has shrunk to a series of pools several kilometres long, 0.4-1.2 km wide
and connected to one another by channels only 1-2 metres deep [Michel, 1967: 37]. At
its source the Indus River stands approximately 4,600 m above sea-level and 2,900 km
from the sea. On its descent to the sea, the river falls most dramatically within the
Himalayan and Sub-Himalayan ranges. Once the Indus exits the mountains at Kalabagh,
its rim station, the river's gradient across the plains to the sea is, on average, less than
the gradient of its tributaries in the Punjab plain [Michel, 1967: 25].
As the Indus river winds its way down the Upper Indus Plain, it collects the Kabul from
the right which contributes as much as the Jhelum and more than the remaining
tributaries save the Chenab [Michel, 1967: 36]. The Kabul is the only major tributary to
approach the Indus by itself. In comparison the Punjab rivers approach the Indus after
they have marshalled their forces into a single branch known as the Panjnad. The Sutlej
having collected the Beas, confluences with the Chenab which has already gathered the
Ravi and Jhelum [Ahmad, 1964: 21].
So emboldened the five rivers join the Indus near Mithankot. From Mithankot onwards,
the Indus is an exotic river and maintains no further perennial tributaries along the
remaining 1,000 km to the Arabian Sea [Nijim, 1969: 34]. The five tributaries from the
left share similar characteristics: they rise in the Himalayan or Sub-Himalayan ranges,
and maintain a gradient of approximately 0.2m/km (1 ft/mile) during their descent to the
22 Rao explains that the Aryan name Sindhu was corrupted to 'Hindu' by Persians, as
they could not pronounce the syllable, 'sr. This was later further changed to Indus
[1979: 19].
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Indus at Mithankot. The Sutlej rises within 130 km of the Indus, in the Himalayas, but
does not meet the Indus till they have both traversed the range close to 1,000 km to the
west [Michel, 1967: 25].
The Indus basin contains a paradox of certainty-uncertainty. Certainty arises in knowing
exactly when the seasons change, so that it is possible to refer to storage on the Indus
being full by 31 August of a given year [IBRD-22/11/55]. Despite such certainty of
timing, there is uncertainty regarding the quantity of water falling in the monsoons, and
whether the water will be sufficient for the claims placed on it. Hence, the dependence
of agriculture, and human life, on canals, dams and irrigation in the Indus basin.
2.2 IRRIGATION IN THE INDUS BASIN
Irrigation in the Indus basin goes back thousands of years to the early civilisations of
Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. Using inundation irrigation, these civilisations were
dependent upon the rise and fall of the Indus rivers. Though the civilisations died out
with the shift eastwards of the Indus rivers, the technique of inundation canals persisted
till the advent of the British in the Punjab, in the late nineteenth century. Thereupon, the
British extended and modernised the inundation canals, giving the water users more
control over their fate.23
The chronology of canal building and the successive politics in the Indus Basin, is
described in some detail, to illustrate the level of dependency on irrigated agriculture in
the Basin. (See Figure 3. for a map of the canals.) And therefore, to emphasise the
political implications of this dependency when the water supplying the irrigation canals
is threatened with competition, whether it is provincial or international competition.
23 For a more detailed chronology of canal building in the Indus Basin see Gulhati,
1973; and Michel, 1967. For details of irrigation works built by the British in the
Ganges Basin, see Stone, Ian, (1984), Canal Irrigation in British India:
Perspectives on Technological Change in a Peasant Economy. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge. For an overall description of irrigation development
in India, see Rao, 1979.
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Canals offtaking at barrages
Jinnah B.	 1. Thal Mainline 1947 Madhopur B. 30. Upper Bari Doab
2. Dullewalla Branch 31. Dipalpur
3. Muhajir Branch 32. Madhopur-Ravi-Beas
Taunsa B.	 4. Dera Ghazi Khan Balloki B. 33. Lower Bari Doab
5. Muzaffargarh 34. Balloki-Suleimanke
35. Montgomery-Pakpattan
Gudu B.	 6. Desert Canal
7. Proposed Pat Feeder Sidhnai B. 36.	 Sidhnai
8. Begani Canal Rupar B. 37. Bist Doab Canal
38. Sirhind
Sukkur Hwk 9. North West Canal 39. Bhatinda Branch
10. Rice Canal 40. Kotla Branch
11. Dadu Canal 41. Ghaggar Branch
12. Khaipur Feeder West 42. Bhakra Mainline
13. Rohri Canal 43. Bhakra Main Branch
14. Khaipur Feeder East 44. Fatehabad Branch
15. Ern Nara Canal 1932
16. Jamrao Canal Harike B. 45. Ferozepore Feeder
17. Mithrao Canal 46. Sirhind Feeder
47. Rajasthan Canal (with
extension)
Gh. Mohd B.18. Baghar Feeder
19. Pinyari Canal
	
Ferozepore B.48. Eastern Canal
20.	 Fuleli Feeder
21. Lined Channel
49. Bikaner Canal
Rasul B. 22. Upper Jhelum Canal Suleimanke B.50. Pakpattan Canal
23. Lower Jhelum Canal 51. Fordwah
52. Ern Sadiciia
Trimmu B. 24. Rangpur 53. Hakra Branch
25. Haveli
Islam B. 54.
	 Mailsi Canal
Marala B. 26. Upper Chenab Canal 55. Qaimpur Canal
27. BRBD 56. Bahawal Canal
28. Marala-Ravi Link 57. Desert Branch
Khanki B. 29. Lower Chenab Canal Panjnad B. 58. Panjnad Canal
• 59. Abbasia Canal
Fig. 3 cont. The Canals of the Indus Basin up to 1960. [Source: After Michel, 1967;
Ahmad, 1964 and Johnson, 1979]
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Canal irrigation is defined in the Indus basin as being either perennial, non-perennial or
inundation. Perennial canals are able to utilise even the reduced winter flow of the Indus
basin rivers. By contrast non-perennial canals are closed from October to mid-April.
Non-perennial canals are only operational in the summer and use any surplus left by the
perennial canals, whereas, inundation canals have no control at the off-take point and
need the river to be in high flood. This limits the operating period, which begins
between May and early July and goes on through to the end of September or early
October.
The means of transporting water to the place of use is determined by the nature of the
flood plain. For the most part irrigation in the Indus Basin depends upon canals, though
wells are also used. In the Upper Indus Plain, inundation canals are not possible as the
height of the river banks do not allow the floodplain to extend far from the river.
However in the Lower Indus Plain, inundation canals are more common as the banks'
height is lower and the floodplain can extend further. By contrast wells are less effective
in the Lower Plain in Sind Province, compared to the Upper Plain in Punjab Province.
This is largely because the clay soils of Sind act as a poor aquifer compared to the
coarse silts and sands of the Punjab [Johnson, 1979: 52].
Well water is used to supplement irrigation on non-perennial and inundation canals
during the winter (rabi) months. Gulhati claims that wells, in their own right, are also
responsible for the irrigation of approximately 19,200 km 2 [1973: 43]. Sailab irrigation
also makes use of the rivers' flooding and is possible after July-August when the rivers
overflow, inundating low-lying areas along the river bank. 24 Cultivators plant crops in
these areas during winter, unless the water has dried up. However, if the rivers rise
again, the cultivator loses everything. Gulhati estimates the total area of sailab
cultivation in the Indus basin to be approximately 8,800 km 2 with most of the area along
the River Indus [1973: 43].
Many of the canals constructed in the Indus Basin take their names from the interfluves
of the rivers, which were given originally by the Mughals who ruled India before the
British. It was customary, then, to call the interfluves `doab' meaning two rivers
[Michel, 1967: 42]. The names of each of the doabs was taken from the rivers it lay
between. Thus, the doab between the Jhelum and the Chenab used to be called `Jech'
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but now is known as `Char. Similarly, the Chenab-Ravi doab is called Rechna; the
Ravi-Beas doab is called Bari; and the Beas-Sutlej doab is called `Bise. The Indus-
Jhelum doab was called 'Sind Sagar', meaning Desert of the Indus, but now is called
'Thal'. The divide between the watersheds of the Indus and Ganges basin, lying between
the River Sutlej and River Jumna, is called the Sirhind doab [Nijim, 1969: 33].
The principle mode of transporting water to the fields is by canal. The British in the late
nineteenth century extended the canal network throughout the Indus plains, both in the
Punjab and Sind Province. They established canal command areas or colonies which
cultivated a variety of crops such as cotton, rice, wheat and sugarcane. The Indus basin
is thought to contain the world's largest irrigated area [Ali, 1967: 317]. Under the
British, a rotational system was established, whereby, when a canal was closed for
inspection, repairs or as a result of short supply, any available water could be transferred
to another canal.
Quite why the British chose to conduct this large scale engineering experiment in the
Indus basin is open to debate. Whether altruism prompted by the onset of devastating
famines in other parts of India played a key role, or commercial adventuring was the
principle push [Michel, 1967: 65], is largely immaterial in the face of the benefits
derived from the presence of water. What did happen was that as existing temperamental
irrigation was made sound, and crown wastelands provided with water, the British were
able to offer irrigable land to their allies, such as the Sikh community, thereby
establishing new settlements [Gulhati, 1973: 34]. See Table 2.2 for a chronology of
canal building in the Indus Basin up to 1960.
In 1859, the Upper Bari Doab canal (UBDC) was built supplying water from the River
Ravi to approximately 4,000 km2 between the Ravi and the Beas. In 1872, the Sirhind
canal was built to protect existing canal command areas (cca) in the Punjab and
neighbouring princely states, totalling 12,000 km 2. At the same time, inundation canals
in the Punjab taking off the rivers Sutlej, Chenab and Indus were improved as was
irrigation in Sind. By providing headworks and extending the canals, Sind's annual
irrigable area increased from 6,000 km 2 in 1875 to 12,000 km2 by 1900.
24 Sailab means 'flood', therefore sailab irrigation is possible when rivers overflow
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Table 2.2 Chronology of canal building in the Indus Basin until 1960.
Date	 Canals Built
1859
	
Upper Bari Doab canal (UBDC) offtaking the River Ravi.
1872	 Sirhind canal offtaking the River Sutlej.
1882	 Para and Lower Sohag canals in Punjab.
1885	 Lower Swat canal in North West Frontier Province.
1886	 Sidhnai canal offtaking the River Ravi in Punjab.
1892 Kabul River canal in North West Frontier Province, and in the
Punjab the Chenab canal which is now called the Lower Chenab
canal (LCC).
Early 1900s	 Ranbir, Pratap and Kashmir canals in Jammu and Kashmir
offtaking the River Chenab at Akhnur.
1901	 Jhelum canal later called the Lower Jhelum canal (LJC) in
Punjab.
1907	 Paharpur canal in North West Frontier Province.
1914	 Upper Swat canal in North West Frontier Province.
1915	 Triple Canals Project in Punjab: the Upper Jhelum (UJC),
Upper Chenab (UCC) Lower Bari Doab (LBDC) canals.
1932	 Sutlej Valley Project (SVP) in the Punjab, Sukkur barrage
project in Sind and part of the Bhakra project.
1939	 Haveli canal in the Montgomery-Pakpattan link was completed,
offtalcing the River Ravi.
1946	 Nangal barrage and canal started on upper part of the Bhakra
canal system. The Rasul hydroelectric scheme was also started.
1947	 Thal canal opened by Punjab offtaking the River Indus before
partition in August.
1949	 Pakistan starts building a barrage project at Kotri to improve the
inundation canals in lower Sind.
1951	 India reviews the Bhakra project and decides to prioritise canal
construction over the dam.
1952	 India completes the Harike barrage upstream of the Ferozepur
headworks.
1953 India opens a new distributary system near the towns of Mudki
and Golewala, drawing water from the Sutlej river above
Ferozepur.
1954	 Pakistan opens the Balloki-Suleimanke (BS) Link.
1958	 Pakistan opened the Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh canals
offtaking the River Indus.
[Source: After Michel, 1967]
The Punjab continued to be the main area of canal building and extension. In 1882, the
Para and Lower Sohag canals were built, followed in 1886, by the Sidhnai offtaking
from the River Ravi. These canals gave sufficient profit for the Crown Wastelands to
not only encourage further investment in the Punjab, but to do so on a larger scale.
Around 1890, two projects were sanctioned the Chenab and Jhelum canals. The Chenab
leaving behind flooded areas, in which crops are then planted.
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canal, now called the Lower Chenab Canal (LCC), was built in 1892 and soon doubled
the canal command area between the Chenab and Ravi rivers to nearly 10,000 km 2. In
1901, the Jhelum canal, now known as the Lower Jhelum canal (LJC) was completed
and provided water to 2,500 km 2 of Crown Wasteland between the Jhelum and Chenab
rivers. Both these canals later merged into the Dipalpur canal established as part of the
Sutlej Valley Project (SVP) in the Punjab.25
After the commercial success of the LCC, attention focused upon the crown wastelands
south of the Ravi. It had been intended that the Ravi would be used to supply water to
the lower parts of the Bari doab. However, not only was the whole winter supply of
water in the Ravi claimed by the UBDC, the alternative of using the Sutlej was ruled out
as the Sirhind canal lay claim to most of its waters too during winter. Another option
emerged with the plan to utilise the Beas by building a headwork and canal at Harike,
just below the Beas-Sutlej confluence.
The Indian Irrigation Commission was established in 1901, to report on the development
of irrigation. It was before this Commission that the Harike proposal was opposed. The
reasons were: first, that the Jhelum had more water flowing through it than was used in
the Jech doab; second, the LBDC was regarded as the last chance to use surplus water
from the Jhelum; and finally, supplies in the River Sutlej were needed to extend and
develop irrigation on both sides of the river. The Harike project was re-examined and
replaced with the Triple Canals Project which would transfer surplus Jhelum river flow
to the lower sections of the Bari doab, by a series of links. In 1915, the Triple Canals
Project was completed. The Upper Jhelum canal (UJC) supplied the Jech doab; the
Upper Chenab canal (UCC) watered the Rechna doab and the Lower Bari Doab canal
(LBDC) transferred water to land between the Ravi and Beas rivers.
After the First World War, three major projects were proposed: the Sutlej Valley Project
(SVP), the Sukkur Barrage and the Bhakra dam. The first two projects were completed
in 1932, situated in the Punjab and Sind respectively. The SVP comprised of three
headworks and nine canals taking off the River Sutlej proper, and one headwork with
two canals at the Sutlej-Chenab confluence at Panjnad. The canals offtaking at the
Ferozepur, Suleimanke and Islam headworks were principally non-perennial, unless
otherwise stated.
25 The Sutlej Valley Project (SVP) is also known as the Sutlej Valley Canals (SVC).
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At Ferozepur the canals were the Dipalpur, Eastern, and Gang, a perennial canal. At
Suleimanke the part perennial Pakpattan, the perennial Sadigia, and Fordwah. At Islam
the Mailsi, and perennial canals Bahawal, Qaimpur. The canals at Panjnad were the
Panjnad and perennial Abbasia. Other than the tail end of the Eastern canal which
irrigated parts of the Princely State of Bahawalpur through the Bahawalpur State
Distributary, the Dipalpur, Eastern, Pakpattan, Mailsi canals irrigated mainly the Punjab.
Though the Gang canal did irrigate the Princely State of Bikaner, it flowed through
Punjab. The remaining canals could be considered to be Bahawalpur canals.
As the Punjab was building the SVP in 1932, Sind was simultaneously busy erecting a
barrage across the River Indus at Suklcur. The project comprised of seven offtaking
canals. On the left, the Eastern Nara, Rohri canal including Khairpur Feeders East and
West. On the right, the Northwestern, Dadu, and Rice canals, the latter being the only
non-perennial canal. The canal command area in Sind increased to more than 24,000
km2.
The remaining project on the River Sutlej, the Bhalcra dam project intended to irrigate
southeasten Punjab and neighbouring Bikaner State from a storage of 3,406 mcm (2.76
MAF) proved more contentious and was shelved till the differentiating claims of the
Punjab and Sind could be resolved. The dispute on the use of the River Sutlej, did not
stop the Punjab from opening the Thal canal in January 1947, and Sind from preparing
the Kotri barrage project on the River Indus to improve its inundation canals [Gulhati,
1973: 39].
Sind and Punjab were not the only provinces to benefit from irrigation, the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) and strips of Jammu and Kashmir were also included in the
great leap forward in irrigated agriculture. In the NWFP, the Lower Swat canal was built
in 1885, the Kabul River canal in 1892, the Paharpur canal in 1907 and in 1914, the
Upper Swat canal. These four canals, by 1946, irrigated more than 2,000 km 2 to the
west of the River Indus. In Jammu and Kashmir three canals were built in the early
1900s. The two taking off the Chenab at Akhnur are the Ranbir canal which also has a
small hydro-electric power plant at Jammu, and the Pratap canal, which together supply
water to 600 km2. The Kashmir canal, taking off the River Ravi upstream of the
Madhopur headworks, is a small non-perennial canal.
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Gulhati attributes the success of irrigation in the Indus Basin to two factors [1973: 40].
Firstly, the use of link canals to transfer surplus river flow to areas of need; and
secondly, augmenting the pattern of use established previously whereby the demand for
supplies is low in winter, but rises in the spring to reach a peak during the summer.
Considerable time and money was spent in extending irrigation through the use of
surface flow. But any further expansion would require storage, and this would demand
far greater expenditure than hitherto engaged in [Ali, 1967: 317].
Prior to the expansion of the irrigation works, by the British, the canals in the Indus
Basin were mainly inundation canals. The British modernised the system by
constructing headworks to control the flow of the rivers that, in turn, extended the period
for which water was available. They also increased the area that was serviced by
building new canals. The construction of irrigation works, separately, in the provinces of
Sind and the Punjab created one of the largest irrigated areas in the world.26
Despite the fact that the provinces in which most development was occurring were
controlled by the British, an integrated development policy was not followed. The
resultant arbitrariness of construction led to increased rivalry between Sind and the
Punjab for the water. Fuelled partly by the political needs of each province, and partly
by the commercial revenue that was being generated, this competition led to a dispute
over allocation of the water and the politicisation of water in the Indus Basin.
2.3 POLITICS IN THE INDUS BASIN: THE SUTLEJ RIVER DISPUTE
The international dispute involving all the rivers of the Indus Basin has its origins in the
dispute that arose between two provinces within British India, the Punjab and Sind, on
the River Sutlej. As irrigation expanded the areas that could be put to crop, so did the
resulting revenue prove attractive to further development. In this upward spiral of
development the different provinces, under separate governments, strove to use the
26 In 1989, Pakistan had 162,200 km 2 (16,220,000 hectares) of irrigated land. Only four
countries around the world had more irrigated land: China 453,490 km2 (45,349,000
hectares); India 430,390 km2 (43,039,000 hectares); the USSR 210,640 km2
(21,064,000 hectares) and the USA 181,020 km2 (18,102 hectares) [Gleick, 1993b:
269]. What is even more remarkable, is that Pakistan's land is irrigated by the
collective waters of just one basin.
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available water to their own advantage and entered into competition with each other as a
result.
2.3.1 Before Partition
The administrative makeup of the provinces in British-controlled India contributed to
the dispute over the River Sutlej that was to emerge in the 1930s. After the formal
acknowledgement, in 1857, of British interests and political control in India, direct
control of certain provinces was concentrated in the coloniser's hands. The remaining
states, ruled by numerous indigenous princes, were subject to British advisors
representing the Government of India, and its master in Whitehall. By the beginning of
the twentieth century, the move by Indians to determine their own fate and that of their
country (however that was described) had begun in earnest, with the strengthening of the
All-India Congress Party.
The British, in reply, followed a policy of simultaneously relaxing, and tightening, their
hold on the reins of power. The exertion of tighter control was evident in numerous
ways and at different times. Ranging from the 1919 Jallianbagh 'massacre' where a
peaceful demonstration was cornered and fired upon, to the innumerable political
prisoners held during the various civil disturbances engineered by political parties
calling for Indian independence. Evidence of a 'relaxation' was witnessed at the
governmental level. It was largely an effort to form a more inclusive government that
incorporated the indigenous elite in governing the provinces of 'British' India.
The relaxation started with the 1909 Morley-Minto reforms. These reforms extended the
principle of electing members to the state legislative councils and introduced the notion
of communal electorates. As Thakur points out, the reforms also started the debate on
three constitutional issues [1995: 42]. Firstly, whether to extend suffrage, and the means
to do so. Secondly, the notion of having state legislative bodies composed entirely of
elected members. And finally, to determine the appropriate power-sharing structure
between the national and provincial governments.
In 1919, the British went further in their policy of including an indigenous elite in
governing the provinces of British-controlled India, but not on key policy matters at the
centre.. Under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms the principle of `dyarchy' was
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introduced. This devolved more responsibility to the provincial governments for
infrastructural matters such as health, education, agriculture, irrigation and public works.
The central government through the Governor of each province, retained control on key
reserved subjects which included law and order, and finance. In addition to increasing
the number, and influence of Indians in the provincial governments, these reforms also
increased the number of people considered eligible to vote. Not surprisingly, the British
concentrated on the elite yet again. Suffrage was limited to property taxpayers,
landholders and educated men, who comprised no more than 4% of the population in
rural areas, and 14% in municipal areas [Thakur, 1995: 42].
The final act of relaxation that was to involve the legislative functioning of British-
controlled India before independence was the Government of India Act of 1935. The
Act set up an union with autonomous units joined into a federation [Thakur, 1995: 691.
These units had full responsibility for certain subjects, and derived their power directly
from the Crown. The Act also increased suffrage, from the previous 6 million to 30
million [Thakur, 1995: 42], in other words from approximately 3% of the population to
16%. Thakur regards the 1935 Act to have left a practical legacy, whereby Indian
politicians emerged at independence with the experience of governing, and a political
base that derived from the provinces [1995: 69].
With the 1935 Act coming into force on 1 April 1937, the centre handed over to the
provincial governments the responsibility for river development. Thus, the provinces
had a free hand to utilise any rivers passing through their territory. In the event of a
dispute between the provinces on the use of a river, only after a formal complaint had
been lodged could the Governor-General intervene [Gulhati, 1973: 38]. The
consequence of provincial responsibility for irrigation development was the absence of
any basin wide development plan. Different provinces developed the rivers flowing
through them at different times [Gulhati. 1973: 39]. "For a long time, too, irrigation
works were not initiated unless they were expected to be commercially viable as judged
by rather narrow criteria" [Farmer, 1983: 39].
Sind formed part of the Bombay Presidency until 1935, when it was granted separate
status. Regarded as the 'step-child' to the Punjab's 'golden child' status in the British
nursery, Sind was conscious of coming a poor second in the pursuit of development.
Inter-state rivalries clashed on the issue of water use. Though some princely states
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(Bikaner, Bilaspur, and Bahawalpur) were also involved, the principal dispute was
between the Punjab and Sind [Gulhati, 1973: 36].
The Punjab, lying upstream of Sind in the Indus basin, with substantial areas already
under canal command, had its sights set on expanding further its irrigated areas through
the building of the SVP and Bhakra dam on the Sutlej River. In 1934 Sind, then under
the Bombay Presidency, and the Punjab reached agreement on the size of the Bhakra
dam. Work was blocked, however, by the refusal of Bilaspur, a princely state, to allow
tracts of its territory to be submerged under the accompanying reservoir [Gulhati, 1973:
37] .
By 1935, the number of interested parties in the development of the Indus basin's water
resources had risen to six [Michel, 1967: 124]. To integrate all the various interests and
proposals, the Government of India, in the same year, appointed the Anderson
Commission to recommend allocation of the basin's water between the different
factions. The Commission submitted its report in September 1935 [Michel, 1967: 124].
The findings were essentially a compromise, whereby losses made in one area were
offset by gains made in another, though overall the Punjab was to benefit the most.
The gains were: Sind received more water at Sukkur; Bahawalpur received more water
at Panjnad; Bikaner was to receive more at Ferozepur via either the Gang or Bikaner
canals; while the Punjab received more water at Suleimanke, larger rabi allocation at
Trimmu and the final authorisation for the Thal project. It appears that only Bahawalpur
had to reduce its withdrawals at Suleimanke and Islam to permit greater withdrawal at
Panjnad and Ferozepur [Michel, 1967: 124].
The Punjab was unable to make use of the additional water available for the Trimmu
Scheme, and proposed building a link transferring the water to the Rechna doab, thereby
freeing up more of the River Ravi to be used in the Lower Bari doab. With the
Government of India Act of 1935 coming into force in April 1937, the Punjab
government was able autonomously to sanction the Haveli project in July 1937 [Michel,
1967: 125].
Work on the Haveli project was completed in April 1939. A N Khosla was employed in
designing parts of the link, and would later be the Indian Engineer Designee during
negotiations leading to the Indus Water Treaty. Michel questions whether the Thal
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project, which was sanctioned by the Punjab Government in 1937, would have been
implemented if the 1935 Act had not devolved responsibility for irrigation to the
provinces [1967: 126]. The project had on repeated scrutiny appeared unviable, either
economically or to settle migrants, to the central government.
Sind and the Punjab arrived, in 1934, at an agreement regarding the size of the Bhakra
project. Hindered by Bilaspur State's unwillingness to have its land submerged, the
Punjab sought to redesign the project (Bilaspur was finally, in 1945, to agree to the
project). The new design, proposed in 1939, required a smaller reservoir possibly in
order to accommodate Bilaspur, but made greater demands upon the River Sutlej for use
in the SVP. As Michel [1967: 126] points out, under international law a treaty is to be
observed as long as the conditions remain the same (rebus sic stantibus). With the
construction by the Punjab of the Haveli and Thal projects, Sind was well placed to
argue that conditions had changed and the agreement reached in 1934 was now subject
to renegotiation.
In October 1939, Sind formally complained to the Governor-General about the Bhakra
Project. As the provinces were now separate, and irrigation a provincial matter, a special
commission was convened with quasi-judicial powers. Appointed by the Government of
India in September 1941, the Indus Commission comprised of two Chief Engineers, P F
B Hickey and E H Chave, and was chaired by Justice B N Rau [Michel, 1967: 129;
Gulhati, 1973: 38]. The Commission's report, presented in July 1942, was the outcome
of an adversarial dispute resolution procedure.
The Central government having appointed the Commission, made no representations to
it, leaving Sind and the Punjab to battle out their claims to the River Sutlej's water. Sind
having learnt its lesson, tried to use the Commission as a forum in which to have the
Punjab prevented from encroaching on what Sind regarded as its share of the river.
Thus, Sind not only complained about projects that had already been built, or were
presently being considered; but it also tried to guess which projects the Punjab might try
to build in the future. The Punjab admitted to having further plans for using the Sutlej,
but on a much smaller scale than Sind had suggested [Michel, 1967: 132].
The Indus Commission's findings, on the whole, acknowledged the damage that would
occur to Sind's inundation canals should the Bhakra dam be constructed. To protect
these canals, the Commission recommended constructing two barrages across the River
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Indus flowing through Sind, the Gudu and Hajipur barrages (the latter was superseded
by the Kotri-Hyderabad barrage). In addition, it was suggested that the Punjab
contribute to the cost of these works. Neither the Punjab, nor Sind accepted the Indus
Commission's findings, and both appealed to the central government. Informal meetings
between the two Chief Engineers continued, leading to the draft of an agreement in
September 1945. But as no final accord was reached the matter was referred, in early
1947, by the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India in Whitehall
[Michel, 1967: 132; Gulhati, 1973: 39]. However, the events of partition were to
overwhelm this dispute momentarily.
Devolution of political power by the British to the provinces and indigenous elite began
in the early part of the twentieth century. The 1909 Morley-Minto Reforms cleared the
way for an elected body of Indian elite to participate in the ruling of the provinces. This
mandate to rule was extended further in 1919 with the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms,
which established a `dyarchy' for the first time under British rule in India. The
Government of India Act of 1935, which came into force in 1937, handed over
responsibility for certain topics to the provinces including irrigation development.
Prior to the 1935 Government of India Act, irrigation in the Indus Basin had been
extended to a considerable extent. However, devolution of responsibility for this
development coincided with growing competition for the waters of the Basin. The
provinces of Sind and the Punjab had begun to construct works that would utilise the
River Sutlej, to the detriment of the other province. This competition led to a dispute
that, for the main part, was between these two provinces.
In an effort to resolve this problem, the Central Government appointed the Anderson
Commission in 1935 to decide upon the allocations each province was entitled to. The
recommendations proved to be a temporary respite. In 1939, Sind complained once
more to the Central Government about the works the Punjab was planning on the River
Sutlej. This time, the Bhakra dam project was the subject of the Indus or Rau
Commission that was charged with resolving the dispute. The recommendations were
rejected and the advent of partition overwhelmed the dispute.
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2.3.2 Partition and Beyond, 1947-51
"This stain-covered daybreak, this night-bitten dawn,
This is not that dawn of which there was expectation
This is not that dawn with longing for which
The friends set out, (convinced) that somewhere there would be met with,
In the desert of the sky, the final destination of the stars,
Somewhere there would be the shore of the sluggish wave of night,
Somewhere would go and halt the boat of the grief of pain."
[Faiz, translated by Kiernan, 1971: 122-127]
Matters of greater political consequences overtook what appeared to be a dispute
between two provinces over the River Sutlej, of which both rivers and provinces there
were many in British-controlled India. The Second World War was over, and the
business of rebuilding Britain had begun with a Labour government in Whitehall. In
addition, it was becoming apparent that the British could not maintain their presence in
India for much longer. Independence was becoming regarded as inevitable by those
sitting in Whitehall and the people they ruled, across the seas and continents, in India.
As Michel states, "[d]ecisions on irrigation schemes and allocation of water within the
Indus Basin were losing priority to decisions on constituent assemblies, interim
governments, and boundaries" [1967: 132].
Continuing the trend of devolving power to an Indian elite, the British had, in 1946,
inaugurated an interim government under the guise of the Viceroy's Executive Council.
With the Muslim League boycotting the Council, the All-India Congress Party
dominated the body. Communal tensions were rising, as different groups tried to claim,
shape and retain power in the forthcoming new, independent India. This would lead to
the division of India, under tragic circumstances, claiming lives estimated to range from
500,000 to 1,000,000 people. Most of the killings happened within the Indus Basin,
between different halves of a partitioned Punjab.
Construction of irrigation works continued, unabated, in the provinces in the build up to
independence and partition. In 1946, as part of the disputed Bhakra dam project, the
Punjab started the Nangal barrage and canal, and the Rasul hydroelectric scheme. In
January 1947, the Punjab opened the Thal canal, and Sind prepared its Kotri barrage
project. The decision to create Pakistan was announced on 3 June 1947 [Gulhati, 1973:
48]. This was followed by the Indian Independence Act which was passed by the British
parliament on 18 July 1947. The Act set up the principle of partitioning India into two
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separate dominions of India and Pakistan, and nullified all previous agreements between
the Indian government and the princely states [Gulhati, 1973: 50].
The Indian Independence Act merely addressed Britain's intention to rescind control of
the colony, and not the borders and relations of the Act's offspring. Independence
proved a mixed blessing for the people set to inherit the political mantle of Whitehall.
Though the principle of independence was known, the shape of the countries the Indian
and Pakistani politicians would rule was still being determined. Under these
circumstances, the issue of water allocation was not dealt with. As Gulhati points out,
even if the allocation of existing canals and water use was determined as part of the
partition process, the question of access to surplus water for development would have
remained unanswered [1973: 56].
The practicalities of partitioning India was left to the Radcliffe Commission.27 The
Commission was to decide simulataneously, in little over two months, the route of an
international boundary in not one, but three provinces, the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam.
Of these provinces the Punjab and Bengal were, furthermore, heavily populated by
different communal groups and sustained an intricate infrastructure. To compound the
difficulties of such momentous decisions, the task was left to all intent and purposes to
one man, Cyril Radcliffe. Under such circumstances, of course, the decisions carry an
air of 'the best that could be done'. Not until the Radcliffe Boundary Award was
announced on 17 August 1947, did the governments of India and Pakistan know the
extent of their jurisdiction [Ali, 1967: 319]. A curious situation considering Pakistan
became independent on 14 August 1947, with India following suit a day later on 15
August 1947.
Difficulties in deciding where the international boundary between East and West Punjab
would lie was exacerbated by the integrated nature of the canal system, and the high
dependence of agriculture in undivided Punjab upon the canals' water [Gulhati, 1973:
57]. As demonstrated by the following quote, Radcliffe was well aware of the problems
27 American attitudes to partition is suggested in Afroz [1983: 57], who writes with
reference to the Indus Basin dispute that: "According to American diplomatic
correspondence from Pakistan, this grave situation was 'another consequence of the
notorious Radcliffe Award where power of life and death over Pakistan was put into
the hands of a lawyer, rather than those of a skilled topographer and economist.'
The correspondence was from American Consul General, Hooker A. Doolittle, to the
Pakistani Secretary of State, January 1949.
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but remained, curiously, optimistic. "The fixing of a boundary in this area was further
complicated by the existence of canal systems, so vital to the life of the Punjab but
developed only under the conception of a single administration. ..I think I am entitled to
assume with confidence that any agreements...as to sharing of water from these canals
or otherwise will be respected by whatever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction
over the headworks concerned." [in Ali, 1967: 3191.
Though Radcliffe felt joint control of the canal intakes at Ferozepur should accompany
the demarcation of the boundary he, nonetheless, decided to split the canal system, most
notably awarding territory to India that contained the headworks to canals lying in
Pakistan. The Madhopur headworks on the River Ravi controlled the Upper Bari Doab
canal (UBDC), and the Ferozepur headworks on the River Sutlej controlled the Dipalpur
and the Eastern Grey canals [Ali, 1967: 319].
Radcliffe's remit was restricted to the allocation of territory on the basis of communal
distribution. Therefore, though recognising the need for joint control of the headworks,
Radcliffe could do no more than hope for joint Indian-Pakistani control of the UBDC,
having had to sacrifice its unity. Furthermore, when the princely states of Bahalwapur
and Bikaner asked Radcliffe to take into account their interests in the canals with
headworks in the Punjab, Radcliffe was to refuse. Radcliffe did point out that the
division of the Punjab did not affect the rights of private property [Gulhati, 1973: 57].
The Punjab Partition Committee (PPC), chaired by the Governor of Punjab, and with
equal ministerial representation between East and West Punjab had appointed a two
member committee to determine the provision of water to each half of divided Punjab,
and to each canal. The PPC was to agree with the findings of Committee B with respect
to the canal waters. The Committee was able to report, on 28 July 1947, agreement on
the allocation of water, prescribing to maintain pre-partition water supplies.
Disagreement arose, however, over the value of the canal system and crown waste
lands, lying in the separate parts of Punjab. It was agreed, therefore, to submit the
disputed issue of financial value to the Arbitral Tribunal [Ali, 1967: 318].
Under section nine of the Indian Independence Act difficulties arising from the
practicalities of partition were to be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal set up by the
Governor-General on 12 August 1947, coming into to effect from 14 August 1947.
Disputes could be presented before the Arbitral Tribunal until 1 December 1947, or at
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the chairman's discretion until 1 January 1948. The Tribunal would hear any matter
arising directly out of partition, or disputes over the division of assets or liabilities
between India and Pakistan [Gulhati, 1973: 48].
By 30 November 1947, five matters had been referred to the Arbitral Tribunal regarding
the partitioning of the Punjab. All five referred to the financial adjustments needed for:
[i] the irrigation system; [ii] the crown waste lands; [iii] irrigated forest plantations; [iv]
seigniorage charges for canal use in transporting water around the Indus Basin; and [v]
the general ratio for calculating the financial adjustment needed. With the Chairman's
permission, West Punjab submitted its claim to the Mandi hydro-electric plant, on 22
December 1947 [Gulhati, 1973: 48]. Ali points out that the apportionment of water
between India and Pakistan was not submitted to the Tribunal, because there had been
no disagreement over this issue when it was considered by Committee B of the Punjab
Partition Committee [Ali, 1967: 318].
Once the British had decided to leave India, the process by which the country would be
partitioned and then given its independence was undertaken with questionable haste.
Territory was allocated to the dominions of India and Pakistan, on the basis of the area's
communal make-up. In the Indus Basin, the province that underwent the worst excesses
of partition was the Punjab. It was torn into two pieces: West Punjab formed part of
West Pakistan, and East Punjab formed part of independent India.
Having allocated land on the basis of religion, partition was to share the assets of
British-controlled India between the two dominions. A committee was established to
deal with the partition of the Punjab - the Punjab Partition Committee (PPC). Any
disputes that the PPC could not resolve were passed on to the Arbitral Tribunal set up
specifically for the purpose of resolving such disputes. The primary disputes that were
put before the Arbitral Tribunal were, in the end, of a financial nature rather than related
to the use and allocation of water within the Indus Basin.
2.3.2.1. Punjab vs Punjab
Amidst the upheaval of partition, the issue of water and allocation was a low priority.
Communal violence was growing, feeding off itself; people appeared to be trying to out
do each other in the horror they could inflict upon each other. Nascent governing bodies
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in India and Pakistan struggled to maintain order, while giving food and sanctuary to
fleeing refugees.
At the last minute the British were unequal to the double demand of giving up power
and protecting those who had been subject to that power. Neither the Muslim League,
Congress or the British could control the violence which, with suspicions running high,
it was rumoured was orchestrated [Gulhati, 1973: 53]. The killings, deaths, and mass
migrations left a deep memory of bitterness and misery that clouded the relationship
between the two dominions. This relationship was replicated in microcosm by West
Punjab, now lying in Pakistan, and East Punjab, left in India.
Relations between the two halves of the Punjab appeared, initially, to be promising. On
20 December 1947, Chief Engineers from East and West Punjab signed a Standstill
Agreement. The status quo was to continue on the UDBC and the Dipalpur canals. The
Punjab Partition Committee signalled its approval the same day. Further agreement was
to be negotiated before the Standstill Agreement expired on 31 March 1948,
coincidentally the same day that the Arbitral Tribunal would cease to exist [Gulhati,
1973: 58].
On 17 March 1948, the Arbitral Tribunal made its awards on all six matters before it
[Gulhati, 1973: 48]. The financial liability each dominion had to the other, was
determined by the assets that were being divided. Therefore, by accepting the Indian
premise that the canal system situated now in Pakistan was worth more than Pakistan
was claiming, the Tribunal assumed the existing water supply would be maintained.
Without water, the canals, rather than being assets, would merely be dry ditches. In
addition, the Tribunal regarded the existence and practice of irrigation as giving the
crown wastelands in Pakistan a higher value [Ali, 1967: 320].
It is believed that the East Punjab government formally informed the West Punjab
government, on 29 March 1948, that the Standstill Agreement was to expire at the end
of the month, subject to further negotiations [Gulhati, 1973: 64]. But as Ali points out,
there was an element of complacency in the West Punjabi attitude [1967: 319]. Thus far,
East Punjabi assurances, the agreements of the Committee B and the Punjab Partition
Committee, and the Standstill Agreement had satisfied West Punjab that its counterpart
would not take advantage of its hold on the headworks to Pakistan's canal network. But
the tide was to change.
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The West Punjab government had, on being informed of the coming expiry date,
requested an extension of the Standstill Agreement and further discussions between the
Chief Engineers of both Punjabs. East Punjab replied in two ways. On 1 April 1948,
East Punjab stopped the flow of water passing through its territory to canals in Pakistan.
Acting without formal Federal government approval [Mehta, 1988: 72], the East Punjab
government had closed the Ferozepur headworks on the River Sutlej affecting the
UBDC and the Dipalpur canals. The other reply was to invite the Chief Engineers of
West Punjab to meet with their East Punjab counterparts at the province's new
headquarters in Simla, on 15 April 1948, to renegotiate resumption of the water supply
[Gulhati, 1973: 65].
Though East Punjab, in the absence of a formal agreement, was justified legally to
suspend supply, its action proved to have far reaching consequences. The actual amount
of water involved was insignificant in the face of the vast quantities that flow annually
through the Indus Basin. Gulhati, who was later to be the Indian Designee Engineer to
the Indus Water mediations, in describing the effect of stoppage dismissed it as "some
irrigation channels near Lahore became dry" [1973: 60].
What was of prime importance was that this water flowed through canals to the most
fertile parts of West Punjab. The return in crops per unit of water was amongst the
highest in the Indus Basin. Moreover, the crops from the Punjab fed Pakistan. In
addition, the timing in terms of the agricultural clock in West Punjab, could not have
been worse. The winter crop needed water to be ready for harvesting, and the summer
crops needed water to be ready for sowing. The repercussions were felt in the wider
political scene, as the government of Pakistan sensed the extent of its vulnerability. "The
headwaters of all these rivers were in India, or in territory not subject to Pakistan, and
the consequences of possible aggressive intentions on India's part soon loomed large
before Pakistan" [Gulhati, 1973: 60].
The stoppage brought to the fore the urgent and competing needs East and West Punjab
had for water. West Punjab need to be assured of its existing uses, and access to surplus
water for further development of its irrigated agriculture. East Punjab, occupying
territory that had not been developed under the British, claimed water to develop the
irrigable land at its disposal [Mehta, 1988: 72; Shivananda, 1961: 7-8]. Attitudes,
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hardened by partition, appeared to regard the situation as a zero-sum affair such that
both parties could not get what they wanted, or needed.28
The Indian perspective is recounted by Gulhati, who explains that under the British most
of the expansion and modernisation that occurred of the irrigation system happened in
the territory that later formed West Punjab. East Punjab, formed after partition, regarded
this as unjust especially as any further development would now need expensive storage
facilities. Using the 1941 census it claimed there were 21 million people in Indian
Punjab and 25 million in Pakistani Punjab, yet out of 105,000 km 2 irrigated annually in
the Indus Basin less than 20%, or 21,000 km2, was in East Punjab territory [1973: 59].
Furthermore, the international boundary had a disrupting effect on: [i] the food supply to
the 21 million people in East Punjab; [ii] the hydrological unity of the basin; [iii] the
development of several million acres of highly arid, but otherwise fertile land, which
were wholly dependent upon the Indus rivers; and [iv] settling the large number of
refugees from West Punjab and Bahawalpur, who worked the land [Gulhati, 1973: 59].
East Punjab sought to rectify the situation by establishing its own claim to the water.
While India regarded the uneven development as unjust, Pakistan viewed the water
stoppage as catastrophic. To paraphrase Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, Prime Minister of
Pakistan (1955-56): With scant rainfall falling outside of the summer monsoons, and the
arid climate of most of West Pakistan, the rivers flowing through West Punjab provide
the mainstay for supporting agriculture. Upon the success of the West Punjabi crop
production, rested the livelihood of the 43 million people populating West Pakistan as a
whole, including the refugees from India.
Ali continued by drawing a comparison between India and Pakistan's national water
availability. He pointed out, that India has many rivers flowing to the seas untapped, and
large areas of rainfed agriculture in addition [1967: 316]. With the stoppage, the distress
and acute suffering increased daily as crops and herds faced ruin, and large areas did not
have any drinking water [Ali, 1967: 320]. Summing up the situation, Ali said that "[o]n
28 Afroz points out that, "American diplomats stationed in Pakistan and India stressed
the importance of a final and binding settlement of water rights. In their view the
control of Indus waters by India threatened to return the entire Punjab to a desert"
[1983: 57]. In India, the American diplomat, H Donovan, wrote to the Government;
as did his colleague in Pakistan, Hooker A. Doolittle to the Pakistani Government in
January 1949.
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the side of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity. On the part of West Punjab
there was neglect of duty, complacency, and lack of common prudence - which had
disastrous consequences on Pakistan" [1967: 319].
The violence that was unleashed with partition marred the relationship between the
dominions of India and Pakistan, as well as the two halves of separated Punjab. Yet, the
signing of a standstill agreement in December 1947 appeared to suggest that, at least
with regard to the international waters of the Indus Basin, East and West Punjab may
come to some arrangement. Unfortunately, the shared waters of the Indus system were
shortly set to replicate the larger hostility of the political environment. The Agreement
regarding the UBDC and the Dipalpur canal was temporary and due to expire on 31
March 1948.
Shortly before the Agreement did expire the East Punjab Government informed its West
Punjab counterpart of the imminent date. The Government of West Punjab asked East
Punjab for an extension of the Standstill Agreement, but was met with a blunt rejection.
On 1 April 1948 the East Punjab Government closed off the supply of water from the
Sutlej River to the UBDC and Dipalpur canals. Only then did East Punjab invite West
Punjab to talks regarding this water.
2.3.2.2. The Delhi Agreement, 1948
Gulhati doubts whether the East Punjab government had studied, dispassionately, the
logic of its actions and the consequences devolving from it [1973: 64]. The atmosphere
at that time was heavily charged, the memory and fact of blood hung in the air,
distorting the standards by which to measure rational action. Officially, the provincial
government had acted without the federal government's prior approval, and were to
elicit little sympathy from some sections of the Indian central government. In fact, the
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is thought to have castigated the East Punjab
government and their engineers, in September 1949, for having taken matters into their
own hands [Gulhati, 1973: 64].
Water had been stopped, East Punjab was later to explain, so as to establish exclusive
ownership of the Upper Bari Doab canal (UBDC). It was felt that, in the absence of any
formal agreement, if East Punjab had not closed the water temporarily this might have
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led to West Punjab acquiring legal rights on the UBDC for the benefit of the lower
section of the canal, now called the Central Bari Doab canal (CBDC) [Gulhati, 1973:
63]. In effect, East Punjab was concerned about allowing a precedent to arise that would
prove detrimental to it at a later stage. But, as Gulhati points out, whatever the reasons
for the stoppage, West Punjab and Pakistan could only regard it as provocative [1973:
63].
At the invitation of the East Punjab government, engineers from West Punjab met their
counterparts at Simla on 15 April 1948. As a result of the Chief Engineers' meeting, two
standstill agreements were signed on 18 April 1948, regarding the Dipalpur canal and
CBDC, to take effect upon ratification by India and Pakistan [Gulhati, 1973: 65]. But the
West Punjab Government refused to ratify the Agreements. Shivananda claims that in
the absence of ratification, "the supply of water to the Central Bari Doab Canal and the
Dipalpur Canal was not restored" [1961: 14].
If the Agreements had been ratified, they would have provided an immediate, but
temporary, supply of water. The first Standstill Agreement, dealing with supplies to the
CBDC, restored the status quo until 30 September 1948. For practical and administrative
reasons, small channels, crossing the international boundary from east to west, were
ignored by the Chief Engineers. The second Standstill Agreement, attended to the non-
perennial Dipalpur canal's supplies from the Ferozepur headworks, and other canals in
West Punjab and Bahawalpur offtaking from the Sutlej at the Suleimanke headworks.
This Agreement was due to expire on 15 October 1948 [Gulhati, 1973: 67].
Under the British, Bikaner state had had to pay seigniorage charges to the Punjab for
supplying water, and proportionate maintenance costs for the Ferozepur headwork and
the feeder canal sited in Punjabi territory. East Punjab, citing this precedent, stipulated
that West Punjab must pay similar costs. Whether reluctant or not, West Punjab agreed
to pay: [i] seigniorage charges; [ii] proportionate maintenance costs; and [iii] interest on
a proportionate amount of capital [Gulhati, 1973: 67].
Curiously, as Gulhati notes, the Standstill Agreements did not mention the Bahawalpur
State Distributary (BSD) [1973: 67]. Supplying a canal command area (cca) of 270 km2,
the BSD took off water, in particular, from the Eastern canal's end situated in East
Punjab. Though water for this system was included in the agreed supplies from the
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Ferozepur headworks, provision had not been made to convey it through the Eastern
canal [1973: 67].
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, proposed on 24 April 1948 an Inter-
Dominion conference to settle the dispute, and asked for the "immediate restoration of
the water supply" [Shivananda, 1961: 14]. The Indian Prime Minister replied, on 30
April 1948, that he had instructed East Punjab to restore supplies to the CBDC and
Dipalpur canals. It appears that in the Indian administration, it was understood that this
was on the basis of the Standstill Agreements subject to any changes arising in the Inter-
Dominion conference to be held in New Delhi on 3 May 1948 [Gulhati, 1973: 65].
Pakistan and India arrived at the conference with conflicting aims, which they were keen
to achieve or at the very least reluctant to relinquish. West Punjab wanted to protect its
existing uses. The most obvious mode to do this was, in the absence of storage facilities,
to restrict East Punjabi developments which would divert water from the River Sutlej.
East Punjab, of course, wanted to irrigate as much land as was possible, as quickly as
possible, for the lowest cost possible.
At the Inter-Dominion conference, Pakistan challenged the calculation by which the
seigniorage charges and capital cost of the UBDC for interest charges, was made.
Gulhati states Pakistan did not raise any objections to the exclusion from any agreement
of the upper Sutlej waters and the BSD [1973: 68]. Yet it was only on the second, and
last day, that any progress was made and agreement reached. In essence, India and
Pakistan agreed to disagree by postponing a decision on the points upon which they
differed. Ali suggests that apart from the legal status, the parties wanted to retain a
practical spirit in finding an accord [1967: 3211.
The Inter-Dominion Agreement, also known as the Delhi Agreement, was signed on 4
May 1948. Signatories on behalf of India were the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,
the Minister for Works, Mines and Power, N V Gadgil and representing the East Punjab
government, its Minister for Irrigation, Swaran Singh. The Pakistani signatories were
the Finance Minister, Ghulam Muhammad, and representing the West Punjabi
government, its ministers, Shaukat Hyat Khan and Mumtaz Daultana [Gulhati, 1973:
68].
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The Inter-Dominion conference in Delhi agreed to restore water to the CDBC and the
Dipalpur canals. However, the East Punjab government would gradually diminish
supply to these canals for its own use, thereby giving the West Punjab government time
to find alternative sources. The West Punjab government agreed, in turn, to pay
seigniorage charges for the cost of transporting water through canals in East Punjab, and
give its share of any maintenance costs. As the dispute over the calculation of
seigniorage charges remained unresolved, the portion that was held in dispute would, it
was agreed, be held in escrow. This amount would be decided by the Indian Prime
Minister. It was, also, agreed that further talks should be held to achieve the friendly
solution both sides wanted [Ali, 1967: 321].
As Gulhati points out, the Delhi Agreement stipulated certain conditions under which
the East Punjab government would restore water to West Punjab, specifically the
Standstill Agreements signed at Simla though it does not mention them explicitly [1973:
70]. The agreement, thus, acknowledged the Simla agreements; noted Pakistani
objections to two terms within the Delhi Agreement; postponed the decision on disputed
matters; and gave practical shape to water replacement for the first time. In other words,
Pakistan had a specific amount of time, though undefined, to find alternative sources in
general and specifically for the CBDC and Dipalpur canals [Gulhati, 1973: 70].
The Punjab Partition Committee (PPC) was still residing when the Delhi Agreement was
signed. At West Punjab's insistence, the Committee took note of the agreement at its
meeting on 26-27 May 1948, and the West Punjab statement that further negotiations
would take place between representatives of India and Pakistan. The Committee,
herewith, relinquished all responsibility for the Sutlej River dispute [Gulhati, 1973: 71;
Shivananda, 1961: 17].
Though the Delhi Agreement was signed the manner of its signing, later, became a
contentious issue. Pakistan claimed that with India's refusal to submit the disagreement
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an impasse had arisen. Ghulam Mohammad,
the then Finance Minister of Pakistan, had appealed to Lord Mountbatten, India's
Governor-General, who consulted with Prime Minister Nehru [Ali, 1967: 321]. The
result was the Delhi Agreement, constituting a statement that was "placed before
Ghulam Muhammad, and he was asked to sign it without changing a word or a comma -
a condition for restoring the flow water" [Ali, 1967: 321]. A Government of Pakistan
document, "Pakistan: The Struggle for Irrigation Water - and Existence", even
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challenges the notion that an international agreement had been signed: "Unable to come
to any final agreement, a Joint Statement was issued after the meeting" [1953b: 10,
emphasis added].
In addition, there is some confusion over the status of the Bahawalpur State Distributary
(BSD) in the Standstill Agreements signed at Simla in April 1948. Ali, representing the
Pakistani position, claims that the Indians failed to honour agreements and restore water
to the BSD, resulting in considerable tracts of the State of Bahawalpur returning to
desert. Yet, "[n]otwithstanding the compulsion under which the arrangement was
signed, Pakistan performed its part and deposited in escrow the sums specified by the
Prime Minister of India. Later, Nehru, in an apparent fit of amnesia, denied that there
had been any compulsion" [Ali, 1967: 321].
But Nehru writing in September 1950 to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, expressed his surprise at Pakistan's position that India had forced it to sign the
Delhi Agreement: 'I cannot imagine how any question of compulsion could possibly
have arisen in these circumstances. There was then no kind of threat or even suggestion
about stopping the flow of water' [Ali, 1967: 321]. Nehru recalled, in November 1960,
how agreement was reached in Delhi. Nehru had entered the discussions when they were
on the verge of breaking down, and took a broad approach asking neither India nor
Pakistan to give up any rights, deferring that decision to the future [Gulhati, 1973: 711.
In addition, Gulhati, in representing the Indian position, claims the Standstill
Agreements signed at Simla in April 1948 made no allowance for the BSD and nine
other smaller canals offtaking from the CBDC. This was, Gulhati suggested, due for
both Punjabs' administrative convenience [1973: 67]. Since an agreement covering
these canals had not been signed, India was not under any obligation to supply water to
them. Therefore, Pakistan could not accuse India of reneging upon a promise it had not
made.
The politicians in charge of the nascent countries had a larger capacity to push through
policies that, later, less established politicians may have shied away from because of the
unpopularity of the issues involved. Stephens suggests that Jinnah could have pushed
through any form of constitutional, political and social innovation, since he "wielded
authority of an unquestioned, overriding, personal sort" [1963: 229]. Though, Stephens
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suggests, Nehru neither had, nor wanted such power, it is probable that Nehru did wield
similar powers whatever their source.
Unfortunately for Pakistan, in light of the shambles the political system would become
Jinnah, the country's founder, Governor-General and President of the fledgling
Constituent Assembly, died in September 1948. Jinnah had, reluctantly at first,
demanded this child of British India, and then witnessed the trauma of its birth. With
promises still fresh on the winds of Karachi Jinnah, father of the nation, died. Pakistan
was left to age in years without ever shedding its inherited feudal political system, and
attaining the mature political system dreamed of at partition.
The actions of upstream East Punjab, taken without the knowledge of the central
Government of India, took downstream West Punjab by surprise. East Punjab tried to
rationalise its actions by explaining that it was trying to establish a claim upon the River
Sutlej's waters, as it did not want Pakistan to assume it would have access on the same
basis as before partition. This explanation did little to calm the West Punjab Government
which was shaken by the realisation that not only were its existing uses vulnerable to
upstream withdrawals and control, but that the upstream riparian contained elements that
were hostile to Pakistan.
Pakistan was keen to resume the water supply, and negotiated a hasty agreement with
India at an Inter-Dominion Conference in May 1948. The resultant Inter-Dominion
(Delhi) Agreement of May 1948 acknowledged that there was a dispute between the two
halves of the Punjab, and though a final solution was not available at these talks, further
talks were to be held by the disputants to find such a solution.
The Delhi Agreement would, however, restore water to Pakistan but at a cost. Firstly,
Pakistan was to pay for the transport of water through India, and secondly, India was to
be allowed gradually to diminish this supply to Pakistan. Though the Agreement did not
contain a date beyond which it would be defunct, it did call for further discussion of the
problem between the two countries. Though Pakistan had signed the Agreement, it was
to become dissatisfied with the provisions therein, and challenge not only the Agreement
but also the manner of signing. India, however, was satisfied with what it regarded as an
international water agreement, and refuted Pakistan's claim that it was invalid and
signed under duress.
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2.12.3 Communicating Hopes and Suspicions
Difficulties with the Delhi Agreement began almost immediately. West Punjab had
begun to dig a channel from the River Sutlej's right bank. The plan was to link the Sutlej
to the Dipalpur canal by circumventing the Ferozepur headworks altogether. Of course,
India was not pleased with this development. West Punjab's reply on 16 May 1948, to
East Punjab's protests, was to take the matter up at the Inter-Dominion level [Gulhati,
1973: 71]. This led to a series of telegrams being exchanged between the Foreign
Ministers of Pakistan and India, who were respectively Zafrulla Khan and Jawaharlal
Nehru. The latter was, of course, also India's Prime Minister.
Pakistan justified its decision to dig as a precautionary measure against India closing
down the water supply in the future. India's reply did not address this fear, but rather
focused upon its own interests in the matter. Namely, that the channel would divert
water from the Sutlej upstream of the Ferozepur headworks, which could be damaged as
a result. This would endanger Indian planned uses offtaking from the Sutlej.
Furthermore, India warned that it would take retaliatory action, and dig a channel further
upstream of Pakistan's channel [Gulhati, 1973: 71].
A few weeks later, an opportunity arose by which India could put added pressure on
Pakistan to stop the digging. On 4 June 1948, Pakistan made its first formal complaint
about water not being supplied to the BSD from India's Eastern canal. India replied that
provision had not been made for it under any of the post-partition agreements between
the two dominions. On 15 June 1948, India offered to ask the East Punjab government
to start supplying the BSD, subject of course to seigniorage charges under the Delhi
Agreement, if Pakistan stopped digging the channel. Pakistan informed India, on 6 July
1948, that it had stopped work on the channel. It was agreed that all outstanding Indo-
Pakistani matters would be discussed in another meeting [Gulhati, 1973: 72].
The Delhi Agreement had envisaged a succession of Inter-Dominion meetings to discuss
the outstanding disputes. Unfortunately, the situation at the time of the Agreement
quickly disintegrated and, following their own dynamic, events disrupted the meetings.
On 21 July 1948, India and Pakistan met in Lahore, led by N Gopalaswami Ayyangur
and Zafrulla Khan respectively. The meeting ended without agreement, and only an
exchange of statements. Ali puts this down to India reverting back to the position
initially taken by East Punjab: that the state government held all proprietary rights to the
74
water in its territory, and that this should be formally recognised in an agreement.
Pakistan, of course, was unwilling to abandon its legal position on the Sutlej River
[1967: 321-322].
Meetings were being held also by the Chief Engineers of the two Punjabs. After one
such meeting, Pakistan sent India a telegram, on 15 September 1948, giving its own
interpretation of the Delhi Agreement: [i] India was to supply West Punjab with water
until a final agreement was reached by the two sides; and [ii] excepting the two disputed
points, the Standstill Agreements signed at Simla were to be recognised. Since Pakistan
wanted the water supply to continue for rabi 1948-49, it requested India to give it
immediate confirmation of the interpretation drawn, and for the Indian Prime Minister to
fix the seigniorage charges West Punjab was to pay for three to six months starting from
the following October [Gulhati, 1973: 72].
In this interpretation of the Delhi Agreement, Pakistan did not put an expiry date on the
agreement. Its reference to reaching a final agreement implied that Pakistan regarded the
Delhi Agreement as temporary. As Shivananda points out Pakistan's Foreign Ministry
wrote to its Indian counterpart, on 15 September 1948: 'The Delhi Agreement clearly
provides for continual supplies to West Punjab until the final agreement is arrived at
between the two Dominions and at the same time accepts Simla Agreements excepting
two disputed points' [1961: 171.29
India assured Pakistan, on 26 September 1948, that it would supply the water requested
but did not comment upon the interpretation Pakistan was giving to the Delhi Agreement
[Gulhati, 1973: 73]. Meanwhile, the Standstill Agreements signed at Simla were due to
expire. These Agreements only assured water to the CBDC until 30 September 1948,
and the Dipalpur canal until 15 October 1948, after which supplies would have to be re-
negotiated.
The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan corresponded with each other to no avail.
Pakistan refused to accept India's interpretation of the Delhi Agreement, as outlined by
Nehru in 18 October 1948: [i] East Punjab had the right to diminish the supply to West
Punjab; [ii] further meetings were to be held on this matter; and [iii] if either side was to
29 The disputed points refers to the disagreement between India and Pakistan over the
value of the UBDC, and seigniorage charges Pakistan was expected to pay India for
the supply of water.
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incur unrealistic delay because of the other, then the injured party could terminate the
Agreement after giving reasonable notice. Ali suggests Pakistan understood the
interpretation to imply that if it did not accept India's conditions quickly, India would be
justified in ending the Agreement and stopping the water once more. "For Pakistan to
accept the Indian interpretation would have been a permanent renunciation of Pakistan's
legal rights" [1967: 322].
In April 1949, the Government of India agreed to continue supplying water under the
Delhi Agreement's terms. But in June 1949, Pakistan widened the dispute to include all
common rivers, and requested another meeting, in August, to allocate the water
equitably. If agreement was not forthcoming then, Pakistan suggested, the matter should
be referred to the ICJ [Gulhati, 1973: 73]. India in turn refused, once more, the option of
going to the ICJ [Ali, 1967: 322].
Pakistan's decision to include all common waters with India probably referred only to
all the waters in the Indus Basin. The two countries had in common the waters of two
river basins, the Indus in the West, and the Ganges-Brahmaputra in East. However, the
Government of Pakistan was, soon after independence, dominated by politicians from
the western wing. Therefore, though Indian plans to build a barrage at Faralcka were
soon to become concrete, it is doubtful whether the national government residing in
West Pakistan was overly concerned in light of what was going on within the Indus
Basin.
The Sind Observer, 18 January 1949, reported the establishment by the Pakistani
government of an organisation to deal with the Indus basin problem. This organisation
was being advised by an American law firm. Not to be outdone, the Indian government
set up its own organisation looking at the Indus basin problem, as well, and also
collecting data on Indian needs for the future planning purposes.
To head this organisation, the Indians created the post of Deputy Secretary (Special) in
the Ministry of Works, Mines and Power, to which Gulhati was duly appointed at the
end of June 1949 [Gulhati, 1973: 74]. The organisation was peopled by personnel from
the East Punjab government: Vidya Ratna, an ex-engineer; Dr J K Malhotra, Statistical
Officer; and S M Sikri, Assistant Advocate-General. Its first task was to prepare for the
forthcoming Inter-Dominion meeting being held in New Delhi during August 1949
[Gulhati, 1973: 74].
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The Inter-Dominion meeting, held on 4-6 August 1949, brought together the same
representatives as before to discuss the problems arising out of shared use and needs of
the River Sutlej. Though, the atmosphere remained cordial, discussions were limited to
an exchange of cautious, terse comments and the only agreement reached was to meet
again [Ali, 1967: 322]. At this meeting, India suggested setting up a joint technical
committee, but the idea was met with caution by Pakistan. India suggested this
committee would comprise of two engineers, one each from Pakistan and India.
The joint committee's functions would be to: [i] investigate and report on the availability
of water in the Indus Basin; [ii] to assess the overall irrigation needs of areas that had
already been developed and those areas for which development was planned; and [iii]
the works that would be needed to supply all requirements in an equitable fashion, for
the maximum benefit of both countries [Gulhati, 1973: 75].
After a string of communiqués, with India trying to convince Pakistan of the joint
technical committee's desirability and Pakistan requesting further clarification each
time, it was agreed to meet in Karachi on 27-29 March 1950 [Gulhati, 1973: 76]. India
had in a previous communication, on 5 October 1949, suggested establishing a
preliminary negotiating committee comprising of three people each from India and
Pakistan. This committee would settle the terms of reference for the joint technical
committee, and explore any possibilities for settling the dispute [Gulhati, 1973: 75]. In
effect, this committee was to be the pre-negotiating committee for the proposed joint
technical committee.
Pakistan's Foreign Minister wrote to his Indian counterpart on 1 November 1949,
offering not to press for prior recognition if it was agreed that the interim period under
the Delhi Agreement had expired [Gulhati, 1973: 76]. Pakistan also proposed alternative
arrangements to a joint technical committee: First, to negotiate new interim
arrangements pending a final settlement; second, to appoint a commission comprising
non-engineers and headed by a neutral chairman. This commission would, however,
retain the authority to employ technical advisers if necessary, from India, Pakistan and a
neutral source. The commission's remit would be limited to making recommendations
not arbitrating between the two countries; and finally, if agreement was not reached then
India would be obliged to allow the dispute to be out before the ICJ [Gulhati, 1973: 76-
77].
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Pakistan's offer to rescind its demand for prior recognition was a contradiction, Gulhati
claims, of the stance it had taken over a year before in the telegram of September 1948
[1973: 76]. The remainder of the proposal followed the same line taken before. In other
words, the involvement of a neutral commission or tribunal in the dispute. India refused
to countenance any change to the terms of the Delhi Agreement, and insisted that a
bilateral fact-finding commission without the involvement of a neutral body was the first
step to resolution [Gulhati, 1973: 77].
The March 1950 meeting in Karachi was to explore the idea of joint development and
management of the Indus basin, with the whole basin's water resources to play with.
The six people jointly representing the Dominions could, possibly, have made up the
preliminary negotiating committee that India suggested in October 1949. Being
represented were not just the provinces as in previous meetings, but the central
governments too.
India was represented by: B K Gokhale, Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Mines and
Power; A N Khosla, Consulting Engineer to the Indian government and Chairman of the
Central Power, Irrigation and Navigation Commission; M R Sachdev, Chief Secretary of
East Punjab, who was assisted by Gulhati and Dr J K Malhotra. Pakistan was
represented by: Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, Secretary-General to the Pakistani
government who headed the delegation; H A Majid, Chief Secretary of West Punjab; Pir
Muhammad Ibrahim, Chief Engineer in West Punjab's Irrigation department [Gulhati,
1973: 76; Ali, 1967: 322].
At the meeting, it appeared that both sides were making an effort to put aside politics,
and explore options on a practical level. Pakistan proposed: [i] existing uses be met by
existing sources; [ii] new supplies be met by building storage facilities on the Sutlej,
Ravi, Beas and Chenab rivers; and [iii] the cost of construction be shared proportionally
to the benefit derived and the waters be allocated equitably.
India proposed: [i] that the Sutlej River, upon which India was building the Bhakra
Dam, be appropriated by India; [ii] the Beas, Ravi and Chenab be made available for
Pakistan to maintain existing uses, subject to certain adjustments favouring India; and
[iii] a link from the Chenab be built to meet any shortfall in Pakistan's supply. They
further proposed that [iv] if there was still a deficit, then a dam be built on the Chenab to
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meet this deficit, and to supply new developments. It was agreed that the Indian and
Pakistani engineers would study the proposals and present the relevant engineering data
before the next meeting in May 1950 [Ali, 1967: 322].
Al's hopes for an agreement were dashed by the next meeting in Delhi during May
1950. The atmosphere had changed completely. India was not willing to pursue the line
suggested in Karachi. Instead, it intended to take all of the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi rivers
and 283 cumecs (10,000 cusecs) from the Chenab via a tunnel at Marhu [1967: 322-
323]. Ali spoke to Nehru about the consequences of India's proposed actions upon
Pakistan's uses and people: "He [Nehru] was very effusive in expressing those soulful
sentiments that have appealed so much to foreigners and professed anxiety for a humane
solution; but I could not change his mind on the point in question" [1967: 323].
Pakistan began to say that the Delhi Agreement had been signed under duress, and gave
notice of its expiry, in a note to the Indian government on 23 August 1950 [Gulhati,
1973: 79]. India's Prime Minister Nehru replied to his counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan, on
12 September 1950, that India had not pressured Pakistan to sign, and there was no
question of duress. India sent another note to Pakistan a few days later, on 15 September
1950, saying that Pakistan had previously not mentioned this issue of duress in: [i] a
joint communiqué issued on 7 May 1948; [ii] a note sent to the Punjab Partition
Committee by the West Punjab government three weeks later; and [iii] nor was it
mentioned at the Inter-Dominion Conference held in Lahore three months later [Gulhati,
1973: 79-80].
As late as September 1954, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra was
still claiming that Pakistan had been forced to sign the Delhi Agreement [Gulhati, 1973:
79]. This was after the talks sponsored by the IBRD had broken down, and negotiations
were ongoing to restart them. The initial issue of duress may have appeared at a time
when Pakistan was unhappy with India's proposals to appropriate the waters of three
rivers, and tap into a fourth river.
In addition, the Delhi Agreement gave India the supposed right to diminish water to
Pakistan, but without stipulating a concrete timetable. Pakistan probably feared India
would, simultaneously, use the agreement to full measure and diminish water, as well as
develop its control of the three Eastern rivers as it proposed to do. Therefore, by saying
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the Delhi Agreement was invalid, Pakistan could hope to get India to return to the
negotiating table - or possibly be free to invoke international law.
The disagreement that arose between India and Pakistan surrounding the Delhi
Agreement was repeatedly addressed at Inter-Dominion meetings held throughout the
period of 1948-50. The proposals that emerged from these meetings at times appeared to
offer a solution to the problem, only to be lost in the follow-up period due to changing
events in the domestic politics of both countries. The dispute over the water of the Sutlej
was accumulating other disputes as the dispute remained unresolved. Notably the issue
of charges Pakistan was to pay India for the transportation of the water through to West
Punjab, i.e. disputed seigniorage charges.
2.3.2.4 Disputed Seigniorage Charges
As part of the Delhi Agreement, Pakistan agreed to pay India seigniorage charges which
India claimed for transporting water through canals on its territory. However, the
calculation of these charges was disputed by Pakistan. Therefore, it was decided that
West Punjab would pay in full the charges, including the contested amount, as specified
by the Indian Prime Minister. The money would be deposited in the Reserve Bank of
India by the West Punjab government, from which the undisputed amount would be
transferred to East Punjab. The remaining money would be held in escrow until
agreement was reached on this matter [Gulhati, 1973: 82]. By acquiescing to this
procedure, both India and Pakistan had, in effect, agreed to put the dispute on hold but
without recognising or abandoning either country's position as right or wrong.
At Pakistan's request the arrangement of water transfer for kharif (summer) 1948 was
extended to rabi (winter) 1948-49 and then kharif 1949 too. Thereafter, India
unilaterally arranged to transfer water for each crop and charge Pakistan seigniorage as
agreed. Gulhati claims that India did not want to repeat the situation that arose in April
1948, neither did it want to let Pakistan have the water for free [1973: 82]. Therefore,
East Punjab was instructed to supply water under the strictures of the Delhi Agreement,
on receipt of the indents from West Punjab's engineers. These routine matters generated
a large amount of correspondence [Gulhati, 1973: 82].
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When Pakistan first made a deposit in the Reserve Bank of India, it informed the Bank
that the drawing authority would be the Secretary for Finance in the West Punjab
government. The Indian government, on hearing this, asked Pakistan to put the deposit
in the Indian Prime Minister's name, because there would be little sense in depositing
the money if Pakistan could withdraw it unilaterally [Gulhati, 1973: 82]. Though
Pakistan did not object to this alteration, it took several months to revise its instructions
to the Reserve Bank. In June 1949, Pakistan announced it as irrelevant as to whose name
the money was being held, as it was in fact in escrow. However, the Reserve Bank was
not aware of this. The matter was cleared up when on 17 November 1949, Pakistan
instructed the Bank to put the money in escrow [Gulhati, 1973: 83].
In September 1949, the Sterling Bloc countries followed the United Kingdom's lead and
devalued their currencies. However, Pakistan's refusal to toe the line was interpreted by
India as a hostile act, and it imposed an economic blockade forthwith. It is possible that
this was fresh in the Pakistani government's mind when it decided to unilaterally declare
the Delhi Agreement void. On 1 November 1949, Pakistan informed India that though it
regarded the Agreement as having expired, it would continue its deposits in the Reserve
Bank as a goodwill gesture. However, Pakistan also requested to be able to stop these
deposits [Gulhati, 1973: 83].
India's emphatic response was that, not only was the Delhi Agreement still binding upon
all its signatories, but the deposits were an integral part of the agreement. Moreover, the
Indian government expressed its surprise at Pakistan's unilateral invalidation of the
agreement [Gulhati, 1973: 83]. Pakistan continued depositing the seigniorage charges
till July 1950, when it stopped paying the portion of the charges that were in dispute. In
November 1950, Pakistan informed India that it had established credit with an American
trust company. This company was instructed to pay India the outstanding money in the
event that: [i] India agreed to refer the matter to the ICJ or another international tribunal
agreed to by the two governments before 30 June 1951; and [ii] after referring the matter
to the ICJ, the Court decided the amount that was due to India [Gulhati, 1973: 83-84].
India regarded Pakistan's unilateral changing of the escrow arrangements as
contravening the Delhi Agreement, and refused to associate itself with the changes. The
ensuing correspondence failed to resolve the impasse. At the beginning of each crop,
India demanded payment in full for the water it was letting pass through its territory.
Pakistan paid the amount that was undisputed, but either ignored the remainder, or
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retaliated by repeating its request for the matter to be arbitrated. During this period,
India continued its obligations and supplied water to Pakistan [Gulhati, 1973: 84]. The
impasse continued as India continued to demand full payment, and Pakistan reiterated it
would pay only if India agreed to put the whole Sutlej dispute before an international
tribunal [Gulhati, 1973: 87].
The issue of disputed seigniorage charges dogged bilateral discussions between India
and Pakistan and had reached an impasse by the time the World Bank came to intervene.
In the meantime, both countries continued to construct works that would safeguard their
water supply, either existing or planned. The matter of the seigniorage charges was only
resolved in 1960, in the final stages of the Indus Waters Treaty's drafting under the
auspices of the World Bank.
The Bank representative informed the Governor of the Reserve Bank in Bombay, of
India and Pakistan's agreement on this matter:
"There is an amount now held in escrow (believed to be Rupees 2,936,485) in
canal dispute account with Reserve Bank Calcutta. As part of Indus Waters
settlement India and Pakistan have agreed that amount in this account should
be transferred to new account with the Reserve Bank to be opened in name of
IBRD and denominated IBRD - canal dispute account. India and Pakistan
would also instruct IBRD to hold amount transferred to new account until
Indus Waters Treaty enters into force and thereupon to pay amount to payee
to be designated by Government of India" [IBRD-26/8/60].
2.3.2.5 Constructing Alternative Irrigation Works to Safeguard Supply
It became clear almost immediately, that the Delhi Agreement of May 1948 had been
unsuccessful in allaying Pakistani fears about its upstream neighbour, nor had it
determined an avenue that could resolve the dispute on the River Sutlej. Radcliffe, in
dividing the Punjab, had awarded to Pakistan a small enclave just above the Ferozepur
headworks. The River Sutlej flowed through India, then through a small pocket of
Pakistan before re-entering India and encountering the headworks at Ferozepur. Spurred
on by its impression of the Delhi Agreement's fragility, Pakistan sought to protect its
uses on the Sutlej. This Pakistan began to do by building a channel from the section of
the river where it was upstream of India, to the canals offtaking the Sutlej downstream
of India. (See Figure 3 for the canals and places mentioned below.)
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What followed was a development programme that had been interrupted, and then
distorted by partition. Loyalties that had pitted province against province, now first
pitted state against state, and then involved the provinces within each country.
Therefore, West Punjab competed internationally with East Punjab for the use of Sutlej
water, and then nationally against downstream Sind for the remaining water.
In May 1948, Pakistan was making progress with its plan to divert water from the Sutlej,
upstream of the Ferozepur headworks. India regarded this as hostile behaviour, and
demanded Pakistan that it stop the project, because the by-passing of the headworks
would be detrimental to Indian canals offtaking from it. East Punjab prepared a
contingency plan to safeguard its supply from the Ferozepur headworks to the Eastern
and Bikaner canals. Firstly, to confine the Sutlej River's flow to Indian territory; and
secondly, to build a link canal between the Eastern and Bikaner canals from a barrage
that had already been proposed at Harike, situated just below the Sutlej-Beas confluence
[Gulhati, 1973: 84].
In April 1949, the East Punjab Government was asked to submit a proposal for the
construction of the Harike barrage. By December 1949, despite Pakistani protests, the
Indians decided to build the barrage for two reasons. Firstly, to safeguard against
upstream diversions by the Pakistani project; and secondly, to utilise water that would be
"set free by progressive diminution" to Pakistan's supplies [Gulhati, 1973: 85]. The
latter arrangement was, India claimed, written into the Delhi Agreement. India planned
to build a tunnel at Marhu on the Chenab River to divert water, and in due course to take
the entire flow of the Beas River too.
The Harike Project envisaged head regulators for the Ferozepur and Sirhind feeders of
311 cubic metres per second (cumecs or m3/sec) (11,000 cubic feet per second or
cusecs) capacity, and for the proposed Rajasthan canal of 425 cumecs (15,000 cusecs).
Included in the project were plans to replace an old inundation canal, offtaking from the
Sutlej, with the Makhu canal. East Punjab was also asked to prepare details for a
proposed link between Madhopur on the Ravi to the Beas River, with an initial capacity
of 170 cumecs (6,000 cusecs) later to be increased to 368 cumecs (13,000 cusecs) after
the Marhu Tunnel had been constructed on the Chenab [Gulhati, 1973: 85].
The proposed Rajasthan canal highlights a couple of points. Firstly, the inter-state
rivalry within India that existed for the water of the River Sutlej. The East Punjab
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Government was reluctant to share the Sutlej with Rajasthan [Gulhati, 1973: 86].
Rajasthan's position on the edge of the Indus Basin does raise questions about
transferring water out of the basin before prioritising intra-basin uses. (This was, also,
raised by Israel's supply to the Negev desert from the Jordan River basin.) But East
Punjab's hesitance probably had more to do with the desire to retain as much as water
for their own uses and to not have to curb their own irrigation development.
Secondly, the financial matters pertaining to the Rajasthan canal's construction. In April
1950, the Government of India asked the provincial government of Rajasthan to survey
areas in the state that would be served by the proposed canal. The Rajasthan
Government, however, proved reluctant to undertake this investigation. It was feared
that if, after investigation, the canal was not built Rajasthan would have incurred the
costs unnecessarily. The matter was settled after the central Government agreed to carry
out the investigations and cover the costs of the study [Gulhati, 1973: 86].
Construction continued in East Punjab as new distributaries from the UBDC were being
built to settle refugees from West Punjab. The first of these channels was opened for the
kharif (summer) crop of 1950. But since these canals only received water after meeting
the full indent of the CBDC, that is Pakistan's needs, there was only enough water for
them for part of the kharif season [Gulhati, 1973: 85]. Under these circumstances, the
state Government wanted to concentrate its efforts on building the Bhakra dam, which
would store excess water during kharif (summer) and be able to supply these channels
that were at the mercy of the weather and Pakistan's indent [Gulhati, 1973: 86].
However, when the Bhakra project came before the Planning Commission for review, it
was concluded that if the Bhakra canal could be completed at the same time as the
Nangal project, it would be possible to operate it on a non-perennial basis without
encroaching upon existing supplies offtaking from the Sutlej and Beas. The Nangal
barrage and canal project had been started in 1946, and was expected to be completed
by 1952. Therefore, the Bhalcra-Nangal project was re-oriented to prioritise the Bhakra
canal, with the hope of starting operation in kharif 1954. But as Gulhati states, the East
Punjab Government "had almost to be forced by the Planning Commission, in which I
was the Chief of the Natural Resources Division" [1973: 86].
To Pakistan it was clear that India wanted to prolong negotiations to build the Bhakra
dam and the Rajasthan canal amongst other engineering works. "[T]he effect of which
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would be to deprive Pakistan of vital water supplies" [Ali, 1967: 324]. Furthermore,
Pakistan regarded India as forcibly appropriating water from Pakistani supplies at
critical times of sowing and maturing. The construction schedule was seen as
detrimental to Pakistan, especially the building of the Bhakra dam. At 2,428 metres, the
Bhakra dam was going to be 46 metres higher than the Hoover Dam in the USA, which
was the highest dam in the world. The Bhakra dam's storage capability had also been
increased with its height from 4,936 mcm (4 MAF) to 9,872 mcm (8 MAF). This change
would allow the entire Sutlej flow to be stored in the Bhakra's reservoir [Ali, 1967:
324].
Pakistan and India were proceeding with their own constructions, independently of each
other. India was preparing its irrigation system in East Punjab and Rajasthan to use all
surplus water from the three eastern rivers, the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi. It was also
expecting more water to be made available to it as supplies to Pakistan were diminished
under the Delhi Agreement [Gulhati, 1973: 86]. Pakistan was busy trying to secure
supplies to the CBDC and Dipalpur canal from the River Chenab, and to insure itself
against any further threats to its water supply from India [Gulhati, 1967: 87].
India was receiving reports that Pakistan was building, or proposing to build a number
of works to safeguard its supply from the Eastern rivers. Pakistan was planning: [i] to
build the Bambanwala-Ravi-Bedian link (BRB) to supply the CBDC from the Chenab,
and in fact had been looking at this link canal since June 1948; [ii] to investigate a link
between Balloki, on the River Ravi, and Suleimanke on the River Sutlej. The aim was to
transport water from the River Chenab to the Dipalpur canal's lower section and the
Sutlej Valley canals (SVC) which off-took at Suleimanke; [iii] to build the Kotri barrage
(renamed the Ghulam Mohammad barrage), which was started in 1949, to upgrade
inundation canals to non-perennial canals in Lower Sind, and to supply a new perennial
canal; [iv] to investigate the construction of two barrages, at Taunsa and Gudu, on the
River Indus to improve supplies to inundation canals offtaking from the Indus in West
Punjab and Upper Sind respectively; and [v] to continue West Punjab's tubewell scheme
based upon the Rasul hydroelectric project, which had been started in 1946 [Gulhati,
1973: 86-87].
But these additional works did not resolve the whole problem in Pakistan, and
highlighted the need for storage facilities in the basin. Soon after East Punjab stopped
water in April 1948, Ali had asked Pakistani engineers to explore sites on the rivers
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Jhelum and Indus suitable for dams. A site was found at Mangla on the River Jhelum,
which the Pakistani Government sanctioned and started work on without foreign aid
which was withheld due to the dispute with India. On the River Indus a site was initially
found at Darband, which was later bypassed by the site at Tarbela [Ali, 1967: 325].
Pakistan was building, at its own expense, link canals as insurance against India and to
provide a more uniform irrigation across the various colonies. India was also busy
constructing works to extend its irrigation demands in the Indus Basin. Rivalry for the
water was not only international between India and Pakistan, but also provincial. East
Punjab in India was reluctant to share the water of the Sutlej with Rajasthan, as was
West Punjab in Pakistan to share it with Sind. In addition, Pakistan continued to press
India to allow the involvement of a third party, specifically, the International Court of
Justice.
2.3.2.6 Involving the ICJ and Other International Tribunals
In January 1950, Prime Minister Nehru of India wrote to his counterpart in Pakistan,
Liaquat Ali Khan, proposing a joint declaration that their countries would not go to war
over any dispute between them. Moreover, India and Pakistan would seek peaceful
means to resolve their differences, including third party intervention in the form of
mediation, agencies especially set up to resolve the matter, or an international body
recognised by both countries. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed in February 1950, but added that
there should be a clear timetable that would bind the governments to the process and a
peaceful solution [Gulhati, 1973: 77].
A list of Indo-Pakistani disputes, as Pakistan saw them, accompanied Liaquat Ali
Khan's letter: [1] Jammu and Kashmir; [ii] Junagadh and neighbouring states which
wanted to accede to Pakistan; [iii] the River Sutlej dispute, also known as the canal
waters dispute; [iv] property left behind in India by refugees now living in Pakistan; and
[v] assets still being held by India to which Pakistan laid claim. India on receiving this
list, stated that it regarded Junagadh as a dead issue, and India had its own financial
claims to assets Pakistan held [Gulhati, 1973: 77].
In the meantime, Inter-Dominion conferences continued to be held under the auspices of
the Delhi Agreement. In March 1950, a meeting was held in Karachi to discuss the canal
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waters dispute. Gulhati claims that the negotiators were willing to partition the rivers.
Pakistan was willing to let India use all of the Ravi, and Beas waters that was being used
in Pakistani canals since before partition. India was amenable to this proposal, but
wanted the right to tap the Chenab as it passed Marhu in India. And to stave off any
shortage to Pakistan, India suggested building a dam on the Chenab at Dhiangarh in
India. But Pakistan was unwilling to let India have the right to build on the Chenab, and
the proposal was abandoned. No mention, however, had been made by Pakistan of
limiting Indian activity on the upper reaches of the Jhelum and the Indus [Gulhati, 1973:
81-82].
"The interim arrangement of May 4, 1948, instead of paving the way toward an
agreement had become an obstacle" [Ali, 1967: 323]. With bilateral talks failing to reach
agreement, India filed the Delhi Agreement with the United Nations (UN) as treaty
number 794, in May 1950.30 Pakistan regarded the agreement as temporary, and acted
to nullify the effect of permanency by registering a disclaimer with the UN in December
1950 [Shivananda, 1961: 18-19; Government of Pakistan, 1953b: 12]. As Ali states,
Pakistan "explained the true nature of the statement to the UN and certified that it had
been terminated" [Ali, 1967: 323]. India in turn challenged this termination, and
registered another disclaimer with the UN Secretariat to that effect in November 1951
[Shivananda, 1961: 20].
Efforts were made to find an acceptable solution to the dispute. India proposed setting
up jointly a technical committee that would look into the Sutlej dispute and make
recommendations for resolution. If this committee failed to reach agreement, then the
Indian government would be willing to consider submitting the matter for arbitration, or
to another tribunal approved by both governments. Pakistan, though admitting it had
practically agreed to a joint technical committee, urged India once more to submit the
matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). India refused, preferring to appoint a
technical committee and await the results of its study before deciding upon the
procedure and forum in which to continue discussions [Gulhati, 1973: 78].
30 The UN expects all international treaties to be registered with the Secretariat, two
years after its signing and ratification [Shivananda, 1961: 19]. Indian compliance to
this stipulation was seen by Pakistan, however, as being "obviously a maneuver to
get indirectly what India could not get by agreement" [Government of Pakistan,
1953b: 12].
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Under the United Nations Charter, any international legal disputes amongst members
should be put before the ICJ. However, members of the British Commonwealth were
exempt from this stipulation as it was assumed that matters would be resolved within the
forum of the Commonwealth. Yet, solution for the Sutlej dispute had eluded the
Commonwealth, and India continued to refuse to submit the matter to the ICJ [Ali, 1967:
324]. Since India had been willing to accept arbitration if the technical committee failed,
Pakistan expected it to accept the referral to the ICJ. India's refusal to do so was seen by
Pakistan as evidence that India's position in international law was untenable and that it
did not want this shown before the ICJ [Ali, 1967: 324].
In September 1950, India proposed putting the matter before a tribunal comprising four
judges, two from each country. Pakistan refused the offer on the basis that the tribunal
did not have an impartial chairman which meant the forum could be used by India to
delay resolution of the dispute [Ali, 1967: 324; Gulhati, 1973: 80]. Nehru replied that is
was undignified for two independent countries to submit their differences to another
body, as if they were incapable of resolving the matter themselves. The Indian Prime
Minister also refused the idea of setting up another tribunal with an impartial chairman
to resolve the issues the first tribunal failed to resolve. This would, in his view, relegate
the significance and weight of the first tribunal to that of a preliminary round [Ali, 1967:
324; Gulhati, 1973: 81].
The following year, a week before the Pakistani and Indian Prime Ministers were to
separately and formally accept the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development's offer of good offices, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs wrote to
the Pakistani High Commission in Delhi [IBRD-1819/51]. Following the favoured style
of bureaucracy in the Indian Subcontinent, the letter repeated its claims and refutations
again and again. If Pakistan questioned the Delhi Agreement's validity, then India
would be willing to submit this question to an impartial international tribunal. However,
India neither considered the agreement invalid, nor had it reneged on any obligations
therein. In fact, India claimed, the reverse was true and Pakistan had reneged upon
obligations incumbent upon it [IBRD-18/9/51].
Pakistan had, India continued, failed to: [i] inform India of changes in West Punjab's
capacity to draw water from alternative sources, which would allow East Punjab to start
diminishing the amount passed onto Pakistan; [ii] continue depositing the disputed
seigniorage charges, in escrow, agreed to under the Delhi Agreement; and [iii] negotiate
88
changes with India before declaring, unilaterally, the termination of the agreement.
"Such changes can only be regarded as a violation of international obligations
undertaken by Pakistan and a continuation of such violation would expose Pakistan to
all the legal consequences of this violation including the discharge of India from their
obligations under the Agreement" [IBRD-18/9/51].
Gulhati believes Pakistan was determined to get some form of arbitration on the matter,
even presenting the dispute before the UN Security Council. "Whatever the outcome,
Pakistan would not be satisfied unless a third party could somehow be brought into the
picture" [1973: 89]. Wriggins suggests a reason for such behaviour. Not only was India
upstream on the Indus basin, but it was also the stronger of the two countries. Pakistan's
foreign policy was a continuous process of balancing its own power against India's. But
the relationship had not settled into a static equilibrium; rather the process remained one
in which continual innovation and manoeuvring was needed. If, into this situation, a
third party, especially one sympathetic to Pakistan, could be incorporated so much the
better for Pakistan vis-a-vis India [Wriggins, 1977: 302].
Pakistan was probably convinced of its rights and position in international law and
therefore, in the absence of any other weapon, was to press for the inclusion of the ICJ
in the dispute resolution process. India, by contrast, was reluctant to allow the ICJ to
decide the outcome of the dispute. Instead, the Indian Government was to propose a
succession of tribunals made up of an equal number of Indian and Pakistani judges.
This, however, Pakistan dismissed as a delaying tactic and matters reached an impasse
resulting in an entrenchment of the dispute.
2.3.2.7 The Dispute Entrenched
Four years of independence had hardened Indo-Pakistani relations. Like Siamese twins
torn apart, the blood of the operation remained in the senses of those that had survived.
Betrayed by history and their own desires for safety, communities across the Indian
subcontinent remained embittered and sought revenge in a myriad of ways. In the face
of unquenchable anger, promises made to cooperate lacked the force to survive the
scrutiny and demands made upon them by the political bodies of both countries.
Suspicions ran high, and the 'naming-blaming-claiming' sequence was being danced out
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in a number of issues, not least the River Sutlej dispute. As Gulhati points out, these
issues were paraded in public by both sides [1973: 87].
Fearful for its existing uses feeding off the River Sutlej, Pakistan began not only to
accuse India of withholding water from it, but also to question the legality of the Delhi
Agreement. Pakistan accused India of abusing its upstream position and attempting to
sabotage Pakistan's economy by withholding water. Supplies to pre-partition and
partition agreed uses had been curtailed, and Indian construction on the Sutlej was to
Pakistan's continued detriment. Pakistan, therefore, demanded that India cease
construction, and continue supplies. Pakistan, also, began to question the standing of the
Delhi Agreement. In the summer of 1950, Pakistan had stopped depositing, in escrow,
disputed seigniorage charges, and had informed India of the agreement's termination.
The issue of Pakistan having been forced to sign the agreement continued, along with
the actual legality of the agreement being questioned [Gulhati, 1973: 87-88].
India was concerned about its plans to develop land surrounding the Sutlej, and regarded
the Delhi Agreement as a legal instrument delimiting use of the river. Therefore, India
rejected what it regarded as Pakistan's unilateral termination of an international
agreement. It was, after all, continuing to supply water as agreed, and India viewed the
agreement as a venue towards a final solution of the problem [Gulhati, 1973: 88].
Despite Nehru's attempt to reassure Pakistan that India would not build its prosperity on
the misery of Pakistani farmers, Pakistan remained, unsurprisingly, suspicious.
Like a Punch and Judy puppet show, the River Sutlej dispute entailed a conversation
whereby each side appeared merely to contradict the other. Yet running through the
whole dialogue was fear. The Pakistanis feared losing water to their existing uses. The
Indians feared having to limit the development of new uses. Each side feared having
insufficient water to feed its population. The political representatives of each country
possibly, also, feared losing their power base. The scene appeared to be haunted by what
would be lost by each side, and not what stood to be gained by mutual cooperation. It
was into this arena that the World Bank would step to offer its good offices. It was
hoped that the stalemate would be broken by this intervention and the new approach of
mediation.
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SUMMARY
The physical wealth of the Indus Basin's water supply belies a significant problem that
hampers use of the waters. The distribution and timing of water availability results in a
situation of feast-or-famine. For two months during the summer, the monsoons pour
down water from the sky, swelling further the rising rivers. For example, the River
Indus during the summer, several miles wide in flood, is a stark contrast to its shrunken
winter state of large puddles. Irrigation is needed, therefore, to enable utilisation of the
waters to grow produce, and sustain livelihoods, in the arid reaches of the Indus Basin.
Large scale irrigation was developed thousands of years ago to capture the waters of the
basin. Under the British these works were modernised and extended into an immense
network of canals. The principal motivation for the large scale development of the
irrigation works is thought to have been commercial and political. The resulting revenue
from agricultural produce proved sufficient incentive to overcome the high costs of
construction. Politically, the opening up of new canal irrigated land was useful in
maintaining commitments to, and rewarding, allies in previous wars.
Canals were principally constructed in the British provinces of Punjab and Sind, though
not under an integrated plan of basin management. Each province built its own works
independently of the other, despite their reliance upon the same sources of water,
principally the River Sutlej. Without storage facilities, and with continued construction,
competition for the run-of-river flow increased and led to a dispute between Sind and
Punjab. Partition obstructed any final judgement to settle the dispute. Though India and
Pakistan had no international water dispute at the time of partition in August 1947,
matters were to change in April 1948.
The international boundary between India and Pakistan separated canals from their
headworks, and left India as the upstream riparian on the five rivers of the Punjab. A
Standstill Agreement had been signed by representatives of divided Punjab, but this
Agreement expired on 31 March 1948. East Punjab (India) stopped the water supply to
Pakistani canals on 1 April 1948. Whatever legal justifications were given by the
Government of East Punjab for its decision, the overriding effect was to instil
considerable fear in Pakistan. Partition had created two countries with disharmonious
relations, and the suspicions that existed on both sides were exacerbated by the start of
the international Canal Waters dispute.
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Bilateral efforts to settle the dispute did more damage to Indo-Pakistani relations than
good. The Inter-Dominion Agreement, or Delhi Agreement, signed in May 1948 was to
prove an obstacle to settling the dispute. It did no more than acknowledge there was a
dispute in which both sides had legitimate claims. Successive meetings between India
and Pakistan failed to find acceptable avenues by which the River Sutlej could satisfy
both claimants, and each side fortified its position vis-a-vis the other in the dispute. Both
countries, also, claimed they were legally correct in their demands and rights.
Under the ensuing deadlock, and with tensions mounting between the two parties, the
need for impartial third party intervention was clear. Pakistan repeatedly proposed
inviting the International Court of Justice to intervene and India, with equal frequency,
would refuse. Though a legal third party was rejected by India, an alternative intervenor
was becoming apparent. India and Pakistan had both applied to the World Bank for
loans to construct their irrigation works. The Bank, unable to fund projects on the
disputed Sutlej River, was willing to assist the countries in resolving their dispute. Thus,
after an initial prompting, the World Bank offered its good offices. India and Pakistan
accepted its intervention, and this marked the start of the Indus Basin mediation process.
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3THE MEDIATION FRAMEWORK
The intervention of the World Bank in the Canal Waters dispute between India and
Pakistan began the long walk to a mediated settlement. Matters between the disputants
had reached breaking point as bilateral talks on a number of outstanding issues had
failed to reach an acceptable conclusion. India had been, and remains, adamant that no
third party should intervene in its dispute with Pakistan over the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. However, over the specific issue of water in the Canal Waters dispute India
was, ultimately, willing to allow a mediator to assist the resolution process. This the
Bank did by offering its good offices.
Before the particular details of the mediation process in the Indus Basin are told, general
aspects of the mediation process are reviewed. As will be shown in the succeeding
chapters, effective intervention by a third party can change the nature of a bilateral
dispute if the conflicting parties are unable to resolve the dispute through direct bilateral
negotiations. Parties are encouraged to move away from conflict and stalemate, as their
principal means of interaction, towards a more constructive process. The change from
the 'naming-blaming-claiming' routine that characterises so many conflicts, is facilitated
by the voluntary nature of mediation [UNITE].31 The disputants and the mediator all
have to volunteer to join this process. By this means, the mediator retains control of the
process, but more importantly, the disputants retain control of the outcome [Bercovitch,
1992: 5].
The mediation process can be characterised within a framework comprising of four
sections: engaging, issues, options and agreement [UNITE]. 32 The framework appears,
to this thesis, to describe not only the process of mediation but also other conflict
resolution processes, whether bilateral or multilateral. In addition, this framework
31 Refers to the mediation training undertaken by the author, given by UNITE,
Southlands Centre, Ormesby Road, Middlesborough TS3 OHG.
32 The framework described by UNITE has a fifth section - feedback to the mediators.
Though this feedback can be given by one mediator to the other the disputants are,
in fact, asked to give their opinion on the mediation process, and the mediators.
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appears to have validity at different scales of conflict. Therefore, it can be used to
describe disputes between both neighbours on a housing estate, and international
disputes between sovereign nations.
Successful mediation can lead to the resolution of a conflict however entrenched it may
appear. Bar-Siman-Tov describes successful conflict resolution as distinct to conflict
management and involving "the reconciliation or elimination of fundamental differences
and grievances underlying a conflict. Conflict resolution occurs when the
incompatibility between the preferences of the various parties to a conflict disappears or
when the sources of a conflict situation are removed" [1994: 75].
Even if the conflict is not resolved through mutually acceptable outcomes, the process of
mediation is beneficial to the disputants as it allows them to interact with each other
away from the necessary violence of the battlefield. This, too, can change attitudes that
may serve to make later agreement more likely. All the participants Ma mediation have
their own perspective on the process. This thesis will focus upon the mediator and the
means by which the mediator can intervene, and assist the disputants.
3.1	 DISCUSSION OF THE FRAMEWORK
"Communication"
[McDonald interview, 25/4/96].
Disputes are a hostile form of communication, thus the aim of a dispute resolution
process is to continue the communication between the parties, but with less hostility.
The most important actors in any dispute are, obviously, the disputants. The decision to
resolve, or perpetuate, their conflict rests with these actors, and is ideally determined
through direct bilateral talks. This is because "contacts across political barriers, in the
right circumstances, lead to greater human understanding, and that understanding of
those on the other side should facilitate the resolution of the dispute or conflict" [Bailey,
1985: 212].
If bilateral talks fail to resolve the dispute, then intervention by a third party can help the
disputants find a suitable settlement. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques
describe the different guises third party intervention can take once bilateral negotiations
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have proven unsatisfactory.33
 These different approaches are arbitration, adjudication,
advocacy, counselling, good offices, conciliation and mediation.34
This thesis suggests that all these different techniques of intervention have in common a
skeletal framework of engaging, issues, options and agreement. All the actors must
engage in the dispute resolution process. In arbitration and adjudication, for example, it
is the legal teams and the judge that must engage in the process. In conciliation it is an
independent intervenor and the disputants. Likewise, during the process the issues in
dispute must be discussed to understand the positions and interests of each party.
Options that address these interests are explored to a different extent depending upon the
technique, and wherever possible agreement is reached. The process remains cyclical,
with agreement needed on many points throughout the intervention, before a final
settlement is agreed upon.
Similarly, this thesis proposes that this skeleton is applicable at different scales of
intervention, from local neighbourhood disputes to international disputes. As Bercovitch
points out, mediation is used "in virtually every area of human interaction" and is
becoming of "increasing importance in international relations" [1992: 1]. The process of
intervention is the same. Whether the dispute is between neighbours on a housing estate
over a fence, or between countries over an international boundary, the third party still
engages in the resolution process. The issues are still discussed, possible options are still
explored, and wherever possible agreements are still reached. And the process still
repeats itself in a cyclical fashion.
33 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) techniques arose out of frustrations with the
litigation process in the USA. See Scimecca, 1991, for details of its emergence
there. The focus has been to avoid costly procedures that still leave the disputants
dissatisfied with the outcome. ADR encompasses a range of techniques of which
some are closer to the litigation process than others. See Bevan, 1992 for a more
detailed description of the different approaches; and Merrills, 1993 and Umbricht,
1989 for dispute settlement on an international scale. Moore and Delli Priscoli, 1989
give an excellent illustration of the complexities arising from different audiences in
Chapter Seven, "Negotiation".
34 Bindschedler regards conciliation and mediation as being the same process enacted
by different types of third parties. Conciliation is the intervention by a private
individuals and mediation is intervention by states [1981a]. Wood distinguishes
between conciliation and mediation in terms of the intervenor's role. In conciliation
the third party does not, formally, make any suggestions. By contrast, in mediation
the third party has additional power and can make "formal recommendations"
[1992: 247].
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Obviously, within this general framework the individual events that constitute particular
disputes, and their resolution process, are different. Therefore, the type of third party
that intervenes in arbitration is different to conciliation. Likewise, the influences and
events of a dispute will differ from the local scale to that of the international scale.
UNITE divide the different types of intervention possible according to which actor holds
the decision-making power. In other words, who makes the decisions regarding the final
outcome in the resolution process? In mediation, and its sister techniques of counselling
and conciliation, the decision-making power remains with the disputants. In the
remaining techniques, the decision-making power is assumed by the intervening third
party. This is especially apparent in legal techniques, such as arbitration and
adjudication, whereby the incumbent judge decides which outcome is most 'suitable'.
At the different levels of intervention it is the scale that is, obviously, most striking. The
differences attributable to the different scale can be seen in that the decision-makers'
internal dynamics, audiences and other contributing influences. Differences due to scale
can be summarised as, simply, affecting different numbers of people.
Generally, in an international dispute a number of people are involved in the resolution
process to varying depths. At the interface with the other disputant and the third party, is
the delegation. The delegates report back to people in the appropriate ministries who, in
turn, report to more senior figures and politicians, including the head of the government.
And the government may well have to answer to a parliament. Thus, the scope for
internal disagreement, by the people involved, is considerable in international disputes.
By contrast, in neighbourhood disputes the representatives are, often, the people who are
solely responsible for decision-making. Though internal disagreements may exist, the
scope for dissension is severely reduced simply because there are less people involved
in the process.
Decision-makers also have audiences for their actions, and other factors that influence
the decisions. At the international level, the governments have their constituencies to
consider. This may include the opposition parties, the domestic public, the international
community and, perhaps, the armed forces. In addition, the decision-makers may be
concerned about the effect of their decisions upon the economy and security of the
country. In local disputes, the disputants may be concerned about the opinions of their
audience - other neighbours and the local community. Local disputants would, also, be
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concerned about the financial and social costs of agreement. All these concerns effect
the individual events that occur in the dispute and the resolution process at the
international and local levels.
The primary focus of most dispute resolution processes, such as arbitration, appears to
be to reach agreement. But as Moore and Delli Friscoli point out:
"Dispute management is not simply a contest or a game in which substantive
gains are either won or lost. It is a relationship-building process. It involves
process, content, and emotions. Frequently, parties must live in the future with
those with whom they are disputing. The way that a dispute is resolved may
often be as important as the specific settlement" [1989: 18].
Agreement is, therefore, only part of the walk towards a truly peaceful settlement of a
dispute. Any agreement signed still needs to be implemented and maintained before the
dispute can begin to be regarded as finally over. This implies that the disputants will, by
necessity, have some form of continued interaction after the agreement is signed. If the
resolution process is particularly adversarial, then the post-agreement relationship may
have been damaged to the point of obstructing implementation. This can lead to further
deterioration of the disputants' relationship which, in turn, wastes all the goodwill
generated in proposing, signing, and ratifying the agreement.
With this thesis focusing upon international water disputes, it is suggested that
mediation is probably the optimum route to resolving these disputes primarily because
the disputants determine the shape and nature of outcome of the process. This is useful
not only because it increases the chances of reaching an agreement that satisfies the
disputing parties' interests (and therefore one that will be implemented) but it can
equally lead to an improved post-mediation relationship between the disputants. Or at
the very least, it will not exacerbate existing tensions to the extent that the more
adversarial techniques of intervention can. Thus the assumption of greater control of
substantive decisions by the disputants is assumed to favour mediation in the
international setting which, in the case of the Indus Basin, proved successful.
3.2 DEFINITION OF MEDIATION
The term 'mediation' is used to cover a range of activities which appear to be
substantially different and is reflected in the lack of consensus, on an exact definition, in
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the literature [Bercovitch, 1992: 2]. The primary difference in these activities, all termed
mediation, is the extent to which the mediator intervenes in the actual discussions and
output of the resolution process. Intervention can range from providing a safe location
for meeting opponents, to a third party setting the agenda for the process and heavily
influencing the final outcome. Therefore, it is important to define the term as it is
intended to be used in this thesis. And since the perspective of this thesis is that of the
intervening body, the role of the mediator is given principal focus in this chapter.
3.2.1	 What is Mediation?
"The reality of mediation is that of a complex, changing and
dynamic interaction between a mediator who does have some
resources and an interest in the dispute or its outcome, and the
disputing parties or their representatives" [Bercovitch, 1992: 7].
At its simplest level, mediation is the intervention, preferably short-term, by a third party
to aid communication between two or more disputing parties. (See Bercovitch, 1992, for
a discussion of the different definitions given to mediation). The objective is to alter the
situation so that it changes from being a two-way fight to a three-way search for a
solution [UNITE]. In other words, "[m]ediation is negotiation assisted by a third party"
[Ury et al, 1988: 420].
Mitchell and Banks believe there is an implicit assumption in mediation, that if the
disputing parties have made the problem, they can then 'unmake' it [1996: 3]. Lamb and
Taylor warn that once a powerful third party, such as a judge, intervenes then the
outcome "may not reflect local needs" [1990: 974]. "Legal mechanisms in particular are
sensitive to the consistency of outcomes with formal rules, rather than with actors'
interests" [Dryzek and Hunter, 1987: 94]. Therefore, the mediation process seeks to
ensure that the disputants retain control of decision-making leading, it is hoped, to
resolution of the dispute [Burton, 1986: 240].
Mediation, by giving the disputants the space and opportunity to interact with each other
peacefully, is giving the disputants the chance to manage their conflict, and if possible
resolve it. Bar-Siman-Tov defines conflict management as "controlling, limiting, and
containing conflict behaviour in such a way as to make it less destructive or violent" and
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points out that it "does not necessarily eliminate the causes of conflict; however, its
success may help toward resolving it" [1994: 75].
Dryzek and Hunter commend mediation aswell:
"Mediation scores over more legalistic adversarial proceedings here because it
can address the quality of the content of decisions, collective choices, and
policies. Legalistic methods address only the process through which outcomes
are reached, or the consistency of decisions with a set of rules" [1997: 92].
At one end of the scale of mediation is 'good offices' and at the other end is a more
interventionist approach which it can be argued is akin to arbitration or adjudication
[Bercovitch, 1992: 15]. Bindschedler provides a definition for good offices, which was
the pretext under which the World Bank became involved in the Indus Basin dispute:
"in its wider sense, 'good offices' means the involvement of one or more States
or an international organization in a dispute between other States with the aim
of settling it or contributing to its settlement. A further aim of such involvement
is the solution of specific problems which the States in question are unable or
unwilling to solve themselves" [1981b].
Where good offices seeks to provide silent support for the disputants while they are
talking, a more interventionist approach seeks to decide for the disputants how the
dispute should be settled. This latter approach is the process that Mitchell and Bank seek
to avoid when promoting their 'problem solving workshop' which in essence is another
form of mediation, i.e. assisting communication. During the whole process, the nature of
mediation may change if the need arises. If resolution is faltering because the disputants
cannot agree on an outcome acceptable to both, then the mediator may temporarily
adopt a more interventionist approach and suggest another outcome.
Though obvious, it is as well to state that the whole process of mediation is voluntary.
The disputants, voluntarily allow the intervention of a third party; and the third party
volunteers to intervene [Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 32; Bercovitch, 1992: 5; Susskind
and Babbitt, 1992: 35]. Should any party not wish to condone the intervention, the
process disintegrates. As pointed out, intervention changes the nature of the dispute,
stopping the 'naming-blaming-claiming' routine that characterises most conflicts
[UNITE]. The focus now lies on the interests behind the positions each of the disputants
has taken. This opportunity affords the disputants the chance to "communicate
accurately", and to explore options that previously were untenable [Ury, 1987: 225].
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Ozawa and Susskind describe mediation as an opportunity to separate the facts from the
values attached to them, by simply getting the disputants to interact. This, in turn, allows
the differing needs of the disputants to be accommodated. Ozawa and Susskind,
correctly, regard this process as more desirable for two reasons. Firstly, because the
cost-benefit analysis that accompanies any action can be incorporated into the way the
data is handled. And secondly, because the credibility of the process lies with its
individual success and not the pre-established reputations of the people involved, as may
be the case with a more adversarial procedure [1985: 32]. Effective mediation arises
when the disputants have, through facilitated communication, been dissuaded from
using force to settle their dispute [Stein, 1985: 345].
The value of mediation is best exemplified by the well-known case of the orange
[Bevan, 1992: 2]. There is one orange available, and two people want it, one wants the
peel, the other wants the flesh. The different conflict resolution techniques would be
expected to allocate the orange in the following ways. The legal avenue ending in a
courtroom, would see the judge decide between the two parties and assign it to one of
them. Arbitration would, simply, cut the orange in half and share it between the two
parties. Mediation, by contrast, would ask why each party wanted the orange, and then
allocate it accordingly, thereby arriving at an optimal win-win solution. This has been
possible because the mediator has focused upon interests, and not rights or positions.
Bercovitch stresses the need to remember that there are four elements to a mediation: the
disputants, the mediator, the mediation process, and the context within which mediation
is taking place. And therefore, he believes to focus exclusively upon the techniques used
by a mediator is reductionist, and unrepresentative of the whole mediation 'experience'
[1992: 7]. Princen adds that "intervention is...neither a technical fix for overcoming the
difficulties of negotiations nor a short-cut to a solution" but merely a means of
influencing the disputants' interaction with each other [1992b: 66].
Therefore, in a dispute, the parties have four choices available to them: One, to maintain
the dispute at its present level of violence. Two, to resolve the dispute completely, either
through bilateral negotiations, or third party intervention. Three, to escalate the dispute.
And four, to manage the dispute so that the costs are reduced, even if formal agreement
is not reached and the dispute fully resolved. The choice a disputant will make depends
upon its domestic politics, and its perception of the costs and benefits incurred from a
particular procedure [Bar-Simon-To y, 1994].
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If the disputants want to manage their conflict, or even resolve it, then mediation can aid
their communication process. This is because mediation allows the parties to interact
with each other away from the battlefield, and redefine the problem and the objectives in
a more realistic manner. This as Bar-Siman-Tov points out is the outcome of successful
conflict management. He describes it as "a learning process in which the sides to a
conflict not only redefine means and goals in more realistic ways, but also change their
mode of thinking about the conflict itself, such that they come to prefer conflict
resolution as the best strategy to accomplish some of their basic objectives" [1994: 75].
"Thus mediation can cope with situations where participants bring different concerns,
values, and interpretations to a problem" [Dryzek and Hunter, 1987: 92]. Therefore, if
the disputants want to redefine their conflict what then is the role of the mediator in this
process, and how can it assist the disputants' to communicate more effectively?
3.2.2	 The Role of the Mediator
"If mediation is successful, the parties take the credit: if it fails, the
mediator gets the blame" [Bailey, 1985: 222].
"Intermediary intervention. ..is a method of conflict management distinguished by the
intermediary's peculiar role of being neither party to nor completely removed from the
dispute" [Princen, 1992b: 214]. The mediator's primary responsibility is to build trust,
which is "a very precious, unique commodity for any breakthrough" [Jonah, 1992: 199].
As a secondary function, the mediator can provide 'resources' ranging from an actual
meeting place to motivation.
The disputants must trust the mediator, the process of mediation and, ultimately, each
other if the dispute is to be resolved. If the disputants had been able to generate trust in
each other by themselves, there would have been no need for a mediator. Naturally, at
the start of the mediation process, the disputants are wary of each other, and are hesitant
to do more than trust the intervenor superficially. With the intervention of the third
party, it falls to that party to, initially, generate that trust.
With the mediator playing such an important function in the process, two factors
determine whether trust can be generated. Firstly, the qualities of the mediator, and
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secondly, how the mediator behaves. The mediator, whether an individual or an
institution, needs to be neutral, committed to the process, open, flexible and non-
judgmental - in other words, impartial [Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 34; UNITE; Mitchell
and Banks, 1996: 5].
The professionalism of the mediator's behaviour will allow it to maintain control of the
process, and leave the disputants in control of the content [UNITE]. Therefore, the
mediator should ensure that disputants are kept equally informed during the process,
establish ground rules such as confidentiality, focus on the disputants' interests, and also
focus on any positive elements such as the progress made or existing common ground,
and guarantee execution of the agreement [Bindschedler, 1981a: 722; UNITE].
This element, of trust, is critical to keeping the talks going, as Princen points out:
"But when strategic behaviour prevails in a bargain, when all interaction is
manipulative, when trust is rare and escalation constantly a risk, just a bit of
nonstrategic behavior in the way of neutral proposals or mere third-party
presence may be enough to keep negotiations going. Other factors - shifts in
the balance of power or changes in the domestic politics - may ultimately
determine whether and how settlement is reached" [1992b: 45].
The mediator's secondary role is to provide resources to assist communication between
the disputants, and thereby assist the gradual transition from conflict to cooperation and
resolution. This is because "[a]lmost all international disputes, but especially those of
long standing, combine genuine and objective conflicts of interest with misperception
and misunderstandings of the aims and intentions of the other side" [Bailey, 1985: 218].
Rather than replicate resources the disputants are already able to provide, the mediator
seeks to fill the remaining gaps. These include practical aspects such as a place to meet;
administrative staff needed to compile documents; specialised skills whether specific to
the conflict or general listening skills; motivation to keep trying to find a mutually
acceptable outcome; financial support either during the process or as part of reaching
agreement; ensuring everyone party to the conflict voice their concerns; and exploring
all the options [Ury, 1987:228; UNITE; Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 5; Ozawa and
Susskind, 1985: 32; Bindschedler, 1981a: 722].
The mediator is well placed to handle two critical aspects of a conflict resolution
process, namely information and power distribution. The process of gathering, analysing
and interpreting data considered relevant to the dispute is laced with disputes and
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politics. The mediator can assist both parties by either requesting or presenting, on their
behalf, certain information. If a disputant has been withholding information from the
other party, the mediator's request obliges that disputant to make this information
available or otherwise risk jeopardising its relationship with the mediator [Stein, 1985:
34511. The mediator can also call in experts, or conduct an inquiry to clarify, impartially,
disputed data [Bindschedler, 1981a: 721].
Alternatively, if by unilaterally presenting information or making a proposal a disputant
feels its position will be weakened, the mediator can present this information as its own
[Bailey, 1985: 212]. Bailey also points out, that the "mediator need not, of course, agree
with a proposal submitted to the parties in dispute, for a mediator's role is not to
advance personal opinions but to help the parties find common ground" since the
objective is to facilitate communications rather than "wanting to sell a set of
preconceived answers" [1985: 218].
As Mitchell and Banks point out, the mediator can also help the parties prepare and
present a credible offer to each other [1996: 69]. "In short, as a guardian of the process,
a mediator can intervene to correct miscommunications, to clarify ambiguous messages,
and to challenge deceptive communications. Also, a mediator can point out when
differences in interpretations have arisen and when participants are making prescriptive
rather than descriptive statements" [Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 35].
The mediator facilitates the generation of trust, and transfer of information, by wearing a
variety of hats. Stulberg's classification lists a number of roles the mediator plays [in
Bercovitch, 1992: 15]. Bercovitch believes, correctly, the third party does not follow a
pre-ordained sequence but utilises any number of roles at a given time, determined by
the specific need of the process at that moment [ibid].
With the intervention of the mediator, a dispute is 'frozen' at a particular point. This
status quo, Mitchell and Banks argue, favours the more powerful disputant putting the
weaker party at a disadvantage that is then sustained throughout the mediation process
[1996: x]. In any conflict, there is an uneven distribution of power which, however, does
fluctuate with time and specific issues. And as Mitchell and Banks recognise if it has
been a long conflict the 'weaker' party must also have some leverage over the 'stronger'
party, otherwise it would have succumbed earlier and there would not be a conflict to
resolve [1996: 54].
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"For international mediation to be effective, it must reflect as well as affect the wider
conflict system" [Bercovitch, 1992: 18, emphasis in original]. Mediation does not hope
to alter the power balance within a dispute, as it would be outside the mediator's remit
of assisting communication. What mediation does hope to do is convince the parties to
focus on the interests each disputant has, rather than rely upon force and power to gain
their objectives. As the process is voluntary, the mediator's power comes from the
disputants' accepting its legitimacy. In turn, this legitimacy is conferred because of the
mediator's impartiality, and insistence on each disputant having an equal right to voice
its grievances and interests.
It may be possible to suggest, however cautiously, that mediation circumvents the
power-imbalance issue by changing the focus from the conflict, and its history, to the
underlying interests. The mediator pays "attention to keeping the negotiations on track.
They are the thread that ties the negotiation process together" [Susskind and Babbitt,
1992: 37]. The means available to the mediator to change the focus is highlighted by the
following framework - engaging, issues, options and agreement - which is seen from the
mediator's perspective.
3.3	 THE MEDIATION FRAMEWORK
For disputants to allow a third party to mediate, entails consideration of a number of
political factors. Most importantly, these are: face-saving; good public relations;
satisfying a domestic audience; and accepting and working through the stages involved
in going from conflict to cooperation. The stages themselves describe a process that will
engender many more political considerations.
The stages are broadly divided into three categories - pre-negotiation, negotiation and
implementation [Susskind and Babbitt, 1992: 36]. Pre-negotiation is the engaging stage
when the parties agree to get involved in the mediation process. The negotiation stage
involves the actual negotiating during which the disputes' issues are discussed, options
explored, and agreement is reached on a proposal. The implementation stage involves
presenting the proposed agreement to the domestic audience; accepting agreement;
signing; ratifying; implementing and maintaining the agreement.
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Once involved, the mediator's remit is restricted to assisting communications between
the representatives present at the mediating table. Of course, the mediator can assist the
participants thereafter to get approval from the domestic audience, however it is
comprised, and to implement the agreement. But this is dependent, once again, upon the
disputants, and upon them reaching an agreement, and their willingness to allow such
intervention.
The process is described, in this thesis, from the mediator's perspective. The mediator
engages or intervenes in an ongoing dispute, subject to acceptance by the disputants. If
accepted, the next stage is to bring out the issues that are in dispute. Only once the
mediator is satisfied that all the issues have been discussed, and all parties to the dispute
have had their say, are possible options explored. The final stage in the mediation
process is for the disputants to agree on an outcome that is mutually acceptable. As new
issues come up, or agreement is sought on specific parts of each stage, the cycle (issues,
options, agreement) is replicated in microcosm [UNITE].
Mediation is a contradiction of planning and spontaneity. Planning because the mediator
consciously aims to go through the different steps bringing out the issues, exploring the
options, keeping the focus on the disputants' interests and steering away from the use of
force as an alternative to negotiating [Ury et al, 1988: 415]. Spontaneity enters because
the situation being faced changes as issues are discussed, and the mediator needs to
retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate new and, sometimes, unexpected changes
which can prove vital to moving towards resolution [McDonald interview, 25/4/96].
Ideally, at the end of a successful mediation, the disputants have agreed upon a peaceful
arrangement that satisfies their interests, and that they can implement [Mitchell and
Banks, 1996: 6]. The process itself can be considered successful when the disputants
have shown themselves willing to try the mediation process, and not exploit the trust
upon which it is based [Bevan, 1992: 2]. Yet, even if a satisfactory outcome has not
been reached, the disputants still gain from having been part of the process. Each now
has a better understanding of their opponent, alternative options and the cost of returning
to coercive action [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 6].
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3.3.1	 Engaging
Mitchell and Banks believe participants in a violent conflict will not seek resolution
techniques such as mediation, because of the conflict's dynamics. Polarisation,
misperceptions, entrapment and escalation all dissuade disputants from seeking
alternative, peaceful means of resolving their differences. Or at least from being seen to
seek alternative measures, as this may be interpreted by opponents as a mark of
weakness and, therefore, encourage them to attack. Instead the parties, generally,
continue the conflict till either they are victorious, so that they can recover the costs that
they have already incurred; or their adversary has had to 'pay' [1996: 10].
Yet "even if the parties' goals are wholly incompatible, they may cooperate tacitly or
explicitly in keeping a conflict manageable, or be forced to do so. Parties that are
unwilling or unable to resolve their conflict may still be interested in preventing war or
limiting it, because of their mutual, though not necessarily symmetrical, fear of its
outcomes" [Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 76]. However, though the disputants may be willing
to negotiate an end to the conflict, they may feel they cannot afford to initiate such
events [Princen, 1992b: 225]. This is where an intermediary may intervene. Rubin
points out though, that "[n]o matter how complex, powerful, or formal the organization
responsible for intervention in international conflict, the work of mediation is eventually
carried out by individuals" [1992: 249-250, emphasis in original].
The timing of intervention by a third party is considered to be very important, and can
influence the mediation's outcome [Princen, 1992b; Susskind and Babbitt, 1992; Rubin,
1992; Wall and Lynn, 1993; Zartman, 1986]. From the mediator's perspective, the
timing of entry can determine the amount of leverage it has available to it during the
mediation process. This, as Princen observes, is because with relations deteriorating
between the disputants, they are more willing to allow intervention, and look to the
intermediary for assistance [1992b: 217].
Princen continues to explain the considerations a third party may take into account:
"The intermediary's trade-off in the entry-timing question is between
assuring involvement and assuring control once involved. If the
intermediary enters early, it forestalls an out-of-control escalation but has
little procedural control once it sets up a dispute resolution process. If the
intermediary enters late, it has greater procedural control owing to the
disputants' worse alternative, but it risks foregoing any involvement owing
to an out-of-control escalation" [1992b: 59].
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Zartman believes that a conflict, and its negotiations, form part of an evolutionary
process [1986]. Thus, a conflict is considered to have a ripening process into which third
party intervention can occur with greater success, if timed appropriately. The resounding
feature is usually, with hindsight, as the dispute reaches a stalemate and the cost of
escalation is beyond that which the disputants are willing to consider. It is at this critical
point that the disputants, however, are unable to see an alternative to conflict, and a
mediator can intervene to suggest such an approach.
All parties in mediated talks have their own interests and agendas for participating
[Princen, 1992b; Bercovitch, 1992]. Bercovitch believes the assumption that the third
party is intervening due to altruism is misguided because "[m]ediators are often
important actors with their own assumptions and agendas about the dispute in question.
International mediators are both interested and concerned parties" [1992: 5]. The
disputants' incentives in allowing third party intervention can vary to include, for
example, gaining an ally, a delaying tactic, and courting international goodwill [Princen,
1992b: 66]. But "[w]hat they expect and what they get may be entirely different" [Mid].
The intervention of a third party is not like that of a director shooting a battle scene.
When the director says "cut", the actors stop pretending to hate and kill each other
contenting themselves, instead, with chit-chat and tea. In a protracted conflict the
tensions, hate, and mistrust are real [Wall and Lynn, 1993: 177]. Each side's populace
may have been actively involved in the conflict, and at the very least the body politic of
each side is bruised and wary.
Therefore, third party intervention needs to lead to a sufficient lessening in the
disputants' mutual mistrust. Otherwise the disputants may be unwilling to consider a
cessation of violence, even temporarily. Clearly, time remains a factor in convincing the
parties to be willing to see an alternative to violent conflict. A tacit or formal agreement
by each disputant to allow intervention, is only the start of further negotiations to
establish the rules for formal discussion of the dispute. This process can take some time,
as each disputant needs to weigh the political implications of being seen to talk to its
opponent, and the effect the mediator will have upon the preferred outcome of a
disputant.
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Within the conflict the disputants have already experienced high levels of uncertainty.
Therefore, it is important to keep them as fully informed during the mediation process as
is tenable. The intervenor should let the participating governments know what they can
expect from the proposed forum. Furthermore, invitations to start the mediation process
should focus on the positive outcome, without diminishing the scale of the difficulties
ahead [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 89].
Naturally, with the disputants walking off the battlefield, there will be considerable
distrust between the parties which will lead to them trying to establish certain conditions
before they are willing to talk to one another. Bailey believes that the mediator should
not allow either party to demand any preconditions. This means no more, he argues,
than "that they will not argue about the agenda until negotiations begin" [1985: 209].
The mediator's role at this stage can tip the balance towards getting the parties to engage
in talks. As Princen observes, by the mediator deciding "the question of venue - along
with the multitude of other questions that must be jointly decided - can be critical
enough to make or break a fragile set of negotiations" [1992b: 44].
As Bindschedler points out, if the proceedings are voluntary the disputants' acceptance
is vital [1981a: 722]. What then makes a particular intervenor acceptable to the
disputants? The bottom line is whether the third party is regarded as fair and impartial,
and whether they will then ensure the mediation process is also fair. The criteria by
which disputants assess an intervenor are: the institution or organisation itself and its
reputation, the talks' location, and financing of the talks and potential agreements
[Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 83-87].
"Ideally, the administrative structure would be efficient, smoothrunning, adequately
funded and expertly managed - in a word, professional" [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 8].
Part of the disputants' impression of institutional impartiality comes from the forum's
financial independence. Therefore, suspicions concerning financial support should be
cleared up in advance [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 82]. In assembling the third party's
representatives, expertise should be gathered, obviously, to fit the appropriate issues and
technical matters involved. These people will determine the forum's atmosphere, which
should be one designed to encourage exploration of issues and options with honesty.
To maintain credibility in the third party and the process, promises made during the
engagement period should be fulfilled. Therefore, the third party needs to balance the
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promises it makes against those promises that can actually be fulfilled. In addition, the
professionalism of the third party needs to be established from the outset. Therefore,
efficient communication is essential between the mediator and the disputants, and within
the mediating body. This implies that letters need to be answered promptly, and field
trips made to encourage participation. Getting permission to intervene in a dispute and
then persuading the disputants to join negotiations, entails considerable work and
dedication from the third party [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 82]. Therefore, the institution
that is mediating needs to be committed to the talks, and finding ways to assist the
disputants' communications with each other.
Any third party interested in intervening in a dispute needs to consider three issues:
Firstly, should it wait for an invitation to participate, or volunteer its services
unilaterally? Secondly, should it approach the disputants simultaneously, or
consecutively? If the third party opts to initiate the process with one disputant, which
one should it be? And finally, what is the optimum means of getting access to the key
decision-makers, so that they would be willing to join the talks? Another question that
overshadows the three above is how to weigh up the benefits and costs of the different
approaches, and their affect upon the mediation's future credibility [Mitchell and Banks,
1996: 60].
In getting disputants to participate, Mitchell and Banks urge the third party to talk
directly to the political leaders. Leaders who are secure, politically, will be able to
consider channels of interaction that bureaucrats may not be able to. This is especially
true should the decision to talk with an opponent entail a dramatic departure from the
established line a government has been taking. Under those circumstances, even if
subordinates are empowered with decision-making authority, they would probably
decline the invitation. Once having said "No", the bureaucrats may have vested interests
in ensuring the decision is not later changed [1996: 57].
In describing what the mediation process is about - communicating with opponents
without making any commitment - it is equally important to stress what the process is
not about: [i] it is not open to public; [ii] it does not follow the previous adversarial
format; [iii] it is not another manoeuvre in the disputants' point scoring; [iv] there is no
pre-established commitment to agreement; and [v] the process does not confer
legitimacy, or recognition of an opponent's standpoint [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 65].
Therefore, the process of engagement is one of reassuring disputants that sitting at the
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negotiating table will not be to their detriment. Political leaders need to be assured that
talking with their opponents will not entail having to make any concessions; nor will it
affect strategic manoeuvres planned vis-a-vis the enemy, or their own audiences
[Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 68].
Finally, the locational arrangements the third party makes should convey the symbolic
and practical intent the intervenor has. Clearly, the site must be neutral, safe and equally
accessible by the disputants. The overall message is one of distancing from the old
conflict, to seek new, innovative ways to resolution [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 87-88].
Having engaged in the mediation process, the participants begin discussion of the issues
comprising the dispute.
3.3.2	 Issues
"The very manner in which we apprehend the reality of our world can
determine the reality. For a true understanding of environmental
conflict there must be a true understanding of the environment, both
how it functions and how we perceive its functioning. All
environmental disputes at some level hinge on the interpretation of
data" [Painter, 1988: 150].
"Problem solving seeks to analyse and resolve a conflict, not to extend its scope"
[Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 98, emphasis in original]. Disputants adopt positions early
on in conflicts which are then often used to rally public support. Since these positions
can hinder the resolution process the third party needs to encourage the disputants to
decommit themselves from the positions they have taken. The adversarial nature of
position-taking often leads to inflexibility. Thus, the disputants eitherrefuse to negotiate
with each other and fight on to the bitter end, or only consider something if the
conditions they have set have been recognised [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 69].
The mediator's task is to draw out the disputants' interests, separating them from the
positions that have formed the conflict and dogged any previous resolution attempts
[Fisher and Ury, 1981].35
 As Mitchell and Banks point out, the mediator can be
informed of the issues prior to the start of the mediation process, but it is essential to
hear the issues from the disputants for two reasons. Firstly, to see how the disputants see
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the conflict, and secondly, to keep abreast of information as it changes during the
mediation process [1996: 98]. But also, McDonald points out, to define what is going to
be negotiated (but policy, it must be remembered, is made by the governments involved
and not the negotiators) [McDonald interview, 25/4/96].
In focusing on the issues in dispute two factors are involved. Firstly, what information
each participant regards as relevant. Since "[a]nalysis requires data and the data consist
mainly and most importantly of the perceptions and experiences of the parties
'represented' by the participants present at the workshop. By definition, the perceptions
of the two sides will differ in any conflict" [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 97, emphasis in
original]. Secondly, the process must overcome the reluctance of the participants to
share 'their' information. "While disputants in adjudicating proceedings see every non-
supportive piece of information as a threat to their claims, participants in a mediation
process are encouraged to see information as a means of opening up new possibilities
for dealing with differences" [Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 32].
When the conflict involves specialised information, it is imperative for all the
participants to be familiar with the technical aspects of it [Painter, 1988: 146]. Though
this appears obvious, its value and importance bear repetition. As Winham explains, not
only do the representatives familiarise themselves with the issues involved, but they are
also creating the topic that is to be negotiated [1986: 85]. For example, at the Tokyo
Round (1973-79) of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), the subject
was so complex that the negotiators had to have an intellectual understanding of the
principles involved before they could start to negotiate. So the pre-negotiation process,
of the Tokyo Round, involved gathering data, organising the material, relating it to
existing data, and creating a negotiating structure that resembled the data's structure
[Winham, 1986: 88].
In general, the participants' commitment to the mediation process can be measured by
their commitment to collect data that has been requested or agreed to be relevant. This is
especially true if data collection has political implications. Unsurprisingly, political
connotations often do arise during the resolution process, and hamper progress. The
political difficulties that the decision-makers are wary of probably devolve from
contested methods of data collection, or imagined consequences that will damage their
35 See Fisher and Ury (1981) for an interesting discussion on the importance and
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national interests [Winham, 1986: 87]. However, "when the greatest impediments to
political action are ignorance, uncertainty, and complexity, the establishment of a
bureaucratic process to generate and structure information may be the most creative step
that can be taken to address the problem" [Winham, 1986: 89].
Ozawa and Susskind, in turn, describe three approaches that are available to the
mediator: information sharing, joint fact-finding and joint model building [1985: 32].
Firstly, information sharing. Generally the adversarial nature of a dispute tends to make
the disputants reluctant to share information. Mediation, by contrast, seeks to encourage
information sharing and to include those actors who are party to the decision-making
process. Within the mediation process, the cost of suppressing information is high, and
the loss of credibility upon discovery acts as another incentive to the disputants to share
relevant information. Secondly, joint fact-finding. The disputants jointly set the
question, and choose the methodology, assumptions, and simplifications. The disputants
choose who will conduct the research, and monitor the outcomes. Thirdly, joint model
building. Since the model is meant to be neutral, the disputants can make concessions
without losing face, leading potentially to a balance or compromise between each
disputant's favoured model [Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 32].
Clearly all four sections of the mediation framework (engaging, issues, options and
agreement) are important, and failure at any stage can scupper the whole resolution
effort. Nonetheless, of particular significance is the opportunity to discuss the issues
involved. The dispute exists in the first place because two or more parties disagree upon
a particular point. As the conflict continues the disputants entrench themselves in their
positions. These positions determine how each party perceives any further information
about the conflict which, in turn, further shapes the dispute.
But until the disputants and the mediator discuss these issues, neither party will have a
clear idea as to how the others perceive the issues involved. An added benefit of this
stage is that both disputants are 'actively-listened' to. This may, in fact, be the first
opportunity each party has had to not only speak, but to feel that the message is being
heard. It is a simple process, but as happens so often in conflicts, communication
between the different parties breaks down adding to existing uncertainties and fears.
method of separating the disputants' interests from their positions.
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Once the issues have been discussed, and narrowed down, the participants can begin to
explore options that may prove to be viable solutions to the problem.
3.3.3	 Options
"Parties to a dispute are seeking to 'win' - that is, to achieve a result
that accomplishes their most important purposes. Very often when a
dispute arises it is centred on things the disputants do not like. In such
situations a dispute is effectively just opposition to something. There is
likely to be little attention given to alternatives" [MacDonnell, 1988:
15].
Mediation aims to explore all the options available, and disengage from the restricted
bargaining that is characteristic of a conflict [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 74]. As Fisher
and Ury point out, disputants often assume that resolution of the dispute lies with a
single option, usually the one they are suggesting. In addition, the disputants also
assume that settlement is a zero-sum situation, and that finding a solution is only their
opponent's responsibility and not something that is in their collective interest [1981: 61].
Therefore, the role of a mediator is to address these assumptions, and broaden the search
for solutions that are not zero-sum and engage the interests of both parties. Susskind and
Babbitt add that the options should be ones "with which all the disputing parties can
live" [1992: 36].
In deciding to negotiate the disputants must, Fisher and Ury suggest, first determine
their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) as it is the "standard against
which any proposed agreement should be measured" [1981: 104]. That is to say, the
disputants must know the cost and value of both agreeing to a proposal and, leaving the
negotiating table and resorting to any unilateral action. As the costs change with the
talks' progress, so does the BATNA. In other words, the best alternative to a negotiated
agreement is not a static, fixed quantity, but a factor that changes according to the
negotiated situation [Fisher and Ury, 1981: 108].
All the participants need to know each other's BATNA, since it is the "only standard"
that can protect the disputants from "accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from
rejecting terms it would be in..[its]..interest to accept" [Fisher and Ury, 1981: 104]. The
BATNA, therefore, influences the options that will prove acceptable to all the
disputants.
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White and Neale believe that the BATNA of each disputant is merely the starting point
to understanding the options that will be acceptable, and therefore, two other factors
have to also be accounted for [1991: 387]. Firstly, the reservation point which, like the
BATNA, is determined by the parties before they enter the negotiating room. The
reservation point is based upon the transaction costs involved, for each party, of
engaging in dialogue with a hostile actor. Raiffa describes the transaction costs in
economic terms, but does not mention the political costs that this thesis believes are the
defining influence on the negotiation process [in White and Neale, 1991].
The second factor that influences the options, and the outcome of the talks, is the
resistance point. Walton and McKersie describe the resistance point as being determined
by the interaction of the disputants during the negotiations [in White and Neale, 19911.
In other words, the extent to which the disputants are willing to compromise and use
their reservation points is based upon the relationship between these actors, which is
influenced by subjective matters such as personality. The decision to settle or not, also
influences the resistance points as do the level of uncertainty each disputant can tolerate,
and their perceptions of the negotiation's progress and equity [White and Neale, 1991:
386]. Once the options have been explored the participants can begin to assess the extent
and topic upon which agreement is possible.
3.3.4	 Agreement
Any relationship entails a trade of gains [Susskind and Babbitt, 1992: 36]. If this
relationship has led to conflict, resolution will depend upon each party gaining an
outcome that is equitable by their own standards. That is to say, if by agreeing the
parties feel they benefit sufficiently to balance the costs of agreement, then resolution is
viable. Therefore, a conflict that may appear resolvable to observers, may in fact be
intractable because of the views each disputant has of the other, and of the conflict [Ross
and Stillinger, 1991: 393].
A conflict, especially a long held one, can prove difficult to resolve because it takes on a
dynamic of its own, with matters becoming so complicated that the disputants are unsure
of what is happening [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 3]. The dispute is also simplified with
time, losing the initial nuances to solidify around certain issues for which the stakes are
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then raised by the disputing countries' decision-makers. In addition, "[m]embers of
`diasporas', distant from the actual arena in which the conflict is being pursued, often
tend to possess more extreme views and positions than those directly involved in, and
knowledgeable about, the conflict, and bearing its costs directly" [op CU: 100].
Before agreement can be reached the disputants have to be reassured that the cost of a
negotiated settlement will be outweighed by the benefits that they will accrue from it.
The process by which this decision is made, is complicated. Firstly, as Ross and
Stillinger point out, the judgement and perceptions of the parties is crucial and form the
psychological barriers to resolution. Thus, any potential agreement will be interpreted
according to the disputants' needs, and if it is regarded as inequitable, or incurring a
disproportionate amount of loss compared to the proposed gain, then agreement will not
be reached. Disputants are, by nature of their interaction with each other, suspicious of
one another's actions. Therefore, proposals made by one party may be obstructed either
by an intransigent opponent, or an opponent who automatically dismisses the proposal
as inadequate [1991: 392-395].
An additional complication in a disputant deciding whether to accept a proposed
agreement arises from the number of people involved in the decision. Not only do
increased numbers of people bring with them a larger number of political audiences to
contend with, but also different expectations from the outcome of the dispute. Thus,
some members of a disputing party may wish to agree to the proposed option, whereas
others may wish to have some form of revenge based upon their continuing enmity.
Under such circumstances it may be necessary to de-link all the issues in conflict, to
allow resolution on one issue [Ross and Stillinger, 1991: 396-397].
The mediator can assist the disputants by giving them the opportunity to explain any
decision to cooperate. Stein believes a successful mediator builds a relationship with the
disputants whereby they feel obliged to accommodate the third party, and each other
[1985: 346]. This works because the "relationship between a mediator and the disputing
parties is reciprocal" [Bercovitch, 1992: 18]. Another aspect of successful mediation is
seen as simplifying the complex conflict situation [Stein, 1985: 346]. In many ways, the
disputants have already done this, but the simplification is obstructive. This is because
the process has resulted in a black-white, us-them, our-their outcome division. Stein
refers instead to a different simplification process, turning away from the us-them type
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divisions to an exploration of options based upon interests and what is possible rather
than rights and moral high ground [1985: 346].
The mediator recognises, however, that the process will not turn hardened enemies into
loving friends. Despite efforts to build trust amongst all participants, suspicions will
undoubtedly remain. Mediation, in itself, will not heal and reconcile deep wounds.
Mediation does, however, initiate the process of stopping the wound deepening and
starting the slow walk to healing and reconciliation. As such the mediator recognises
that the disputants may be hesitant to propose solutions or make offers that could lead to
an agreement, because of concerns regarding effectiveness and attribution [Ross and
Stillinger, 1991: 398].
Concerns about effectiveness and attribution arise because neither disputant wants to be
seen to be making compromises, in case it is interpreted as weakness [Ross and
Stillinger, 1991: 398]. Hence, a disputant may withdraw from making an unilateral
offer, because it believes its opponent may regard the proposal as ineffective, token and
therefore worthless. The result is that the disputants may either wait for a bilateral offer,
and then emphasise that they are agreeing as a gesture of good will; or offer a 'menu' of
options having made it clear that a reciprocal offer is expected. The mediator can
circumvent this routine, which can take considerable time, by making proposals on
behalf of the disputants.
Disputant concerns about attribution are, in effect, about justification. The disputants
feel that unless they can justify the timing and reasons for making an offer, the value
their opponents attached to the offer will diminish, and potentially may damage the
relationship [Ross and Stillinger, 1991: 398]. Moreover, opponents especially in long-
standing disputes, come to expect certain behaviour from each other - usually
intransigence. Therefore, if an opponent is to change this behaviour to one of greater
cooperation, the other disputant's suspicions would be aroused. In this situation the
mediator can, once again, provide an alternative route. By setting a deadline, the
mediator frees the disputants to not only be flexible but to explain their own flexibility,
and that of their opponent's, to the necessary audiences [Ross and Stillinger, 1991: 399].
This, in turn, has the effect of increasing or at least sustaining the offer's value, as the
recipient does not have to search for a hidden motive. The establishment of a deadline, it
is clear, has forced each disputant into a position whereby they have to make an offer to
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keep the talks going. However, as Ross and Stillinger also point out, a deadline can lead
to suggestions that the offer was forced, and therefore is sub-optimal. Nonetheless, in
the face of a genuine desire to reach an agreement, preserving the status quo and
prolonging negotiations may appear less desirable than reaching even a `sub-optimal'
agreement. An important element remains, though, that any offer must be regarded as
equitable rather than having it imposed by one disputant [1991: 399]. And the agreement
must be made formal with a written document, whenever possible [Susskind and
Babbitt, 1992: 37] and cover all the details of implementation [UNITE].
3.4 'PITFALLS' OF MEDIATION
Mitchell and Banks believe traditional mediation is flawed because it truncates
discussion both of the issues and options in dispute [1996]. This truncation is a natural
extension of the power imbalance that exists in a conflict and the mediator has been
unable to banish from the table. This, despite the fact that the mediator usually has
leverage, because it is a powerful political figure; who if effective is likely to be
partisan, and the process cannot be kept secret. Furthermore, the mediator carries into
the room its own political baggage, which acts to discourage discussion as well. Instead,
Mitchell and Banks recommend using track two mechanisms, especially their own
problem-solving workshops. The principle advantage being, it is claimed, the separation
of politics from the representatives.
It is questionable whether politics can be removed, entirely, from any conflict resolution
process. Certainly, it may retire to the back of the room in some processes but,
generally, the body politic hovers over the representatives at a negotiating table. If this
aspect is put aside, the problem-solving workshop proposed by Mitchell and Banks
appears to closely resemble the mediation process. The intervenor seeks permission to
participate, and invites the disputants to join it at the table. The participants discuss the
issues involved, explore options and, if fortunate, agree on particular options. One
further difference, though, is the degree to which the representatives may be authorised
to decide upon the offers being given and received, as problem-solving workshops
suggest using non-political actors such as academics.
Mitchell and Banks have compiled a list of six 'problems' with traditional third party
intervention which includes mediation [1996: 3-4]. First, the disputants only stop the
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violence if they are tired, or looking for a temporary respite. Second, the third party's
method of intervention can be unsustainable if coercive techniques or rewards are
offered for stopping the violence. Third, if the third party's individual goals clash with
the disputants', the third party may be drawn into the conflict.
The list continues with the fourth problem: the third party also has its own agenda, and
is usually biased towards one disputant. Therefore, when the violence does cease, it is a
disguised victory for the favoured party. This can lead to a broadening of the conflict if
other actors then intervene to aid the disadvantaged party. This, in turn, replicates the
previous power balance but with more actors involved. The result is that violence is
being remade, not unmade. Fifth, if the third party forces a settlement upon the
disputants, though it may satisfy the third party's goals, if the disputants are unhappy the
agreement will fail. This is because when the third party's restraining hand is removed,
the disputants' interests and goals reassert themselves and may end in violence. And
last, mediators at the start can frequently compound the dispute they set out to help
resolve.
These points are valid, but also avoidable. The nature of mediation, as described here, is
not to impose the will of the intervenor upon the disputants but to offer them a venue to
communicate more clearly. Therefore, it is maintained that mediation and problem-
solving workshops have the same aim, that is to help the disputants come to an
agreement they want, and will implement. As Bercovitch points out, "mediation rarely
does more harm than good, and more often than not it helps the cause of constructive
conflict management" [1992: 10]. However, as Bar-Siman-Tov observes, there is a
danger that mediation can, by helping the disputants to manage their conflict, in fact
perpetuate the conflict because the costs are more tolerable [1994]. But this in the face
of undesired escalation, may be a trade-off that the disputants are willing to accept.
3.4.1 Asymmetric Power Balance
Parties to a dispute, often, have asymmetric power, however it is defined. Therefore an
intervening third party does not facilitate between equals [Mitchell and Banks, 1996:
37]. Nonetheless, in a protracted conflict, the 'weaker' party must have some strengths
otherwise the conflict would have been over earlier [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 54].
Linked to the perceived power imbalance in a dispute, is the idea that intervention by
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another agency can be detrimental. Intervention occurring before the conflict has run its
course ends up favouring the stronger party, because it in effect freezes the conflict. The
subordinate party can be further discriminated against if the problem-solving process
deteriorates into appeasement [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: x].
The above criticisms of third party intervention are reminders that an equitable outcome
is essential for long term resolution of a conflict. Asymmetric power, though a potential
obstacle, can be circumvented in the mediation process and, as Mitchell and Banks
argue, in the problem-solving workshop because the focus changes from bargaining
power to finding the optimal option using creativity and inventiveness [1996: 54].
Nonetheless, Mitchell and Banks [1996: 55] suggest three issues the intervenor should
consider: [i] If the disputants' representatives are unequal in the key areas, it is better not
to hold a joint meeting. [ii] The disputants' representatives should have similar skills and
experience. [iii] Ideally, the representatives of both sides should have similar access to
their domestic decision-making structure. (But this latter point is beyond the control of
the intervenor.) This is the fundamental truth of a mediation process: the mediator can,
ultimately, only work within the framework the disputants establish. To reiterate, "[i]n
principle, if the parties make the problem, then they can unmake it" [Mitchell and
Banks, 1996: 3].
SUMMARY
There are two aspects of mediation that are by far the most important to the long term
success of the process. Firstly, that the participants have all joined the process
voluntarily. The mediator has volunteered, for whatever reasons particular to that body,
to assist the disputants explore ways of resolving their differences. The disputants, in
turn, have agreed to allow an intervening body to assist them in their search for a
solution. Secondly, the function of the mediation process is quite simply to assist the
communication process between the disputants. It is not for a mediator to impose a
given solution upon the conflict by use of political influence or military might.
Not only does the second factor determine the success of the process, but it is also the
principal reason to recommend mediation over other forms of third party intervention in
an international water dispute. Though the mediator may control the procedural matters
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that set the physical and psychological environment within the mediating room, the
disputants control the outcome that will arise from the talks and upon which agreement
may rest. The decision-making power is left with the disputants. They will decide,
through discussion and compromise, what is tenable and untenable in an acceptable
outcome.
This latter aspect is of supreme value in a dispute over a shared international
watercourse for two main reasons. Firstly, any agreement that is signed will need to be
viable, not only technically and financially, but more importantly politically. Disputes,
and agreements, take place within a political context and are influenced by factors that
happen away from the battlefield and negotiating table. Therefore, the disputing parties
need to be able to accommodate not only each other, but also their own internal factions
and interests. Thus, by leaving the decision-making power with the disputants, they can
adjust the outcome to make any agreement politically viable.
The second reason for leaving the decision-making power with the disputants is that
after any agreement is signed and the mediation is over, the agreement needs to be
implemented, and maintained. This implies that the disputants will have some form of
post-agreement relationship. If the dispute settlement process was particularly
adversarial, then agreement may have been reached at the expense of this relationship
which is as important, if not more. This is not to suggest that mediation leaves the
disputing countries as each other's closest ally, but it does at the very least not
exacerbate the pre-mediation tensions. This would imply that the post-agreement
relationship has a better chance of facilitating the implementation and maintenance of
the agreement.
The mediator's role, therefore, is to assist communications between the disputants.
Assistance can take place in a number of ways. For example: [i] The mediator may act
to clarify issues between the disputants that have become confused during the dispute.
[ii] The mediator may present ideas or proposals on behalf of one disputant, to the other
disputant(s). This situation may arise if the disputant feels that its position would
weaken if it was seen to be offering alternatives to conflict. [iii] The mediator can also
be used by the disputants to explain to a domestic audience the reasons for complying
with a particular outcome. This is especially useful if such compliance contradicts the
previous positions taken publicly. The disputants can simply blame the mediator,
suggesting that they had demanded such compliance.
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This underlines the fact that the responsibility for a successful outcome rests, not with
the mediator, but with the disputants. Should the disputants refuse to relinquish
cherished and established positions vis-a-vis the other in the dispute, then the mediation
is unlikely to result in a settlement. To reiterate, how can a mediator assist
communications when the disputants are not communicating? The attitude of India and
Pakistan in the Indus Basin discussions highlights this point. The World Bank was not
there to drag an agreement out of the two countries, but to help them reach an acceptable
agreement. The narrative of the mediation process in the Indus Basin is told in detail in
Chapters Four and Five.
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4THE PROCESS OF COOPERATION IN THE INDUS BASIN, 1951-53
The preceding chapter focused upon the theory and practice of mediation in general, and
established a framework with which to address the details of dispute and cooperation in
the Indus Basin. The framework used, as already stated, fits the generic mediation
pattern of engaging, issues, options and agreement. The four segments comprising the
framework occur in a cyclical, rather than a linear, pattern that repeat themselves over
different scales and durations. For example, once the third party has engaged in the
search for a solution, agreement has to be reached over the procedure to follow. This
requires the discussion of issues and options related to procedural matters, with
agreement being pieced together wherever it can be found.
The Indus Basin dispute is described over two chapters, from the third party's
perspective.36 In this chapter, the first two segments of the framework, engaging and
issues, are considered. The process by which the World Bank was able to engage in the
talks, and why India and Pakistan accepted this intervention. The engaging stage is
essentially the laying down of ground rules. The mediator explains the rules by which
the mediation process will be conducted, and the disputants set out their own
stipulations. For example, the World Bank requested a policy of no-publicity for the
duration of the talks, and the Indians limited the talks to the water dispute with no
reference allowed to the Kashmir dispute. The process also encouraged discussion of the
issues in dispute. Clearly, without agreement on what is actually in dispute, little can be
done to resolve these matters.
36 See Richmond, Oliver, (1997), Being Mediated Upon: The Cypriot Communities
and the United Nations 1964-1994. Unpublished Ph.D thesis, International Relations
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4.1	 ENGAGING
Though the World Bank entered into the Indo-Pakistani fray as a good officer, its role
changed as the challenges to cooperation arose. By the time the Treaty was signed, the
Bank's stamp was on every facet of the signed document. The intended role of
interested-but-uninvolved had been relinquished for one more actively involved
whereby the Bank suggested ideas, but still left the decisions to the two disputing
parties.
Fearful of losing their painfully gathered hoard of sovereignty, India and Pakistan had
through their obstinacy and intransigence blocked each manoeuvre the other made
towards settlement. These countries regarded each twist and turn as the actions of a
hangman preparing the rope for the other. Coming from an independent body, with little
to profit from the Indo-Pakistani interchange, the Bank's offer of good offices carried
with it credibility. Nonetheless, Indian and Pakistani suspicions and experience with
each other turned the walk to the negotiating table into an obstacle course the World
Bank had to navigate. Rather like a computer game, reaching the first level only meant
preparation for the next level with no guarantee of surviving until the final stage.
4.1.1	 The Actors
Two words can describe the contrast in Indian and Pakistani political leadership from
independence to the signing of the Indus Water Treaty in 1960: consistency and
instability. India, under the watchful eye of Prime Minister Nehru, was able to retain a
consistent approach to its interests. Pakistan, under the strain of political infighting,
struggled to maintain a stable approach to its jostling interests. Only in its rigid rivalry
with its large neighbour, was Pakistan consistent. "Sibling rivalry - bitter since birth -
has long dictated that Pakistan must strain every military sinew to match technologically
whatever India can do" [The Economist, 1998: 19]. It was into this boxing ring that the
World Bank chose to step to referee an agreement between the punch-drunk opponents,
over the Indus Basin waters.
Department, University of Kent; for a rare example of a mediation being examined
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4.1.1.1 India
In the official events of two days in August 1947 stand possible symbols that represent
the relationship India had after independence with the British and its neighbour to the
east and west, Pakistan. India shook off the mantle of British rule on 15 August as
power transferred peacefully from the coloniser to the colonised. India was ready, as
Prime Minister Nehru famously greeted independence, for its "tryst with destiny" [in
Wolpert, 1996: 3]. The day before, on 14 August, events that had started years ago but
recently accelerated with vicious results culminated in partition. The separation of
nations into the India that would be granted independence, and Pakistan that would be
granted life, was a bloodied affair. Subsequently, the Anglo-Indian relationship has, for
the most part, been peaceful and cooperative since 1947. By contrast, the Indo-Pakistani
relationship has been one of intense rivalry and, at times, war.
As the official successor to pre-1947 India, independent India inherited automatic
membership to a number of international organisations, such as the United Nations and
the World Bank. 37 Embassies that had been established to represent India before
independence, were handed over to the new government. Symbolically exemplifying the
continuity that India experienced in its governmental functioning, was the role of the
Foreign Minister [Brown, 1994]. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had held the foreign
affairs portfolio in the Viceroy's Executive Council and continued as Foreign Minister
of independent India. At the moment of independence, Nehru would be able to remain
seated at the same desk, in the same office, in the same building and assume the
independent office.
Such continuity could also be measured in the domestic governing of the country.
Leaders of the independence movement now stepped forward for their reward, to hold
political office. Under the aegis of the Congress Party, the Cabinet that was formed
contained many familiar faces who had an already established power base within the
country. A prominent exception was Gandhi who, because of partition, refused to hold
political office and six months after independence, in January 1948, was assassinated by
Hindu extremists [Wolpert, 1996: 429]. Though there was continuity in government
personnel, this is not to suggest there was complete unity in government policy. Central
from the disputants' perspective.
37 Pakistan had to make a formal application to join the World Bank, which it did on
11 July 1950 [Mason and Asher, 1973: 815].
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government embodied many Congress politicians. But as a long established organisation
tiny fracture lines had entered into the party, as differences of ideology and action
emerged. But it was not until the formation of Congress (I) in 1978 at the behest of
Indira Gandhi, that a split was recognised formally.
But within the era in focus the dominant split was between Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar
Vallabhai Patel, Prime Minister and Home Minister respectively. Nehru held socialist
ideals and was thought to let family attachments to Kashmir obstruct the political
settlement of that issue. Whereas Patel, coming from the Gujarati business community,
was considered to favour a more capitalist line, and a more 'pragmatic' approach to
foreign policy. Matters were decided by Patel's death in December 1950. Three months
earlier, in September, Patel had succeeded in getting Tandon, a protégé, elected as
president of the Congress Party. After Patel's death Tandon was deposed, in favour of
Nehru, in the 1951 elections for the Congress presidency. Having captured the
remaining pillar of power in Indian politics, Nehru's position was to be unassailable for
the remainder of his time in office.
The Indian Union (Bharat) declared itself a republic on 26 January 1950, and a member
of the British Commonwealth [Stamp, 1960: 192]. The Republic of India has a
constitution that embodies a secular democracy, and a president as the head of state. The
first election with full suffrage took place in January 1952, and since then India has been
ruled by an elected government. An exception was the 1975-77 Emergency under Indira
Gandhi [Thakur, 1995: 337]. Within the first few years of independence, disparate
voices clamoured to be heard, amongst them were the demands for linguistic unity. In
November 1956, the States Reorganisation Commission submitted its report and led to
the political map of India being redrawn into fourteen major linguistic regions. The map
was later altered again.
India's relations beyond its borders were played out with regard to two aspects: its
territorial interests and its international reputation. The resonating influence that a
country experienced in its dealings with India depended upon its proximity to the
sovereign territory of India. Regionally, Indian friendship with the People's Republic of
China (PRC), proclaimed under the banner "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai", 38 was short-lived
38 "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" translates from Hindi as "the Indian and Chinese people
are brothers". This slogan was popularly used to typify an era of friendly relations
between the PRC and India.
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as territorial disputes in the Himalayan range led to tensions and a Chinese offensive in
1962. Relations with Pakistan were fraught from inception with myriad disputes:
economic blockade, military might, political matters such as Kashmir and the fate of
other states, governmental and refugee property, and the canal waters dispute.
In the Commonwealth and international community, India's reputation had a better
standing than in its relations with Pakistan. The non-aligned movement Nehru had
initiated was aimed at side-stepping the Cold War raging between the USA and the
Soviet Union. Toeing a neutral line, India, nonetheless, flirted with both superpowers,
much to American frustration. Each superpower tried to tempt India with items such as
military aid, food, and technology. Though India took what it needed from both
countries, for example food aid in the midst of famine, and development aid [Michel
interview, 16/5/96] it was determined to walk its own ideological path.39
India, though it had suffered the ravages of partition, emerged from the process strong
and confident. Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, the country was to experience
a continuity in central government. This, in turn, allowed the country to focus its efforts
on utilising its considerable resources for economic development. Continuity resided not
only at the national level, but also at the international level. Independent India inherited,
from British-controlled India, membership of the international organisations that had
emerged in the 1940s, and embassies in the major countries of the post-war era.
Regionally, with the exception of China, India was fast emerging as the main power. Its
position vis-a-vis Pakistan, is described in microcosm by its position on the two major
international river basins the countries shared. In the west, India was the upstream
riparian in the Indus Basin, which it shared with West Pakistan. In the east, India was
the upstream riparian in the Ganges-Brahmaputra Basin, which it shared with East
Pakistan (later to become Bangladesh).
39 US President Ike Eisenhower offered military aid to Prime Minister Nehru, in May
1954, but was refused due to the non-alignment policy of India [Sober interview,
16/4/96].
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4.1.1.2 Pakistan
In pre-1947 India, the Muslims formed the largest religious minority in the country. A
third of the population was Muslim, spread over the vast subcontinent that was India.
Different cultures, different physiques, and different interpretations of Islam were only
united in that they all stood facing Mecca at prayer. Nonetheless, under the British this
slender thread was used to tie these disparate groups together. During the independence
movement these groups merged and separated as their interests changed, but by the
1940s fear had united a significant proportion of the population behind the Muslim
League and its leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah.40
The argument for the creation of a Muslim homeland, that was promoted belatedly by
the Muslim League, profited from two assumptions, but was based upon fear. The
British assumption of a united Muslim population was used, as well as the second
assumption that after independence the Hindu majority would oppress this minority as
part of the age-old battle between the religious communities. The latter assumption also
doubled as the fear powering the movement for Pakistan.
Three main areas of pre-1947 India had large Muslim populations. In the east, the State
of Bengal; in the west, the states of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and North West Frontier
Province (NWFP); and in the north, there was the State of Kashmir and the United
Provinces. Support for the Muslim homeland was not unanimous even at the moment of
creation amidst Muslim majority provinces. For example, NWFP resisted joining the
homeland preferring secular India instead, but geographical constraints resulted in union
with Pakistan. The demand for a homeland was strongest and longest from the Muslims
of the United Provinces (UP), who supported the Muslim League.
Impatient to leave India after less than a century of direct rule, the British accepted the
two nations theory. After the detailed and difficult task of deciding whether different
segments of a state comprised a Muslim or Hindu majority, and therefore allotting it to
India or Pakistan, came partition. Millions crossed the new borders to what they hoped
would be a haven from persecution, real or feared. Amidst the migrants were the people
who had clamoured loudest for Pakistan, the Muslims from UP.
40 Jinnah, like Gandhi and Sardar Patel, was from Gujarat.
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Whereas at independence India had experienced continuity in its political framework,
Pakistan was to struggle to breathe. "Few countries have celebrated their independence
under the conditions as inauspicious as did Pakistan" [Mason and Asher, 1973: 667].
Not even its territory formed a continuous mass. Pakistan was created in two halves,
rather like a do-it-yourself country kit. Separated by the enemy it most feared, the East
and West wings struggled to establish a nation where there had previously been none.
(For the course of this thesis the use of 'Pakistan' refers, in fact, to West Pakistan.) With
hindsight it is unsurprising that the divisions at the provincial level and between the two
units came to the fore with the speed they did. In addition to the internal difficulties,
Pakistan also felt vulnerable to what it regarded as external aggression.
The political leadership that had got Pakistan for the Muslims, formed the government
of the fledgling country. Within five years the structure of the regime had altered
drastically as the local elite vied for power with the Muslim League and its reliance on
an elite now displaced and less powerful. 41 'Deprived of its long-standing power base in
UP, and facing challenges to its leadership, the Muslim League was unable to retain
control of the political framework.
Within four years of partition, the League had lost two key members of the Cabinet, and
Government was becoming a free-for-all. In September 1948, Pakistan's founding father
and Governor-General, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, died. Three years later, in October 1951,
the remaining politician of nation-wide stature, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, was
assassinated. After Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination, considerable political shuffling
took place, and did not end for a period until the 1958 military coup.
Khwaja Nazimuddin who had been made Governor-General after Jinnah's death in 1948
took over the office of Prime Minister after Liaquat Ali Khan's death in October 1951.
The office of Governor-General fell to Ghulam Mohammad, who had held the finance
portfolio. Under Governor-General Mohammad, Pakistan's political administration
began to disintegrate. Fatefully, in January 1951, General Ayub Khan was made Chief
of Staff of the Pakistani Army. 42 By the time of the 1958 coup d'etat, Pakistan had had
41 Political control of Pakistan transferred from the elite of the Muslim League, who
had for the most part drawn their power from owning land in the north of India, to
the local elite: landowners from Sind, Punjab, NWFP and Baluchistan.
42 In 1955, Ayub Khan was invited to take over the defence portfolio, which he did
before relinquishing it the following year.
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seven Prime Ministers, and one Chief of Staff. 43 (By contrast India had one Prime
Minister and seven Chiefs of Staff.)
"Pakistan's economic performance during the 1950s ranked somewhere
between poor and miserable...A major reason for Pakistan's poor economic
performance was that it lacked a government able and willing to get on with
the task of development. Between 1953, when the Planning Commission was
established, and 1958, when General Ayub Khan came to power in a
bloodless revolution, there were five governments, each headed by a different
prime minister. None gave high priority to development" [Mason and Asher,
1973: 667].
The population of Pakistan was distributed almost equally between the two wings. West
Pakistan with its larger territorial unit contained just under 50% of the whole population,
and was comprised of five different linguistic groups: Punjabi, Baluchi, Sindhi, Pushtu
and Urdu speakers. There were, however, only four provinces and their constituent
governments: Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP. East Pakistan contained in its much
smaller territory just over 50% of the whole population, who were for the most part of
one linguistic group: Bengali speakers in one province.
Provincial rivalries within West Pakistan put "conflicting demands and pressures on the
central government" all of which produced "a political climate of confusion and
conflict" [Tayyeb, 1966: 179]. As Tayyeb points out, between 1947 and 1955, three of
the four provinces in West Pakistan had a number of governments. Sind had fifteen
different administrations, Punjab eleven governments and the NWFP had seven different
governments in those eight years [1966: 179].44 Matters had deteriorated sufficiently,
towards the end of 1954 for the Governor-General to, first, dismiss the provincial
governments in Punjab and Sind and, then, to dismiss the central Government.
43 Prime Ministers of Pakistan, 1947-58: Liaquat Ali Khan (August 1947-October
1951), Khwaja Nazimuddin (October 1951-April 1953), Mohammad Ali Bogra
(April 1953-October 1955), Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali (October 1955-October
1956), Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy (October 1956-October 1957), II Chandrigar
(October 1957-December 1957), and Malik Feroz Khan Noon (December 1957-
October 1958).
44 It remains, unfortunately, true that "[p]olitical upsets, changes, dismissals and
reinstatement of governments have been a common feature of politics in West
Pakistan", with the pattern being repeated in the 1990s and probably set to continue
into the next millennium [Tayyeb, 1996: 179].
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Integration of the four provinces into a single unit in 1955 finally put the East and West
wings on an administrative par.45
Rivalry between the East and West wings also existed and deepened as those people in
the East felt the government based in, and dominated by, the western wing did not
represent them. As in India the issue of language was to be an important political factor.
At independence, Urdu was designated to be the sole national language of Pakistan.
Naturally, East Pakistan with its marginally larger population objected to the absence of
Bengali, and the concept of having two national languages. The issue of language came
to symbolise and crystallise other grievances East Pakistan had against the West wing.
The differences between the units can be shown in their problems with agriculture,
which in "West Pakistan is scarcity of water and the need for irrigation, whereas in East
Pakistan it is an excess of water and the need to control the flow during the monsoon
period" [Mason and Asher, 1973: 668]. The differences and the difficulties between the
units were complicated by financial grievances East Pakistan held against West
Pakistan. The East wing felt the Government sitting in West Pakistan allocated to itself
an uneven proportion of foreign exchange earned by East Pakistan.
However, East Pakistan's grievances were masked by the inflated value of the Pakistani
rupee since, "Pakistan's overvalued currency distorted the terms of trade between the
two wings, to the disadvantage of the east". This was not the only effect of the exchange
rate. An inflated rupee also "exaggerated the investment contribution that Pakistan was
making to its own development in relation to the foreign contribution" [Mason and
Asher, 1973: 671].
The myth of a united Pakistan finally broke down after the Army, installed in West
Pakistan, overturned the results of the 1970 election. 46 The marginal majority enjoyed
by the East Pakistani population appeared to tip the political balance back towards the
45 The Government of Pakistan had hoped that integration into a single unit would
reduce the political instability the provinces, and the country, were experiencing.
But unfortunately, political instability continued to cast a long shadow over the
nation's development.
46 "Pakistan's defense potential was concentrated mainly in the west" as was the elite
which ruled the country, whether civilian or military, for the most part [Mason and
Asher, 1973: 671; Tayyeb, 1966; 181]. Notable exceptions, coming from East
Pakistan, were Mohammad Ali Bogra and Hussain Suhrawardy who both held the
office of Prime Minister during the 1950s.
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East, when the Awami Party carried a landslide victory and legitimately claimed its right
to form the national Government of Pakistan. The suspension of civilian government
resulted in a civil war, from which Pakistan emerged trimmed into two separate nations:
Pakistan - no longer East and West - and Bangladesh.
Internationally Pakistan had only one focus and foe - India. Pakistan still arms itself as
protection against the threat it feels emanates from India. Time and again, Pakistani and
American interests have coincided and resulted in considerable military aid, first in
1954, and again in the 1980s. The USA believed it was arming Pakistan against the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. But Pakistan's aim remained India. Pakistani-
Chinese friendship and collaboration is fuelled in part by the hostility between India and
China. Fixated with the idea of military parity, Pakistan has engaged in an arms race that
led, in 1998, to the nuclear option [The Economist, 1998].
The fear that drove the idea of a Muslim homeland, did not fade away with the creation
of Pakistan. Some Muslims in British-controlled India had feared domination by the
Hindu majority, and disastrous consequences, when independence would come. This
fear, even once the homeland was created, remained to dog the policies of the new
country. Pakistan, conceptualised, created and governed by this fear, remains a state that
struggles internally to survive.
Discontinuity is everywhere in Pakistan. At creation, the geographical territory
comprising the country was discontinuous, split in half and separated by approximately
1,500 km of Indian territory. Internally, the political leaders of partition were unable to
manage the transition to government. The discontinuity in government continued as
political rivals vied for power. With the focus of most politicians on their own political
survival, little attention could be given to the development and needs of the country.
Unlike India which inherited a number of benefits from its predecessor, Pakistan had to
carve its own way in the international community. It had to apply for membership to
international organisations such as the UN and the World Bank. It had to find and buy or
rent buildings to house its embassies abroad, and was only able to afford to staff
overseas commissions in the most 'important' countries.
Pakistan felt vulnerable to attack from India, and feared endlessly for its own survival.
As explained above, the fact that it was downstream to India on its two most important
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river basins, served as a constant reminder of the potential threat that India played to
Pakistan's existence. Whatever fear the Government of Pakistan felt from outside its
borders, was coupled with fear for its political survival from inside its borders.
4.1.1.3 The World Bank
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was conceived at
Bretton Woods in 1944, along with its twin institution the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Their function was to rehabilitate the international financial system after the
trauma of the Second World War, by helping war-torn countries reconstruct their
infrastructure, and less developed countries develop their infrastructure. The IBRD, also
known as the World Bank, first opened its doors in 1946. Most of the literature on the
World Bank deals with the effect of the policies that have been implemented, rather than
the history and structure of the institution itself.47
The World Bank had been established with the idea of first providing soft loans to
European countries for projects that would repair and rebuild their damaged
infrastructure. But the US Government's Marshall Plan removed that task from the
Bank's list. Instead the institution turned to the development aspect in its name. This,
Lord Keynes had foreseen. 'It is likely, in my judgement, that the field of reconstruction
from the consequences of war will mainly occupy the proposed Bank in its early days.
But as soon as possible, and with increasing emphasis as time goes on, there is a second
primary duty laid upon it, namely to develop the resources and productive capacity of
the world, with special reference to the less developed countries' [in Mason and Asher,
1973: 2].
Though the Bank had been established with credit of $10 billion, only a fraction of that
amount had been paid in. The remainder was to act as guarantees from the member
countries for any loans that the Bank was to take out. It was intended that the World
Bank would make loans for specific projects either directly to the national governments
involved, or to agents who were backed by governmental guarantees. But the Bank
47 See Mason and Asher [1973] for a detailed story of the institution up to and under
the McNamara presidency; and Morris [1963] for an idea of the atmosphere
pervading through the Bank during the early days. For an up to date account of the
World Bank Group see van Meerhaeghe [1998].
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would only consider the application if the project had failed to find private capital, and
then only after it was satisfied that the project was viable.
In order to be able to make loans, the Bank had to borrow from the financial markets. If
it failed to convince the markets to buy its bonds, the institution would fold. After the
Second World War, the only financial market that remained intact was the US market.
Furthermore, the only convertible currency was the US dollar. The American financial
market was, however, "openly distrustful of foreign governments; and the guarantee of a
foreign government issue by the Bank - an institution whose own credit was not yet
established - could not be expected to enhance greatly their eagerness to lend money
abroad" [Mason and Asher, 1973: 44].
Therefore, there was some urgency in acquiring a credible reputation on New York's
Wall Street. Under Black's presidency this reputation was actively sought, and
achieved.48 In stark contrast to the present-day institution which stands mature, and it
can be argued arrogant, the fledgling World Bank took faltering steps as it learnt to walk
and find its place in the international community.
Writing in 1981, MacBean and Snowdon point out that the Bank Group49 "have an
overriding interest in the ability of a potential recipient of loans to be able to repay"50
and therefore, "the Bank invariably attaches conditions to its project loans" [1981: 228].
Though these conditions can be seen as infringing the national sovereignty of the
recipient country, the choice remains with the applicant to refuse the terms and
conditions of the proposed loan. The conditions the Bank outlines are generally to do
"with issues directly affecting the projects; for example, methods of putting out
contracts to ensure competitive bidding, control over use of funds to avoid corruption,
48 Iliff describes Black's style of managing the World Bank: "Black preferred to run
the IBRD with more delegation, he trusted his staff to know and do their job. He
kept an eye on events but only became more involved in really important IBRD
policy" [1961].
49 The World Bank Group comprises the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) and three additional units, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) opened in 1956 the International Development Association (IDA)
opened in 1960, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) opened
in 1985. It also has an autonomous member, the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) which became operational in 1966.
50 The Indian Executive Director of the World Bank, B K Nehru, speaking to the
President of India, Rajendra Prasad, in early 1952, remarked that "international
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concern with pricing policies and management methods" [MacBean and Snowdon,
1981: 228].
The Bank's structure has changed over the five decades it has been operational. 51 But
the basic structure remains, dividing the 'Management' from the member governments.
Countries can only join the World Bank organisation if they are members of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and are therefore subject to the terms and
conditions of such the IMF membership. Each year a meeting of the Board of Governors
is held, represented by the member governments' Ministers of Finance.
The member countries are represented on a daily basis by an Executive Director, who
answers to the Finance Ministry of each country. 52 The number of Executive Directors
has increased over the years from 13, in 1946, to 24 in 1998 [van Meerhaeghe, 1998:
69; Mason and Asher, 1973]. The five largest shareholders in the Bank - the USA,
Japan, Germany, the UK and France - have the privilege of appointing their Executive
Directors. 53 The remaining members are represented by a handful of Directors who are
elected, and each Director will represent a clutch of member countries.
The Executive Directors interact with the Management in decisions governing the daily
functioning of the Bank. The Management comprise mainly the President, Vice
Presidents and, since the mid-1960s, other senior members of staff [Mason and Asher,
1973: 69]. The hiring, or firing, of staff is a decision taken by the Management,
irrespective of pressure from the member countries [Garner, 1961]. Loyalty of the
debts were never meant to be repaid" [Nehru, 1997: 252]. Clearly the Bank could
not afford such an attitude.
51 The number of Vice Presidents in the World Bank increased for the first time in July
1956 with the appointment of Iliff, Burke Knapp and Sommers. Garner who had
previously been Vice President moved across to head the newly formed IFC.
52 At Bretton Woods, the USA had wanted Executive Directors to be more involved in
the managing of the Bank, but most of the other countries disagreed [Garner, 1961].
The fight for control of the World Bank between the President and the US Executive
Director, between 1946-49, was probably due to the USA still trying to gain more
influence in the daily management of the Bank [Sommers, 1961]. As Black points
out, "the American Director has a large share of the votes, it would be an impossible
situation if he and the President of the Bank didn't get along. One of them would
have to quit" [Black, 1961].
53 The largest shareholders in 1996 were: the USA 17.7%, Japan 6.26%, Germany
4.84%, the UK 4.63%, France 4.63%. The following countries held 2.99%: China,
India, Canada, Italy, Saudi Arabia and Russia [van Meerhaeghe, 1998: 69]. The
remaining countries each hold less than 2.99% of the shares in the World Bank.
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international staff is expected to be with the institution rather than with their originating
country [Mason and Asher, 1973: 69].
As Garner, who was Vice President of the World Bank from 1947-56, points out:
"we broke down the feeling of nationality within the work of the Bank. In fact
that gave a basis for emphasizing that the Bank was not political, that the
Bank would not - that members of the staff of the Bank should not, allow
their personal or national interests to intrude. I believe the fact that this
principle has actually been developed as a tradition is one of the most
important factors in the Bank's reputation and competence" [1961].
Directly linked to the shareholding capacity of a member is its voting power. Obviously,
the largest shareholder has the largest voting leverage. But as Black points out, "[t]he
power of the governments is not in getting the Bank to make loans, the power of the
governments is to prevent the Bank from making loans. It's a veto power" [1961]. This
veto power, however, does not imply that the Bank is crippled from the outset.
The Bank, in fact, retains considerable leverage in the international community, as Black
points out:
"The strength of the World Bank is our ability to speak frankly to these
countries and to insist upon them carrying out their proper policies. That's
very difficult for the US government to do, or for any large government to do,
because then they are under suspicion of a big country trying to interfere in
the affairs of the small country, trying to dictate to them what they should do.
Now, we can do that, because we say to a country, "Well, you're a member of
the Bank, you're a stockholder in the Bank, and all we're asking you to do is
what you'd want us to make some other country do to protect your interest in
the Bank" [1961].
The World Bank, as it is known today, is a far cry from the institution as it was in the
late 1940s and early 1950s. The Bank, then, was trying to establish a reputation for itself
that would ensure it could raise capital on the international financial markets. This, in
fact, meant gaining credibility in the American financial markets, which was the only
one to survive the trauma of the Second World War. Armed with this objective, the
Bank made loans according to stringent rules that governed which applications would be
successful. This professionalism was coupled with a flexibility in procedural matters
that has long since disappeared as the institution has aged. The World Bank's interest in
the Indus Basin dispute arose partly because of its objective of establishing a credible
reputation. It believed that if it could aid a successful resolution of the dispute, then this
would enhance its international reputation.
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4.1.2	 World Bank Involvement
The World Bank, initially, became involved in the dispute between India and Pakistan
over the River Sutlej, in 1949. 54 The nature of its involvement changed after the Bank
adopted the Lilienthal principles in 1951, and offered its good offices to assist India and
Pakistan in their search for a peaceful solution to the Sutlej dispute. Indian and Pakistani
acceptance of the offer marked the start of a long and tortuous journey that finally ended
with the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.
4.1.2.1 Pre-Good Offices
With matters undecided in the Indus Basin over the Sutlej River, India and Pakistan
continued separately in their efforts to make secure their water supply. Less than a year
after the stoppage of water to canals in West Punjab, India approached the Bank for
loans to fund large water projects using the waters of the Indus and Ganges Basins.
Namely: the construction of the Bhalcra-Nangal multipurpose project on the River Sutlej
[IBRD-13/4/49] and the Damodar Valley Project in the state of Bihar [IBRD-2/6/49]. In
the meantime, the Bank also became aware of the dispute over the Sutlej that was
adding to the already strained relations between India and Pakistan [IBRD-3/6/49]. This
was confirmed in a letter that India sent to the Bank, informing it officially of the
dispute [IBRD-28/9/49].
As an international lending agency, the World Bank was reluctant to make loans for
projects that involved any unresolved disputes for two main reasons. First, such loans
would make for bad investments. And this would potentially damage the trust the
member countries and their representatives on the Board had in the Management's
judgement. And second, once built these projects could exacerbate the existing dispute.
An additional consequence would be the apparent sanctioning of one side over the other
54 Some of the World Bank people involved in the Indus Basin talks were: Robert L
Garner, appointed Vice President, March 1947-July 1956; Harold N Graves Jr,
appointed Director of Public Relations Dept of Bank, November 1950; William A B
Iliff, appointed Loan Director, February 1948, and later made Assistant to the
President in April 1951, before being made Vice President in July 1956 till October
1962; Davidson Sommers, appointed General Counsel, August 1949 and Vice
President July 1956-December 1959; General Raymond A Wheeler, appointed
Engineering Adviser, January 1949; and Lars H. Bengston, a .lawyer. See Garner,
1972, for more about their personalities
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in dispute, by the Bank. Any such interpretation, however unintended, could damage
relations between the institution and the particular members.
The President of the World Bank advised the Secretary of the Reserve Bank of India, Sir
Chintaman Deshmukh, and the Indian Executive Director, B K Nehru, of the Bank's
attitude to the Bhakra-Nangal project. In the Bank's opinion the Nangal dam's economic
viability depended upon the presence of the Bhakra dam. Without the Bhakra reservoir
storing water and smoothing seasonal variations the Nangal project's ability to produce
power would be precarious. Unfortunately, as the Bhakra dam involved using water
already in dispute with Pakistan, the Bank was unwilling to invest in the project.
Therefore, the Bank urged the Indians to resolve the dispute quickly, so that it could
then consider the Bhakra and Nangal projects together [IBRD-9/1/50].
India was, naturally, unhappy about this stipulation and the World Bank's determination
to abide by it. Representing Indian interests, B K Nehru searched for ways to get
funding without involving Pakistan. In a meeting with a World Bank Loan Officer, B K
Nehru initially asked whether the World Bank would fund the Nangal Dam if India built
the Bhakra Dam unilaterally. The Loan Officer reiterated the Bank line [IBRD-213/50],
that the decision would rest not only upon Indian creditworthiness, but resolution of the
dispute. The Bank was not, however, passing judgement upon the position of each
country. As the Bank's representative pointed out, a country on the brink of war would
hardly be regarded by the World Bank's bond investors to be a good investment
opportunity [IB RD-11/1/50] .
B K Nehru's reaction made use of the principle of national sovereignty, and the
advantage of being the upstream riparian vis-a-vis Pakistan. Since Bhakra and Nangal
were sited within Indian territory, the Government was free to develop those sites as it
saw fit. The Federal Government was not bound by Pakistani opinions and reactions
and, B K Nehru contended, nor should the Bank be in its consideration of the Nangal
project [IBRD-11/1/50]. Nonetheless, it was clear that the point had been understood by
the Indians. In March 1950, the World Bank Loan Director noted that B K Nehru had
since "taken some pains" to show pacific statements made by India regarding matters in
dispute with Pakistan [IBRD-213/50]. The Bank was equally anxious to be scrupulously
discrete about the link between Bank investment in India and the state of Indo-Pakistani
relations [ibid].
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In an interesting contrast to the World Bank's present-day standing, the Canadian
Minister for External Affairs advised the President to tread carefully with India. While
the Bank today is more used to outlining what is, and is not, acceptable in order to get
loans, in 1950 the institution had only begun to carve a niche for itself. The Minister
suggested to the President, that by refusing to make further investments in India until it
had resolved its disputes with Pakistan, it was running the risk of damaging its relations
with India. In fact, if the Bank wanted to maintain good relations, it "should avoid taking
any position in relation to this very controversial issue" [IBRD-2/3/50].
Pakistan had been unable to apply for a loan from the World Bank, because it was not a
member country. Whereas independent India had inherited its membership from British-
controlled India in 1947, Pakistan had to apply for this status. Pending membership,
talks were to be held between the Pakistani Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, and
the Bank regarding loans for various projects. As the projects in question included a
proposed barrage at Kotri on the River Indus, India was quick to point out that any
investments in Pakistan were subject to the same criteria as those for India vis-a-vis
disputed water rights [IBRD-22/6/50].
The World Bank did apply the same principle, of only funding water projects if there
was no outstanding dispute, to Pakistan. For example, in assessing the Warsak hydro-
electric project's feasibility [IBRD-31/1/51], the Bank determined that the project was
not only technically sound, but that by raising the dam's height the results would be
further improved. The dam was to be sited on the Kabul River in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan near to its border with upstream Afghanistan.
Since the new height would cause water from the river to go back into its co-riparian,
Pakistan needed to reach agreement with Afghanistan on the expected consequences.
The World Bank suggested an approach that would benefit both countries, whereby the
Afghans would, perhaps, be willing to buy hydro-electric power produced by the
Warsak project [IBRD-15/8/52].
The Bank explained its thinking further. As it had not studied the question of agreement
between Pakistan and Afghanistan in detail, it did not have an opinion vis-a-vis
Pakistan's position (that it had the right to any water entering its borders). But aside
from any legal questions, the World Bank was concerned that in the absence of an
agreement with Pakistan, the Afghans might be tempted to divert water from the River
Kabul to the detriment of the project [IBRD-15/8/52]. It is interesting to note that
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Pakistan and India had similar attitudes to water flowing through, or into, their territory.
Both felt that their sovereignty was not to be challenged, and that they were free to
develop the resource as they pleased. The effect on other riparians was not their
concern, and nor should it influence the Bank's decision to make a loan or not.
Pakistan approached the World Bank not only for a loan to construct works in the Indus
Basin, but also to involve it directly in its Sutlej River dispute with India. By July 1950,
as Inter-Dominion tensions worsened Pakistan had stopped depositing, in escrow,
disputed seigniorage charges with the Reserve Bank of India. But to reassure India of its
good intentions, Pakistan established credit with the State Bank of Pakistan, and
approached the World Bank to act as escrow agent. However, India's access to these
deposits was dependent upon the search for an adjudicated solution to the Sutlej dispute
UBRD-24/10/50]. As the Dominions parried with each other, incompatible descriptions
of international tribunals heightened each country's sense of injustice and delayed
resolution of the conflict.
Pakistan outlined the terms under which its escrow agent, the World Bank, was to award
India the money. Firstly, if proceedings before an international tribunal started before 30
June 1951; and secondly, if the resulting judgement, regarding water received by
Pakistan since 1 July 1950, favoured India. In event of the judgement going against it,
Pakistan would receive any money surplus to the disputed charges. However, if the
tribunal upheld Pakistan's defence that India was presently receiving all the seigniorage
charges it was entitled to, the Bank would return to Pakistan the deposited money in full.
Failing the appointment of an international tribunal altogether before the 1951 deadline,
the money would return automatically to Pakistan [IBRD-24/10/50].
It appears that the World Bank was unwilling to become embroiled in the Indo-Pakistani
dispute over the River Sutlej. Pakistan's attempt to reassure the Bank that its
responsibility lay only in issuing the money under the circumstances described above,
and that it would act promptly upon the instructions of the Bank's General Counsel
failed to dispel the Bank's reluctance. It was becoming apparent to the Bank that the
dispute over the Sutlej was spawning many more little disputes that threatened to
destabilise Indo-Pakistani relations further. In addition, this dispute was obstructing the
institution's ability to fund much needed development projects in the Indian
Subcontinent. Therefore, the Management of the World Bank was probably willing to
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listen to alternative proposals that would ease tensions in the region, and possibly solve
the problem of this dispute [huff, 1961].
4.1.2.2 Lilienthal 's Principles
Independently of the World Bank, the United States of America (USA) was exploring,
informally, ways to cooperate with India. Its intermediary in this particular enterprise
was David Lilienthal, who had formerly been Chairman of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. Propelled partly by an idealistic zeal that sought to challenge the 'red peril' of
communism, and partly by self interest, Lilienthal regarded India as representing for
"the United States and democracy an opportunity" [Lilienthal, 1966: 51].
In October 1949, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had invited Lilienthal to
visit India. Convinced that India was not yet lost to communism, and despite its neutral
stance could still be recruited into the American camp, Lilienthal began preparing for a
trip to the Indian Subcontinent in January 1951. Armed with the blessing of the US
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and information gathered from the World Bank
regarding the situation in the Indian Subcontinent RBRD-31/1/511, 55 Lilienthal visited
the two dominions in February 1951 [Lilienthal, 1966: 54 and 58].
In January 1951, the US Government was already aware that the Sutlej River dispute
constituted a major obstacle in Indo-Pakistani relations [Lilienthal, 1966: 70]. This was
further confirmed, a month later, in discussions with the Government of Pakistan. The
Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan, and the Secretary-General of the Pakistani delegation
to the United Nations (UN), Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, 56 discussed the situation as it
stood with India regarding the rivers flowing through West Punjab [Lilienthal, 1966:
75].
Though the River Sutlej dispute was of importance, it remained sub-ordinate to the
dispute over Kashmir for both countries. This subordination continued into the domestic
and international realm of Indo-Pakistani relations. As the Prime Minister of Pakistan,
55 In January 1951, the World Bank's Chief of the Asia and Middle East Division,
Joseph Rucinski provided Lilienthal with information regarding the dispute on the
River Sutlej.
140
Liaquat Ali Khan, was to state: "Unless the Kashmir issue is settled it is unreal to try to
settle the issues about water or about evacuees" [Lilienthal, 1966: 83]. 57 The river
dispute was also hostage to the suspicions that permeated Indo-Pakistani relations. The
Foreign Secretary, Ilcramullah, asked Lilienthal to "bear in mind there is a large element
in India that does not accept the partition of India, that is still talking and planning to
undo what they insist was a mistake" [ibid].
Lilienthal returned from the Indian Subcontinent, and talks with the Governments of
both India and Pakistan, convinced that the water dispute had to be tackled first. Only
then, Lilienthal argued, would relations between the two Dominions be calm enough for
discussions on Kashmir. Because, Lilienthal warned, as the situation stood presently
India and Pakistan were close to war Lilienthal warned [Lilienthal, 1966: 160].58
Lilienthal "urged that the tortured question of water rights be removed from the
politicians' negotiating table and handed to the engineers of the two countries to work
over, with the technical and presumably financial help of the World Bank" [Perham,
1952].
Lilienthal saw three principles as essential to the dispute's resolution. Firstly, recognition
by the disputants that there was enough water in the Indus Basin for both India and
Pakistan's existing and future uses. Secondly, the water in the River Sutlej, alone, would
be inadequate for resolution, therefore, the water in all six rivers of the Basin should be
considered. And thirdly, to avoid past claims and disputes from obstructing the
resolution process any further, the matter should only be approached from a functional
perspective. 59 Lilienthal also envisaged the involvement of a third party in bringing the
disputants to the negotiating table such as an institution in the manner of the World
Bank [Lilienthal, 1966: 160 and 200].60
56 Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali later become, first, Minister of Finance and, then, Prime
Minister of Pakistan for a year (October 1955 - October 1956).
57 Lilienthal wondered whether Prime Minister Khan's terse statement was for the
Pakistani domestic audience, as it contrasted to the correspondence Lilienthal had
seen between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India [1966: 83].
58 Lilienthal reported to the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South
Asia and Africa, George McGhee.
59 Lilienthal, David E., "Another Korea in the Making?" Colliers, 4 August 1951.
60 Lilienthal was to refuse personally to intervene when asked informally by
representatives of the US and Pakistani Governments.
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4.1.2.3 Negotiating Participation as a Good Officer
The Lilienthal Proposal, as it came to be known, was well received by both the
disputants, India and Pakistan, and the proposed intervening body, the World Bank
[IBRD-2/8/51]. Lilienthal had expected Pakistan to regard the proposal with suspicion
and disagree with its findings. Though there remained an element of suspicion the
Pakistani Government, speaking through Laylin, 61 was quick to accept the proposal in
principle [Lilienthal, 1966: 199 and 205]. The World Bank was equally interested in the
proposal, and through a series of meetings with Lilienthal, determined how it would
approach the parties [Lilienthal, 1966: 205, 210, 230 and 233; IBRD-13/8/51]. 62 In the
process of deciding how to intervene the Bank also met with representatives of India and
Pakistan [IBRD-218/51].
Nonetheless, there was general agreement amongst interested observers, such as the
USA, the World Bank, Pakistani representatives and even the Indian representatives,
that the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, would refuse the Lilienthal proposal
[Lilienthal, 1966: 199 and 223; IBRD-7/8/51]. The reasons envisaged differed a little.
Laylin, representing Pakistani interests, was concerned that Nehru would reject the
proposal if it was seen as a Pakistani initiative. Nehru's reaction would, Laylin believed,
be based upon the principle that anything that Pakistan wanted could not benefit India,
and therefore needed to be rejected [Lilienthal, 1966: 199].
61 The Government of Pakistan had retained an American law firm to advise it on the
River Sutlej dispute with India. The firm known, initially, as Covington, Burling,
Rublee, O'Brian and Shorb became Covington and Burling by August 1951.
Lawyers representing Pakistan included John Laylin, John Lord O'Brian and Roger
Fisher. Laylin was to continue representing Pakistan for the duration of the Indus
Waters Treaty talks.
62 Sommers suggests that Black liked Lilienthal's proposal because he felt that
"engineers speak a sort of international language and communicate across political
difficulties that stop the politicians" [1961]. Black agrees: "I was naive about this
because I thought maybe we'd get all these engineers together and sit around a table.
You could work out a big master plan, because I felt that engineers were different
from other people, that they were interested in combating nature, that they were
above politics, they didn't care much about politics. I thought if he'd get all of them
together, we could dot it. But I was naive in that because I didn't realize the feeling
between the two countries and the historical difficulties involved. It took us seven
years to do it. That was the beginning of it. It was very discouraging. It cost us a lot
of money, a lot of time, but the good thing about it was that all during this period,
we worked out ad hoc arrangements about the supply of water and got agreement
that nothing would be done to disturb that supply of water until we had finished or
the whole thing had blown up. In that way over that period of years we prevented
any bad situation from developing" [1961].
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Lilienthal was proposing to resolve the water dispute by restricting discussions to
functional matters such as engineering principles and facts. Yet despite this
recommendation, Lilienthal recognised and advised the World Bank that pursuing a
functional approach would be futile unless there was clear political agreement on the
principles embodied in the proposal. This belief mirrored the USA's view that the water
dispute was not occurring in a political vacuum. As McGhee, US Assistant Secretary of
State, pointed out: "a settlement of the canal waters question would signify those basic
reversals of policy by the Governments of both India and Pakistan without which there
can be no political rapprochement. Thus, the canal waters question is not only a
functional problem, but also a political one linked to the Kashmir dispute" [IBRD-
7/8/51] .
McGhee believed that this problem, therefore, needed more than the goodwill of
engineers who had worked together before partition. "To achieve success an India-
Pakistan canal waters authority would have to work in a somewhat changed political
atmosphere with lessened fear and tension pervading the subcontinent" [IBRD-7/8/51].
The World Bank regarded this view as an important point, and one that would put in
doubt Indian acceptance of the Lilienthal proposal. The Bank's representative stated: "I
think this is a shrewd appreciation; and that's why I have doubts about the likelihood of
Nehru's being receptive of a proposal offering the Bank's good offices" [IBRD-7/8/51].
Even the Indian Executive Director, B K Nehru who happened to be Jawaharlal Nehru's
nephew, believed the Prime Minister would reject the proposal [Sommers, 1961;
Sommers interview, 30/4/96].63
63 Sommers showed B K Nehru, in advance, a draft of the 6 September 1951 letter that
the Bank was proposing to send to the Indian and Pakistani Governments offering
its good offices. Nehru is quoted as saying, "Well, it's a nice letter, the Prime
Minister is expert at answering such letters and you'll get a very polite answer
which won't say no but will mean no" [Sommers, 1961]. B K Nehru, in his memoirs,
contradicts this account and claims the Bank bypassed him altogether, and had
approached the Prime Minister without his knowledge. B K Nehru states he learned
of the Bank's offer of its good offices from a newspaper [Nehru, 1997: 253]. The
Bank is credited with bypassing him for the following reason: "they thought that,
vigorous as I was in repelling any assault on our sovereignty or interference in our
internal affairs, I might oppose the proposal" [ibid: 254].
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The World Bank, after discussions with Lilienthal, opted to approach the disputants by
letter. 64 Lilienthal had impressed upon the Bank the importance of acting as soon as
possible, if not immediately [IBRD-13/8/51]. The Bank's Management, without the
knowledge of the Board of Directors, drafted a letter offering its good offices in
resolving the canal waters dispute. 65 Before sending the letter through the official
channels to the Governments of India and Pakistan for formal consideration, the Bank
showed the drafts to representatives of the two countries in Washington, DC [IBRD-
2/8/51; Sommers, 1961]. The Bank was to repeat this strategy, of informal previews,
throughout the subsequent negotiations.
On 6 September 1951 the World Bank President wrote, formally, to the Prime Ministers
of India and Pakistan offering to make available its good offices if they "would be
inclined to look with favor upon Mr. Lilienthal's proposal" [IBRD-6/9/51]. The
Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, having already praised the Lilienthal
Proposal in public, signalled Pakistan's acceptance of the World Bank's intervention on
the basis of this proposal on 25 September 1951 [Lilienthal, 1966: 210; IBRD-25/9/51a].
India too, unexpectedly, 66 gave its consent to the involvement of the Bank [IBRD-
25/9/511467
64 Sommers points out that in "the Indus, what seemed to give us an interest in it was
that we had been asked by both sides to finance projects on the Indus system, and
had refused because of the unresolved question of the water. We've done that in
various parts of the world. And so you're right, that there is a relation to lending. If
you write a letter asking to be invited in as mediator, to put it crudely, you generally
find the letter winds up with some such phrase as appeared in our letter to Nehru
and - I don't remember who the Pakistani Prime Minister was, Mohammed Ali
Khan, I think - saying, 'If you would like to proceed, the Bank will assign people
and will be prepared to consider sympathetically any financing proposals that result
from the agreement.' There's always an overtone of financial help in the
background. Otherwise it doesn't have the necessary sex appeal" [1961].
65 Under Black's presidency the Bank's Management, which oversaw the daily
running of the institution, gained considerable influence and would only approach or
inform the Board of Directors once matters had been arranged satisfactorily. Thus as
a matter of routine, the Board was informed of loan applications only after the
details had been investigated, and the decision taken to make available the requested
funds.
66 As late as 9 September 1951, on hearing of Pakistan's acceptance, Lilienthal still
believed Indian acceptance to be remote [Lilienthal, 1966: 223].
67 B K Nehru "asked the Prime Minister how it was that he had so readily agreed to
outside interference in this dispute when he was so adamant about similar
interference in Kashmir, his answer was that this was not a political question. He did
not want any unnecessary tension with Pakistan and he had faith in the impartiality
of the World Bank" [Nehru, 1997: 254].
144
In a detailed letter to the Bank's President, dated coincidentally 25 September 1951,
Prime Minister Nehru reminded the Bank, though, of the specific nature of this
intervention: "I might make one point clear. The Canal Waters dispute between India
and Pakistan has nothing to do with the Kashmir issue; it started with and has been
confined to the irrigation systems of East and West Punjab" [IBRD-25/9/5 1b]. The
Pakistani Prime Minister concurred with this opinion, stating that the parties should
"refrain from using the negotiations in one dispute to delay progress in solving any
other" [IBRD-25/9/51a].
With acceptance from the Governments in hand the Bank consulted Lilienthal as
regarding the next step to be taken [IBRD-3/10/51; 16/10/51a]. (For a discussion as to
why India and Pakistan may have agreed to the World Bank's intervention see Chapter
Five.) Meeting in early October, Lilienthal warned the Bank from pursuing a functional
approach to the dispute without clear political agreement upon the principles of
engagement [Lilienthal, 1966: 2331. 68 Since the Bank had already agreed in writing to
his principles, Lilienthal suggested using them as the basis of discussion for the
mediated talks. Lilienthal was, also, anxious to ensure two features were maintained
during the Bank's good offices.
Firstly, the policy of integrated water and basin management since "this will solve many
of the particularly thorny issues that will arise and that have already arisen" [Lilienthal,
1966: 233]. This meant that the whole Indus Basin was under consideration and water
was to be allocated throughout the region. Secondly, and in direct disagreement with the
World Bank's engineer, General Wheeler, Lilienthal believed that the Bank
representative should only assist the participants in their discussions, rather than
arbitrate any disagreements. This Lilienthal believed would be more effective once it
was clear that the Bank was "not there to decide" [ibid, emphasis in original; IBRD-
9/10/51].
The World Bank began drafting its next letter to the disputants shortly after its meeting
with Lilienthal [IBRD-12/10/51]. "It was generally realised that it is of great importance
that the Bank should write the terms of reference as far as general principles are
68 This would appear to contradict Lilienthal's own recommendation of avoiding
politics, but it was, nevertheless, a realistic appraisal of the situation in the Indus
Basin. Without the political will of the Governments, the mediation process would
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concerned" [IBRD-16/10/51b]. Towards the end of October the Bank had prepared the
letter outlining its ground rules for engagement [IBRD-22/10/51]. However, the
Government of Pakistan strongly urged the Bank to postpone replying to the Pakistani
letter dated 25 September 1951, for approximately two weeks [IBRD-24/10/511. 69 The
World Bank wrote to the Governments of India and Pakistan in early November,
outlining its proposed mode of conducting the discussions [IBRD-8/11/51]. 70 Both
Governments were asked to refrain from any further publicity on this issue, and to keep
discussions secret. 71 (For the text of the complete letter see Appendix Two.)
The World Bank proposed setting up a working party of engineers to deal with the
Canal Waters problem. Pakistan and India would each send qualified engineers to meet
with the Bank's own engineers. These Designee Engineers would be accompanied by
their technical staff they thought necessary. The World Bank would ensure that any
shortfall in technical expertise would be covered either by in house specialists or by
hiring consultants. The Bank made it clear that their engineer would have a very specific
role; in which he would "assist in solving problems without being in the position of an
arbitrator" and would ensure plans were financially viable given "the Bank's previously
expressed readiness to consider financing proposals" [IBRD-8111/51]. They also sought
be impeded by domestic politics. As it was to happen, despite the assenting political
will, domestic politics repeatedly encroached upon the 'functional' approach.
69 The circumstances of this request were tragic not only for the individuals involved,
but for the country as it ushered in an era of political instability. On 16 October
1951, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. With
Jinnah's death in September 1948, the two most prominent members of the ruling
Muslim League had now passed away leaving the party in disarray and vulnerable to
challenges from more local interests.
70 The World Bank copied its letter, dated 8 November 1951, to the USA (Donald D.
Kennedy who was the Acting Director in the Office of South Asian Affairs of the
US State Department), and the Executive Directors of the Bank for Pakistan (Yaqub
Shah), India (W R Natu), and the UK. In the initial stages, the Bank was to hold
discussions with the USA [IBRD-16/11/51] and the UK regarding its approach.
Though this was to become less frequent, but more specific, in the latter stages of
the negotiations confidential consultation with interested governments would remain
a constant theme throughout the talks.
71 The policy of no publicity was important throughout the talks, but one that both
India and Pakistan would flout. Statements were made by both Governments in
parliament, and in interviews. Publications were also produced for the international
community. Rao, a legal adviser to the Indian Foreign Office, [1958] presented the
Indian perspective; but Pakistan's publications were considerably more numerous:
the Government of Pakistan reports [1953a-b; 1958a-c]. Pakistan also claimed that
Honig, an international lawyer, [1957] supported their argument.
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to reassure the Governments that "[b]efore selecting its representative, the Bank would
ascertain that he would be acceptable to the two Governments" [IBRD-8/11/511.72
In his letter, dated 8 November 1951, the Bank's President explained the function and
method of the Working Party:
"The working party would hold an initial meeting for the purpose of
determining the procedure to be followed in working out the plan, the steps
needed to be taken, the order and manner in which those steps would be
undertaken and the persons by whom they would be undertaken, and would
set target dates for completion of the various steps. On reaching agreement on
these matters, the working party would promptly, without the need of any
further authorization, put the agreed procedure into effect and begin work on
the plan" [IBRD-8/11/51].
India and Pakistan's response was more guarded this time. The letter was seen by
them, and Lilienthal, as raising more questions than it proposed to answer. The
most controversial section was the Bank's interpretation of Lilienthal's principles:
"I shall base my suggestions on the essential principles of Mr. Lilienthal's
proposal which are, as I understand them, the following: (a) The Indus basin
water resources are sufficient to continue all existing uses and to meet the
further needs of both countries for water from that source. (b) The water
resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed and used in
such manner as most effectively to promote the economic development of the
Indus basin viewed as a unit. (c) The problem of development and use of the
Indus basin water resources should be solved on a functional and not a
political plane, without relation to past negotiations and past claims and
independently of political issues" [IBRD-8/11/51] .
As Lilienthal was to observe, by not including the stipulation that Pakistan must
continue to receive the same levels of water as it did at partition, the Bank was
introducing uncertainties which had already been dealt with. In the lead up to the Bank's
intervention, India and Pakistan held separate talks with Lilienthal, asking his advice,
and discussing matters in general. Pakistan had readily accepted Lilienthal's ideas,
because of the assurance of continued supply. And India had made it clear that it did not
intend to harm Pakistan's existing needs [Lilienthal, 1966: 234].
In private conversations with A N Khosla, who would later become the Indian Designee
Engineer, Lilienthal was told that Prime Minister Nehru did not intend to harm
72 Indian, Pakistani and World Bank representation at the Indus Basin talks appeared
almost exclusively to be male, both in the negotiating room and the governmental
decision-making process. Women only appear to contribute to the talks in a
secretarial capacity.
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cultivators in Pakistan in order to benefit Indian farmers [IBRD-13112/51; Lilienthal,
1966: 234]. Yet the letter that the World Bank had sent was sufficiently vague in its
definitions to not only allow further interpretation, but also to increase Pakistan's fears
for its existing uses should it participate in the proposed working party [Lilenthal, 1966:
269]. The subsequent clarifications initiated by the Bank that resulted in the status quo
failed, however, to dispel Pakistan's disquiet for the duration of the mediated talks.
Initially it had been hoped that a working party would be able to convene in
Washington, DC at the beginning of January 1952 to discuss the procedures by which
the negotiations for a comprehensive plan could take place. But with matters unclear
regarding the water supply to Pakistan's uses for the duration of any talks, the working
party's convening depended upon reaching agreement on this matter. Whereas
Pakistan's fears focused sharply upon the supply to its existing uses, Indian concerns
centred more on th- uses it hoped to develop from the Sutlej River. Indian reliance on
the Sutlej River was not so much a matter of how much water was being used at that
time, but how much it hoped to use in the future.
Prior to the sending of the November 1951 letter the Bank's President had anticipated
visiting the Indian Subcontinent, as part of a larger tour. It was planned as an exercise in
reinforcing the disputants' commitment to the new approach the Bank was promoting.
The Bank hoped the President would thus smooth any remaining issues obstructing the
start of the negotiations. However, as a result of the Bank's interpretation of Lilienthal's
principles, communicated in November 1951, considerably more had to be smoothed
over than the Bank had been previously anticipated [IBRD-1811/52; 23/1/52].
The Bank's Management first sent out the Assistant to the President in December 1951
for a short visit [IBRD-19/12/51; 21/12/51; 24/1/52]. The President followed in
February 1952 with visits to India and Pakistan accompanied by, amongst others, the
Chief of the Asia and Middle East Division [IBRD-14/1/52]. For this duration and to
hold 'daily' talks with the Indian and Pakistani authorities, while the President continued
with his scheduled tour, a Bank lawyer was also sent out [IBRD-25/1/52; 29/1/52;
10/2/52; 20/2/52; 4/3/52; 8/3/52a-e; 9/3/52; 10/3/52ab; 12/3/52ab; 13/3/52a-c;
14/3/52ab; 15/3/52ab; 16/3/52a-c; 20/3/52]. The World Bank also continued to hold
discussions with Indian and Pakistani representatives in Washington, DC. The result of
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this shuttle diplomacy, was a tripartite understanding on supplies to existing uses.73
The working party held its first meeting in May 1952.74
The World Bank's success, however unexpected, in engaging itself in the Indo-Pakistani
water dispute was due in part to the timing of its intervention. India and Pakistan had
reached a stalemate after successive Inter-Dominion meetings had failed to find a
mutually acceptable solution. India had rejected Pakistan's proposal of inviting the ICJ
to adjudicate, and Pakistan had refused India's suggestion of an alternative arbitrating
tribunal. And in order to safeguard their water supply, both parties were unilaterally
constructing works which, in turn, acted only to exacerbate existing Indo-Pakistani
tensions.
In addition, the World Bank had refused loans to both countries to fund projects utilising
the disputed water of the River Sutlej. The Bank was explicit in explaining the terms
under which the loan applications had been refused, and pressing India and Pakistan to
resolve the dispute so funds could be made 'available. Thus, when a proposal was made
to break the deadlock the two disputants were willing, it appears, to consider it for two
main reasons.
Firstly, the proposal had been made by an impartial observer. This circumvented the
pressure for such an initiative to have come from either disputant. The proposal involved
intervention by the World Bank with which both countries already had a working
relationship and which was a potential source of finance. Secondly, the proposal aimed
to satisfy the interests India and Pakistan both had in the dispute's outcome. Thus, not
only was the timing of intervention appropriate, but the proposal that was being put
forward was appropriate to the stage of the dispute's evolution.
The process of engaging in the dispute had itself been an arduous task for the World
Bank. It illustrated the nature of the engagement, and promised to be a time-consuming
procedure with India and Pakistan wary and determined to safeguard their own interests
at every step. Relations between these two countries was fraught with difficulties that
impinged upon the mediation. The voluntary nature of mediation is highlighted in the
73 India and Pakistan had agreed to not diminish supply to any existing uses for the
duration of the World Bank's good offices [IBRD-13/3152]. This was different,
though, to Pakistan getting a clear guarantee that its existing uses would be
maintained throughout the talks, which is what Lilienthal had proposed.
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engagement stage. All three participants had to voluntarily agree to this new approach, if
it was to have any hope of success.
The role of the third party is critical, and it evolves with the mediation process. Though,
the World Bank was there to only assist the disputants to communicate with each other,
it could facilitate the mediation process at every step. Moreover, as Baxter observes, the
nature of the Bank's role evolved as the gap between the Indian and Pakistani positions
became clear, and "the Bank was forced to play a more active part in working out a
solution" [1967: 477].
To get the parties to engage in the mediation process the World Bank had to reassure
both parties that participation was without prejudice to their legal rights and positions.
Nor would either party be committed to anything discussed during the talks, if an
agreement was not reached. In other words, neither party would be forced to abandon
their agendas before or during the talks, unless they were willing to change their
positions and demands. Once India and Pakistan had agreed to join the talks and to the
World Bank's involvement, the way was open for all parties to discuss the issues
involved in the River Sutlej dispute.
4.2	 ISSUES
The principal issues at stake in the Indus Basin dispute were not particularly complex or
mysterious. Simply put, the dispute was about the use of water. India wanted to use
water flowing through its territory to develop new areas for irrigation. Pakistan wanted
to maintain supplies to existing uses within its own territory. Since the amount of water
appeared to be finite to the disputants, unless expensive works were constructed, each
side emphasised its right to the water. In the bilateral negotiations that had taken place
since 1948 India and Pakistan had both relied upon their interpretation of international
law, and especially international water law, to justify their demands and actions.
Other than complicating and frustrating Indo-Pakistani matters, however, the legal
avenue failed to lead the parties to agreement. Entry of the World Bank into the dispute
altered the mode of functioning momentarily. Rather than repeating each party's legal
74 See Gulhati [1973: 103-104] for details of the Working Party members.
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position, the Bank encouraged India and Pakistan to address the underlying need for
water. To allow the disputants the space to explore the issues and options involved, the
conflict had to be put on hold. This the Bank attempted to do by establishing a status
quo. However, this, was to prove to be equally contentious and become another point in
dispute over which India and Pakistan took positions.
4.2.1	 Positions Taken and Underlying Interests
As Fisher and Ury point out, disputants often take positions in a conflict that can
obscure their actual interests and aims. Therefore, they recommend separating the issues
from the positions adopted by the disputants [1981: 11]. Otherwise, these positions can
deflect any ongoing discussions away from the actual issues that could potentially lead
to some form of acceptable agreement. Generally, a dispute arises and is perpetuated by
the conflicting positions the disputants take. Therefore, if the focus of the talks is, then,
upon the positions each party is taking, a stalemate is not an uncommon product.
Refocusing the talks upon the issues behind the positions can encourage the disputants
to find ways to settle their differences rather than only see the chasm between them.
By the time the World Bank came to intervene in the Indus Basin dispute, India and
Pakistan had already established their positions, and guarded them against attack from
the other. Clothed in a range of terms (legal, technical, uses) each country laid claim to
the waters from the eastern rivers, in particular the River Sutlej. India, adamant that it
was justified in developing its own irrigation needs, refused to subjugate its needs to
Pakistan's prior, and absolute claim, to these waters. Pakistan, fearful of any further
action by India to unilaterally alter its water supply, in turn, refused to recognise that
India too had a legitimate claim to use some of the water.
What is striking in the Indo-Pakistani relationship vis-a-vis the Indus Basin are the
similarities in the goals of each party. Both India and Pakistan were interested in
safeguarding their national security, promoting economic development, and being
independent and self-sufficient in their production of food. Both parties, also, wanted to
have an assured and untampered supply of water, independent of an upstream riparian.
Both countries were prepared to use international law to legitimise their position, and
both wanted to minimise the financial costs that might be incurred from alternative
approaches to resolving the problem. With so much in common, it is a testimony to
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Indo-Pakistani suspicions and wariness that the dispute, and subsequent negotiations
involving the World Bank, dragged on for over twelve years.
Indian and Pakistani reluctance to relinquish their positions arose from the fear that this
would be used by the other party to its own advantage. Despite considerable effort by
the Bank to build trust, in the parties and the process, this fear remained till the end of
the negotiations. In fact, it is even encoded in the Indus Waters Treaty in Article XI:
"Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed by the Parties as in any way establishing any
general principle of law or any precedent" [Appendix 7].
The manner in which India and Pakistan saw their positions did change during the
negotiations. At the start of the talks under the Bank's good offices, both countries
highlighted their respective standing and rights in international law, and international
water law. The legal argument was used less frequently by the disputants as discussions
incorporated Indian and Pakistani concerns, respectively, financial liability to Pakistan
and assured supply to historic uses. At the start of its involvement in the Indus Basin
negotiations, the World Bank attempted to limit the dispute by suggesting the
establishment of a status quo. This strategy would, unfortunately, serve only to
complicate matters.
In referring to the interests and positions adopted by India and Pakistan, these political
entities are being considered as monoliths. India and Pakistan are, for the most part,
taken in this thesis to be single, unitary actors engaging in mediated talks with the World
Bank, which is also treated as a monolith. It is appreciated that this is an over
simplification of the diverse and often conflicting interests that govern the separate
constituents comprising these countries. It is also appreciated that the events and
decisions of the mediating room were influenced by the events and context of these
diverse interests.
Nonetheless, all three parties are still treated as monoliths, and the focus of this thesis
remains within the mediating room, as it is beyond the scope of this work to enter into a
discussion of these other interests. On occasion, though, reference is made to the
conflicting interests of the Pakistani provinces of Sind and West Punjab as these had a
direct, and at times visible, influence upon the negotiations.
152
4.2.1.1 India
After independence, India was keen to begin its long road to economic development.
The centralised economy and the five year plans that emerged to clear the path to
development, relied upon utilising all of the resources India had at hand. As a result of
partition, sections of the Indus rivers lay within the sovereign territory of independent
India. India laid claim to these water to expand its existing irrigation framework with the
hope that it would, eventually, become self-sufficient in food production and stave off
famine. India's interest in developing its irrigable lands, in the west, also included hopes
of rehabilitating refugees who had fled Pakistan during the bloodied partition of the
Punjab. 75 India wanted the additional water, but it did not want to wait indefinitely for
a decision nor pay Pakistan handsomely for the allocation of this water.
Indian interests evolved further, after the intervention of the World Bank and resultant
discussion of proposals for a comprehensive plan, to include time and financial liability.
In the meantime, India unilaterally began constructing irrigation works on the River
Sutlej and was keen to start using these works as they became available. However, India
was restrained from diverting water to these works by a commitment to maintain the
status quo and not diminish water to Pakistan for the duration of the Bank's good offices
(this will be discussed in more detail later). With Pakistan refusing to give clear
agreement to key issues such as the basin's division, the cooperative work dragged on
with the attendant stipulation not to diminish supplies. With newly constructed irrigation
works standing idle, and public pressure growing to utilise them, the Government of
India was eager to bring the talks to a conclusive end, whether by agreement or by the
talks breaking down.
The other key interest that determined Indian action during the negotiations, was the
financial liability that each plan potentially incurred for India. In its 1954 Proposal the
Bank decided that financial liability was to be determined by the extent to which each
country benefited. All three participants accepted the principle that any link canals built
to replace water from the Eastern rivers, would benefit India. This was because India
would then be allowed to withdraw water from those rivers for its own use. Thus, it was
75 This land was not just in East Punjab, but also Rajasthan. Rao points out that the
Bhakra system provides Rajasthan with water for 231,000 hectares, and adds that
"the total irrigation potential in Rajasthan amounts to about 1.8 million hectares
(ha) due to Indus waters" [1979: 64].
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agreed that India would be liable for the cost of constructing replacement works in
Pakistan.
Thereafter, the cost of proposed replacement works became of prime interest to the
Indian delegation, as efforts were made to limit the cost by proposing and opting for the
more economical plans available. Berber, an international law specialist who had been
hired by the Indian Government, even tried to demonstrate that India, in fact, would not
benefit from the replacement works [IBRD-2/10/56]. Using the "Principle of Benefits",
Berber strove to demonstrate to the World Bank that India would not benefit, and in turn
Pakistan would not receive any money from India for the replacement works. However,
if the "Principle of Equity" was used, then clearly both countries would benefit. And
since the Bank had, of course, intended for India to pay to the replacement costs to a
'certain extent', "the cost of replacement works should be shared by the two countries"
[IBRD-2/10/56; 4/10/56].
Over the duration of the mediated negotiations, India did not relinquish long held
positions as it took up new ones, it merely added them to its growing stable of policies
and posturing. This was illustrated in 1957 during talks between the World Bank and
India, in which India stated it would resort to the 1948 Agreement if an acceptable
outcome was not forthcoming. The Bank representative "replied that even this
'agreement' is in dispute" [IBRD-10/6/57]. In fact, the legality of this Agreement had
been disputed within months of its signing, in 1948, by Pakistan, and had exacerbated
tensions over the River Sutlej.
Indian posturing began, in 1948, by seeking to justify its claim to the Sutlej. The British
colonisers were blamed for being unfair in their uneven development of the Indus Basin.
It was explained that because certain areas that, after partition fell into India, had not
been considered as viable for development as those areas that now comprise West
Punjab in Pakistan. Independent India claimed that this under-development in East
Punjab needed to be reversed even though the works, now required, would be more
expensive to construct than those built under the British.76
76 India is subject to the same problems with irrigated agriculture as Pakistan, namely
waterlogging and soil salinity. As far back as 1958, while the Indus Basin
mediations were ongoing, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, said
regarding these problems: "On the one side, we carry out irrigation works and put
more and more water for fresh areas, while on the other side, land goes out of
cultivation due to waterlogging. This is a curious state of affairs and it is far better
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Shivananda describes the Indian perspective:
"Thus the developments of the past were due to political and financial
policies pursued in those days and not because this part of the Basin had
less need of water or could not have brought to it. Obviously, people in the
Indian part of the region would not now accept the proposition that the
mistakes of the past be perpetuated indefinitely" [1961: 7-8].
India also drew upon international law to shore up its claims. In a curious interpretation
of international law India, soon after independence and partition, stated that it was under
no legal obligation to Pakistan since the country did not exist prior to 1947. Therefore
though India was willing to inherit the mantle of British India and the benefits of
automatic membership to international organisations such as the World Bank and the
United Nations, it was unwilling to continue the previous entity's legal obligations to
areas that comprised Pakistan after partition.
After the signing of the 1948 Inter-Dominion Agreement (Delhi Agreement), India used
this document to argue that by diverting water away from Pakistan it was within the
remit of the agreement. Though this would appear to be true, Pakistan challenged the
legality of this agreement. And though India side-stepped Pakistan's request to submit
the Sutlej dispute to the International Court of Justice (/CJ) for settlement, it was willing
to answer Pakistan's questioning of the 1948 Agreement's legality.
In a telegram from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 18
October 1948:
"We deny that the Delhi Agreement provides for continuance of supplies to
West Punjab until a final agreement is arrived at between the two
dominions. We consider that if a party refuses to come to a final settlement
of the dispute without any reservation or if there is unreasonable delay in
the part of a party in concluding such final settlement it is open to other
party to put an end to the agreement by giving reasonable notice. Further,
the Delhi Agreement is based on recognition by West Punjab Government
of the right of the East Punjab Government to progressively diminish
supply of water to West Punjab in order to give reasonable time to enable
West Punjab Government to tap alternative sources. Further meetings
between representatives of the two governments should be on the basis of
this recognition by West Punjab Government of above-mentioned rights of
East Punjab Government" [IBRD-23/3/51].
to stop every irrigation work than allow waterlogging. It seems to me the height of
folly that while we advance on one side we retreat from another side" [in McCully,
1996: 168].
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India selectively agreed to aspects of international law that appealed to its course of
action. In a letter to the Pakistani Prime Minister on 8 October 1950, the Indian Prime
Minister refused to consider the involvement of the ICJ or any other impartial, third
party: "To think, ab initio of a third party will. ..be a confession of our continued
dependence upon others. That would hardly be becoming for proud and self-respecting
independent nations" [IBRD-23/3/51, emphasis in original].
Prime Minister Nehru went on to reiterate the point: "You seem to think that. ..only
outsiders can decide for us. I confess that I am unable to appreciate the force of this
argument, which, as I have indicated above, reduces us to a dependent status relying
upon the pleasure of others; this is something wholly repugnant to me and, in my view,
incompatible with the dignity of both India and Pakistan" [IBRD-23/3/51]. Nonetheless,
India was to offer some form of international tribunal as a means of resolving the
dispute. But these tribunals would be composed of an equal number of members
representing India and Pakistan, without the involvement of another impartial member to
decide matters in the event of a deadlock.
India also portrayed itself as the aggrieved 'victim' in the Indus Basin dispute. It pointed
out that though East Punjab in India had approximately the same population and
territory as West Punjab in Pakistan, it had only a fraction of the irrigated works that
watered crops in West Punjab. Additional burdens were, also, being placed upon East
Punjab and its under-developed lands by the need to rehabilitate refugees fleeing from
West Punjab and other parts of Pakistan. All East Punjab was asking for was water it
was due under international law, and which amounted to no more than 20% of the water
flowing through the Indus Basin. India did not mention that it had, as a country,
numerous basins supplying numerous canals. 77 If the population of East Punjab did not
receive water to canals that had not existed a few years ago, it would not mean the
whole of India could face food shortages, unlike Pakistan.
In 1957, the Indian Minister of Irrigation and Power was justified in claiming that
"[d]uring recent months, there has been a good deal of propaganda by and on behalf of
Pakistan, aimed at misleading world opinion by suppression and distortion of facts"
[IBRD-25/7/57]. However, the moral highground appears to have been lost when in the
same session the Minister was equally responsible of misleading Indian opinion when
77 See Rao, 1979, for more details of India's water wealth.
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replying to a question in the Lok Sabha: "At present, only about 10 per cent of the
irrigation in West Pakistan depended on the waters from the eastern rivers" [IBRD-
25/7/57].78
Less than a month later this figure was to halve: "At present Pakistan depends upon the
eastern rivers only for about 5 per cent of the total supplies used by her for irrigation in
the Indus basin in Pakistan, if she makes full use of the link canals already constructed
by her" [IBRD-21/8/57b, emphasis added]. There was, however, no mention of
Pakistan's ability at that time to utilise the link canals under construction. Under the
good offices of the Bank, and as construction of the Bhakra Dam on the River Sutlej
neared completion, the Indian representatives reminded observers that India had shown
great patience in not withdrawing water for its projects, and was making tremendous
sacrifices as a result.
The Indian Minister of Irrigation and Power pointed out his Government's benevolence:
"It was in a spirit of good neighbourliness that we accepted the Bank
Proposal, although it meant giving up our rights on certain vital supplies
flowing through our territory. In the same spirit we voluntarily imposed on
ourselves restrictions on the utilisation of the waters flowing through our
rivers, although in the context of the tremendous problems of rehabilitation
following partition, we would have been fully justified in rapidly extending
irrigation to areas which depend for their development on the waters of the
eastern rivers. And, in our anxiety to see that the Pakistan cultivators were
not penalised for the faults of their Government, we have continued to
supply water from the three eastern rivers, although the Government of
Pakistan, contrary to the agreement of May, 1948, have defaulted in the
payment of canal water charges, the arrears of which have steadily mounted
up to over a crore rupees. There is, however, a limit to our patience. India
will not wait indefinitely for a settlement, ignoring the needs of her own
people" [IBRD-2517/57].
4.2.1.2 Pakistan
It is said that if the British had not extended the irrigation system in the Punjab to the
extent that they did then Pakistan, as an independent nation, would not have been able to
support itself. The country's complete dependence upon the Indus Basin's rivers and the
78 Though the Eastern rivers contribute approximately 20% of the total available
surface fresh water in the Indus Basin, West Punjab was heavily dependent upon
these rivers. Most of the irrigation infrastructure was in areas serviced by these
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irrigation canals that used the water therein, was clearly demonstrated in April 1948.
Any complacency the Government of Pakistan may have had regarding its water supply
was sharply challenged. Fear was to colour the negotiations, both bilateral and
multilateral, thereon. The Government of Pakistan feared for the fragile existence of its
country in the presence of a more powerful, and possibly hostile, neighbour.
Successive governments were later, also, to prioritise their fear for their own existence
over difficult decisions regarding the Indus Basin talks. The fight among different
political parties for control created an unstable situation in the political arena. Ministers
would be endowed with power, only to have them revoked months later in favour of
another candidate. In this unstable atmosphere, making difficult political decisions to
'sign away' the three eastern rivers was regarded as being tantamount to political
suicide. Yet the political death that politicians including several Prime Ministers were
desperate to stave off, proved unavoidable. Political will to agree to the division of the
Indus Basin only came with the military coup d'etat in late 1958.
Pakistan's interests vis-a-vis the Indus Basin negotiations are multi-layered. At the base,
most important and pervading all foreign policies, was the first layer which dealt with
simple survival as a country. Pakistan did not want to be re-absorbed into India. The
second layer dealt with maintaining a supply of water, from existing sources, to its
existing uses. The third layer dealt with Pakistan's unwillingness to consider alternative
sources. This is linked to the fear that India would be free to utilise water which Pakistan
needed for further development in the Punjab. This, in turn, would mean Pakistan would
not have the water it needed. And to replace that water from alternative sources would
be expensive and Pakistan would be expected, though it could ill-afford it, to bear the
costs.
The fourth layer dealt with Pakistan's reluctance to undertake any action that India could
claim set a precedent, and could use later to its own advantage. Therefore, Pakistan was
to resist the division of the Indus Basin in the absence of any guarantee as to how the
water was to be supplied and used. Pakistan feared that if it agreed to the division, and
subsequent talks failed to find agreement India would unilaterally divide the waters
claiming Pakistan had agreed to the division. Pakistan would then be left without the
waters it depended upon, and without the infrastructure it needed to supply its historic
rivers, and which also happened to be the most productive areas in Pakistan, and
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uses from alternative sources. The fifth layer dealt with the internal rivalry for water
between West Punjab and Sind. Neither wanted to subjugate its irrigation plans and
projects to the other's. This rivalry was to, later, create obstacles during the mediated
talks with the World Bank.
Pakistani posturing vis-à-vis the Indus Basin also began in 1948. Just as India was to
play to an international audience, so did Pakistan. The result was a propaganda war of
sorts, conducted in the tit-for-tat manner favoured by politicians in the Indian
Subcontinent. Pakistan described the closing of the Dipalpur canal and the UBDC with a
dramatic interpretation of the facts. India, it claimed, had cut off "every canal that
crossed the boundary" [IBRD-23/3/51].
It was Pakistan's turn to pose as the aggrieved victim: Pakistan claimed that even though
India knew that its actions would lead to a "national calamity" it rejected "Pakistan's
plea" to respect the authorised allocations pending a decision by the ICJ. Whereas
Pakistan was using the UN Charter to promote the legality of its position and the
illegality of the Indian action, India was using force. India, instead, using its upstream
status tried to get Pakistan to agree to one condition before it would restore water.
Namely, that Pakistan recognised it had no claim to the water and India could in future
appropriate Pakistan's share [IBRD-23/3/51].
Pakistan maintained that the water that was in the Eastern rivers was its only supply,
whereas India had other sources to draw upon. 79 Without this water the country would
starve and the economy fail. Thus to Pakistan the Indus system was its bloodline.80 Iliff
agrees that "[i]f Pakistan was deprived of her canal water from the Indus system, the
whole of west Pakistan would really become a desert" [1961]. Under the World Bank's
upon which it depended heavily for food.
79 Pakistan was correct in pointing out that India had available to it other sources of
fresh water upon which it could draw, whereas Pakistan was restricted to the Indus
Basin. This is illustrated by the other great Himalayan river, the Ganges, which
flows through India. Its basin covers 900,000 km2 or 26% of Indian territory. The
Ganges' water contribute approximately 25% of all the water available to India, and
is used to water 43% of the land irrigated in India [Newson, 1992: 167]. For a fuller
description of the fresh water resources India has, see Rao [1979].
80 A river of comparative but more symbolic importance in Indian eyes is the Ganges.
Rao describes the river as "the most important and sacred river in India and reflects
the culture of India from ancient times", and recalls Prime Minister Nehru
acknowledgement of the river's importance as: 'The Ganga is above all the 'River
of India" [1979: 64].
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proposal to divide the Indus Basin, made in 1954, Pakistan was asked to agree to
changing the source of its water supply. It was not asked to reduce its needs. As already
pointed out, Pakistan was reluctant to comply. Throughout the negotiations, both
bilateral and multilateral, Pakistan kept alive the international law aspect of the dispute.
At the start of the dispute, in 1948, India (or at the very least the East Punjab
Government) was to justify its actions by questioning why Pakistan had not referred the
dispute to the Arbitral Tribunal set up under the instruments dealing with Partition.
Pakistan, rightly, replied because no dispute existed on the waters of the Indus Basin for
the duration of the Tribunal's existence. International law was to be used more
vigorously later, after the 1948 Inter-Dominion Agreement had been signed, and was
being challenged by Pakistan. Two claims were made to nullify the legality of the
Agreement. Firstly, the Government of Pakistan was to claim that it had been coerced
into signing the agreement, against its will. Secondly, that the agreement was temporary,
and had long expired, though the Government did not specify the date of expiry.
The moral highground that Pakistan was eager to gain, was questioned not only by the
Indian Prime Minister with regard to the issue of coercion, but also by the 1948
Agreement (see Appendix Four). In the text of the Agreement, no mention is made of an
expiry date. Other than expounding to explore options for a settlement with further
meetings, research and a spirit of goodwill, the Agreement does not propose a deadline.
Nonetheless, Pakistan continued to maintain that under international law, India was
obliged not to cause appreciable harm to existing uses.
Convinced its position in international law was secure, Pakistan time and again proposed
settling the dispute through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 81 On each
occasion, India refused Pakistan's proposal, thereby nullifying that particular option.
Hirsch suggests that India refused this option, "feeling that a purely legal evaluation of
the situation would favor Pakistan" [1956: 221]. Pakistan concurs, alleging India was
not willing to "test its unilateral interpretation" of the 1948 Inter-Dominion Agreement
in front of the ICJ [IBRD-23/3/51].
81 There are two important criteria that must be agreed to before submitting a dispute
to the ICJ for adjudication. Firstly, all parties to the dispute must be willing to put
the case before the Court. Secondly, these parties must give a commitment to
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And yet, curiously, Pakistan would continue to regard the ICJ as a possible avenue to
settlement of the Indus Basin dispute despite clear evidence that India would refuse to
allow the dispute to go the Court. As late as 1957, after six years of World Bank
involvement, the Prime Minister of Pakistan was to state "that in his view the proper
course of action was to have this question referred 'adjudicating body initio' to the
International Court of Justice" [IBRD-11/6/57].
India did offer to set up joint international tribunals with Pakistan to try the dispute. But
Pakistan was to, rightly, point out that without an impartial member in the tribunal it
would only lead to stalemate. Pakistan interpreted this as confirming "that India has no
real interest in a Commission of engineers except as a means of promoting delay"
[IBRD-23/3/51]. Pakistan reiterated that rather than using the UN's court established for
such disputes, India was proposing tribunals that were constituted to "invite deadlock
and interminable delay". Whereas Pakistan by comparison was attempting
'meaningfully' to resolve the dispute. And therefore, "Pakistan will accept, however,
any tribunal for settling the dispute that has a chance of being impartial and effective.
India has Pakistan's standing offer to do this" [IBRD-23/3/51].
The issue of maintaining the status quo that was mentioned above, came to represent the
Indus Basin dispute in microcosm. The World Bank had made its stipulation clear that
"while the cooperative work continues with the participation of the Bank neither side
will take any action to diminish the supplies available to the other side for existing uses"
[IBRD-13/3/52d]. The Bank's intention was to reassure Pakistan that participating in
these talks would not prejudice its position or damage supply to its existing uses.
Nonetheless, the simplicity of the concept belied the difficulties that would arise from its
implementation and practice.
Almost every aspect of this stipulation came to be contested: the starting date, the
amount of water to be delivered from India to Pakistan and the collection of data to
verify the correct supply. Even the introduction of special commissioners, on both sides,
acted to complicate matters rather than simplify the issue of not diminishing supply.
Some of Pakistan's representatives also raised the understanding within President
Black's letter to the level of an agreement. Thus, Laylin in writing to the World Bank
referred to "the March 13th Agreement" [IBRD-16/6/52].
implement the Court's ruling irrespective of whether the decision favours them or
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On 6 April 1953, the Prime Minister of India informed his Pakistani counterpart that
India was appointing a special commissioner to ensure "that full effect is given to our
assurance" to not diminish supply to existing uses in Pakistan and to see that the data on
river and canal discharges were verified [IBRD-6/4/53; 17/4/531. 82 However, the
special commissioner's title and duty were to include "the implementation of the water
treaty of May 4, 1948" [IBRD-9/4/53]. Pakistan found reference to the disputed 1948
Inter-Dominion Agreement unacceptable and informed the World Bank of its
displeasure [IBRD-7/4/53].
As was to happen throughout the mediations, efforts by the World Bank to resolve
differences in one area and move the negotiation along would in effect be negated by the
arrival of another problem. The Bank was trying in Spring 1953 to get "agreement on
the procedure for verification and collection of current flow data" between India and
Pakistan in order to remove Pakistan's "fear of reduction of supplies" [IBRD-28/3/53a-
b; 31/3/53; 7/4/53; 8/4/53; 29/4/53a-b; 1/5/53; 4/5/53; 8/5/53]. Amidst those efforts the
World Bank was also asked, by Pakistan, to resolve the issue of the commissioner's
appointment and title. India was duly informed that unless the title was changed, the
Bank would be unable to endorse the appointment of the special commissioner.
The Bank said the benefits of this appointment, indicating the Indian government's
intention to assure full compliance with the stipulation of not diminishing supplies,
would be lost on Pakistan by referring to the 1948 Inter-Dominion Agreement. India
changed the title of the commissioner to "Special Commissioner for Canal Waters"
[IBRD-13/4/53]. However, the Indian Government stressed to the World Bank, through
its Executive Director, that the "water being given to Pakistan under the assurance given
to the Bank on March 13, 1952 is being given under the Treaty of 1948 and is based on
the position as it then stood under that Treaty" [IBRD-13/4/53]. Nonetheless, the Bank
welcomed the appointment of the Indian Special Commissioner [IBRD-15/4/53;
21/4/53]. In May 1953, Pakistan appointed an Irrigation Commissioner to "cooperate
not.
82 Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of 6 April 1953 was also to make clear that
though he welcomed the involvement of the World Bank in the Indus Basin dispute,
he would have preferred direct bilateral negotiations on this matter as on other Indo-
Pakistani matters in dispute [IBRD-6/4/53].
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with...the Indian Special Commissioner", and ensure full compliance with the no-
diminishing stipulation [IBRD-13/5/531.83
The newly appointed commissioners explained to each other their duties. The Pakistani
Irrigation Commissioner explained his principal function was to cooperate with the
Indian Special Commissioner, in implementing water supply arrangements as outlined in
Black's March 1952 letter. The Government of Pakistan was anxious for the
implementation to progress smoothly and successfully, and the Irrigation Commissioner
was confident this would be possible. As a first step in the process, the Pakistani
commissioner suggested to his Indian counterpart that "we meet to discuss procedures
for simple and direct exchange of information and views, and also a suitable programme
for the distribution of supplies" [IBRD-25/5/53].
The Irrigation Commissioner, appointed by the Government of Pakistan, continued:
"I am most anxious that you and I should establish a basis for working co-
operatively. In order that there may not be the slightest embarrassment in our
meetings or communications I shall assume that our discussions and
communications will not commit our respective Governments to anything
beyond what they have already undertaken. With this understanding between
us, we should be able to meet and communicate freely without fear of
becoming involved in matters beyond our jurisdiction" [IBRD-25/5/53].
The Indian Special Commissioner retained a more formal approach, and replied that he
was responsible for "assuring the Government of India that the local authorities are
fulfilling the understanding given by the Government of India to Mr. Black as per letter
of the 13th March, 1952; and further to make immediate enquiries into any complaint
which may be made regarding this to the Government of India or directly to me" [IBRD-
6/6/53]. The Indian Special Commissioner did not see the need to meet as had been
proposed, because he was "satisfied" and had "assured the Government of India that the
83 Colleagues in pre-partition India were appointed as the commissioners. Pakistan's
Irrigation Commissioner was K A Ghafoor, and India's Special Commissioner was
G R Garg. "The newly appointed Pakistani Water Dispute Commissioner reports
that he is a close friend of Mr. Garg's, having worked side by side with him for
many years when they were junior engineers, and expects to get along well with
him" [IBRD-22/5/53]. Indeed Ghafoor stated clearly his delight in working again
together: "I look forward to our work together with real personal pleasure and send
you my warm regards" [IBRD-25/5/53]. The promise of friendly and efficacious
relations proved futile as India appeared to repeatedly put obstacles in the path. Real
cooperation on data collection and verification was lacking even though it was
essential for determining the level of water supplies to Pakistan, and therefore
compliance with the no-diminishing supplies stipulation.
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undertaking given to Mr. Black is being implemented in full"; moreover he had not
received any complaint regarding supplies "from any source". And in addition since
"the information regarding river supplies and canal withdrawals etc. which was being
supplied to the local canal officers in Pakistan prior to the 13th March, 1952, is also, I
am informed, being regularly furnished", there really was no need to meet [IBRD-
6/6/53].
The Pakistani Irrigation Commissioner replied in July 1953, that he was surprised that
the Indian Special Commissioner was not aware of the complaints regarding shortages
that had been telegrammed, on a regular basis, by the Pakistani canal officers to their
opposite numbers in India. The Irrigation Commissioner enclosed the list of telegrams,
thirty-three in total, all had gone unacknowledged. Therefore, the "need to evolve
procedures for simple and direct exchange of information and views is obvious enough,
as this data is required to check the implementation of the 13th March 1952 Agreement"
[IBRD-28/7/53].
Since this information was required often and quickly, the Pakistani Commissioner
proposed to "thrash out procedures for this exchange of information at a meeting rather
than through formal correspondence which takes time" [IBRD-28/7/53]. Despite the
willingness of the Pakistani Commissioner to put aside formal procedures in favour of
more informal and efficient action, the initiative was lost due to the Indian
Commissioner's insistence upon formality.
There was also some misunderstanding regarding the meaning of status quo. The World
Bank and India appeared to regard the status quo as coming into effect from the date of
the President's letter, 13 March 1952 [IBRD-5/1/53; 24/3/53; 8/4/53]. This would imply
that the 1948 Inter-Dominion Agreement that Pakistan was contesting, would still
remain in the picture. Pakistan would still need to resolve its dispute with India on that
issue. So though this Agreement conferred upon India the right gradually to diminish
water to Pakistan's existing uses, by agreeing to comply with the status quo it would
appear that India had put that right on hold for the duration of the World Bank's good
offices. India was simultaneously continuing with its unilateral construction of its
planned irrigation works.84
84 Bound by the no-diminishing stipulation, India was still keen to make these works
operational as soon as it was possible [IBRD-10/4/53]. Therefore, it urged upon the
Bank the necessity for some transitional arrangements that would allow it to make
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Pakistan, however, insisted that the status quo should mean the situation as it was at
partition in August 1947 [IBRD-26/3/53]. This would remove the 1948 Agreement from
consideration, and assure Pakistan continued supplies to its existing uses, an issue that
was one of Pakistan's key interests. It was an issue that India was aware of, as the World
Bank Executive Director for India pointed out, Pakistan was trying to "establish a right
to distribution of water on the basis of status quo at the time of the 1948 agreement"
[IBRD-8/4/53].
The date of the status quo therefore, was of some significance, and hotly debated.
Throughout the negotiations the different definitions of the status quo were to interfere
with the talks' progress. Pakistan was to complain that supplies coming from across the
border were being reduced in contravention of the no-diminishing stipulation. India,
however, would maintain that it was adhering to the stipulation. Though the
commissioners had been appointed to deal specifically with this matter, the issue was
often taken to the highest ministerial level with the involvement of the Prime Ministers
of India and Pakistan, and the World Bank President.
4.2.1.3 The World Bank
The assumption of an impartial, objective mediator is misleading because they "are best
seen as self-interested actors" [Princen, 1992b: 215]. It is, therefore, necessary to look at
the mediator's own position-taking, and underlying interests [Wall and Lynn, 1993;
Bercovitch, 1992; Princen, 1992b; Zartman, 1986]. It is as well to remember two points
regarding the mediating body. Firstly, though the mediator may under ideal conditions
be completely impartial and objective, under more usual conditions, the third party has
entered into the mediation process with an agenda of its own. Secondly, this agenda will
influence not only the manner of the third party's involvement, but also the mediation
process. Therefore, it is important to consider the positions and interests of the third
party as well.
The interests of the World Bank shall be considered first, because the position taking is
more complex. The Bank's interests can be sub-divided into reasons why it entered into
some withdrawals from the Eastern rivers. These agreements were negotiated for set
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the Indus Basin dispute, and how its interests affected the mediation process. From the
Bank's perspective, intervention in the Indus Basin dispute appeared to benefit all the
parties. If the dispute over the Sutlej River could be resolved, then the Bank could
seriously consider loan applications from these two member Governments for projects
utilising these waters thereby, making available international finance for the economic
development of these countries. Furthermore, successful intervention would enhance the
reputation of the World Bank considerably. This would, it was hoped, make it easier to
raise capital in the sceptical American finance markets, which also happened to be the
Bank's principal source of finance.
Once the Bank had determined to intervene in the dispute, its interests lay in getting the
disputants to talk to each other, in a 'meaningful' manner i.e. without threats, or other
inflammatory talk that would escalate the dispute. It is in pursuit of this interest that the
Bank took its position comprised of three parts. Firstly, that the talks would approach
the dispute only from an engineering perspective, with little reference to any
accompanying political matters, thereby avoiding the political obstacles that had ended
all attempts thus far in stalemate. Secondly, the Bank would only facilitate the process; it
was not on hand for India and Pakistan to use it to support their particular positions vis-
a-vis the other. Thirdly, since the Bank expected the talks to reach a successful
conclusion quickly, and envisaged being involved for only a matter of months, for the
duration of the Bank's involvement neither disputant would act to deteriorate the other's
water supply. The no-diminishing-supply criteria also established a status quo, which
sought to prevent any escalation of the dispute. However the status quo and the no-
diminishing-supplies criteria served only to enlarge the topics over which the Indian and
Pakistani delegations were able to create obstacles and bicker.
The discussion of the issues involved in the dispute in the Indus Basin allowed all
parties to understand and assess the nature of the task confronting them if they wanted to
resolve the dispute peacefully. All three participants had certain issues or agendas that
had brought them to the mediation table. The World Bank had volunteered its good
offices in order to not only benefit its member countries, India and Pakistan, but also to
secure for itself a credible reputation in the international financial markets. Pakistan's
interest in joining the talks was to secure a water supply to its existing uses, and India's
reasons were to ensure an equitable apportionment of water for the development of new
periods throughout the remaining negotiations.
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irrigation works. Once the issues were apparent, attention could turn to the options that
could both resolve the dispute and meet the agendas of the disputants.
SUMMARY
World Bank involvement in the Indus Basin dispute predates the offer of good offices in
1951. India and Pakistan had both, separately, approached the Bank for loans to
construct works utilising the River Sutlej's water. But the Bank had had to refuse these
loan applications, irrespective of their economic viability and merit, because at stake
was the use of disputed water. The subsequent formal involvement in the dispute of the
Bank was the result of frustrated loan applications and a number of other factors that
suited the institution's agenda at the time.
It took months to move from the initial acceptance by India and Pakistan of the Bank's
good offices to the actual start of the mediation. The reason for this delay was the need
to sort out the procedures of the negotiating process. In other words, each party's agenda
had to be met to a satisfactory degree. India and Pakistan wanted to ensure that
participation in the multilateral talks would neither set a precedent nor commit them to
any undertakings that might detrimentally affect their bargaining positions. The World
Bank made repeated efforts to reassure both disputants that participation in these
discussions would not set any precedent nor commit them to any unacceptable
outcomes.
The issues around which the dispute centred came to the simple competition for what
appeared to be a fixed amount of water. India wanted to use the water flowing through
its territory to develop its own irrigation uses. However India, lying upstream of
Pakistan, would in the process appropriate water that supplied existing uses in Pakistan.
The downstream riparian was therefore concerned about the ensuing damage to its uses
and resulting effect upon its agricultural output. As the discussions progressed another
issue came to the fore regarding the financial liability of each disputant.
The reluctance of India and Pakistan to move from their positions stemmed partly from
anxieties regarding accepting any large financial liability, and from internal political
difficulties. Nonetheless, through dogged persistence and exploration of different
options, the World Bank was able to squirrel away little agreements as they came.
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However, as shall be seen in Chapter Five, the final agreement that led to the Indus
Waters Treaty was only possible after a quantum leap in Pakistani attitude vis-à-vis the
existing proposals.
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5THE PROCESS OF COOPERATION IN THE INDUS BASIN, 1953-60
The preceding chapter focused upon the means by which the mediator engaged in the
Indus Basin dispute and encouraged the disputants to address the issues involved.
Examination of the Indus Basin dispute continues in this chapter by looking at the
second two segments of the framework: exploring options and reaching agreement.
Having understood the issues at stake, the World Bank was able to encourage India and
Pakistan to explore alternatives to continuing the dispute.
The process of exploring options, however, had a dynamic and evolutionary effect upon
the mediation process as it added new issues to the existing stable of complaints and
grievances. This latter aspect, in turn, obstructed the already difficult task of reaching
agreement. The final proposals that were agreed to in 1958, and led to the signing of the
Indus Waters Treaty in 1960, had been available since 1954 and 1956. The political cost
of agreeing to these proposals though appears to have forestalled such a step for a
number of years.
5.1	 OPTIONS
The World Bank had succeeded in engaging itself in the dispute resolution process India
and Pakistan had started, half-heartedly, a few years before. The promise had been to
help the disputants find an alternative to the stalemate that had characterised their
previous encounters. Based, initially, upon the Lilienthal principles the Bank encouraged
the disputants to find a solution that would satisfy both India and Pakistan's separate
agendas. This exploration of possible acceptable options was also meant to 'expand-the-
pie' and demonstrate to the countries that there was enough water in the Indus Basin for
all their needs. Therefore, neither party had to continue to insist upon meeting their
particular demands before reaching agreement.
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Nonetheless, demonstrating that alternative options exist is not the only consideration
needed in resolving a dispute. The issues that characterise the dispute filter out options
that may appear optimal to an observer, but are regarded as detrimental to either
disputant. Therefore, India refused to give up its claim to the Eastern rivers, and
Pakistan refused to relinquish these rivers. The World Bank had initially attempted to
get the disputants to draw up a joint plan for the development of the Basin's waters for
the benefit of both countries. However, the differences between the disputants remained
sufficient for the Bank to ask the Indian and Pakistani delegations to draw up separate
plans. When these separate plans failed to bridge the differences, the World Bank
presented its own plan in 1954.
The mixed response to the Bank's original plan threaten to torpedo the mediated talks.
However, a compromise was reached by suggesting another option. The 1954 Plan and
the talks preceding it, had focused upon the development of a comprehensive plan that
would utilise all the waters of the Basin. This would, in effect, be a permanent plan.
With difficulties plaguing the discussions for this plan, the Bank suggested reaching
temporary agreements that would meet the immediate water needs of the countries.
These ad hoc agreements would be negotiated in parallel with the comprehensive plans.
The search for acceptable options appears to have been an evolutionary process, with
the issues in dispute naturally influencing the nature of the options.
5.1.1	 A Comprehensive Plan
Lilienthal's assessment of the Indus Basin dispute had generated the principles that were
adopted by the World Bank for the Working Party. The key element of the dispute was
the simple competition for the waters of the River Sutlej. India wanted to develop its
new uses and Pakistan, though it too would want to develop new uses, wanted to
safeguard its existing uses. Though neither disputant was denying the right of the other
to make use of the water, India and Pakistan prioritised their own uses over each other's.
Lilienthal's principles stipulating the treatment of the Basin as a single unit and the
sufficiency of water within the Basin allowed all three participants to interpret the
principles in their own way. The World Bank regarded the principles, and the disputants
acceptance of the principles, as signalling the search for the optimal development plan
available. Optimal development would mean using all the waters of the Indus Basin, for
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the joint benefit of the riparians, in the most economic and efficient manner. This the
Bank believed would remove the reasons for the dispute over the River Sutlej since all
the waters were now open for consideration.
India welcomed the principles because it interpreted them as recognising its need for the
Sutlej waters. Since independence India had been unilaterally constructing works to
utilise these waters. Though it would take time for the works to be completed in totality,
different phases were gradually being finished and India, naturally, was keen to make
them operational. India believed there was enough water within the whole Basin to meet
all demands for water, especially since most of the water was "at present unused and
running waste" to the Arabian Sea [IBRD-18/9/51]. The Indian Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru stated: "We are convinced that there is more than enough water in the
Indus Basin to satisfy the needs of both India and Pakistan, provided it is properly
exploited" [IBRD-2519/5 1 b]. Therefore, by looking at all the waters of the Basin, India
believed, Pakistan would realise there was enough water, and India would get access to
the River Sutlej.
Pakistan also welcomed the intervention of an international agency in its long-standing
dispute with India. But the most important factor that it wanted was the absolute security
of its existing uses. This Lilienthal had recommended in his article, and the World Bank
tried to secure through the obligation for neither party to diminish supply to each other
for the duration of the Bank's intervention. With this assurance in hand, the
consideration of all the rivers in the Indus system, appeared to be to Pakistan's
advantage too. The different provinces in the country had different irrigation schemes at
work, or planned, which under these principles would also be taken into regard, and
safeguarded, in any final settlement.
However, though India and Pakistan agreed to enter into discussions based upon
Lilienthal's principles, their priorities had not changed. Though obliged to respect each
other's need for water, India and Pakistan were unable to reach agreement upon a
common approach to developing the Basin jointly. Frustrated by the differences, the
World Bank asked the parties to submit separate plans outlining their concept of
development. The resultant plans highlighted the differences more acutely, and the
World Bank was forced to propose its own plan to keep the talks going.
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5.1.1.1 The 1953 Indian and Pakistani Plans
On 6 October 1953, the Indian and Pakistani delegations presented their respective
proposals for the comprehensive development of the Indus Basin [Michel, 1967: 230].
The plans had a number of aspects in common: [i] each Dominion had favoured its own
uses above the other's; [ii] both had estimated similar amounts of water available within
the basin; [iii] both plans, in effect, jettisoned an integrated approach and divided the
waters between them; [iv] both India and Pakistan appeared to recognise India's use of
the Indus basin could really only come from the eastern rivers; 85 and [v] neither side
allowed each other allocations for planned uses and future development.
The Indian proposal was optimistically called the "Comprehensive Long-Range Plan for
the Most Effective Utilization of the Water Resources of the Indus Basin" and dealt with
the whole Indus Basin. In terms of the percentage of water allocated to Pakistan, it
appeared to be more generous than Pakistan was being towards India. India was giving
Pakistan 76% of all the water, whereas Pakistan was allocating a meagre 13% to India
[Michel, 1967: 230].
However, such apparent generosity came at a price. India was proposing to requisition
all the water of the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi), and 7% of the western rivers for
its own existing and planned uses. Pakistan was to meet all its uses from the remaining
93% flow of the western rivers (Indus, Chenab, Jhelum). In other words, the Bhakra-
Beas-Rajasthan project would proceed, and India would make additional withdrawals
from the Chenab via the Marhu Tunnel, depositing the water in the Ravi [Michel, 1967:
230] .
Just as the Indian Plan had favoured India, the Pakistani Plan favoured Pakistan. In
effect, though confined to the Pakistani section of the Indus Basin, the plan proposed to
allocate all the water beyond India's present-day uses to Pakistan. Indian uses amounted
to 70% of the eastern rivers or 13% of the total water supply in the basin. (The eastern
rivers supplied approximately 20% of the total Indus Basin water supply, with the
western rivers making up the remaining 80%.)
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Table 5.1	 1953 Indian and Pakistani Plans for the Indus Basin
Total/bcm	 For Pakistan/bcm[%1	 For India/bcm [%J
Indian	 147	 111 [76]	 36 [24]
Pakistani
	
146	 127 [87]	 19 [13]
[Source: after Michel, 1967: 231 and IBRD-5/2/54]
Aside from an issue of quantity, Pakistan was keen to maintain its present sources. The
highly developed areas of West Punjab were fed principally from the eastern rivers. To
change the source of this water supply would entail considerably more expense as link
canals, and dams, would be needed to bring replacement water from the western rivers.
Pakistan was unwilling to carry the additional expense, especially as it felt it was legally
justified in demanding the status quo be maintained. In other words, the quantity and
source of water supplied to Pakistan's uses should remain unchanged.
The extent of the divisions between the two Dominions is suggested in a report on the
Indian plan [IBRD-12/10/53]. 86 The report contested five points in the Indian plan: [i]
the method by which the total amount of water available in the basin was calculated; [ii]
the fact that allocations to Pakistan were less than its uses already in existence; [iii] that
the Indian plan ignored Pakistan's pre-partition plans, and underestimated Pakistan's
needs; [iv] that India was still claiming the same amount of water as it had in the
unsuccessful Inter-Dominion conferences in 1950, which included part of Pakistan's
existing uses. The Tipton report implied that the Indian plan put the responsibility to
replace water from other sources upon Pakistan. (This appears to suggest that efforts by
the IBRD and the Working Party to reconcile Indo-Pakistani differences had failed); and
[v] the plan proposed pooling together all the water of the basin and then allocating it in
accordance with the Indian Designee Engineer's instructions. The Designee Engineer
would decide which areas in both countries were commandable by the rivers, and the
amount of water needed [IBRD-12/10/53]. The Plan appeared not to suggest conferring
with the Pakistani irrigation authorities.
85 Even the Indian claim to 7% of the western rivers was drawn from the River Chenab
flowing through Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir.
86 The report was submitted by Tipton, the consultant engineering firm Pakistan had
employed for advice on a comprehensive plan.
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The report's author, Tipton, advised Pakistan that "[Necause of the character of the
submission of the Indian Designee, it appears to me it might be to the best interest of
Pakistan to emphasize the additional uses of water that were conceived before Partition"
[IBRD-12/10/53]. This implied accepting Indian plans for Bhalcra and that extra-basin
transfers would occur but it also meant that Pakistan's pre-partition uses had equal
weighting as the Bhakra project. But, as it turned out, both countries rejected each
other's plan. It fell to the IBRD to attempt to keep the negotiations from falling apart by
making its own proposal for the comprehensive development of the Indus Basin.
5.1.1.2 The 1954 World Bank Plan
The Indian and Pakistani Plans were markedly different "in concept and in substance"
[IBRD-5/2/54]. Though later discussions would produce some concessions, these were
insufficient to result in agreement and the "margin of difference" between India and
Pakistan remained wide [IBRD-5/2/54]. 87 The principal difference was the matter of
existing sources. Pakistan believed it had the right to not only the quantity of water it
had enjoyed prior to partition, but that it was also entitled to receive this water from the
same source. This belief fuelled Pakistan's efforts in finding a comprehensive plan.
India, though not contesting Pakistan's right to water for its existing uses, did challenge
the issue of maintaining the same source.
The result was a deadlock in the mechanisms of the Working Party. As Iliff points out:
"it became apparent that the real issue here was, how were the waters to be
divided? How many million acre feet, to use the technical term, were to go to
India, and how many million acre feet were to go to Pakistan? And it became
87 
"Moreover, there is a large measure of accord between the two Designees on certain
fundamentals. The Working Party are in agreement that the average annual flow is not
sufficiently dependable to be taken as a basis for planning and that some more conservative
figures must be used. For the most practical purposes, they are in agreement on the amount
of unusable supplies in the rivers, on the amount that can be developed through storage, on
the sites and capacities of possible storage facilities and on the technical feasibility of
proposed engineering works. They agree that existing uses of water must be respected
(although they differ as to the meaning of "existing uses"). They agree that surplus usable
supplies, including supplies that can be developed through storage, must be equitably
apportioned among the potential new uses in the interests of the economic development of
the basin as a unit (though they differ in defining the boundaries of the basin). They agree
that existing inundation canals should be replaced by weir-controlled. canals. Finally both
sides appear to accept the concept that the cost of the new works should be allocated to the
two countries in the proportion in which they derive benefit therefrom" [IBRD-512/54].
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obvious that if we didn't get some agreement on that particular point, it was
quite hopeless to try to work out any comprehensive engineering plan"
[1961].
As Nakayama points out, both countries wanted to break the deadlock [1997: 369].
Speaking to the World Bank on behalf of the Pakistani delegation, Laylin made some
candid observations:
"Both sides have expressed the view that supplementary conversations are
necessary to break the deadlock in the Working Party. The Bank has indicated
that it is equally anxious to see the deadlock removed. Numerous
conversations have taken place to this end. The Working Party has been
unable to reach agreement on the separate components of which to build a
comprehensive plan because of fear on one side or the other of weakening its
position for the future should the present endeavour break down. There
appears to be agreement that this deadlock can be broken through an attempt
to reach agreement on talks that go directly to the end result" [IBRD-
ND1954] .
Laylin went on to outline the procedure by which such talks could take place, and
accommodate fears both disputants had. Laylin also outlined what Pakistan understood
by reaching agreement:
"We understand that B. K. Nehru is prepared to participate in the
supplementary talks but is concerned as to how the conversations can move to
the heart of the matter without prejudice to India's position should agreement
not be reached. We share this concern but would put it this way. For
agreement to be reached each side must take the Bank into its full confidence.
Neither side can do this if either side can use what it learns to the prejudice of
the other side. It seems to us that to achieve what we both want the
conversations should be understood to be unofficial 	 Agreement on any
reduced supplies will assume agreement on the part of India not to tap the
Chenab and agreement by India to bear the cost of installations India
proposes that Pakistan build for India's benefit" [IBRD-ND1954a].
The proposed supplementary talks were aimed at not substituting the Working Party
discussions, but at assisting the negotiations on an unofficial basis. Despite such
apparent conciliatory efforts by the Delegations to resolve their differences, their
differences were being reinforced by reports from the Indian Subcontinent. With the rabi
season having officially started in mid-October, Pakistan's irrigation authorities began to
complain that India was not supplying the full quota of water it was expected to and that
the Indian army was obstructing the collection of necessary data regarding the level of
supplies being sent [IBRD-14110153; 21/10/53a; 24/10/53; 4/11/53]. The Indian army
was not alone in being accused of obstruction. The Pakistani army also refused to allow
Indian engineers to enter the section of river banks that they controlled. The Indian
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Special Commissioner pointed out that "[b]oth Commissioners are helpless in the
matter" [IBRD-21/10/53b].
Formal representation was also made by Pakistan to the World Bank regarding the
shortage in supply, which in turn informed India of the formal complaint [IBRD-
28/10/53a]. The issue of shortages came to involve the senior most level by including
the President of the World Bank, and the Prime Ministers of both countries [IBRD-
28110/53a; 28/10/53b; 10/11/53]. Prime Minister Nehru wrote to Prime Minister Ali that
having made enquiries into the issue of shortages "there is NO reason for complaint.
Apparently misunderstandings have arisen over methods of calculation and rotational
programme period. There have been NO actual shortages of any substance on the
U.B.D.0 while on the S.V canals Pakistan received much larger supplies than due"
[IBRD-2111153, emphasis in original].
The issue of shortages remained a consistent and persistent thorn during the
negotiations. An additional problem that threatened to create further problems for the
Bank-led discussions was the distribution of information regarding the dispute, water
shortages and the talks themselves. Pakistan had prepared a pamphlet for publication on
the subject of the Indus Basin dispute, despite clear instructions and agreement not to
disseminate information [IBRD-23/11/53] •88
Statements in parliament by ministers of the Pakistan Government, were also ill-timed.
The Minister for Industry, Khan Abdul Quiyum Khan, was quoted as saying of the
procedure for reporting shortages that "Pakistan had agreed to give this procedure a trial
at the request of the World Bank, which had lent its good offices in this matter, even
though she doubted the efficacy of this agreement" [IBRD-5/11/53]. India, naturally,
was unhappy with this development and complained to the World Bank [IBRD-
23/11/53]. India was also to make public announcements regarding the Indus Basin
dispute, as testified by its Prime Minister's comments in parliament [IBRD-18/5/54].
As the President of the World Bank was to explain, in proposing the Bank's February
1954 plan: "The Indus Basin Working Party have labored long and industriously at their
task, but for some time it has been evident to me that no further progress could be made
88 The pamphlet was entitled, "Pakistan: The Struggle for Irrigation Water and
Existence", and published in November 1953 for distribution by the Pakistani
Embassy in Washington, DC.
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at the engineering level unless the Bank took some initiative" [IBRD-8/5/54]. Rather
than being a reflection upon the capabilities of the delegates, it was more a matter of the
difficulties involved in the dispute that "it appeared unlikely to me that the engineers
would be able to make, in open discussions in the Working Party, the kind of
concessions that are required to bring about a settlement" [IBRD-8/5/54].
The World Bank realised that "the problem could not be solved solely by technicians;
the Bank would, positively, have to negotiate according to a strategy or strategies of its
own" [Iliff, 1970]. Therefore, after considerable thought and effort, the Bank had
decided to put forward its own proposa1. 89 "Informal conversations with the two sides
separately disclosed that both would welcome such action" [IBRD-815/54]. The World
Bank was clear, though, of the limitations to its plan, and openly acknowledged that
"[t]he proposed plan will not fully satisfy either side" [IBRD-8/5/54]. But the Bank
pointed out that "[n]o plan could do that; there is not enough water to fulfil all demands"
[IBRD-8/5/54].
The World Bank believed that progress in the Working Party was not being obstructed
by technical matters, but by three basic difficulties that had political implications
[IBRD-5/2154]. Firstly, that the water supplies and storage potential within the basin,
were "inadequate to the needs of the basin". Secondly, that though the Working Party
was trying to create a comprehensive plan that treated the Indus Basin as a single
economic unit, two separate sovereign territories were involved. And thirdly, the
delegations had presented plans that differed dramatically in concept regarding the issue
of existing sources of supply [IBRD-5/2/54].
Therefore, on 5 February 1954, the World Bank presented its ideas to the Indian and
Pakistani delegations in Washington, DC. The residing principle was the division of the
waters of the Indus Basin. Pakistan would have complete control and use of the western
rivers, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. India, in turn, would have complete control and
use of the eastern rivers, the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi [IBRD-512/54; see Appendix 5 for
the complete proposal].
The quantity of water allocated to each country under the plan is shown in Table 5.2.
Despite the Bank's claim that its "proposal is no arbitrary compromise, arrived at by
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mathematically splitting the differences between the two sides" but a "plan based on
concepts of its own, which produce a fair and economic result" [IBRD-5/2/54],
comparisons with the Indian and Pakistani plans show the allocations to be halfway
between the two.
Table 5.2 1954 World Bank Plan for the Indus Basin
Total/bcm	 For Pakistan/bcm[%]	 For India/bcm IN
Indian Plan	 147	 111 [76]	 36 [24]
Pakistani Plan	 146	 127 [87]	 19 [13]
World Bank Plan	 147	 120 [82]	 27 [18]
[Source: after IBRD-5/2/54]
The Bank reasoned that the accruing independence would negate the problems outlined
above. Moreover, the "mutual independence afforded by the Bank proposal would also
bring benefits of a different kind. The location of works serving each country on
territories under its control, and the assurances against interference by either country
with the supplies on which the other depends, should reduce the chances of disputes and
tension and contribute to improved relations" [IBRD-5/2/54].
5.1.2	 Re-engaging in Mediation
"The proposed plan will not fully satisfy either side. No plan could do that;
there is not enough water to full all demands. However the plan would bring
great benefits. It would protect existing irrigation and would permit, and
even stimulate, substantial future development. Most important of all, by
providing a fair, understandable and definitive division of waters, it would
eliminate a point of serious friction between the two countries" [IBRD-
8/2/54].
The President of the World Bank was clear that an optimal plan that would satisfy both
claimants was unattainable. However, what was possible, given the physical and
89 General Raymond Wheeler, with the approval of the World Bank's Management,
put forward a proposal in February 1954 [Iliff, 1961; Sommers, 1961].
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political limitations within the Indus Basin, was a plan that would still be of significant
benefit to Pakistan and India. The President urged the Governments to accept the
principles of the Plan without waiting for the accompanying details, which would be
worked out later: "I am convinced that this proposal represents the best opportunity for a
settlement that has not yet arisen; that an equally favorable opportunity for a fair
settlement is not likely to recur; and that this chance should therefore not be missed. For
these reasons I urge you to examine the proposal thoroughly and give it your approval"
[IBRD-8/2/54].
Despite such a clear commitment to the World Bank's 1954 Plan by its President to
commend it, the Governments of India and Pakistan were to reserve their judgement on
the principle of division. India was the first to accept the plan, in March 1954 stating, "in
the interest of a speedy and constructive settlement and in the spirit of good-will and
friendship that has guided my Government ever since the beginning of this controversy,
we accept the principles of the Bank Proposal as the basis of agreement" [IBRD-
22/3/54; 25/3/54].
But the Government of India made it clear to the Bank that this was not without
sacrifices:
"The Bank Proposal requires India to give up the use of a large part of the
waters flowing through her own territory and thus to abandon, for all time,
any hope of the development of a considerable portion of the extensive arid
lands in India which has no possible source of water supply other than the
Indus system of rivers and which will therefore remain a desert for ever. Its
acceptance would also imply a very heavy financial burden for my
Government; not only would it involve the payment of large sums of money
to Pakistan, but would also make new developments in India much more
expensive than if all the waters running through her territory and
indispensable for her normal development could have been utilised therein"
[IBRD-25/3/54] .
Pakistan did not commit to the Bank proposal with the same speed as the Indian
Government. This was to be a consistent feature of the mediations, whereby India would
readily accept Bank proposals, Pakistan would tread more carefully. Though consistent,
it was not unexpected since Pakistan would appear to have the most to lose from a hasty
agreement, and it had already experienced the consequences of one such legal
instrument, the 1948 Inter-Dominion Agreement.
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Iliff believes that the "Bank's February proposal left the Pakistanis cold because it did
not recognise their insistence that they be guaranteed the existing uses of water from the
existing sources, along with previously planned uses" [Iliff, 1970]. As Iliff pointed out
in 1961, Pakistan's reluctance was because it felt "the Bank proposal did not indicate
that there would be any provision for reservoir storage on the Pakistan side, and
Pakistan felt that it was absolutely essential that she should have this reservoir storage to
take care of her irrigation needs during the critical periods of the year when river flow is
low" [1961].
While Pakistan was deliberating its formal reply to the Bank Proposal, it had also been
constructing irrigation works to safeguard its uses dependent upon the Eastern rivers.
This dual policy of negotiation and construction was followed by both India and
Pakistan. It was reasoned by both parties that some form of protection of their uses and
planned developments was needed in case the negotiations broke down. In addition,
neither India nor Pakistan wanted to be held to an agreement if only its opponent was
benefiting.
Thus, with Pakistan not committing to the Bank's Proposal, India did not want to be
restricted by this plan or the promise not to diminish supply to existing uses in Pakistan.
India regarded the talks as having ended, and it was no longer bound by the ground rules
of engagement. Interestingly, Pakistan regarded the talks as merely having adjourned. In
April 1954, Pakistan opened the Balloki-Suleimanke (BS) link canal to transfer water
from the River Ravi to the River Sutlej, still without a clear commitment to the principle
of dividing the Indus Basin.
Pakistan's construction and opening of link canals to transfer water from the more
western rivers to the River Sutlej, gave India the opportunity to demand Sutlej water for
its Bhakra canals. These canals had been under construction since after partition and
were now on the verge of completion. Pakistan, naturally, was fearful of the effect of
increased withdrawals upon its River Sutlej uses and voiced its concern to the World
Bank [IBRD-2314154]. India replied that it would use water surplus to Pakistan's
existing uses [IBRD-23/4/54]. India defined this surplus as existing once Pakistan used
its new link canals to transfer water and, therefore, was to press Pakistan to make
immediate use of its link canals.
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Though India on the one hand was adamant that the talks had ended, along with its
obligations arising from the talks, it was also wary of closing the door to further
negotiations. Therefore, India was aware that without Pakistani transfers of water, any
additional Indian withdrawals from the River Sutlej could be regarded as reducing water
to Pakistan's existing uses. This would contravene the undertaking given to the Bank not
to diminish supplies for the duration of its good offices.
India, therefore, forewarned Pakistan of its intention to open the Bhakra canals in June
1954, and expected its neighbour to make the necessary provisions needed to safeguard
the SVC. Furthermore, India wanted an interim ad hoc arrangement whereby Pakistan
would have to transfer water in the BS link, so that India could withdraw water for the
Bhalcra canals [IBRD-10/5/54a]. The Government of Pakistan agreed to interim talks
vis-a-vis the Bhakra canals, but these talks were to be without prejudice to the talks for a
comprehensive plan [IBRD-10/5/54b].
Unfortunately for Pakistan, though the BS link canal was designed to have a capacity of
425 cumecs (15,000 cusecs), it was never fully realised in operation. Not least because
of siltation problems, but also because by the time the link had been completed, India
was already withdrawing more water upstream than previously with its new Ravi-Beas
(RB) link canal at Madhopur. The Ravi-Beas link canal reduced further the water
available on the River Ravi which, even before the link, was uncertain at times
throughout the year. Therefore, to augment supplies, another link canal was started by
Pakistan in September 1953, the Marala-Ravi (MR) link and was completed in 1956.
Unfortunately for Pakistan, the MR link, designed to transfer water from the Chenab
River to the River Ravi, was also unable to be run at its full capacity [Michel, 1967:
210].
With India claiming the talks had finished, but that it was willing to consider a new
round, and Pakistan refusing to commit to the Bank's Proposal without adjustments, the
World Bank considered what further role it had open to it. In a note written by the
World Bank, four approaches open to the institution are mentioned: [i] To use the
Lilienthal approach. [ii] To consider the Bank's February 1954 proposal to have been
rejected, and therefore start "horse-trading" with the supplies of the eastern rivers. [iii]
To use the Tipton study. And [iv] to start work on other aspects of the Indus Basin
dispute, such as the canals and cost, leaving the principle of division until later [IBRD-
ND1954b]. It would appear that the last option was decided upon, since the Bank
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appeared unwilling to write-off its 1954 Proposal, and talks were held on interim
arrangements.
India and Pakistan sent delegations to Washington, DC, to negotiate the interim
arrangements for the kharif (summer) 1954 [IBRD-10/5/54b; 25/5/54; 10/6/54]. Headed
by Ghulam Mueenuddin the Pakistani delegation included the Bank Executive Director
for Pakistan, Mohammed Shoaib. The Government of Pakistan had decided to expedite
matters that otherwise would have required written correspondence and consent.
Therefore, their representation before the Bank gained weight with the presence of the
Foreign Minister, Zafrulla Khan [IBRD-27/5/54]. The Vice President of the World Bank
pointed out that India had attached great importance to opening the Bhakra canals by 10
June 1954. He also noted that India had regarded this achievable since Pakistan would
be able to transfer surplus water to the SVC from the Rivers Chenab and Ravi, if it
opened the BS link [IBRD-10/6/54].
However, Pakistan had dragged its feet in giving information that would have allowed
the Indians to calculate the amount of water they could withdraw. And even with the
meeting of the delegations, certain criteria still needed to be completed before an ad hoc
arrangement could be reached. The World Bank doubted that these criteria could be met
in time [IBRD-10/6/54]. Representing Pakistan, Mueenuddin believed that "[it is
important that the pressure of time should not interfere with a careful examination of the
problems involved", but in order to allow the Bhalcra canals to open Pakistan was
willing to let India withdraw a small amount of water. Mueenuddin wanted the Bank to
appreciate that his Government had given consent to this withdrawal despite having
insufficient information regarding the flow of the eastern rivers: "They have expressed
this agreement as a token of their good will" [IBRD-10/6/54].
Further discussions were held to iron out disagreements and misunderstandings
regarding the amount of water involved, the operational practices and legal position
thereafter vis-a-vis the situation outside the temporary arrangements [IBRD-7/6/54;
9/6/54; 11/6/54a-b; 15/6/54; 17/6/54a-b; 19/6/54; 7/7/54a]. This was not, however,
without Indian impatience at the time that was being taken to reach agreement. India
asked the World Bank to inform the Pakistani delegation that there was a deadline for
further conversation, and unless matters where agreed upon and a procedure resolved by
21 June 1954, the Indian delegation was to return to the Subcontinent [IBRD-11/6/54c].
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During the discussions for an ad hoc agreement, the World Bank, India and Pakistan
were also engaged in talks to satisfy both disputants vis-a-vis the Bank's proposal. In
May 1954 the Prime Minister of Pakistan had stated that his Government was unwilling
to accept the Proposal unless adjustments were made. The Proposal did not meet the test
of fairness that the Bank had, itself, lain down. It was essential that any proposal had to
assure supply to Pakistan's existing uses [IBRD-14/5154].
The Government of Pakistan believed the Bank Proposal, as it stood, did not meet this
criterion. Nor did the Government like the abiding principle of the Proposal, the division
of the Indus Basin. The resultant independence of Pakistani supplies from Indian control
was not welcomed since it meant cutting off Pakistan's access to the eastern rivers: "The
Government of Pakistan cannot visualize with equanimity the possibility of
implementing a plan which would affect its vital interest adversely for all time to come"
[IBRD-14/5/54] .
India regarded Pakistan's reply as an outright rejection of the Bank's proposal. The
World Bank though was more circumspect about its interpretation. The Vice President,
in discussing the matter with an Indian representative, agreed that the Pakistani Prime
Minister's letter was not an agreement. But the Bank did not regard it as a complete
rejection either, and was willing to press for further discussion with Pakistan and
clarification [IBRD-18/5/54b].
The World Bank informed the Government of Pakistan that its reply was not seen as
being sufficient to act as a basis for continued joint discussions. Any further progress
would have to be made with Pakistan accepting the division of the basin as the starting
point. If it became clear during the course of negotiations that Pakistan's uses could not
be met with the supplies envisaged in the Bank Proposal, then the Bank would use its
good offices to bring about the needed adjustments [IBRD-21/5/54]. As described
above, the Government of Pakistan sent a delegation to Washington, DC, to discuss the
matter further [IBRD-27/5/54].
Pakistan was informed by a representative of the British Government, of the World
Bank's reaction to Pakistan's reply: the President "tells me that first reaction of Bank
has been that it was probable that this reply could only be construed as rejection of the
Bank's proposal and that Amjad Ali had previously been warned of this when he
consulted Bank on draft" [IBRD-20/5/54]. The World Bank was, however, keen to
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minimise this effect since if the Indian Government interpreted the letter as "a rejection
of the Bank proposal it will be impossible for the Bank to persuade them to participate in
any further joint discussions" [IBRD-20/5/54]. The consequence of this "of course
would mean that the Bank could make no further effective contribution" [1BRD-
20/5/54].
However, since the Pakistani representatives in Washington had been asked for
clarificatory talks, this gave Pakistan the "opportunity to remove any
misunderstandings" [IBRD-20/5/54]. Pakistan was reminded of the advantages that lay
for it with the Bank Proposal. Firstly, Pakistan would be assured that India would not
interfere with the waters of the River Chenab. Secondly, India would pay for the costs
incurred in constructing the replacement works. And thirdly, Pakistan's existing uses
would be protected for the duration of the transition period [IBRD-20/5/54].
The British representative continued: "True, Pakistan, under the Bank Proposal, will
have less water than she would have if it could be assumed that the existing situation
would continue. But this is unfortunately an unrealistic assumption, and a more likely
and imminent possibility is that India will cut Pakistan's existing supplies far below
what the Bank proposal would assure to her". And therefore it "would be disastrous
from every point of view if discussions now broke down and responsibility could be
attributed, however unfairly, to Pakistan" [IBRD-20/5/54].
During their discussions with the World Bank the Pakistani representatives made their
position clear: "India has other systems from which water would be available. Pakistan
has not. Money for water is no proposition - not a question of sentiment or principle"
[IBRD-15/6/54]. Nonetheless, after considerable negotiating, an acceptance of the
Bank's Proposal by the Pakistani authorities was drafted during July 1954 [IBRD-
7/7/54b-c; 12/7/54; 13/7/54a-d; 16/7/54a; 19/7/54]. And the Government of Pakistan
formally informed the Bank that it accepted the Proposal of February 1954, as long as
the Bank could ensure that all Pakistan's uses could be met by the Western rivers
[IBRD-28/7/54a; 29/7/54].
But the fate of future talks regarding the Indus Basin dispute did not rest with Pakistan
alone. India was reconsidering its acceptance of the Proposal, in light of what it
considered to be Pakistani foot-dragging. The Indian representatives in Washington,
DC, doubted whether their Government would be willing to continue with the talks for a
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comprehensive plan. But a World Bank representative was to remind the Indians, that
once Pakistan had accepted the Bank Proposal it would make "it very difficult for the
Pakistanis thereafter to attack the Bank proposal and would represent a great step
forward politically if in no other way" [IBRD-6/7/54].
An additional problem was that while Pakistan regarded the talks for a comprehensive
plan as having adjourned, India believed that the talks had in fact ended. As the Prime
Minister of India was to explain to the World Bank: "The persistently negative and un-
cooperative attitude of Pakistan has, therefore, made impossible the continuation of the
talks initiated by you in March, 1952, and Pakistan has thereby voided the
understanding under which we have been working for the last two years" [IBRD-
21/6/54; 11/8/54].
Therefore, India was free, once more, to withdraw as much water as it needed for the
Bhakra canals. However, if Pakistan indicated it was willing to continue on the basis of
the World Bank's proposal, then India would, too, be willing to talk with the
understanding that the Bank's good offices would still be available [1BRD-21/6/54].
The Indian Prime Minister proposed that:
"Although, in view of the situation explained.. .above, we are no longer
bound now by the unilateral restriction implied in your letter of 13th March
1952 under which, de facto, India could not undertake any major new
developments whilst Pakistan could do so without any restriction, we would
be willing to include in the arrangements for renewed cooperative
work. ..appropriate provisions for the transitional period which would enable
developments to proceed in both countries on an agreed schedule as
envisaged in the Bank proposal" [IBRD-21/6/54]
The World Bank informed India that Pakistan's reply on 28 July 1954, was regarded as
"acceptance in principle of the Bank Proposal of February 5, 1954, as the basis for
agreement" [IBRD-28/7/54b]. Coupled with India's acceptance in principle of the
Proposal, this would allow the talks to move towards a "definitive agreement". The
Bank invited representatives of the two countries back to Washington, to continue work
on for an ad hoc agreement for rabi 1954-55, and discussions with the Bank for the
general arrangement and procedures to work out a comprehensive plan [IBRD-28/7/54b;
29/7/54].
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The Prime Minister of India, in replying to the Bank's letter of 28 July 1954, disagreed
with the World Bank's interpretation of Pakistan's acceptance of the Bank Proposal, and
the promise it held for further negotiations for ad hoc arrangements [IBRD-8/8/54].
Nehru wanted further clarification, and since another Working Party session would
necessitate considerable consultation, he proposed holding the meetings in the Indian
Subcontinent. This would prevent unnecessary delay and expedite progress towards an
ad hoc arrangement by the end of August 1954. The Prime Minister asked the World
Bank to send its representatives, as soon as possible, to work out the details [IBRD-
8/8/54].
Prime Minister Nehru continued:
"Although since the voidance of the understanding contained in Mr. Black's
letter of March 13, 1952, there is no longer any need for an ad hoc agreement
exempting India from the unilateral restriction of the standstill clause
contained in that letter, the Government of India are fully aware, and
understand this also to the Bank's view, that early agreement on a transition
arrangement is necessary in order to create the proper atmosphere for the
successful negotiation of an agreement regarding the basis of a new Working
Party" [IBRD-8/8/54].
Perhaps because the World Bank shared the sentiment expressed by Mueenuddin, which
the World Bank was reminded of in early August 1954, the President reiterated his
invitation to the Governments of India and Pakistan to send their representatives to
Washington, DC [IBRD-13/8/54]. Mueenuddin had reminded the Bank that it had
agreed earlier that any further talks should be held in Washington, DC, and that these
considerations still applied for those now being proposed. This was "to avoid delegates
being subjected to political pressure all the time and to avoid tendentious press
propaganda in the sub continent" [IBRD-12/8/54].
The World Bank proposed that the new discussions follow an agreed terms of reference,
in order to retain focus on what was in dispute, and the objective of the talks. And
therefore, with the August 1954 invitation, the Bank also sent two annexes. Annex A
outlined the "Terms of reference and procedure for resumption of cooperative work on
basis of Bank Proposal", and Annex B proposed the "Transitional Arrangements for
September and October 1954" [IBRD-13/8/54].
Both Governments gave a cautious acceptance that was accompanied with
qualifications. The Indian Prime Minister, writing on behalf of his Government,
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continued to insist that the discussions for the ad hoc arrangements should be held in
India [IBRD-19/8/54]. The Pakistani Foreign Minister outlined his Government's
concerns that their existing and planned uses, at Suklcur and Gudu, should be met from
the Western rivers. If this was to prove infeasible, then the Government of Pakistan
would expect the World Bank to lend its good offices to bring about the necessary
adjustments [IBRD-24/8/54].
The World Bank sent out the General Counsel and the Bank's Engineer to the Indian
Subcontinent to iron out any misunderstandings or disputes before the advent of the joint
comprehensive talks in Washington [IBRD-7/9/54; 16/9/54; 20/9/54a]. However, all the
Bank's endeavours did not meet with equal success. The General Counsel had arranged
for India and Pakistan to exchange data with one another. The Executive Director for
Pakistan, Shoaib, informed the General Counsel in October 1954, that despite repeated
requests for this data, India had not furnished it. Pakistan gave notice, that it "also
therefore constrained to stop giving the data" [IBRD-11/10/54].
The Bank's Vice President, who was in the Subcontinent during October 1954, also had
mixed success. The Pakistani Minister for Interior, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, had
remained unclear about the implication for Pakistan, if it was to accept the Bank
Proposal, and was concerned that it would lead to the "Bank proposal opening way for
India establishing future claims on Jammu Kashmir waters" [IBRD-15/10/54]. 90 This
matter was cleared up somewhat when the Chief Minister of Punjab, Feroz Khan Noon,
asked the Vice President to explain the "exact scope of the words 'relatively
insignificant consumptive uses" [IBRD-20/10/54a].91
Chief Minister Noon, went on to explain to the Interior Minister that, the Vice President
had:
"explained that these words were not meant to convey anything more than
really insignificant uses, such as minor extensions of irrigation from existing
channels or the use of insignificant amounts of water from small feeder
streams etc. According to him these words certainly did not cover the
90 Gulhati had suggested that the World Bank consider publishing the Bank Proposal
and the Terms of Reference for the resumed talks. The Bank's Vice President was to
agree with this strategy, because he expected that it "[s]hould include clear statement
Bank's role which I found much misunderstood also high placed Pakistani still
misunderstand proposal" [IBRD-4/11/54].
91 Feroz Khan Noon later became Prime Minister of Pakistan, December 1957 -
October 1958, but was ousted by General Ayub Khan in the military coup of October
1958.
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construction of new channels or major extensions of existing channels. Nor
did they cover the construction of new major works, such as storages, dams,
tunnels etc." [IBRD-20/10/54a].
After clarificatory talks in the Indian Subcontinent, the World Bank was informed, once
more, that India and Pakistan would participate in the talks in Washington [IBRD-
18/10/54a-b]. The Bank representatives discussed, amongst themselves, arrangements
and procedures to be adopted in these forthcoming talks. 92 A definition for historical
use and the incumbent allocation was also decided upon: "The historical withdrawals
were based on pre-participation years. It has been agreed to ignore all withdrawals for
the post-participation period" [IBRD-20/10/54b].
The date for the forthcoming talks was, however, subject to continued postponement. It
had originally been hoped to hold these joint talks in August 1954. But India and
Pakistan still wanted clarifications and assurances from the World Bank during the
summer. The designated date shifted from mid-November through to the beginning of
December. Though the amount of difference, in the number of days, was small, each
postponement, whether arising from the Pakistani or Indian camp, generated
considerable correspondence [IBRD-22/10/54a-c; 26/10/54; 29/10/54; 9/11154;
12/11/54a; 15/11/54]. And the World Bank was caught in the middle of all this activity.
When the talks did finally start, on 6 December 1954, certain aspects of the interaction
had changed [IBRD-6/12/54a-c]. Firstly, there was now a deadline by which the
cooperative work had to produce some positive results. Unlike the previous Working
Party sessions, the new round would comprise of a succession of cooperative periods,
often lasting a year, but which had to be formally extended by the Bank and the
Governments involved.
92 Sommers recalls: "Iliff and I going in to see Black and saying together, 'This is no
longer a thing that should be treated as a pure engineering matter. You have to have
somebody higher up in the Bank's management and also with a little more political
savvy in charge of it.' We jointly suggested that one or the other of us be put in
charge of it. Iliff was put in charge of it at that time" [1961]. Sommers adds, that Iliff
was the natural choice as, "I had a lot of responsibility for the borrowing and the
administration side of the Bank as well as the legal, while Iliffs responsibilities were
not defined, he was not in charge of the lending Knapp had taken that over, and so I
recommended that Iliff be given charge of this and Black accepted that" [Sommers
interview, 30/4/96].
188
Secondly, the make up of the delegations had changed. As Drucicman points out
"[c]ontinuity of delegations between negotiations can be either advantageous or
disadvantageous: experienced negotiators bring with them familiarity with the issues and
players; they may also bring a biased view, based on previous encounters, which does
not apply to the new situation" [1993: 194]. India and Pakistan both opted to bring in
new blood. Gulhati replaced Khosla as the Head of the Indian delegation and Designee
Engineer [IBRD-19/11/54]. The rest of the delegation at the start of the talks comprised
of: Jaini, Malhotra, Barkatram, a personal assistant, a junior engineer, a research
assistant, a computor, a secretary to the delegation and Dr Berber on an occasional basis
[IBRD-19/11/54].
The Pakistani delegation had a similar shake up. 93 Mueenuddin was the Head of the
Delegation and the Designee Engineer, with Mahbub and Khalil-ur-Rahman from the
Central Engineering Authority, Kirmani and Hussain from Punjab. From Sind there was
a superintending and an executive engineer. In addition there was a lawyer, and a
stenographer who would also act as Mueenuddin's secretary [IBRD-12/11/54]. The
Bank team comprised: Iliff, Sommers, Wheeler, Bengston, Colquhoun, Griffin and
Drisko who were consultant engineers, and Guinness who was the Secretary of the
Team [IBRD-3/12/54; Gulhati, 1973] .94
The reasons for the World Bank's continued efforts to keep the Indus Basin discussions
alive can possibly be gleaned from the explanation the President gave the Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan. The Bank felt that if the situation, following the
breakdown of talks, was allowed to continue in its present impasse there would be
93 Kirmani, who was part of the 1954 team, mentioned that the "first delegation was a
chaos" because it included five Chief Engineers, from NWFP, Punjab, Sind,
Baluchistan and Bahawalpur, who were more used to giving orders than working
[Kirmani interview, 1/6/96].
94 Iliff describes the new round of talks that finally lead to the Treaty as: "Practically
daily talks throughout that period, interspersed with very frequent visits to India and
Pakistan. Of course, I had associated with me General Wheeler as my chief technical
advisor, and I also had associated with me a firm of New York consultants, Tibbets,
Abbot, McCarthy and Stratton, who did the very necessary and very complicated
hydrological studies that were required in order to know really just where we were
going. Every proposal that was made, for example, had to be tested with regard to its
effect on water uses. And you have no idea of the arguments that developed. I mean,
although there's something like 150 million acre feet, more than that, but 180 million
acre feet of water in that system, we spent days debating on a matter of five or ten
cusecs - which is probably not much more than would fill a good bath. But I mean,
water is as precious as that" [1961].
189
regrettable consequences for both countries. Therefore, the Bank felt it had the
responsibility to "persevere zealously" with their efforts, as long as there appeared to the
institution the possibility of reaching a solution [IBRD-21/7/544 The Bank did realise
that though talks on the Indus Basin dispute were to restart, the differences had not
diminished, and it could not rely upon the search for a comprehensive plan to get
agreement. Other means would be needed to get agreement, and placate Indian and
Pakistani fears, pending any comprehensive plan.
5.1.3	 Alternative Proposals
The lukewarm response to the World Bank's 1954 plan was matched by the continued
Indian and Pakistani 'commitment' to the mediation process. Nonetheless, having
persuaded the parties to return to the table for another attempt at cooperation, the World
Bank presided over the search for alternative means. The renewed approach did not
remove the previous obstructions, nor did it appear that the dispute would be resolved
quickly, as negotiations dragged on.
Yet Pakistan's need for water remained; the demand for food and livelihoods was not
suspended. Therefore, in 1955, the Bank proposed negotiating temporary agreements for
the delivery of water by India to Pakistan, on an ad hoc basis. An additional impetus
was India's desire to open the new Bhakra canals offtaking the River Sutlej [IBRD-
9/12/54]. These negotiations continued alongside the search for a proposal that would
mark the 'permanent' resolution of the Indus Basin dispute.
But as the Bank representative explained to the heads of the Indian and Pakistani
delegations, the engineers from all three parties were to have free access to each other
regarding technical issues. Furthermore, efforts should be made to reach agreement on
any outstanding technical questions. However, any changes or compromises of a
fundamental nature were to be made only at "at the Iliff, Gulhati and Mueenuddin level"
[IBRD-6/12/54b; IBRD-7/12/54]. In other words, the delegation heads would sketch the
broad outline, which the engineers could colour in separately.
5.1.3.1 Temporary Ad Hoc Agreements
The World Bank had recognised early in the summer of 1954, shortly after receiving the
Indian and Pakistani responses to their plan, that interim arrangements would be
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necessary. It surmised work would progress on developing a comprehensive plan and
simultaneously work would proceed on developing principles to bring about temporary
measures for rabi (winter) 1954 and kharif (summer) 1955 [IBRD-21/7/54b]. Pakistan,
with an eye to its existing uses, accepted continued negotiations with the understanding
that their uses would be protected by these interim arrangements, while other
negotiations proceeded [IBRD-28/7/544 The Bank informed India that Pakistan had
accepted the criteria for continued cooperative work, and for negotiating the transitional
arrangements for the period up to October 1955 [IBRD-28/7/54b].
When the negotiations started again in December 1954, Pakistan was keen to prioritise
the interim arrangements above the comprehensive plan's development. However, the
Bank was reluctant to comply, because as its representative explained "it can only create
ill feeling". This, it was feared, might lead to the process breaking down, and therefore
obstructing the comprehensive plan [IBRD-14/12/54]. Pakistan wanted to secure supply
for its needs before India demanded water for its new uses. The perennial competition
between new and existing uses continued with greater alacrity, with the impending
opening of the Bhakra canals.
Herein lay India's impetus for demanding interim arrangements. With progressive
completion of the Bhalcra project, domestic expectancy for water in India was high.
Gulhati warned the World Bank that many of the Bhakra canals were ready to receive
water, "and that great difficulties will be created in India unless some water is released
to them" [IBRD-9/12/54]. Under such conditions, it would be possible that the political
atmosphere would harden, making further cooperation with Pakistan difficult to justify
to the Indian government's domestic audience.
The World Bank, fully cognisant of the situation between India and Pakistan, wished to
postpone talks on the interim arrangements [1BRD-14/12/54]. It argued that India would
want to make withdrawals for use in the Bhakra canals in April 1955. Clearly this would
be at the expense of Pakistan's existing uses. Pakistan was constructing the Marala-Ravi
(M-R) link to transfer water from the Chenab to the Ravi. This was to replace water
India planned to take from the eastern rivers for its new uses. As it became apparent that
the M-R link would not be operational before May 1956, India refused to wait till then
before it could make its withdrawals. Instead, India proposed sharing the resulting
hardship with Pakistan on a rationing basis [IBRD-9/12/54].
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Negotiations on the interim arrangements, also known as ad hoc agreements, finally
started in January 1955. The World Bank had not succeeded in postponing the
discussions till March as it had hoped to do. Unfortunately, the mistrust and suspicions
characteristic of the comprehensive plan negotiations pervaded these new discussions
too. At a joint meeting in May 1955 between the Bank, India and Pakistan to discuss the
ad hoc agreements, the disputants' attitude was clearly demonstrated, as well as the third
party's frustration. "After much bickering" India and Pakistan agreed that there was "no
difference" between their data, only in the principles upon which these figures were
based [IBRD-17/5155, emphasis in original]. It was agreed that Mahbub and Gulhati
would meet later to sort this difference out.
Nonetheless the tone of the discussions did not alter. The Bank representative was
forced, "almost in exasperation", to remind India and Pakistan that it was absurd to
spend so much valuable time over a few hundred cusecs, when there were thousands in
the Indus Basin to agree upon for the whole system based [IBRD-17/5/55]. He also
confirmed that if in twenty-four hours, India and Pakistan had not agreed upon the
figures, the Bank would propose some figures instead. The disputants were to bear in
mind two concepts. Firstly, that the Bhakra canals should receive some water and
secondly, that the quantity awarded to India should not put "too serious" a strain upon
Pakistan. Using strong language by the standards of international diplomacy, the Bank
representative said, "that he was completely out of sympathy with both India and
Pakistan in their attitude over this whole issue", and added that "considerably more
reasonableness will have to be shown if any progress is to be made" [ibid].
India and Pakistan managed, amidst the repeated bickering, to reach agreement on the
ad hoc amounts of water to be shared between them. Though the Bank representative's
claim that the kharif 1955 agreement was the first Indo-Pakistani agreement to be signed
since partition is not strictly correct, this agreement was the first to be implemented on
water.95 The Bank's President telegrammed Prime Ministers Nehru and Mohammad
Ali Bogra on 27 June 1955, expressing the Bank's hope that the good work would
continue and lead to an acceptable conclusion "in the same helpful atmosphere".
95 A series of agreements had been signed over other Indo-Pakistani matters including
economic trade and refugee property. The Delhi Agreement, signed in May 1948
over the River Sutlej, had in fact added considerable difficulties to the Indus Basin
dispute.
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Especially as the ad hoc agreement was a clear "manifestation of Pakistan's willingness
to cooperate" [IBRD-27/6/55].
A succession of agreements were signed: 1 April 1955 - 30 September 1955; 1 October
1955 - 31 March 1956; 1 April 1956 - 30 September 1956; and 1 April 1959 - 31 March
1960. The only period for which the parties were unable to agree was 1 October 1957 -
30 September 1958. This may be linked to a souring of relations between the two
countries. Pakistan's Prime Minister Hussain Suhrawardy, regarded India with
disfavour. Unfortunately, agreement on ad hoc supply was not matched with equal
success in the search for a comprehensive plan.
Within the Bank, there was some disagreement as to the course that should be pursued
to get a settlement. The General Counsel suggested formulating a treaty from a
progressive series of ad hoc agreements rather than chasing the elusive comprehensive
plan. The Assistant to the President, however, considered a comprehensive plan as
essential to a long term settlement of the Indus Basin dispute. After the presentation of
the World Bank's proposal in February 1954, and the continuation of the mediations in
December 1954, representation of the Bank was made one Bank member's full-time
responsibility rather than being in joint care. Under this representative the Bank used
both approaches simultaneously as the idea of a comprehensive plan held considerable
attraction for Pakistan so that its water supply would be independent of India [Iliff,
1970].
5.1.3.2 The 1956 Aide-Memoire
Pakistan made it clear in the new round of talks that it regarded the 1954 World Bank
plan to have allocated insufficient water to Pakistan's needs. During critical times in
early and late kharif (summer) Pakistan, it maintained, would face severe water
shortages to its crops. Just when water would be needed the most, or else lose the
harvest, when the crops of one season were maturing and the new crop about to be
sown, the flow of the western rivers would be inadequate to meet even replacement
needs. Therefore, storage facilities were needed to ensure an adequate supply at these
critical times [Michel, 1967: 244].
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Pakistan prevailed upon the World Bank to accept this need for storage. Only after the
Bank had asked its consultant engineering firm, TAMS,96 to evaluate the adequacy of
the seasonal supply to Pakistan's uses, and who in early 1956 verified Pakistan's
position, did the Bank accept that storage facilities were a necessity. Based upon the
consultant's report, the Bank submitted to India and Pakistan an Aide Memoire to the
original Bank Proposal on 21 May 1956 [IBRD-21/5/56]. The Aide Memoire envisaged
building storage facilities on the western rivers to make up the deficit Pakistan would
otherwise face, and to offer once more the World Bank's good offices to obtain
necessary adjustments to the 1954 IBRD proposal.
"The Bank continues to hold the view that the 'division of the waters'
contemplated by the Bank Proposal of February 1954 affords the best
prospects for a settlement of the Indus Waters question; that out of the flow-
cum-storage potential of the rivers allocated to them, India and Pakistan could
each develop very substantial irrigation uses, additional to those that they now
enjoy; and that no insuperable engineering difficulties are likely to arise in
either country in constructing the physical works necessary to develop these
additional supplies. The works would, however, be costly; and their financing
would present a serious financial problem" [IBRD-21/5/56].
Less than a month after presenting the Aide Memoire, the World Bank began preparing
a plan of action in the event that India and Pakistan accepted the proposal [IBRD-
18/6/56] though there was no guarantee of acceptance. The World Bank representatives
decided that if the proposal was accepted each country would be asked to prepare its
own plan based upon the principles embodied in the Aide Memoire. The Bank informed
TAMS that it would expect the engineering firm to review and comment upon these
plans, and draw up a final plan that would then be sponsored by the Bank.
Any plan TAMS was to draw up should, according to the Bank, have four criteria. First,
it should meet the uses envisaged in the Aide Memoire. Second, the plan should be
practical. Third, it should be economical. And last, the plan should use the water as it
flowed in the river to the maximum rather than rely upon storage, using dams only if
there was no other alternative. In addition, the plan and its estimate of India's financial
liability were not to be based upon Pakistan's vision of developing its irrigation uses in
the long term, but rather on what was necessary to meet the replacement needs [ib id].
96 The American engineering firm Knappen, Tippetts, Abbett and McCarthy (KTAM)
which later became Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy and Stratton (TAMS) was retained
by the IBRD at the resumption of Indo-Pakistani talks in 1954.
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During June 1956 Pakistan met with the World Bank at different levels of representation
to discuss matters concerning the Indus Basin situation. Prime Minister Chaudhuri
Mohammad Ali met with the President and one of the Vice Presidents in London for
general talks [IBRD-5/6/56]. And in New York, members of the Pakistani delegation
met with the Bank's consultants for more detailed technical discussions [IBRD-2/7/56].
The minutes of the latter meeting appear to illustrate the difficulty the Bank faced in its
role as intervenor in the dispute [IBRD-2/7/56]. Firstly regarding information, despite
the Bank's efforts to communicate relevant material to both sides, the disputants
remained sensitive to the merest rumour of being excluded. These suspicions led one
Pakistani delegate to state that "he wanted to know if there were any secrets that he
hadn't heard about" [IBRD-2/7/56].
Secondly, the process of gathering information could be problematic if it led to
implications that were regarded by the disputants as being detrimental to their position.
Therefore, the Pakistani delegation questioned why the Bank was investigating irrigation
economics in Pakistan. The delegation wanted to know whether it was linked to the
rumours they had heard suggesting Pakistan was "getting a free ride". The Pakistani
delegation refuted the charge of freeloading at length and appeared to suggest that the
negotiations would not result in Pakistan receiving any new allocations of water [IBRD-
2/7/56].
Thirdly, irrespective of whether the Bank and its consultants regarded a particular
outcome as desirable, unless the disputants were interested the outcome would have to
be amended. For example regarding the Trimmu-Islam link that the Bank was
considering as part of a final agreement, the consultant engineers had to report back that
they "could not arouse any interest in this link" [IBRD-2/7/56].
The Pakistani delegation's claim that Pakistan was not being provided with water for
any new uses has its roots in Pakistan's attitude to the timing of plans for particular
projects. They made a distinction between projects or 'uses' that had been planned
before partition from those that were planned after partition. The pre-partition planned
uses were, in Pakistan's view, not to be considered as new projects. Therefore, water
allocations to these projects made under any plan were not to be taken as providing
water to new developments but as being part of the replacement package.
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India contested this interpretation as it believed Pakistan was trying to include
development works under the replacement banner. This, as has already been pointed out,
would result in India having a larger financial obligation to Pakistan. With limited funds,
and its own irrigation needs to develop, India naturally, did not want to spend large
amounts of money on schemes from which it would not benefit directly. This, in turn,
led to a debate upon the benefits being received by each country from certain works in
the proposed plans, as shall be discussed later.
India also challenged Pakistan to accept the Aide Memoire in June 1956. Pakistan
agreed instead to continue with the cooperative work, but with qualifications regarding
the ultimate plan. The World Bank, in turn, did not regard the Indian and Pakistani
replies as constituting a clear and definitive commitment to continuing the search for a
comprehensive plan. The Bank's suggestion to continue the work, nonetheless, based
upon its 1954 Plan and Aide-Memoire Plan suggests the World Bank was reluctant to
throw in the towel. India and Pakistan's acceptance in September 1956 of the plan, gave
credence to the Bank's persistence.
A joint meeting was held in Washington, DC, between the World Bank, India and
Pakistan marking the start of the new round of talks and to discuss the procedure. The
Bank set the agenda, pointing out that as the disputants had agreed to continue
cooperative work until 31 March 1957, the pace of work would have to reflect a "very
industrious schedule" [IBRD-19/9/56] .
The World Bank proposed that India and Pakistan both prepare plans using the
principles embodied in the Aide Memoire. The disputants were to ensure that the plans
were workable, would exploit the flow of the western rivers water to the maximum, and
make the minimum inroads into Pakistan's storage capacity. It was important that these
plans should accomplish the uses envisaged in the Aide Memoire, and incorporate
details of all the works needed such as link canals, barrages and storage facilities, all
with their locations and capacities. The World Bank, mindful of the need for urgency,
expected these plans to be ready by October 1956, followed soon after with their
estimates of construction costs. To assist preparation of these plans, the Bank proposed
making itself available for any technical discussions required [IBRD-19/9/56].
In accordance with the schedule agreed at the joint meeting, India and Pakistan
submitted their plans based upon the Aide Memoire in October 1956 to the Bank in
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separate meetings [IBRD-16/10/56 and 22/10/56]. Discussing the Pakistani Master Plan
in January 1957, Mueenuddin pointed out that the first stage of the plan would take
thirteen years, cost $1,300 million and only supply water for replacement needs. The
World Bank's reply was that it was a waste to spend so much time and money to achieve
so little and, furthermore, it was difficult for the Bank to associate itself with something
that the Pakistanis were not even enthusiastic about themselves [IBRD-23/1/57].
Michel claims that only after the Aide Memoire was proposed did Pakistan accept in
principle the division of the Indus Basin [1967: 244]. Iliff, in referring to Mueenuddin's
reply in September 1956, concurs that this was the first time that division had been
accepted by Pakistan [1970]. India, though it had accepted the principle of division, was
reluctant to accept the specific works the Aide Memoire was suggesting. Acceptance
would, under the congruent principle of beneficiary-pays, mean that India would be
liable for the costs of building these storage facilities - especially since Pakistan was
adamant that dams were part of the replacement works, and not development works for
which Pakistan itself would be financially liable [Michel, 1967: 244].
In October 1956, the Indian delegation met with the World Bank to present its views
regarding the principle of beneficiary-pays [IBRD-2/10/56 and 4/10/56]. Berber spoke
on behalf of India on this matter rather than Gulhati who, as Head of the delegation,
usually voiced Indian concerns. 97 India in accepting the Aide Memoire understood that
firstly, irrigation works would be constructed in India, by India but for Pakistan's
benefit, and vice-versa in Pakistan, and secondly, that each country would pay for these
works in proportion to the benefit derived [IBRD-2/10/56]. The Aide Memoire which
put "the Bank's assistance for a long-range irrigation plan in Pakistan outside the
cooperative work, was necessary to allay Indian fears about possibly greater costs to
India" [Iliff, 1970].
Berber argued that India would not benefit from the works being constructed to replace
eastern rivers water in Pakistan [ibid and IBRD-4/10/56]. Under the "Principle of
Benefits" India would not be financially liable to Pakistan; however, under the
"Principle of Equity" each country would be liable to the other. Therefore Berber argued
a solution had to be found in equity rather than beneficiary-pays [IBRD-2/10156].
Berber went on to suggest what the World Bank actually meant in the Aide Memoire
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was that India should pay for replacement works to a "certain extent" that is "the costs
of the replacements works should be shared by the two countries" [IBRD-4/10/56]. To
reiterate that Pakistan was the principal beneficiary from replacement works, Gulhati
listed the some of the additional gains India believed Pakistan was making: reduced
variability in supply, receiving water when it was needed, and allocations for new
projects rather than having to rely upon historic withdrawals. Therefore, Gulhati added
that Pakistan would "of course" bear the costs of these additional benefits [ibid].
5.1.3.3 The 1957 Heads of Agreement
The Aide Memoire validated Pakistan's persistent claim for storage facilities. Though
Pakistan won a moral battle with the Plan's acceptance, the war for the Indus waters still
engaged all three parties. Storage facilities are costly affairs, and under the Bank-
determined criterion of beneficiary-pays, India was reluctant to accept any bill that
Pakistan was gleefully running up as it shopped for dams and supporting works. The
location, number and size of these dams were hotly contested, as was the principle of
who was benefiting. If, as Pakistan claimed, these dams were part of the replacement
works then India as the beneficiary would be financially liable. But if India was correct
in stating that these dams were part of the development aspect of any comprehensive
plan, then Pakistan would have to pay.
With the participants at loggerheads over implications of the Aide Memoire, the World
Bank asked each country to prepare its own plan for the basin. The alternative plans
would have to meet the financial requirements of India and the physical requirements of
Pakistan. Talks continued from September 1956 through to March 1957. On one level,
arrangements for ad hoc agreements were being negotiated that would afford Pakistan
time to consider a comprehensive plan, and on another level negotiations continued for
the comprehensive plan.
The Indian and Pakistani plans that emerged differed substantially in concept and cost
due to differing priorities. India prioritised the cost of works in Pakistan over the need
for the works, thereby approving an unrealistically frugal list of works. By contrast
Pakistan prioritised works over cost, and proposed unrealistically grandiose plans for the
97 Dr F Berber, an international law expert from Germany, had been employed by the
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Indus Basin's development. This plan prompted the Bank to urge Pakistan to seriously
re-examine its irrigation plans and objectives.
Michel correctly attributes the bloated Pakistani plan to the Pakistani view that the
negotiations' aim was to restore Pakistan to its 1947 status vis-à-vis water [1967: 244].
However during the post-Partition period, Pakistan's demographic statistics had begun
to change as the population increased; as did the agricultural statistics with land being
lost to waterlogging and salinity. Therefore, Pakistan regarded an equitable outcome as
one that not only included plans and finances for replacement works, but also for
development works, thereby enabling Pakistan to return to its 1947 water status. "These
arguments obviously did not carry much weight with the Indians" [ibid: 245].
The World Bank President's proposal to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that
cooperative work continue till 30 September 1957, was accepted in April 1957. With the
assurance that the talks were not going to break down imminently, the World Bank took
the step of reviewing the progress thus far, to determine future action. On 13 May 1957,
the Bank presented a draft of its ideas or "Heads of Agreement" to the Indian and
Pakistani delegations. Intended, as ever, as the basis of resolving the Indus Basin
dispute, the Heads of Agreement advocated three principles. Firstly, the division of the
Indus Basin, secondly, allowing a transition period for the change in water management
to occur, and thirdly, the establishment of a commission to prepare plans and oversee the
division of the water.
The Heads of Agreement marked the entrance of a commission to manage water and
relations into the proposed outcome. But other than this new innovation, the Heads of
Agreement failed to ignite interest amongst the protagonists. The Bank's representative
travelled to the Indian Subcontinent to discuss the proposal with each of the
Governments, but failed to make any tangible progress though, as he was to point out:
"In the course of my conversations with the Government of India and the Government
of Pakistan during my visit to the Sub-Continent, I have been repeatedly assured of the
desire of both Governments to reach an agreed solution of the Indus Waters question"
[IBRD-24/6/57]. Pakistan remained the principal objector. Wary of its opponent,
Pakistan wanted clear agreement upon matters before it agreed to part with the eastern
Indian government to advise it in the Indus Basin dispute with Pakistan.
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rivers. Therefore, it focused upon the absence of an agreement regarding the
implementation of the basin's division, and the absence of a financial plan.
The World Bank re-worked the Heads of Agreement, making it more general by
focusing more upon the principles it embodied, and offered it back to the Indian and
Pakistani delegations. As the Bank's representative stated: "I have come to the
conclusion that the best prospects of carrying forward the tripartite discussions to a
successful conclusion lie in my attempting to obtain from India and from Pakistan
respectively, acceptance of certain general Heads of Agreement, based on the Bank
Proposal of February 5, 1954, and of the Aide-Memoire dated May 21, 1956, as a firm
starting point from which we might proceed to the formulation of the detailed text of an
international water treaty" [IBRD-2416/57].
The re-formulated Heads of Agreement contained a caveat to agreement for both India
and Pakistan that was a testimony to the continued suspicions residing at the negotiating
table. "The acceptance by either Government of the above Heads of Agreement, or any
one of them, as a basis for an approach to an international water treaty, shall not, in the
event of failure to conclude such a treaty, be invoked by the other Government in
support of any of its legal rights of claims" [IBRD-24/6/57].
The Bank asked the delegates to comment, by 25 July 1957, upon the proposal's
acceptability as a base upon which to continue discussion. India and Pakistan made their
comments by the July deadline. At the Bank representative's suggestion the delegations
met with the World Bank separately for oral discussions, and to give their opinion upon
the other delegation's written comments regarding the Heads of Agreement. The
objective of the exercise, the representative told the delegates, was that "[Naving
received the comments of each Government on the views of the other, the Bank would
then be in a position to reach a conclusion as to whether the employment of its good
offices could make any further contribution to a solution and, if so, along what lines we
should proceed" [IBRD-24/6/57].
Negotiations were not just held between India, Pakistan and the Bank but internally
within the delegations too. For example, as the negotiations dragged on with little hope
of reaching a successful conclusion, the World Bank's President began to question the
institution's continued involvement in the process. However the appointed Bank
representative who was more intimately involved in the negotiations was able to
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persuade the President to let the Bank remain involved. Another example of internal
differences was the Pakistani delegation's constituency. As Michel and Kirmani both
point out, provincial differences typified the delegation and acted to hamper progress
[1967: 245; Kirmani interview, 1/6/96]. Sind was concerned that plans it had for the use
of the River Indus would be lost to replacement works which would mainly benefit
Punjab, and therefore pushed for development works to be included.
5.1.3.4 The 1958 Marhu Tunnel Plan
India, in Spring 1958, presented its Marhu Tunnel Plan to the World Bank and
Pakistan.98 The Plan envisaged India taking water from the River Chenab and returning
the same amount of water, in fixed quantities, to Pakistan from the eastern rivers. From
the World Bank's perspective the Marhu Plan had a number of advantages to
recommend it "over any other approach so far contemplated in the settlement of the
Indus Basin dispute", principally, the scheme's economy in time and cost [IBRD-
1958a]. 99 The Bank's attitude to the ideas in the Marhu Scheme are summed up in the
following quote [IBRD-1958b]:
98 The concept of building a tunnel at Marhu on the River Chenab, in Indian
controlled Jammu and Kashmir, was originally touted in the 1953 Indian Plan.
Pakistan rejected the concept as it regarded any action by India on the Western
rivers as interference, and totally unacceptable. Nonetheless, the concept did not die
down. The World Bank, surprisingly, also suggested a scheme using the Marhu
tunnel concept, but neither country was to approve the suggestion.
99 The World Bank saw the Marhu Scheme's advantages as [IBRD-1958a]:
"1. It attempts to solve the dispute in stages taking cognisance of India's limited
financial capacity.
2. It is the least costly plan so far put forward.
3. It does not, in our estimation, detrimentally effect India's genuine plans for
development while still recognising the priority of Pakistan's historic uses.
4. The majority of works to be constructed are in Indian territory.
5. The minimum of foreign exchange to India is involved.
6. The onus is on India to complete the works as quickly as possible so that she
can make progress on her development plans utilising the Eastern River water
historically used in Pakistan.
7. The question of the very costly replacement of the Sutlej Valley Rabi uses is
postponed without any great hardship to either party.
8. It is a much more attractive engineering and hydrologic solution in that works
are relatively simple and do not involve complex operation.
9. The control that India can exercise on the Chenab up to and including Phase II
is physically limited to not more than about 25% of the flow of that river.
10. It would not be necessary, though certainly desirable, to have joint observation
of the works and gauges in India.
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"The ultimate objective of this approach would be to afford India the
exclusive use of the quantity of water in the Eastern Rivers and to afford
Pakistan the exclusive use of the quantity of water in the Western Rivers, as
envisaged in the Bank Proposal of February, 1954. The principle of
Pakistan independence of deliveries of water from India, envisaged in the
Bank Proposal, would, however be abandoned because of considerations of
cost. The quantitative division would be effected by permitting India to
divert Western river water for use in India, whilst at the same time requiring
India to make substantially equivalent fixed deliveries of water to Pakistan.
The system of works necessary to achieve the ultimate objective would be
constructed in three phases and, to the extent that works were constructed
whether in Pakistan or in India, to maintain historic Pakistan uses, the cost
would be borne by India. The principle would be maintained throughout
that the development of additional irrigation uses in India should not take
place at the expense of historic irrigation uses in Pakistan." [Emphasis in
original]
In fact certain members of the Bank's team thought so highly of the scheme, that if
Pakistan was to reject the plan, the Bank would be "in a strong position to terminate its
good offices" [IBRD-1958c]. Nonetheless, when Pakistan did reject the plan, despite the
World Bank's recommendations, the Bank did not withdraw from the talks. Though the
plan required less financial cost to implement, Pakistan regarded the Marhu Scheme as
too costly to its interests in the long term. Not only would it involve Indian
'interference' on the Chenab River, but more importantly, Pakistan would remain
dependent upon India for its water. This latter element was something Pakistan appeared
unwilling to countenance after the 1948 incident.
Pakistan promised to present an alternative plan that preserved its water independence.
Nonetheless, meeting in Rome in April and May 1958, discussions continued upon the
Marhu Tunnel Plan [IBRD-15/5/58]. Interspersing the discussion was the search for an
alternative plan acceptable to both protagonists. Using information the Pakistani
delegation had supplied, the World Bank proposed locating storage facilities upon the
River Jhelum. The stored water would supply replacement water for the Sutlej Valley
Canals (SVC), and be cheaper than building a link canal from the Indus to the Sutlej.
As Michel points out, "the Bank, having conceded in the Aide Memoire that storage was
necessary for replacement, wanted to confine all replacement storage to the Jhelum"
11. Water will continue to flow downstream of Harike and Ferozepur thus making
much less serious the problem of channel deterioration.
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[1967: 245]. To persuade the Pakistani delegation of this was to deal with an internal
Sind-Punjab dispute, which the Bank attempted to do. Appearing to agree with Sind, the
Bank suggested using the Indus for development, and as already stated the Jhelum for
replacement. Pakistan agreed to consider the proposed Jhelum storage and prepare a
plan based upon it.
While internal Pakistani sensibilities jostled for air, and the World Bank attempted to
remind Pakistan of the need for overall national rather than just provincial benefits, the
Bank also had to consider the Indian perspective. India was only willing to pay for
replacement works in Pakistan that arose from transfer of the eastern rivers to India.
Therefore, the advantage of using the Jhelum for replacement storage was to reduce the
cost of replacement works and make Indian compliance more likely Ubial.
5.1.3.5 The 1958 London Plan
At the July 1958 meeting held in London, Pakistan presented its aptly named London
Plan to the World Bank and India as a cheaper alternative to the Aide Memoire. In
eliminating the Upper Indus Link which would have been expensive to construct
Pakistan opted, instead, for an array of dams and ten link canals. The cost of Pakistan's
cheaper alternative plan varied according to the source. The Indian delegation estimated
it as approximately US $666 million or Indian Rs. 3,300 million [IBRD-2/12/58]. The
Pakistani estimate was in fact higher at approaching US $728 million [IBRD-
5/2/59] .100
The Tarbela dam on the River Indus would provide storage water for development in
Sind, and replacement in Punjab and Bahawalpur. Replacement water would flow to
lower Punjab and Bahawalpur via two trans-Thal links going from Kalabagh to Jhelum,
and Taunsa to Panjnad. The Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River in Pakistani-held
Kashmir would supply replacement water to Punjab. Three additional subsidiary dams
12. The Marhu Tunnel and ancillary links are well above the flood endangered areas
of the plains."
100 Each delegation was making estimates using its local currency and converting to
US dollars. But the discrepancies were probably not due to a vastly different
exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar. Though that may have been the situation prior to
August 1955 when Pakistan devalued its rupee. Pakistan had refused, in 1949, to
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were also proposed on tributaries of the rivers Jhelum and Indus. Water stored on the
Jhelum would be transferred to the upper parts of Punjab and Bahawalpur via a series of
link canals [Michel, 1967: 2461
Negotiations were adjourned to give India time to study the plan in detail. By October
1958 the World Bank was discussing with India policy decisions that would enable the
country to accept the Pakistani London Plan. However, events in Pakistan were
unfolding that would change the nature of the negotiations dramatically. In October
1958, civilian rule in Pakistan came to an end for the first time with the successful
military coup d'etat staged by General Mohammad Ayub Khan.
5.1.3.6 The 1958 Indian Plan
Not surprisingly, India's reply to the London Plan was unfavourable. In a separate
meeting with the Bank, the Indian delegation stated with regard to the London plan that:
"This plan cannot be regarded as an appropriate basis for working out a replacement
plan under the Bank Proposal" [IBRD-2112/58]. India balked at the size of replacement
works and, of course, at the congruent financial obligation.
In December 1958, the Indian delegation presented yet another plan to the World Bank,
and to Pakistan.' 01 In what appears to be both a voice of frustration and an attempt at
gaining credibility for the plan the Head of the Indian delegation, in a separate meeting
with the Bank, said it was presumptuous to call it an Indian plan when it was really the
result of comments the Bank, and its representative had made or insisted upon India. To
this the Bank representative interjected that: "Mr. Gulhati should not put the blame of
the Marhu Plan on the Bank's shoulders" [IBRD-5/12/58].
devalue its currency in line with other members of the Sterling Bloc, resulting in a
disparity with the devalued Indian rupee.
101 In what appears to be a curious move, considering the World Bank's expectation of
no-publicity and each country's agreement to comply, was the publication of the
1958 Indian Plan by A N Khosla in an academic journal, India Quarterly, vol. XIV,
no 3 (July-Sept 1958), and reprinted by the Indian Council of World Affairs, New
Delhi. Khosla had acted as Head of the Indian delegation to the negotiations from
1951-54, and though a reputable engineer had taken up political office as a Member
of Parliament in India. Moreover, the decision to make the plan available to the
public before giving it the Bank also appears curious.
204
In what was the first joint meeting of the new round of talks, the Bank reminded the
disputants that each side had spent approximately $1 million on the dispute resolution
process so far. Moreover, the World Bank would not be able to continue such
expenditure for much longer, and therefore it hoped progress would be faster in the
sessions ahead [IBRD-9/12/58].
India proposed using a number of sites on the Chenab River in Jammu-Kashmir and
Himachal Pradesh. Two diversion tunnels would be built to transfer water from the
Chenab to other rivers for transfer to the canal command areas. One tunnel would go
from the Chenab River to a tributary of the Ravi, and the second tunnel would go from a
tributary of the Chenab, the Chandra, to the Beas River near Palchar. If a storage dam
was still needed then one would be built at Dhiangarh on the Chenab. If Pakistan
authorised use of these sites, India could guarantee delivery of half of its replacement
needs. India had estimated these needs as being 12,340 mcm (10 MAF), and the
remaining 6,170 mcm (5 MAF) would be supplied from within Pakistan by the link
canals it was building (BRBD, MR, BS) [Michel: 1967, 246].
The Indian Plan's cheaper construction costs and time requirements made the plan, as
Gulhati was to state, "in the Indian view the only practicable Plan for a solution of this
dispute" [IBRD-9/12/58, emphasis in original]. The time factor was of considerable
importance to India as it had already completed a number of works and was constructing
more to use the Eastern rivers' water. 102 An additional benefit in India's view was that
it would be responsible for the replacement works' construction, and could work at a
rate to suit its own timetable [Gulhati, 1973: 250].
An obvious implication of the Indian Plan's proposal to build on the Chenab, and to
supply water to Pakistan, was the continued dependency Pakistan would have upon
India. This lack of independence had already been rejected in Pakistan's reply to the
Indian Marhu Tunnel Plan a few months earlier. As time and cost was of prime
importance to India, so independence in water supply was to Pakistan.
102 India had been busy building its own works to use water from the Eastern rivers. It
had completed extensions to the Upper Bari Doab Canals (UBDC), and built new
canals, the Sirhind Feeder and the Bhakra canals. The Rajasthan canal was under
construction and was expected to be completed by 1962.
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In February 1959 at a meeting between the World Bank and the Pakistani delegation,
Mueenuddin reiterated that the Indian Plan was unacceptable for three main reasons.
Firstly, it would not achieve the necessary results; secondly, it was politically
undesirable; and lastly, it did not conform to the Bank's 1954 Plan and 1956 Aide
Memoire which entailed the independence criterion [IBRD-3/2/59]. This was reiterated
in a document prepared by the Pakistani delegation for the Bank: "There are important
major issues like the control of the Chenab by India, Pakistan's dependence on India for
deliveries etc. which are not acceptable to Pakistan under any circumstances" [IBRD-
5/2/59].
The World Bank had upon initial intervention in the Indus Basin dispute expected to
help India and Pakistan create a comprehensive plan for the integrated management and
use of the Basin's waters. Unfortunately, the idea of an integrated plan had to be
abandoned early on with the presentation of the Pakistani and Indian plans in 1953. It
was clear that the concepts underpinning the plans were incompatible. The World Bank
proposed, in 1954, to make this incompatibility explicit and divide the water resources
of the Indus Basin, something the other plans had held implicit.
The division of the Basin was a step that Pakistan was, initially, reluctant to accept. It
feared that if the division was instituted without any assurance to Pakistan's existing
uses and provision for financing of the necessary works, then it would be worse off than
before the Bank's good offices. Thus, Pakistan only accepted the principle of division
once it was clear that provision for storage facilities was also to be included in any final
settlement. India, happy though it was to accept the division of the Basin, was wary of
incurring a heavy financial obligation to Pakistan and rejected the extravagant plans
Pakistan proposed as the basis of agreement.
The plans that were presented by the disputants reflected the concerns each party had.
Despite the obvious disagreement the plans engendered, both India and Pakistan
repeated the underlying concepts in the 'alternatives' they proposed. India presented
plans that had as their main concern the cost of construction and implementation. Thus,
its plans were often the most economical when compared to Pakistan's. However,
Pakistan was to refuse India's plans, because they often involved a continued
dependence upon it for Pakistan's water. This was something Pakistan was no longer
willing, after April 1948, to countenance. Pakistan's plans reflected its desire for an
independent water supply, and works that could incorporate future development plans
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the country might entertain. Thus, its plans were often grandiose and involved a heavy
financial input from India, which the latter was unwilling to accept.
The World Bank was equally reluctant to let the talks collapse, and attempted to address
the concerns each disputant had in order to perpetuate the talks. Therefore, the Bank
suggested holding talks for a comprehensive plan in tandem with talks to arrange a
temporary supply of water to Pakistan, and to India. Thus, ad hoc agreements were
negotiated that would enable India to withdraw a set amount of water upstream of
Pakistan's uses, thereby making operational the new works India was building. Pakistan,
in turn, was assured of a set amount of water from which to meet its existing uses in
conjunction with supplies transferred across from the Western rivers to these uses via its
link canals. Agreement, in both the temporary arrangements and the comprehensive plan
talks, was subject to 'hard' negotiation by both disputants.
5.2	 AGREEMENT
As has already been stated elsewhere, the mediation process is not linear but cyclical.
Therefore, agreement does not follow on, spontaneously, after the issues involved have
been addressed and relevant options that are acceptable to the disputants have been
considered. Rather, agreement is present, and absent, in all stages of mediation. For
example, before the World Bank could lend its good offices, India and Pakistan had to
agree to the Bank's intervention. Thereafter, the disputants had to agree to comply with
certain ground rules for the duration of the Bank's good offices, and upon the issues that
characterised the dispute.
Agreement not only takes place at different stages, it also occurs at different levels.
Therefore, agreement occurred on relatively minor decisions, such as sharing particular
data regarding river discharge, and on larger issues that then changed the nature of the
talks, such as the principle of dividing the Indus Basin. Obviously, to make significant
progress within the talks, agreement was needed upon the major issues in dispute,
though, incremental agreement of the calibre of data-sharing was useful too. However,
the absence of agreement upon even the smallest issue, such as data-sharing, was
sufficient to obstruct the talks and lead to considerable time being lost over these details.
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Despite the appearance, and reality, of a tortured negotiation process, India and Pakistan
were able to reach a number of agreements prior to the final agreement that led to the
Indus Waters Treaty. The Governments of both countries had agreed to send delegations
to discuss the Indus Basin dispute under the aegis of the World Bank's good offices.
They had accepted the principles Lilienthal espoused, and attempted for a short duration
to find a common route to development of the Basin. There was an understanding that
data were to be a shared resource. Talks were resumed, in December 1954, on the
agreement that India and Pakistan would engage in cooperative work for a specific
duration. The delicate question of financial liability was also accepted with the principle
of beneficiary-pays.
However, despite these agreements, substantial differences remained and forestalled the
final agreement. Though, with hindsight, it can be seen that these disagreements acted
only to postpone the final agreement, at the time of the negotiations the effect appeared
more serious. The obstacles were significant and featured at heart the issue of political
will. The party most affected by this issue was Pakistan, where political instability was
causing considerable problems for their delegation to the Indus Basin talks. Other
difficulties also obstructed the talks, and were of a technical and financial nature.
Nonetheless, agreement when it came was sufficient to lead to the Indus Waters Treaty.
5.2.1	 Obstacles to Agreement
"Strong value differences mean that parties are reluctant to give away
too much for fear of offering a fatal compromise, or of being accused
by their constituencies of 'selling out' their water rights" [Lamb and
Taylor, 1990: 968].
Both countries had agreed to the World Bank proposal made in 1954, and the Aide-
Memoire in 1956. Whereas India was willing to develop a comprehensive plan
implementing the principles embodied in these two proposals, Pakistan's acceptance
was more begrudging. Dissatisfied with the amount of water being allocated, Pakistan
had only accepted the 1954 proposal to keep the negotiations going. Its attitude vis-a-vis
the Aide-Memoire was more encouraging, as it finally recognised Pakistan's claim that
storage was essential in the Indus Basin if enough needs were to be met to get
agreement.
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But why when there was some agreement in 1956, was a treaty not signed until
1960? 103 What obstacles stood in the way of agreement? The obstacles can be broadly
defined as political, financial and technical. Though these factors in effect only
postponed the final treaty, at times they looked set to prevent agreement altogether. Of
the three, the most important was political, which can be characterised as political will.
India, by virtue of being upstream, had continued with its unilateral development of the
water in its territory. Though there were provincial disagreements about the allocation of
water, India was not beset by the same political problems at the centre as Pakistan was.
Pakistan's downstream status, the reason for its fears vis-a-vis India's water
withdrawals, led to it demanding continued water supply to its existing uses. Though the
World Bank attempted to ensure undiminished supply before the start of the talks, in
1952, the matter had become highly complicated [IBRD-1313/52d]. The issue of
maintaining the status quo at times threatened to scupper the talks.
Though technical and financial matters influenced Pakistan's decisions, the most
pertinent factor was the political situation within the country. During the length of the
negotiations, rival political leaders of Pakistan were fighting either to get power or
maintain their power. Seven different candidates held the Prime Minister's office during
that interim. Away from the centre, the provinces were also vying for water, and this
entailed considerable internal disagreement.
The Pakistani Head of Delegation after 1954, Ghulam Mueenuddin, was more willing to
make new recommendations to the Pakistani government in Karachi but was hampered
by the weakness of the political situation in Pakistan which was to remain a formidable
obstacle for most of the negotiations [Iliff, 1970]. One consequence of this political
jostling at the centre was a jingoistic outlook that hardened as politicians vied with each
other to appeal to the public. Another consequence arising out of political weakness, was
103 Kraske suggests one reason for the delay is that both India and Pakistan enjoy
being accurate in the details. Since both parties in a dispute will have different ideas
of what constitutes accuracy, this leads to considerable discussion. He, therefore,
suggests that the Indus Waters Treaty was signed simply because Prime Minister
Nehru had decided that enough discussion had gone on, and that India would agree
with the Bank's proposal even if it was not as exact as some Indian agencies might
want it to be [Kraske interview, 3/6/96]. Though this might have happened in India,
this thesis regards the turning point as being the decision of President Ayub Khan's
Government to accept the proposals.
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that politicians could not afford to make decisions that could be used against them in the
domestic arena.
Having started the negotiations under the relatively strong leadership of Liaquat Ali
Khan, the subsequent prime ministers were unable to countenance agreement with their
biggest enemy, India, for fear of a domestic backlash. Nor, would it appear, could they
stop the negotiations outright in case this too became a weapon in the hands of their
political opponents. Therefore, the negotiations limped along beset by the absence of a
commitment to make or break the process. It was not until the October 1958 military
coup d'etat that the leadership was strong enough, and had the political will, to make a
decisive settlement with India on the canal waters dispute [Kirmani interview, 1/6/96].
"To exert any influence at all, to change or affect aspects of a dispute, requires the
possession or control of some valued resources" [Bercovitch, 1992: 19]. The World
Bank's obvious resource was financial capital, which it used to provide an incentive to
get agreement [Baxter, 1967: 477]. However, finances were by themselves insufficient
to get agreement, as already pointed out, and at times were also an obstacle in
themselves.
Unsurprisingly, financial obstacles during the mediated talks revolved around which
party would pay for the necessary works. To determine each party's portion of
responsibility towards the cost of works, the IBRD determined that payment would be
proportional to the benefit derived. For example, since India would benefit by the
allocation of the eastern rivers to it, the link canals situated in Pakistan that would enable
this to happen, would be India's responsibility.
Therefore, the first financial obstacle arose with each party trying to show that it was not
the principal beneficiary from particular works, so as to avoid the liability to pay. The
second financial obstacle, which is linked to the first, was the overall cost of works in
the final development plan. Storage facilities are very expensive to construct and neither
country could afford to pay for them. Both these problems were overcome. The first by
the World Bank applying the principle strictly, and the second by the Bank creating a
fund to which interested 'friendly Governments' contributed.
Technical difficulties arose in the calculations of needs and other elements that
impinged upon the size of works required to supply the needs as understood. Therefore,
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before the 1956 Aide-Memoire, Pakistan had insisted that without storage facilities or a
large portion of the eastern rivers, its needs would not be met. Technical surveys by a
consulting engineering firm confirmed Pakistan's claim and storage facilities were
accepted in principle.
The calculation of losses and gains in the rivers and canals were also problematic, as it
had implications for the size of replacement works and link canals. 104 As late as
December 1958 matters concerning the calculation of gains and losses from canals,
ponds and rivers were being challenged. When Mueenuddin suggested collecting
together a body of experts to decide the issue Iliff was reluctant because, "he feared that
such a decision would be no more acceptable to both sides than a decision made by the
Bank engineers" [IBRD-16/12/58]. Other problems arose with estimations made of the
amount of water available to Pakistan, whether it included sailab or not. None of these
problems, however, was insoluble especially as the engineers were pushing back the
frontiers of innovation.
An additional 'technical' problem arose with the management of water and water-
carriers that crossed the international boundary. For example, in Spring 1956, while the
delegations were discussing proposals for a comprehensive plan, difficulties arose
regarding repairs to the Ferozepur headworks. Rather than resolving the matter between
the Indian and Pakistani engineering staff at ground level or referring the matter to the
Indian Special Commissioner and the Pakistani Irrigation Commissioner the matter was
put before the World Bank. When the matter was finally settled with the intervention of
the Indian Prime Minister, the Bank was glad that the situation had been resolved by a
"display of good sense on both sides of the frontier" [IBRD-28/3156].
The breakthrough came with the change in Pakistan's political will with the 1958 coup.
Pakistan unreservedly accepted the World Bank's proposals of 1954 and its 1956 Aide-
Memoire. In doing so, the political leadership of the country undertook to divide the
basin, and change the source of its supply by relying almost exclusively upon the might
of the western rivers through dams and link canals. The decision to reach an agreement
with India on this contentious issue rests most probably with the political leadership. But
104 Michel points out that link canals leak more than ordinary canals because they
are cutting across the 'grain' of the basin rather than going with the flow of the
rivers [Michel interview, 16/5/96].
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Pakistan's engineers would have determined which of the plans on offer to select and
advised the political leadership accordingly.
Though not an obstacle to agreement in the manner of disputant obstinance, another
problem did exist for the Bank's representatives. The World Bank had entered into the
Indus Basin dispute in 1951 thinking its involvement would be needed only in the short
term as agreement would be reached relatively quickly. But as negotiations crept along
at a snail's pace, members within the Bank's Management began to question their
continued presence in these talks, especially when India and Pakistan's commitment to
resolution appeared to waver. Thus, "Iliffs mediation was not only between India and
Pakistan, but with Black as well, since he more and more wanted to abandon the whole
exercise - having believed in the beginning that agreement could be reached in a
reasonably short time" [Iliff, 1970].
5.2.2	 Drafting the Indus Waters Treaty
The transition from small measured agreements that eked the process along to a large-
scale acceptance of an outcome happened literally overnight in Pakistan with the coup
d'etat. In accordance with the instructions coming from Karachi, the Pakistani
delegation unreservedly accepted, on 22 December 1958, the 1954 World Bank Plan
and the 1956 Aide Memoire Plan, each dealing, respectively, with the principles of
dividing the basin and changing the supply sources. Hereon, the discussions that took
place were for the actual plan that was to be implemented, rather than a plan that might
be accepted and implemented at some unspecified far-off date. Discussions continued on
the viability of the plans already proposed by India and Pakistan, the revised Marhu Plan
or 1958 Indian Plan and the London Plan respectively.
As the inherent aims of each country were different, difficulties with these plans
remained. As Michel points out [1967: 247], India wanted, broadly, to have unrestricted
use of the eastern rivers after a reasonable transition period, and a limit to its
contribution for replacement works in Pakistan. By contrast, Pakistan had entwined the
concepts of replacement and development such that it was reluctant to separate them.
Therefore, though the Marhu Plan had its economy to recommend it to the World Bank,
it was clear that there was little in it that was acceptable to the Pakistanis especially with
its implication of continued dependency. Thus, the Bank realised that if agreement was
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to be found it would need to separate the issues of irrigation works needed from the cost
of constructing those works [ibici].
Using the 1954 Plan and the Aide Memoire, that India and Pakistan had already
accepted, as a basis the World Bank proposed another plan. The Settlement Plan
contained the broad provisions that would be incorporated in the Indus Waters Treaty,
but aspects remained that needed considerable negotiation before agreement was finally
reached. By the Summer of 1959, India had agreed to the criteria it was most concerned
with regarding cost and water use. Thereafter, the Bank sought to reach agreement with
Pakistan as to which works would be incorporated in the treaty, and therefore be eligible
for financing through a Bank-controlled fund, the Indus Basin Development Fund
(IBDF).
India had outlined its expectations vis-a-vis any final agreement in a series of meetings
with the World Bank as far back as September and October 1956 [IBRD-28/9/56 and
10/10/56]. Though these discussions were held over two years before negotiations began
for the final treaty, many of the Indus Waters Treaty's key features were highlighted in
these discussions. Berber had, in 1956, made a number of points that India would expect
to be included in an international treaty between India and Pakistan [IBRD-28/9/56],
which it appears were later included in the Indus Waters Treaty.
Berber stated that the participants, and especially the mediator (in the role of referee),
would need to bear in mind three points in reaching agreement. Firstly, the place of such
a treaty in the constitutions of both countries would have to be considered, as would the
possibility of needing the consent of both parliaments to ratify it. Secondly, a
preliminary agreement might be needed pending a final agreement as a treaty could take
years to complete. Thirdly, neither side while negotiating a final agreement should do
anything contrary to the aims of the final agreement. Therefore, to ensure that India, for
example, did not infringe upon the western rivers' water, and Pakistan did not hinder or
obstruct the replacement works, a standstill agreement would possibly be necessary
[IBRD-28/9/56] .
The treaty itself would be formed of three sections, Berber continued. The treaty would
open with the preamble which would amount to the moral platform for the agreement,
and the treaty's intentions. The second section would house the articles which formed
the main body of the agreement. And the annexes would make up the last section, and
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cover details of the transitional and financial arrangements that had been agreed to by
the disputants [IBRD-28/9/56].
Implementing the treaty may raise difficulties not envisaged during the negotiation
period, Berber went on to warn. Therefore, it was important not only to outline, in detail,
all the issues that had been agreed to, but to provide an avenue to deal with any future
disputes. Berber suggested using arbitration rather than adjudication, as India had
already refused the latter. He also suggested making provision for a commission to settle
administrative issues such as the water used by both India and Pakistan in Kashmir,
maintaining the riverbeds of the eastern rivers, and flood control [IBRD-28/9/56].
In later discussions, Berber recommended further aspects of the treaty that should be
observed. Regarding the western rivers, India should not tamper with the amount and
timing of supply to Pakistan, nor should it build upon the rivers without Pakistan's
permission. In addition, the treaty should allow for Indian uses on these rivers in Jammu
and Kashmir. Berber recommended again considering possible flood control on the
eastern rivers as India did not need to use all the waters, though it might wish to [IBRD-
10/10/561
Though Berber was willing to discuss the treaty's features in general terms, when the
Bank suggested drafting an international water treaty in 1956, even in the broadest
sense, the Indians were reluctant to do so. Not only because, as Berber pointed out, that
"it might be poor tactics from the Indian point of view" but also because India had gone
further in the negotiations than Pakistan had [IBRD-10/1 0/561 Furthermore, it would be
premature to start drafting a treaty when there was insufficient agreement between the
disputants. In the meantime, discussions continued regarding the transitional and
financial arrangements. Regarding the sections of the treaty that would endure beyond
the implementation stage, Berber reiterated the need for an arbitration clause to resolve
future disputes, even suggesting that it should operate automatically when either party
invokes it [IBRD-10/10/56].
5.2.2.1 The 1959 Settlement Plan
While the disputants were preparing plans that they regarded as providing a settlement
to the long-standing dispute, as far back as July 1958, the World Bank had begun its
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own preparations for yet another proposal [IBRD-29/7/58]. At the time when Pakistan
asked whether "the Bank planned to put a plan on the table", the reply was:
"the Bank would prefer to have a plan put forward by either side agreed to
by both India and Pakistan. However, if such a plan cannot be agreed to,
then the Bank would put forward a plan which would be the plan the Bank
thinks would effect replacement and form the basis of discussions for
financial assistance from other governments. This plan would not be put
forward as the Bank Proposal but rather as a plan representing the Bank's
view, for discussion with both sides" [IBRD-29/7/58, emphasis in original].
At a meeting in January 1959, with the Pakistani acceptance of the Bank's 1954 Plan
and the 1956 Aide Memoire in hand, the World Bank suggested the delegations return to
their countries to collect data. Pakistan was to transmit its data by post to the Bank and
India, who would comment upon the data with a view to the final plan that was now to
be negotiated. India clearly wanted to move faster so that it could withdraw more water
for its own works sooner. The Head of the Indian delegation stated that he did not
understand why Pakistan took so long to provide information and how he was to explain
the delay to the Indian Government. India argued that Pakistan surely had the facts
already since it had made preparations for the BS II link, and that the necessary
calculations could be done in Washington, DC [IBRD-16/1/59].
The Pakistani delegation was concerned about the proposal the World Bank was
preparing since the effect of the plan, if it was accepted, would be felt in Pakistan.
Therefore, the delegation attempted to 'influence' the Bank's outlook. At another
meeting in January 1959, the delegation made it known to the World Bank that it hoped
the Bank would discuss its views with the delegation, before finalising them in a plan.
The Bank was, also, reminded that any mistakes in forecasting the gains and losses in
the rivers would be borne by Pakistan [IBRD-19/1/59].
In a meeting in February 1959, the delegation made an "earnest request" that the Bank's
plan take into account three uses Pakistan considered important: sailab, post-partition
increased uses, and reclamation. If the Bank's plan could not meet these uses, then it
was to ensure that water was available to Pakistan for these uses. Reference was made
once more to the gains/losses calculations, and the Bank was asked to give Pakistan the
benefit of any doubt if it arose. The Bank gave a rather stern reply. "Pakistan must
remember that the Bank did not get into this dispute to design and build a development
scheme for Pakistan, but to find a settlement of this dispute" [IBRD-5/2/59a].
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The Indian delegation for its part was still concerned about the financial contribution
India would be asked to make. In March 1959, the World Bank and India met to discuss
the Indian position vis-a-vis the principle of beneficiary-pays. It was made clear to India
that the Bank no longer regarded the Marhu Tunnel concept as an acceptable basis for a
final plan. Therefore, the Bank would not be putting forward a plan based upon it
[IBRD-5/3/59] .
The Indian delegation presented its views to the Bank on the final plan and its financial
liability in a paper entitled, "Some Technical Considerations Relating to the Allocations
of Costs of a Replacement Plan". The World Bank understood this paper as presenting
the Indian government's views on its financial liability to Pakistan. If this was the case,
the Bank's representative said that he would make a recommendation to the Bank's
President not to go to the Indian Subcontinent in May 1959 [IBRD-16/3/59]. The
President was to have separate talks with the political leadership of both countries
regarding various aspects that still needed agreement. The Head of the Indian delegation
explained that the report was informal and contained only his own views as he did not
know those of the Government of India but suspected that they would want to reserve
their judgement for the moment [ibid.
The World Bank presented its "Settlement Plan" on the 26 March 1959. The Plan, which
was based upon the Bank's 1954 proposal, provided for replacement and development
works in India and Pakistan. The Bank sought to distribute the financial burden evenly
between the two countries by applying the principle of beneficiary-pays, and taking into
regard each country's ability to pay. Therefore, Pakistan was asked to absorb the cost of
existing replacement works, and India's payments were calculated to reflect the actual
cost of construction. Using loans to pay for works benefiting them, India was liable for
the link canals, and Pakistan liable for the storage facilities. If the Settlement Planwas
acceptable to the parties, the implementation of this plan would oblige India and
Pakistan to sign an international water treaty. This treaty would, in turn, establish an
Indus development commission for at least the duration of the transitional period.
In May 1959, the Bank's President travelled to India to discuss with the Indian
Government its financial contribution, arrangements for the transitional period, and
India's opinion on the incorporation of a reservoir at Mangla as part of the replacement
plan. Understanding was reached on five issues: Firstly, that India's contribution would
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be limited to $174 million. 105 Secondly, that the transitional period would last for ten
years and if Pakistan exceeded this time, it would be penalised financially. Thirdly, if
however Pakistan needed to extend the transitional period, it could do so for a single
three year period. Fourthly, as part of the Settlement Plan's planned projects in India,
the foreign exchange costs of building the Beas dam would be met with loans. And
fifthly, India's claim to sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir would not be harmed, and in
fact a suitable formula would be arrived at to protect that claim.
The World Bank found some measure of success in its talks with the Government of
Pakistan. Michel points out that the original scheme the Bank was proposing had to be
amended when the Pakistani government showed that it could still lead to "small
shortages on some canals in exceptional years" [1967: 247]. It was apparent to the Bank
that Pakistani thinking had "crystallised around the storage facilities" [ib id]. An
exchange was agreed in which Pakistan would assume the some of the replacement
works' costs, and remove off-channel storage at Rohtas below Mangla on the River
Jhelum, if a dam at Tarbela was included in the Settlement Plan [ibid: 248].
The amended list of works included: [i] reservoirs at Tarbela and Mangla on the rivers
Indus and Jhelum respectively; [ii] eight link canals transferring water from the western
rivers to the Sutlej Valley Canals; [iii] a hydro-electric power plant at Mangla; and [iv]
tubewells to promote drainage within the Indus Basin. The Pakistani government, also,
agreed to absorb the costs already incurred in constructing and operating existing link
canals. The World Bank, for its part, agreed to approach other countries, or 'friendly
Governments', to fund the amended works [Michel, 1967: 247].
Outstanding issues remained: Indian uses on the western rivers, transitional
arrangements and the Head of Agreement that was to encapsulate the form of the final
treaty. The parties met in August 1959, in London to discuss these issues [IBRD-5/8/59
and 6/8/59]. Each side was asked, by the World Bank, to prepare a draft of the Heads of
Agreement that would later translate into the accepted agreement and formalised as a
105 Iliff recalls that the financial negotiations were separate, "between the Bank and
India" [1961]. But apparently, the "size of the Indian contribution finally was set by
Iliff and B. K. Nehru with the help of a bottle of gin" [Iliff, 1970]. Iliff continues
that, "Pakistan of course didn't care whether India was putting up anything or not so
long as the system of works was being constructed at no cost to herself. But when I
say she didn't mind if India was putting up nothing, she was less concerned with what
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treaty. Unfortunately, the drafts that emerged were sufficiently different, even at this late
stage after years of negotiations, to warrant the Bank to ask the disputants to find
common understanding on three key points. Firstly, the definitions being used, secondly,
the transitional arrangements, and lastly, the uses India would have on the western
rivers. The Bank asked the parties to focus on these points, because it believed
reconciliation of the other points would follow on from agreement over these [IBRD-
10/8/59].
Indian uses from the western rivers was much debated. Fowler's belief that Pakistan was
fortunate since "it is difficult to envisage any large-scale irrigation project in, or
diversion if Indus water from, the upper valley in Kashmir or Tibet that might threaten
supplies for canals in the Punjab or Sind" appeared not to placate Pakistan [1950: 599].
It continued to press, for what it regarded as Indian interference on these rivers for use
in Indian-controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir, to be minimised. Mueenuddin stated
categorically that there was "no question of India having carte blanche in Jammu and
Kashmir" [IBRD-12/8/59].
But Iliff believes Pakistan was caught in a difficult position. Though it did not want to
allow India to withdraw water from the western rivers, Pakistan also realised that it
could not afford to be seen to limit Kashmiri irrigation. This, after all, would imply that
Pakistan did not care for its Muslim brethren, especially in the face of Indian concerns to
maintain supply to these uses [1961].
If India was to make significant withdrawals upstream on the western rivers then
Pakistan, its delegates argued, should receive compensation for these withdrawals
[IBRD-10/8/59 and 12/8/59; Ilift 1961]. India counterargued that it would not limit
irrigation in Jammu and Kashmir so that Sind, Punjab or even Rajasthan could double
their uses. The Bank reminded the disputants in the course of this debate that it was
unwilling to consider "taking water for development in Pakistan and giving it to India
for development" [IBRD-11/8/59].
Moreover, the Bank's representative stated:
"that he would like to suggest the following guide with respect to these
uses; that by 'insignificant', the Bank meant that the effect on Pakistan as a
India was going to put up than whether or not she (Pakistan) was going to get the
whole system of works" [1961].
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result of withdrawals in Jammu and Kashmir should be insignificant, rather
than the areas or quantity of water being insignificant. If it were possible, he
said, he would like to see the problem approached with this in mind"
[IBRD-12/8/59].
Suitably chastised, both parties accepted the suggested approach. Nonetheless,
suspicions continued amongst the disputants. This was highlighted in a meeting with the
World Bank when the Pakistani delegation expressed concerns regarding the harm India
could do if it operated the structures "malevolently". The Bank explained its position:
"If India agrees in a treaty to operate these plants in a particular way, then the Bank will
assume that she will so so" [IBRD-14/8/59]. Furthermore, the Bank regretted the
Pakistani delegation's attitude and approach to this problem.
Table 5.3 The IBRD and Pakistan Plans' Estimate of Cost
In US $m	 Total	 Local Currency	 Foreign Exchange
IBRD Estimate 836 444 392
Pakistani Estimate 950 516 434
[Source: IBRD-17/8/59]
Matters did not improve with "Pakistan's Tentative Plan" which outlined Pakistan's
estimate of the cost of implementing the works suggested in the Settlement Plan [IBRD-
17/8/59]. As Table 5.3 shows, the Pakistani estimate expected implementation to cost
US $114 million more than the World Bank's estimate. If Pakistan had hoped that the
Bank would accept these figures, it was disappointed. The Bank made it clear that not
only was it not going to ask the 'friendly Governments' for more money, Pakistan would
also have to restrict its foreign exchange requirements to the allotted US $400 million.
The Head of the Pakistani delegation agreed to prepare a plan in accordance with these
financial limitations  [IBRD-17/8/59] .
Discussions continued into September 1959 regarding a draft of the Heads of Agreement
requested by the World Bank. For example, on the issue of filling-up periods for the
plants generating hydro-electricity using the run-of-the-river, while Pakistan accepted
the Bank's draft suggestions, the Indian delegation rejected them. The Head of the
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Indian delegation said "he wished he could also accept it but for Pakistan's sake he
could not", and proposed postponing a decision till further thought had been given to the
matter [IBRD-8/9/59].
The Pakistani delegation's Head replied, referring to the delay being suggested, that the
"trouble here is that both sides are too busy looking for legal loopholes" [IBRD-8/9/59].
Mueenuddin suggested that the Heads of Agreement draft the delegations were
discussing should not be a legalistic draft, since those issues could be left for more
experienced treaty drafters. Instead, the Heads of Agreement should be the Heads of
'Intention'. The Bank sympathised with the approach the Pakistani Designee Engineer
was suggesting [IBRD-8/9/59].
From the detailed and extensive talks held during August and September 1959, emerged
a general consensus on the nature of the Heads of Agreement. It was agreed by the
participants that the following features should form part of any plan: One, the division of
the Indus Basin between India and Pakistan. Two, a transitional period during which
Pakistan would construct the works needed to prepare for the diversion of water to
India. Three, India should be allowed to make use of the western rivers to generate
hydro-electricity and for other non-consumptive uses. Four, that the financial liability
each country would face would be determined by the benefit it derived from the works
agreed under an international water treaty. Five, that India and Pakistan would exchange
hydrological data. Six, that there would be some mechanism to ensure future
cooperation between the disputants. And finally, that there would also be some
provision to resolve any future disputes if they arose.
Agreement, however, had not been reached on details regarding the transitional period
arrangements, and Indian consumptive uses on the western rivers. In October 1959, a
two-pronged approach matched continuing discussions on these unresolved issues with
the start of efforts to draft an international water treaty between India and Pakistan. In
February 1960 discussions still continued on the transitional arrangements about which
India was particularly unhappy. Gulhati, in a meeting with the World Bank, wanted to
demonstrate to the Bank that the transitional arrangements it was proposing were
"intolerable for India" [IBRD-8/2/60].
A couple of days later the Head of the Indian delegation also took issue over the
calculations upon which the Bank's proposals were based. Gulhati said that taking
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averages for the Sutlej Valley Canals, was not a fair approach. The Bank's minutes for
that meeting notes: "This is contrary to the Indian position on averages taken throughout
the years of negotiations" [IBRD-10/2/60]. Gulhati was also to add in that meeting that
while "simplicity was desirable it is not indispensable", and works should not be
dismissed because the situation may become more complicated [ibid]. The negotiations
between the disputants followed the familiar route of aggrievance mixed with some
progress.
Meeting with the World Bank in March 1960, the Head of the Pakistani delegation noted
that irrigated land was already being taken out of use due to severe salinity, with more
land potentially at risk if India was to have substantial consumptive uses on the western
rivers in Jammu and Kashmir [IBRD-11/3/60]. 106
 Furthermore, Pakistan argued, at
partition India was only using 9,872 mcm (8 MAF) of water whereas it now hoped to
develop its irrigation needs to use 35,786 mcm (29 MAF). By comparison, Pakistan
used 80,210 mcm (65 MAF) at partition, and hoped to develop its uses to consume
134,506 mcm (109 MAF) [IBRD-11/3/60]. That entailed an increase for Pakistan in
water availability of "only 65% compared with 260% in India" [ibid]. Mueenuddin
added that "[t]herefore, any water that might be given to occupied Kashmir will create
further shortages in Pakistan. However, Pakistan recognises the need for some increased
uses in Kashmir" [ibid].
As late as March 1960, the World Bank representative had to remind the disputants of
the talks' purpose. The Bank's representative asked the delegations to forget comments
made by any party regarding interpretations given to phrases in the Bank's proposal.
The delegates were asked, instead, to concentrate on the task at hand namely "to find a
solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan" [IBRD-11/3/60].
5.2.2.2 The 1960 Indus Water Treaty
The activities of the World Bank during summer 1959, had succeeded in resolving a
number of issues and found agreement on the basis of a treaty [Iliff, 1961]. India's
objections to the Bank's Settlement Plan had been dealt with in the main part with the
fixing of the Indian financial contribution. A couple of outstanding issues remained
106 According to Mueenuddin, Pakistan was losing approximately 100,000 acres
(400 km2) per year to salinity [IBRD-11/3/60]. It is interesting to note that irrigation
techniques in the Indus Basin that led to salinisation of the land have not changed in
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between the two disputants over consumptive uses in Jammu and Kashmir and
transitional period arrangements. Pakistan had also agreed to the Settlement Plan after it
had been adjusted during its Government's conversations with the Bank in the
Subcontinent. Yet it was to be over a year before the Indus Waters Treaty would be
signed, and the Indus Basin Development Fund become operational [Iliff, 1961]. The
delay was due to a disagreement between the World Bank and Pakistan regarding the
cost of the works envisaged in the final plan.
The Government of Pakistan established the Indus Basin Advisory Board (IBAB) during
summer 1959 to coordinate planning in the basin between the different agencies
representing Pakistan's interests [Michel, 1967: 2491. 107 The IBAB, comprised of sub-
committees, was chaired by Ghulam Mueenuddin, who also headed the Pakistani
delegation to negotiations with India and the World Bank. The Board first convened in
Lahore during June 1959, and again in London during September 1959 [ibid: 250].
Presenting its plan in September, the IBAB's estimates were considerably higher than
the World Bank's figure even though Mueenuddin had, as pointed out above, agreed to
limit the foreign exchange spending to US $400 million [IBRD-17/8/59]. The IBAB
Plan included US $94.7 million for land acquisition in Pakistan [Michel, 1967: 250].108
Though the Pakistani authorities repeatedly revised their plans, it was usually only
upwards. This the World Bank was unwilling to countenance (see Table 5.4) especially
as the upward spiralling of costs was due to Pakistani attempts to add some development
the succeeding years despite innovations in micro-irrigation. Thus loss of land to
salinisation remains an annual feature in Pakistani agriculture.
107 The different agencies included the Water and Power Development Authority of
West Pakistan (WAPDA), the Department of Irrigation, the Pakistani Delegation to
the negotiations and the Delegation's consultant engineers, Tipton.
108 Frederiksen et al point out that Rs. 2,490 million (approximately $50 million at
1998 rates) were spent in resettling people between 1968 and 1984, as a result of the
Tarbela dam's construction. Yet, despite a "lavish land for land" offer, "much of the
compensation to the oustees was paid in cash" [1993: 1101. The author was told
separately, in an interview, how land was acquired in Pakistan under the Indus
Waters Treaty and the Tarbela supplement. The expected recipients of
compensation were, in certain areas, small scale farmers wholly dependent upon the
land for their livelihoods. When it came to acquiring the land, a rumour was spread
that the Government would seize this land without giving any compensation. Not
surprisingly the land's value plummeted. Soon after buyers appeared offering a
fraction of the real value, or the compensation, assigned under the Treaty. Resigned
to losing their land anyway, these farmers sold their land. The new owners, and
beneficiaries of the compensation that was paid out as agreed under the Treaty, were
apparently the then top six families of Pakistan.
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projects to the Settlement Plan, the cost of land acquisition, and custom duties and taxes
upon the materials procured for the construction of the works [Michel, 1967: 253].
Michel gives a detailed description of the successive proposals the Government of
Pakistan put forward, and the Bank's reaction [1967: 250-255]. The Bank was to insist
upon meeting the figure it had calculated and when Pakistan finally complied, the
articles for the Indus Waters Treaty could be signed.
Table 5.4 Differing Estimates of the IBRD and Pakistan Plans.
IBAB Plan	 IBRD Plan	 WAPDA Plan
(Sept 1959)	 (Feb 1960)	 (June 1960) 
Cost in US $ million 	 936	 838	 1,297.3
[Source: After Michel, 1967: 252]
The difference in estimates of each plan and, therefore, the plans themselves was due to
a difference in attitude vis-a-vis the purpose of the plans. Pakistan regarded the plans
and the works therein as merely compensation for the loss of the eastern rivers to India.
Therefore, though the plan paid for replacement works, to be truly just it would have to
incorporate development costs too, which were becoming necessary. India was, after all,
being given financial assistance to develop its irrigation. However, the World Bank, and
by extension the 'friendly Governments', regarded this assistance as being solely for the
purpose of replacement and to reach a peaceful solution to the Indus Basin dispute. The
Bank was clear that Pakistan was free to develop its irrigation uses, but it must do so at
its own expense.
The six 'friendly Governments' who had agreed, by August 1959, to underwrite the
international water treaty were: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, West Germany, the
United Kingdom and the USA. 109 Together these Governments would subscribe close
109 Iliff describes the process by which the World Bank arranged the consortium of
donors: "Well, when we realized what the cost of this system of works was going to
be, we informally got in touch with the various governments that we thought might
be likely to chip in some financial assistance, and when we got an indication that in
principle they were prepared to do so, then we called a meeting, I mean, put the thing
on a much less informal basis. We called together what I might call really an
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to $800 million for the works needed in India and Pakistan to bring about a peaceful
settlement to the question of the Indus waters (see Table 5.5 for the breakdown of
contributions).
Table 5.5 Contributions to the Indus Basin Development Fund
Country	 Amount in millions (US $m)	 Recipient	 Type
Australia	 EA 6.96	 (15.54)
	 Pakistan	 Grant
Canada	 US $ 22.1	 (22.190	 Pakistan
	
Grant
New Zealand	 ENZ 1.0
	 (2.78)	 Pakistan	 Grant
West Germany	 DM 126	 (30.21)
	 Pakistan	 Grant
UK	 E 20.86	 (58.48)	 Pakistan
	
Grant
USA	 ' $ 177	 Pakistan
	
Grant
$235 in Pkn Rs.	 Pakistan	 Grant
$ 70
	 Pakistan	 Loan
$ 33	 India	 Loan
World Bank	 $ 80	 Pakistan	 Loan
$ 23	 India	 Loan
[Source: After Michel, 1967: 251; who calculated the exchange rate as reported by the
IMF]
Comprising grants and loans the money was directed to the Indus Basin Development
Fund (IBDF), set up to administer and distribute the funds. By January 1960, the Indus
Basin Development Fund Agreement had been drafted and sent to the countries
concerned: Pakistan and the 'friendly Governments'. The contributing countries would
pay into the IBDF, their agreed share, and the administration thereon would be furnished
by the World Bank. The Bank was to decide that payment for the construction costs
intergovernmental working party of representatives of these various countries here in
Washington, and we worked with them. Now, don't ask me how we split the cost, as
between countries A, B, C, and D. That was very much plucking the figure out of the
air. We said ourselves, 'Well, we think country A can afford so much. On the basis
of that country B ought to put out so much,' and so on" [1961]. Iliff also describes
how the Bank decided how much of the Indus Basin Development Fund would be
loans: "Well, I think there again, we pulled a figure largely out of the air, but of
course we were having some regard to Pakistan's capacity to repay hard foreign debt,
and we were very anxious to keep the Bank's contribution down, not so much
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would only occur after purchase and the production of receipts (see Table 5.6 for a
breakdown of the construction costs in India and Pakistan).
Table 5.6	 Cost of works under the Indus Waters Treaty.
US $ millions Local Currency Foreign Exchange Total
A. In Pakistan
I. Storage 169 302 471
II. Links 182 78 260
III. Barrages 35 22 57
IV. Tubewells and Drainage 28 22 50
Sub-total of Works in Pakistan 414 424 838
B. In India
Beas Dam 117 33 150
Power 2 23 25
Sub-total of Works in India 119 56 175
Total Plan 533 480 1,013
[Source: After IBRD-17/2/60]
The main text of the international treaty had been drafted by December 1959. (See
Figure 4. for a map of the works in Pakistan under the Treaty.) After considerable
discussion by the Government of Pakistan on its outstanding issues with India and the
financial disagreement with the World Bank, a final draft of the treaty was prepared. On
19 September 1960, the President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, and the Prime
Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, signed the Indus Waters Treaty in Karachi,
witnessed by Vice President Iliff.110
The ratification of the Indus Waters Treaty, in January 1961, signified the end of
Pakistan's dispute with India over the waters of the Basin. However, another dispute
because we didn't want to invest Bank funds, but because we didn't want to impose
an excessive hard currency repayment on Pakistan" [ibicl].
110 News about the Indus Waters Treaty, from the Bretton Woods twins, was
published by the World Bank in the form of a press release, no. 650. 19 September
1960. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) published its account in its newsletter,
the International Financial News Survey, vol. XII, no. 63, 23 September 1960.
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was developing, this time between the World Bank and Pakistan over the financial
assistance Pakistan was receiving under the Treaty. This too was, eventually, settled
with an additional supplement in 1965 to Pakistan to build the Tarbela Dam. The Bank
was to retain a close interest in the implementation of the Treaty throughout the
transitional period.
The obstacles to agreement were considerable in the Indus Basin dispute. But rather than
being of a technical nature the obstacles, unsurprisingly, had more to do with the
political implications any agreement would have upon the disputants' domestic politics.
This was especially true for Pakistan, which was contending with a political shambles
domestically. By contrast India was in a stronger position, not only because its
Government was secure under Prime Minister Nehru, but also because Nehru had taken
a personal interest in the outcome of the dispute and could marshall the necessary
political forces needed to get agreement. Pakistan was only able to do the latter after
Ayub Khan's military government took over control of the country.
An additional obstacle was the financial costs of implementing any plan based upon the
principles of division and storage. This the World Bank was able to overcome with the
assistance of the six 'friendly Governments' who together set up the Indus Basin
Development Fund. With the main obstacles addressed, the actual agreement that led to
the Indus Waters Treaty, still took time as both India and Pakistan took care to ensure
that the agreement was very specific and limited to the waters of the Basin. The
implementation of the Treaty was, in part, successful because of the detailed nature of
the agreement that was signed.
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SUMMARY
The World Bank had a particularly difficult task as a mediator. Its primary role was to
assist India and Pakistan in their communications with each other. However, though a
considerable amount of talking took place, with India and Pakistan talkingat each other,
very little 'listening' accompanied the process. This was a feature of the bilateral
negotiations that had taken place before the Bank intervened, and it was replicated in the
mediated talks.
For example, India had made it clear that it was willing to pay for a replacement scheme
of works, but would only agree to the absolute minimum of costs. While Pakistan drew
up grandiose plans that not only provided for the basic replacement works but also lay
the foundation for its development interests. In turn, Pakistan was adamant that it would
not accept a plan in which India could "interfere" with the waters of the western rivers,
even though it would be doing so in Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir. Yet India
proposed not one but two plans which involved using the waters of the Chenab River.
India and Pakistan appeared to approach the exploration of options as if they were
hanging off a rung of a climbing frame. They would only move from their position if the
rung ahead was one they liked. But having moved, they would again be reluctant to
relinquish their position and would retain a tenacious grip. As a result, reaching
agreement proved to be difficult. Not only were the overall principles that emerged
challenged and negotiated before being accepted, but so were the minute details of the
process, data collection and interpretation.
The World Bank was to reiterate during the later stages of the talks that there was no
technical obstacle to prevent the resolution of the dispute. What was regarded by the
Bank as barring progress were anxieties about the financial liability each disputant had
to the other, and political difficulties that prevented politicians from being seen to
compromise with an enemy. This was particularly the case with Pakistan. Political
instability within the country discouraged the incumbent politicians from making any
decisions that had far reaching consequences regarding the waters supporting the
country's livelihood.
The overriding and persistent theme throughout the mediations was the fear of setting a
precedent that the other party could then use to their advantage. But the dispute was not
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just between India and Pakistan. Internal divisions, again especially in Pakistan,
influenced the Pakistani delegation's bargaining position. Other divisions also existed,
for example the Pakistani delegation did not necessarily agree with the stance being
taken by its Government. Therefore, it is important to realise that the parties are not
monoliths, and may have had additional problems negotiating because of their internal
divisions.
It is also important to realise, and this the World Bank did, the specific nature of the
Indus Waters Treaty. Though the negotiations finally did end in agreement, the Treaty
would not - and did not - resolve or heal all wounds existing between India and Pakistan.
For example, the problem of Kashmir remained, and may even have been heightened
because of the reminder that some of the rivers Pakistan was still dependent upon
flowed through the disputed state. Yet if matters were so difficult during the multilateral
negotiations, why did the parties persist with the World Bank's good offices? The
concept of water rationality offers an explanation that is specific to the nature of the
resource in question.
In looking at the Indus Basin dispute and the Bank-led mediations that resulted in the
Indus Waters Treaty, a particular framework was used. The framework - engaging,
issues, options and agreement - has been valuable in making sense of the complicated,
and fractious, path of the negotiations in the Indus Basin. This framework, in its inherent
simplicity and applicability to other disputes, would appear to allow comparisons to be
drawn with other international water dispute resolution processes, and other dispute
resolution techniques.
As Bercovitch recognises, the individual events of one mediation are very different to
those of another mediation: "Mediating a dispute between two friendly states requires
different forms, different setting, different resources and different strategies to that
required when the representatives of two antagonistic states seek to have their dispute
mediated" [1992: 4]. What these different mediation scenarios would still have in
common is that the parties would still engage in the process, they would discuss the
issues, explore the options, and if possible arrive at some agreement.
The framework has, also, highlighted the difficulties inherent in third party intervention
as experienced by the World Bank, and the complexity of India and Pakistan's dispute.
This complexity was not necessarily in the substantive matter of the dispute, but in the
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perceptual nature of the dispute. The framework illustrates the cyclical nature of the
resolution process which demands, of the third party, a paradox of flexibility and
planning to guide the talks. Finally, it highlights the comparative advantages of
mediation as a mode of international water dispute resolution. Notably because the
decision-making power remains with the disputants, leaving the mediator to control only
the process of the resolution.
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6WATER RATIONALITY
In looking at the Indus Water Treaty, and the process leading up to its signing, two
factors stand out. Firstly, the spectre of war between India and Pakistan never
disappeared from their relationship, it merely ebbed and flowed. Secondly, amidst these
tidal movements of potential conflict, representatives from each country sought out
means to cooperate with dogged persistence, helped tremendously by the intervening
third party, the World Bank.
The question, then, arises: why did the countries cooperate with each other? The
cooperation centred, after all, upon a resource that was crucial to not only the livelihood
of the people in the basin, but as Pakistan would state, its very survival as a nation. Why
then, as enemies, with many disputes between them, not least Kashmir, did Pakistan and
India choose to cooperate over the waters of the Indus Basin? In other words, why is the
cooperation over water seen as unusual?
As already described in Chapter One, the water wars concept carries with it an
expectation of conflict. Countries who share international water resources and are
competitors for a finite supply will, the concept suggests, resort to violence to secure
their supply. But there is growing evidence of international cooperation between
riparians over the issue of fresh water, despite the existence of a wider dispute over
other issues. The phrase 'water rationality' has been coined in this thesis to offer an
explanation for this 'unexpected' cooperation as also witnessed in the Indus Basin.111
Based upon the idea of securing a long-term supply of fresh water, water rationality
looks at the policies enacted by governing bodies to manage their resource. This
includes policies at the national level, and the international level regarding water
111 In discussing the validity of the water rationality concept with colleagues, it was
pointed out by Dr Joe Oppenheimer and Dr Wulf Klohn, that the word 'rationality'
has different meanings to different people. Therefore, the word 'rationality' as used
in this thesis and water rationality is specified to mean the attitude of political entities
towards their water supply.
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security. Unfortunately, policies also exist that are considered to be 'water irrational'.
Water irrational policies at the domestic and foreign level jeopardise long-term water
security for supply in the short-term.
At the international level, water rationality regards the abiding policy to be cooperation,
even between hostile countries. This is not to suggest that international water disputes do
not exist, or will not exist in the future. Rather water rationality proposes that the
disputants will most probably find the means to cooperate, and that in light of this
expectation, any third parties involved in the dispute should be prepared to assist this
cooperation. In other words, the third party should expect cooperation over fresh water.
6.1	 WATER RATIONALITY: EXPECTING COOPERATION
"We don't understand what really causes events to happen. History is
the fiction we invent to persuade ourselves that events are knowable
and that life has order and direction. That's why events are always
reinterpreted when values change. We need new versions of history to
allow for our current prejudices" Calvin [in Watterson, 1994: 152].
Water rationality uses the premise that fresh water entwined with politics may help
induce international cooperation even between hostile riparians in order to ensure
continued water security [Wolf, 1995a: 3]. The water war concept is being challenged as
the primary orthodoxy in hydropolitics by . recent research [see Wolf, 1995ab, 1996,
1997ab; Shapland, 1997; Beaumont, 1994; Dolatyar, 1998]. Wolf believes there is little
evidence to support the prediction of water wars since the last recorded international
water war happened approximately 4,500 year ago. The Sumerian city states of Lagash
and Umma fought over the right to exploit boundary channels along the Tigris River in
2,500 BC [1997a].
In addition, the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) has determined that
since 805 AD over 3,600 international water agreements have been signed, though most
of these relate to navigational uses. Since 1870, 145 international water treaties dealing
with non-navigational uses have been signed [Hamner and Wolf, 1998]. In contrast to
this array of international cooperation, Wolf claims that only seven minor water
skirmishes have occurred, and some even involved other political triggers [1997a].
Homer-Dixon concurs pointing out that examples of conflicts based solely upon a
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resource scarcity are rare, since conflicts over resources usually include other tensions
as well [1991: 108].
The status of the 1967 Six-Day War, between Israel and the Arab countries, as a water
war has already been discussed in Chapter One. Though Israel did make substantial
water gains as a result of the territory it captured from the Arabs, Shapland argues that
such hydrological gains cannot be made again by military means. The simple reason
being that there is none to be made nearby. Furthermore, the "limited advantages that
would accrue from military action could not outweigh the international opprobium that
Israel would incur by taking it" [1997: 56].
Moreover, Dolatyar believes fresh water is simply too precious for countries to fight
over, and therefore they are cooperating [1998]. As Peres points out 'wars fought over
water do not solve anything. Gunfire will not drill wells to irrigate the thirsty land, and
after the dust of war has settled, the original problems remain' [in Dolatyar, 1998:
Abstract]. The cooperation that has occurred appears, to this thesis, to be a means of
conflict management even in the instances where a formal treaty has been signed. This
is because, "[w]hen the parties of a conflict, for various reasons, are unwilling or unable
to resolve their conflict, conflict management is the only option to make a conflict less
violent and more tolerable" [Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994: 75].
Thus, "[d]espite the strained relations between Pakistan and India, the two countries
have thus successfully negotiated a complex water agreement and have established a
permanent piece of consultative organisation governing one of the larger river basins of
the world" [Lepawsky, 1963: 545]. Yet, as Lamb and Taylor point out, international
water negotiations are more difficult to resolve than the simple two-party conflicts cited
in negotiation literature, because of the "interplay of ideology, science, personality, and
multiple parties" [1990: 968].
Fresh water is regarded in this thesis as a primary resource in that without it life (human,
animal, plant) on this planet is untenable.' 12 By comparison, other resources which
112 Suggestions in the literature that fresh water can be substituted imply that the
need for water in agriculture can be substituted by food imports. This thesis would
contend that though water can be preserved in this manner in arid areas, the
suggestion of substitution is not entirely accurate. Fresh water is still required in the
production of any food being imported into the arid realm. Thus, the water is not
being substituted, rather the use of it is being reallocated to more temperate areas.
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have been termed strategic, such as oil and certain minerals, are secondary resources.
These resources are important for the economic development of a state and, realists
would therefore argue for national security. But their absence is not a threat to life in the
same manner as water's absence.
In light of fresh water's importance, attitudes to it remain inconsistent with its
availability in the arid realm. On the one hand it has been taken for granted, and still
continues to be regarded as a free resource, even by actors in areas of scarcity. Yet on
the other hand, wars are being prophesied over access to and inadequate allocations of
water. Both these attitudes towards water are obstacles to the long term security of a
nation's water supply. Disregarding the preciousness of water can lead to
mismanagement of the national water supply; and expecting war can bypass
opportunities to secure supply through co-riparian cooperation and mundane
management.
The latter perspective on water correlates with the realist approach to resource
management for national security. Essentially, to be safe a nation must control all the
resources it needs and violence is a legitimate means of doing this. Water has been
recently included in the list of vital and therefore strategic resources which could lead to
conflict and war if tampered with. The momentum of the water war concept, had closed
off debate as to whether water was strategic. But more importantly it suggests conflict as
the logical result of competition for scarce fresh water resources. Yet, as Shapland
points out, "[w]hile sharp words continue to be uttered by Middle Eastern governments
regarding the use of water by fellow riparian states, the experience of the last few
decades has been that armed conflict over water (or even the threat thereof) is extremely
rare" [1997: 166-167].
It is this expectation of international conflict based upon competition for water resources
that water rationality suggests is misplaced. The idea of water rationality proposes that
countries will act to safeguard their long-term supply of fresh water. Instances in which
such security has been achievable through war are limited. What has emerged is a range
of policies focusing primarily upon the means of managing the national water system,
and managing co-riparian relations. Even in the situation of an existing conflict, overall
peace is not regarded as a prerequisite of water rationality. This contests Lowi's
This is a form of agricultural globalisation, i.e. agricultural delegation based not
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suggestion that to get overt water cooperation it is necessary first to settle any wider
conflict within which the water dispute may be situated [1993].
Cooperation appears as a constant theme in co-riparian relations, and is suggested by
water rationality to be the more probable expectation. Even if an international dispute
over shared water resources does arise, it is still suggested that any observers should
expect cooperation as an outcome. This is not to diminish the conflict or competition for
fresh water, nor suggest that cooperation is an automatic response.
As Wolf points out, that:
"while no 'water wars' have occurred, there is ample evidence that the lack of
clean freshwater has lead to occasionally intense political instability and that, on
a small scale, acute violence can result. What we seem to be finding, in fact, is
that geographic scale and intensity of conflict are inversely related" [1997a;
emphasis in original].
International cooperation is simply regarded, in this thesis, as being more probable, it
does not mean that war is not possible. It is, also, recognised that the road to cooperation
may be difficult and involve considerable delays, since "water disputes have
ramifications requiring that parties negotiate over a long time span, continuing work
together to achieve useful results" [Lamb and Taylor, 1990: 974].
An additional factor of importance in the event of an international water dispute, is how
an intervening third party views the prospects of cooperation between the disputants.
Third party perceptions are important, in that they can influence the procedures for
conflict resolution. If the third party regards water security as the disputants' primary
concern it will be aware that cooperation is, potentially, more probable. However, if the
third party is blinded by the 'violence' of the conflict then windows for cooperation that
may have existed, however fleetingly, may be lost.
Examples
Internationally, there are more examples of policies or attitudes that follow water
rationality. Le Moigne et al advocate international collaboration as a preventative
measure, whereby countries agree to share data, and jointly develop the water resources
upon labour costs but water costs.
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[1994: 87]. Though some examples exist of co-riparians cooperating as a preventative
measure cooperation, however reluctant, after a conflict has started is far more arresting.
The latter situation is also assessed with the attitude of any intervening third party. But
first, collaborative efforts by co-riparians are addressed.
The co-riparians of a number of international basins in southern Africa have had the
foresight to initiate a process of prevention rather than waiting to rely upon a cure. In
1992, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was set up comprising, in
the first instance, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa and Mauritius joined later
[Barta, 1997]. The aim was to set up a forum to promote the development of resources,
in particular water, within their jurisdiction. The SADC region's international riversare:
the Cunene, Limpopo, Okavango, Orange, Rovuma, Save and Zambezi [ibicl]. In 1995,
riparian cooperation continued with the signing of the SADC Protocol on Shared Water
Course Systems, which was closely followed by the establishment of a Water Sector
under the regional body in 1996 [Kasimona, 1997].
Within the SADC region, Zambia and Zimbabwe, co-riparians on the Zambezi River, set
up the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) in October 1987 [Kapinga and Mukono, 1997].
The ZRA was established to jointly monitor and regulate the surface watercourses
common to these countries - a section of the Zambezi River and Lake Kariba. One of the
ZRA's functions is to collect and process hydrological and environmental data on the
river for improved use of its waters, and for any other benefit to the two countries [ibid.
Another example of water rational policies is the present competition for water in the
Iberian Peninsula. The five international rivers shared by Spain and Portugal are the
Minho, Lima, Douro, Tejo and Guadiana. The rivers originate in Spain before entering
Portugal [Maia and Ribeiro, 1997]. An agreement was signed in 1968 that extended to
all the shared rivers in which Portugal and Spain traded their rights on the different
rivers. Portugal was particularly anxious to keep the Guadiana, the southernmost river,
for its own irrigation in the arid Alentejo region [The Financial Times, 1995]. Though,
Spain encroached upon the Portuguese share of the Guadiana, another agreement was
drafted in 1993 [The Financial Times, 1995], with the most recent version being
proposed by Portugal in 1997 [Maia and Ribeiro, 1997]. Water irrationality, however,
does come in the form of the present day use of water, with extensive agriculture and
tourism uses exacerbating the scarcity during the Summer.
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Even in a situation where the co-riparians are involved in conflict, whether this is
specifically water related or entails other issues, cooperation has occurred. Kliot
highlights the necessity of cooperation with reference to the Middle East. "Water
scarcity in this region is so severe that 'water wars' are not going to solve them - only
co-operation and co-operative management of these resources will benefit the whole
region" [1995: 200]. In fact, throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict, water has on occasions
led to secret talks and negotiated agreements between enemies [Wolf, 1995a: 2].
Though the Johnston Plan was formally rejected by the Arab states in 1956, Israel and
Jordan did tacitly agree to allocate the Jordan basin's water between them in accordance
with the Plan [Lowi, 1993: 198; Kliot, 1994: 2021. 113 In fact, technical representatives
from Jordan and Israel have met since the mid-1950s, two or three times a year, to
discuss allocations at the 'Picnic Table Talks' [Wolf, 1992: 935]. Lowi believes, Jordan
was willing to 'cooperate' with Israel because its "interest in securing access to water
may have taken precedence over political concerns regarding cooperation" [1995: 135].
As Wolf points out, "[it has been shown that people who will not talk together about
history or politics do, when their lives and economies depend on it, talk about water"
[1995a: 83]. This has also been exemplified by talks Syria and Iraq held after Turkey
closed supply to these countries in January 1990. Turkey was filling the Ataturk Dam
which is part of the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) [The Independent, 1994]. Situated
downstream of Turkey on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Syria and Iraq - who viewed
each other with hostility - met in an effort to join forces against Turkey on the issue of
water.
Other examples of parties in conflict agreeing to cooperate specifically over water exist.
Relations between the riparians of Lake Chad can on occasion be tense because of
issues between them that have the potential for conflict. The issues are with regard to
disputed international boundaries, water rights, generating hydroelectric power and
management of the shared water resource. Nonetheless, the riparians - Chad, Niger,
Nigeria, Cameroon - were able to set up and maintain the Lake Chad Basin Commission
113 Sponsored by the US government, the Johnston or Unified Plan was an attempt
to model water development in the Jordan Valley along lines established by the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) by getting Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria to
cooperate. See Lowi [1993: 79-114] for details.
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(LCBC) in 1964 [Isiorho and Njock-Libii, 1996; Kliot, 1995: 195; Kliot et al, 1997:
187]. In fact, "the Commission has demonstrated considerable resolve in that it has
survived for almost thirty years as an organisation for international cooperation, despite
the serious problems of war and economic depression experienced by some of its
member states" [Kliot et al, 1997: 191].
The ten riparian states of the Niger basin are Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Algeria, Guinea,
Cameroon, Upper Volta, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Chad. In 1964 an agreement on the
navigation uses, and establishment of a river commission was signed by most of the
riparians. In 1966 the Niger River Commission was established and was only replaced,
in 1980, with the Niger Basin Authority. The move was designed more as a renewal of
the riparians' commitment to the river authority, and a symbol that these independent
countries were not obliged to uphold treaties or agreements signed during the colonial
era [Kliot et al, 1997: 168]. Coming after an episode of political instability during the
1960s and 1970s in the region [ibid: 171], the efforts to reinvigorate co-riparian
commitment were of considerable importance. "The cooperation in the Niger basin is
noteworthy because some of the states have urgent water needs and a severe water
scarcity and they choose co-operation over competition and conflict" [Kliot, 1995: 197].
Prior to the 1997 handover of Hong Kong by the British government to China, the latter
country was regarded with suspicion. Despite a self-sufficiency drive in Hong Kong
during the 1970s to meet the domestic demand for water by building desalination plants,
water was still bought from mainland China. The imported water was regarded,
curiously, as being politically secure and also less costly than using desalinated water
which was held in reserve [Kally, 1993: 59]. The water comes via a60 km long pipeline
[Dabbagh et al, 1994: 205].
Six countries share the Mekong River basin - Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam,
China and Myanmar [Bingham et al, 1994: 124]. Cooperation over water has prevailed
between some of the riparians (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) in the Mekong
river basin since the formation of the Mekong Committee, in 1957 [Jacobs, 1995]. The
withdrawal of the Cambodian government from the Committee in 1978, resulted in a re-
arrangement. The Committee has been known since then, despite the return of
Cambodia in 1991, as the Interim Mekong Committee [Kliot et al, 1997: 64].
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This cooperation has occurred despite the outbreak of war in South-East Asia. For
example, in 1965, despite tensions between Thailand and Laos both countries signed and
maintained an agreement to buy and sell electricity. In 1970, a plan for the large-scale
development of the lower basin was drawn up, though it could not be implemented due
to war, the Indicative Plan was revised and updated in 1987 [Bingham et al, 1994: 134].
The Mekong Committee, in its various guises, has promoted cooperation by the sharing
of data (hydrological and meteorological), and flood forecasting since 1969 [Jacobs,
1995]. In 1994, the four countries of the lower basin signed a treaty regulating use of the
river [The Economist, 1995c: 90].114
After gaining independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh signed an agreement
with India on the Ganges River. 115
 A window had appeared with the new political
entity, which was keen to break with past animosities and put its relationship with India
on a friendly footing This was despite the grievances the East Pakistanis had had with
Indian policies with respect to the Faraldca barrage [Crow, 1995: 96]. And the process
was repeated again, with the signing of another treaty between the two countries in
December 1996 [Nakayama, 1997: 377].
6.1.1	 Water Security
Realist perceptions of state security centre upon the state's physical ability to defend
itself from military attack. A derivative of this perspective is to guard all resources
considered essential. Naturally, what resources are included is dependent upon the needs
114	 For more details on the Mekong River, see Biswas, Asit K. and Tsuyoshi
Hashimoto, (eds) (1996), Asian International Waters: From Ganges-Brahmaputra to
Mekong. Oxford University Press: Bombay; Report of the International Symposium,
(1996), Regional Development for the Mekong Basin. United Nations University
Press: Tokyo; and Blake eta!, 1997.
115	 For further information on the Ganges-Brahmaputra basin problems, also see
Verghese, B.G. and Ramaswamy R. Iyer, (eds) (1993), Harnessing the Eastern
Himalayan Rivers. Konark Publishers: New Delhi; Verghese, B.G., (1994), Winning
the Future: From Bhakra to Narmada, Tehri, Rajasthan Canal. Konark Publishers:
New Delhi; Verghese, B.G., Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Q.K. Ahmad, B.B. Pradhan and
S.K. Malla, (eds) (1994), Converting Water into Wealth: Regional Cooperation in
Harnessing the Eastern Himalayan Rivers. Konark Publishers: New Delhi. For a
Nepalese perspective on the problem, see Thapa, Bhekh B. and Bharat B. Pradhan,
(eds) (1995), Water Resources Development: Nepalese Perspectives. Konark
Publishers: New Delhi. For a legal aspect to the problem, see Islam, M. Rafiqul,
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of the state, and the perceptions of its governing body. For example, countries with
abundant rainfall relying upon rainfed agriculture will have a different attitude to any
watercourses it may share internationally than those wholly dependent upon such
supplies. De Bono defines these perceptions as comprising a security bubble. Each
country has its own security bubble, dependent upon its own perceptions of security
which, in turn, relate to its resource capabilities [1985].
The labelling of water as strategic has stifled debate as to whether water is, or is not,
strategic and what this implies for co-riparian cooperation. The water wars concept has
gained credence from actors viewing water scarcity within the context of the Middle
East, and its complicated story of conflict. An oft cited example of the promise of a
water war is the comment attributed to Sadat, President of Egypt, in 1978, that his
country would go to war with anyone interfering with its water supply from the Nile
[Kliot, 1994: 68]. It appears that politicians, having taken water for granted in their
development programmes, have gone to the opposite extreme in designating water a
strategic resource. This appears to confer upon water the status of a secondary resource
rather than a primary resource.
Such treatment reduces water's myriad facets to just one. Water is not like oil; it is not
static and uniformly expensive. Fresh water has a set of characteristics: it flows; though
cheap per unit of volume it is expensive to produce through desalination; and though it
is widely used, it is irreplaceable. Under these circumstances, the reasons given to
explain water wars are used here to explain the prevailing tendency towards
cooperation. It is because water is scarce, vital, expensive, a security issue, and demand
is outstripping supply that states are finding ways to cooperate to secure their supplies.
In other words, the logic of the water wars scenario is turned on its head.
Three broad modes of securing water have been identified under water rationality:
national water management, international co-riparian relations, third party perceptions of
a water dispute. All three are interlinked because if the national management scheme is
inefficient and supply cannot meet demand it could lead to a conflict of interests with
co-riparians sharing a river or aquifer. In turn, this could lead to the involvement of a
third party to resolve the dispute.
(1987), The Ganges Water Dispute: Its International Legal Aspects. University
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Firstly, there is the issue of whether internal water management policies a state
implements safeguard the water supply in the long term. Then there is the question of
how the government perceives any water shortage: [i] Does the government believe that
it really is short of water, or is it a matter of mismanagement. [ii] Which sectors are
regarded as facing a water shortage. [iii] What options does the regime have to alleviate
the shortage, can it increase supply or need it decrease demand. [iv] What are the
political costs, to the ruling regime, of changing the existing water use pattern. And [v]
is the ruling regime willing to cover these costs?
There are potentially many different ways in which countries can approach water
security, but not all would prove politically feasible. For example, integrated
management of an international basin would involve one riparian devolving control over
its water resources to a co-riparian. Politically this would probably prove difficult to
reconcile however much the scheme might benefit the countries. But other instances of
water rationality do exist, as well as examples of water irrationality. Moreover, except
for a few situations where water quality has been irretrievably squandered, the potential
for water irrational policies to be altered in line with water rational criteria remain high.
Examples
A number of examples exist of states managing their national water supply prudently,
with an eye to the future and ensuring long term water security. In areas of water
scarcity, a judicious policy is to decrease demand for water. Since in these areas
agriculture is the principle sponge, soaking up 70-90% of the annual water budget
[Wolf, 1995a: 105], this sector probably has room for improvement and can be
'squeezed' for excess water. Squeezing can generally take two forms: either re-
allocating water to another sector such as industry, or improving the efficiency of
application to the land by better irrigation techniques. The latter technique is the more
probable, as changing sectors usually entails greater political conflicts.
Israeli water management displays a number of water rational policies, as well as some
that would be considered water irrational. Their principal mode of squeezing has been to
improve the efficiency of water use either when applying it to the land, or by utilising
Press: Dhaka.
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water of a lower quality. Land application efficiency was boosted by the development
and large scale use of drip irrigation in Israel. By the early 1990s, approximately 50% of
land irrigated in Israel was being fed by a 'teaspoon' [Postel, 1992: 104-1061. Israel is
not alone in using drip irrigation; at least twenty other countries across the seven
continents also use micro-irrigation techniques. In 1991, the amount of land irrigated by
the teaspoon was nearly 16,000 km2 [Poste!, 1992: 105].
The use of non-potable water opens up a range of possible sources, including recycled
domestic or agricultural water, and brackish water. Israel, in the early 1990s, was
treating 40% of the nation's domestic sewage for agricultural reuse - amounting to 110
million cubic metres (mcm) per year [Wolf, 1995a: 92]. Postel puts the figure higher at
approximately 70% of national sewage [1992: 128]. She also adds that the factors that
make waste water, 'waste', can be an added advantage, because the accompanying
nutrients can replenish those lost from the land by modern-day agricultural practices
[Postel: 1992: 127].
Actions that promote water security are considered to be water rational and also include
the relationship a state maintains with its co-riparians, specifically upon the subject of
shared water. "In the case of riparian dispute, the factor that will almost invariably lead
states to seek technical collaboration is that of acute need for water resources and/or
dependence upon a specific, shared body of water. The failure to establish a water-
sharing regime would be considered threatening to the state's continued survival"
[Lowi, 1993: 198]. However, water irrational policies do, also, exist. These are policies
that jeopardise the long-term welfare of a source for short-term benefit and supply.
Thus, the parties that engage in such policies are sacrificing their own water supply in
the long-term, and this forms a neo-security dilemma.
6.2	 WATER IRRATIONALITY
Water irrationality (WIrr) is behaviour by a state and its governing body that jeopardises
the long term quality and security of its water supply. This situation generally arises
from the short term policies a government uses to guide its water management either
nationally or internationally vis-a-vis its co-riparians. Such policies can include,
nationally, the inadvertent polluting of a water source or, internationally, the refusal to
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cooperate over shared waters. It is suggested here, that such water insecurity arises from
the neo-security dilemma that encompasses water management.
6.2.1	 Neo-Security Dilemma
The neo-security dilemma, proposed here, is regarded as a derivative of the security
dilemma that afflicts nations pursuing their military security. The security dilemma was
used to describe and explain the arms race between the USA and the USSR that was a
key feature of the Cold War. Whichever country tried to increase its sense of security by
increasing its weaponry, the other country would feel threatened, and so seek to increase
its own armaments to a level beyond the first country. This spiral, though it may have
been an attempt to increase the sense of security, was in fact a spiral of increasing
insecurity. Each country regarded the other as hostile to its interests, nationally and
internationally. Therefore, to see the other as having more arms meant seeing them as
more powerful than itself. This, in turn, meant being vulnerable to attack.
The key issue in the security dilemma is the idea of a nation's security being threatened
by another country. In the neo-security dilemma, a state's security is affected by its own
actions. Security is, also, given a broader definition than just the military security of the
country. It encompasses issues of resource access, availability and quality. More
importantly, the neo-security dilemma involves a timescale. In other words, what a state
does in the short term to secure its resources, may jeopardise its long term resource
security. But the dilemma comes in trying to balance short term needs with safeguarding
the resource in the long term.
Instances involving the neo-security dilemma, and water irrationality, come in many
forms. Nationally, the choices made by the water management authorities are often
constrained by political criteria necessary to safeguard the ruling regime's interests.
How these interests are defined are varied, and of course, can change. The following
short term policies are examples of water irrationality, and will probably lead to long
term problems unless rectified. If aquifer extraction rates exceed the recharge rate, it can
lead to irreversible damage to the aquifer's water quality. This is especially true for
coastal aquifers, as over extraction can lead to saline intrusion [Das Gupta, 1997: 143].
"Ultimately, overpumping ground water for irrigation is unsustainable and must fail"
[Gleick, 1993a: 7].
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Applying water inefficiently to the soil during irrigation is not only a waste of water but
can lead to problems such waterlogging and salinisation of the soil, both of which are
expensive to rectify. Inefficient application appears to include the mode of application,
and also the environment into which the water is being applied. Therefore, possibly the
worst case scenario that would most probably lead to soil salination would be the use of
flood irrigation in desert areas with high evaporation rates, mixed with heavy use of
chemical fertilisers.
Internationally, water irrationality and the neo-security dilemma arise in the
relationships co-riparians have with one another. Are co-riparians willing to cooperate in
order to safeguard the water resource, and their access and allocations from it?
Cooperation over water covers a spectrum of activity from sharing data to agreeing to
integrated water management. The latter implies that the geographic features of the
basin, as a whole, are taken into account when deciding where to locate storage facilities
or irrigate land for example. This would mean, for example, using highland areas for
dams even though it may mean that the downstream riparian is dependent upon the
upstream riparian to release water for its uses. The decision not to cooperate in whatever
capacity and thereby jeopardise the long term security of the water would be deemed,
here, to be water irrational.
Examples
As examples of policies and actions by states exist that can be termed water rational, so
do examples exist of water irrational actions. Except for a few cases where water
quantity and quality have been irreparably damaged, most of these policies can still be
turned around and made to safeguard the long term security of the water supply. Water
rational policies that safeguard long term water supply need to be maintained. If treaties
are signed under conditions of water rationality, but are not implemented or maintained,
such negligence damages water supply in the long term, and water irrationality creeps
back in.
Examples of water irrational national management exist across the regions. In Saudi
Arabia, efforts to gain some form of food security led to the production of wheat using
fossil fresh water (see Beaumont, 1977, for more details of agriculture in the desert
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kingdom in the late 1970s). "Formerly an importer of wheat, the Kingdom has become
the world's sixth largest exporter" [Wilson and Graham, 1994: 221]. Though the
international sale of this produce generated approximately US $300 million, the cost of
production was estimated to be between three and five times higher than the cost of
wheat on the international market [ibia].
The Saudi Arabian Government was encouraging the production of cereals by paying
their farmers five to six times the international price for cereals during the 1980s, while
simultaneously subsidising the inputs needed such as diesel fuel to pump ground water
up to the surface [Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 160; Shapland, 1997: 149]. Wheat
output jumped from less than 3,300 tonnes in 1978, to over 3.9 million tonnes in 1992
[Richards and Waterbury, 1996: 160].
The ground water used to produce wheat in the desert was from the Saq Formation
which is also shared by Jordan, where it is known as the Disi Aquifer. The Jordanian
Government was concerned about that the Saudi extraction would damage the aquifer
for Jordanian uses [World Bank, 1994: 18]. Fortunately, the Saudi Government changed
its policies in the mid-1990s, and ceased such large scale waste of its precious existing
freshwater resources [Shapland, 1997: 150].
Though, the United Kingdom (UK) does not rely upon irrigated agriculture, dry
summers have highlighted the problem with leaks and getting water to the point of use.
Estimates put the loss of water to leaks, as high as 30% [The Economist, 1997b: 30].
With privatisation of the water in December 1989, the costs of repair and infrastructural
maintenance are proving a testing ground for decisions that involve a political aspect i.e.
who pays for the necessary work? [Beecher, 1997; The Economist, 1995a: 25]. In
addition, Britain is simply using too much water [The Economist, 1997b: 30].
Pakistan, by contrast, does rely heavily upon irrigated agriculture but has similarly made
little effort to employ better water management techniques. The agricultural sector
accounts for 98% of the total annual use [Frederiksen et al, 1993: 10]. The Indus Water
Treaty, through a succession of dams and link canals, allocated the basin's water
between India and Pakistan. Despite soil conditions that would tolerate only a certain
amount of water, age old practices of flood irrigation continue. This has led to large
scale waterlogging and salinisation of the soil [Ahmad and Kutcher, 1992: 37; Dawn,
1998]. The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimates 21% of the irrigated
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land in Pakistan suffers from salinity [in Abdel-Dayem, 1997: 99]. This figure is the
third highest in the world after China (23%) and the USA (28%) [ibid].116
Damage to the irrigation system could be costing Pakistan 25% of its potential
production, or approximately US $2,500 million per year [Ahmad and Kutcher, 1992:
44]. In effect, Pakistan is running to standstill. Therefore, despite having access to water,
the mode of application is not only damaging the soil, but also restricting new uses that
might emerge as national competition continues to grow for the resource. Ground water
extraction is believed currently to be happening at a rate that is 50% more than the
annual recharge rate [Kijne and Kuper, 1995: 73].
By using micro-irrigation techniques, Pakistan could prevent further land from
becoming waterlogged and saline. Moreover, with improved efficiency more water
would be made available for other users as provincial competition grows for fresh water.
Because of inefficient use, this competition has focused attention on another dam to be
built on the River Indus at Kalabagh [Dawn, 1998]. Postel estimates the costs of
constructing new irrigation works to be between $1,500 and $4,000 per hectare for large
projects in Pakistan [1993: 57].
With Pakistan on the verge of bankruptcy, and the disastrous affects of inefficient water
use, constructing the dam would appear to be a water irrational policy. Yet in June 1998,
the beleaguered Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, stated that the controversial
Kalabagh dam would be built [The Economist, 1998c: 48]. Frederiksen explains such
decisions are, usually, due to political pressures with the result that "governments often
proceed with projects that in total far exceed supply, wasting huge investments, both
public and private" [1997: 544-545].117
National management policies that effect other riparians, though the policies are enacted
within the territorial jurisdiction of one country, include the exploitation of groundwater
sources. Aquifers remain an enigma, revealing their secrets only with reluctance as
technology advances. In Israel, before the formation of the Palestinian National
116	 See Abdel-Dayem, 1997, for a discussion on the problems of waterlogging and
salinity in irrigated agriculture.
117 For further information on water management in the Indus Basin, see
Frederiksen et al, 1993; Mustafa, Daanish, and James L. Wescoat, Jr., (1997),
"Development of Flood Hazards Policy in the Indus River Basin of Pakistan, 1947-
1996." Water International. vol 22, no. 4. pp 238-244.
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Authority (PNA) and its resident water body the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA),
the coastal aquifer underlying the Gaza strip was being mined at a rate faster than its
recharge [Nasser, 1996: 50]. The result has been extensive seawater intrusion, which
continues under the new management. This is a clear example of water irrationality. In
securing a water supply today, tomorrow's supply is being damaged.
Another example of aquifer mining that appears questionable is the Libyan effort to
create the Great Manmade River. Libya is in the process of constructing the
infrastructure to extract fossil water from the Nubian Sandstone aquifer which is
estimated to contain 6,000,000 mcm [World Bank, 1994: 10]. Libya intends to
eventually to extract approximately 1,900,000 mcm per year [Shapland, 1997: 151]. The
purpose of mining this fossil water, and transporting it "thousands of miles through a
vast pipeline" is "to irrigate crops worth a tenth the value of the water" [The Economist,
1995-1996: 73]. The water being diverted comes from an ancient aquifer that is shared,
and used, by Egypt and Sudan as well [Shapland, 1997: 151]. The exact size and other
characteristics of the aquifer remain unknown, as does the question of the effect upon
Egyptian and Sudanese uses if Libya does extract water at the rate it intends to.
SUMMARY
"War over water seems neither strategically rational, hydrographically
effective, nor economically viable" [Wolf, 1997a].
Water rationality is quite simply the belief that cooperation over international water
resources is more probable than conflict. Water rationality challenges the premise upon
which the water war concept is based. Recent work has shown that there is no evidence
to support the expectation of conflict over water, and that there is a plethora of
international water treaties. (It is worth reiterating that the water war concept is only an
expectation, and one that treats water as strategic resource.) Therefore, any third party
observing an international water dispute must still expect cooperation rather than
conflict.
The reasoning behind water rationality, and that leads to its opposite, water irrationality,
is the idea of nations trying to secure their fresh water supply in the long term. This
entails, for the main part, prudent national water management, and also sensible co-
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riparian relations. However, any policy that supplies water in the short term, but
jeopardises the long term supply is termed water irrational. Water irrational policies are
based upon the neo-security dilemma, whereby a country is responsible for damaging its
own long term supply. Thus, leaving the last words to Wolf, who believes "the more
valuable lesson of international water is as a resource whose characteristics tend to
induce cooperation, and incite violence only in the exception" [1997a].
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7THE GEOGRAPHY OF COOPERATION IN THE INDUS BASIN
The clash of political boundaries with those of the terrain in the Indus Basin set the
environment for conflict between India and Pakistan. The geography of cooperation that
emerged from the Indus Water Treaty quietened the din specifically with regard to
water. Unfortunately, peace has not fallen like a blanket across the basin, soothing
Indian and Pakistani anxieties. The fact of water's status as a primary resource, it is
argued here, forced India and Pakistan to consider water rational options such as third
party intervention.
A consequence of mediation was the creation of space within which the two parties
could arrive at an acceptable settlement. This was done by talking, and with that,
changing perceptions and the prevailing discourse. As Yi-Fu points out, "[i]n a modern
society in which empiricism, hard science, control over matter are highly valued, people
still find it difficult to accept the seemingly magical idea that mere words can call places
into being" [1991: 691].
7.1
	 WATER RATIONALITY IN THE INDUS BASIN
Water rationality has been defined as actions by a state that secure, in the long term, its
water supply both in quantity and quality. This implies the state not only manages its
water prudently but if it is dependent upon an international watercourse, the state's
relations with its co-riparians is conducive to the long term 'welfare' of the shared
waters. However, should a dispute arise over an international watercourse, the attitude
of a third party intervening to reach resolution comprises the third aspect of water
rationality. If the intervenor expects continued conflict, opportunities to cooperate may
be missed. Therefore, it is suggested that the third party approach the situation
anticipating cooperation.
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Using these criteria, what instances of water rationality can be said to have occurred in
the Indus Basin? Why did India and Pakistan agree to the mediation process? How was
their long term water supply made safe? Much has been made of the financial incentives
India and Pakistan had to cooperate [Biswas, 1992; Lowi, 1993; Nakayama, 1997];
"In summary, the dispute between India and Pakistan was successfully
resolved with external finances that also enabled the development of
additional water resources and separation of the resources of the disputing
sides. The additional water made it possible to give each side more than it
had originally claimed, and the separation diminished the danger of future
conflict" [Kally, 1993: 61].
Undoubtedly, the availability of finances played an important role in concluding the
negotiations once agreement was reached by India and Pakistan, but it does not explain
the delay in coming to agreement. The IBRD had made it clear, from the outset in 1951,
that any final agreement would be funded with some form of assistance by the
institution [IBRD-6/9/51]. Yet, it was not until winter 1958-59 that the delegations
started to draft the agreement. It appears that the delay was neither due to finances, nor
technological breakthroughs, rather the political situation in the Indian Subcontinent.
The breakthrough came with the coup d'etat in Pakistan, and rule by General Ayub
Khan [Kirmani interview, 1/6/96].
The bottom line at the start, and for the duration of the mediations for both countries was
the need and desire to secure their long term water supply. Pakistan felt that upstream
developments on the River Sutlej would wreck its existing uses from that river and
threaten its very livelihood. India, in turn, felt keenly the pressure of poverty and wanted
to develop its own potential for irrigation from that river. The countries were united only
in their need to, first, feed their populations, and then to develop their economies. It is
suggested here that the principal reason why India and Pakistan cooperated is because
each wanted to secure its long term water supply from the Indus Basin. Having already
tried, unsuccessfully, bilateral negotiations - including international tribunals of different
types - it appears that there remained few peaceful and productive avenues open to the
countries.
In terms of water security, India and Pakistan's agreement to undergo the mediation
process was in itself an act of water rationality. The World Bank's perspective that
cooperation was possible, to achieve long term water security, was another water
rational act. The signing of the Indus Water Treaty was also water rational. The Treaty
delimited in detail the resources between India and Pakistan thereby securing, in the
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long term, each country's water supply. Despite a public outcry in both countries, the
implementation stage was another water rational act, as was the subsequent cooperation.
This cooperation was institutionalised in the Treaty's establishment of the Permanent
Indus Commission (PIC) to monitor the Indus waters situation.
7.2	 MEDIATION IN THE INDUS BASIN
"The key to peaceful solutions of disputes over shared water resources
is continued communication between the states concerned, preferably
on the technical level, over everything from hydrologic and
meteorological data to basin-wide development plans" [Gleick, 1993a:
10].
The Indus Water Treaty has been the focus of study to see what possible lessons can be
extracted that could have application in other international riparian disputes. In looking
at how cooperation happened in the Indus Basin, the focus has been on the mediator's
role, and how the World Bank dealt with issues throughout the multilateral negotiations.
Clearly, this involves attempts and measures at removing obstacles and assisting
communication that otherwise might have impeded cooperation.
A clear example of the role of the mediator in the Indus Basin dispute is illustrated by
Iliff, in an interview, shortly after the signing and ratification of the Indus Waters Treaty
[1961]. Iliff recalled that Pakistan had agreed to Indian withdrawals from the western
rivers for use in Indian-controlled Kashmir. However, even after almost a decade of
negotiations under the World Bank's good offices, Pakistan was still wary of Indian
intentions and feared that it may withdraw more water than it was entitled to. Thus,
Pakistan demanded a system of inspection. India, naturally, refused this idea: 'Certainly
not. We've put our name to a treaty, you got to accept that we are going to carry out that
treaty, and we're not going to have any action of the Government of India policed by
Pakistan' [luiff, 1961].
The Bank, as mediator, was able to get the parties to compromise on this issue, that
would otherwise have stalled the talks. Iliff explains the outcome, and illustrates the
advantage of an impartial third party:
"Well, we got that one compromised eventually, on this sort of basis, that
the treaty provides for the appointment of a permanent Indus Commission,
to consist of a representative appointed by the government of India, one
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appointed by the government of Pakistan, and those two commissioners
have got complete freedom to inspect works on any of the rivers in the
system. Now, Pakistan didn't regard that as entirely satisfactory, but in our
view it was a very important step forward, and we strongly recommended to
Pakistan that they ought not to break on this issue and ask for any more"
[1961].
A series of points or 'lessons' have been raised that suggest ways in which disputants
can be encouraged to talk with each other as an alternative to violence. The points are
interlinked and examples given to support one point may be equally valid for other
points. Nonetheless, these points overall can, broadly, be separated into two groups:
conceptual and procedural. Conceptual points are regarded as ideas, or an awareness,
the participants have as they enter the mediation process. Procedural points are
principally ideas that the mediator can use during the process to assist communication
between the disputants.
7.2.1	 Conceptual Underpinnings
It can hardly be surprising that of all the conceptual, and procedural, points raised the
most important is political will. If the political bodies of the disputants had been
unwilling to condone and support involvement in the mediation process, this forum
would quite simply not have been used. Their political will is based, however, upon their
perceptions of a number of issues including the actual dispute, and their political
standing domestically. If the political bodies are willing, the mediator's intervention can
create space for the disputants to cooperate.
Nonetheless, it is imperative to realise that the outcome will probably not be
unadulterated joy and peace. Conflict and cooperation are continuums, not absolutes.
Therefore, there is some mingling of the two in a mediation process. Matters cannot be
assigned 'low' politics status, nor can it be assumed either that cooperation is automatic
or that cooperative spillover into 'high' politics will occur. Cognitive disputes remain
likely, where the collection and interpretation of data are contested.
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7.2.1.1 Political Will
"The national interest indeed is what the nation is interested in,
particularly from the point of view of the major decision-makers,
although these people cannot usually retain power unless their images
are widely shared among the population" [Boulding, 1991: 147]
All the issues of integrated basin management and optimalisation of water that are
presently popular amongst scholars focusing on water, fall at the hurdle that is political
will. Though optimal use of a basin certainly would entail treating all users as belonging
to a single hydrological unit, it is usually not politically optimal and therefore is rejected
by riparians. Therefore, the parties in a dispute have to be willing to talk, and define the
parameters of discussion [McDonald interview, 25/4/96].
"In fact, progress within international negotiating fora was often contingent on policies
moving forward at the domestic level" [Auer, 1995: 47]. The will of political decision
makers is based upon a number of criteria. At the simplest level, it appears that political
decision-makers will only countenance action if their position in power remains safe.
Therefore, even if agreeing to third party intervention in a dispute is risky, if the
decision-makers feel their position is strong enough to withstand any internal backlash,
they will agree to the intervention [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 58]. As Frederiksen points
out, "[p]olitical will to change and strong leadership to carry it through are essential"
[1997: 534].
Though, Druckman is correct in saying that "it pays to keep the.. .head of state involved
in the process, especially if he is the person who must 'sign off' on any agreement
reached" [1993: 198], attaining the will of the national decision-makers is not always
sufficient. National leaders may agree to cooperate with opponents but these agreements
made on the international stage may be sabotaged. As policies created by governments
are implemented by officials on the ground, should these officials not agree to a
cooperative approach, obstacles can arise despite the official policy of cooperation. It
appears therefore that at different stages, different levels of officials need to give their
backing to the cooperative process.
Lintner believes that political will is a key point in any negotiation, but it is something
the mediator cannot facilitate because of a country's autonomy and sovereignty [Lintner
interview, 9/4/96]. Though the mediator cannot get involved in the decisions that a
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government makes, it can give the ruling regime the incentive to get involved. Even with
the consent and political will of a government, the situation is not simple. This is
because, as Frederiksen points out, "[in many countries, a weak conviction that change
is needed coupled with the desire by both [executive and legislative] bodies of
government to retain power sidetracks reform in the short term while conditions
worsen" [1997: 534].
Clearly, then, political will is needed not just to get the disputants involved in the
mediation process, but also to keep them there, and to deal with the inevitable impasses
that arise during negotiations [Druckman, 1993: 198]. Citing the 1996 Ganges Water
Sharing Treaty, Nakayama concurs that riparian will is very important in arriving at an
agreement. The Indian and Bangladeshi Governments that signed that Treaty were new
and interested in facilitating good relations with each other [1997: 377].
In the Indus Basin, the political will of both countries was important in letting the World
Bank engage in the dispute. Pakistan was willing to allow any international body to
intervene that promised to help it with its difficulties in the basin. India, by contrast, was
equally reluctant to allow international intervention, and had, in fact, refused to let
another international entity - the ICJ - be involved.
It would appear to this thesis that India's political will was formed by the perception that
the ICJ would damage its position in the dispute, and the World Bank could potentially
benefit it. The Bank had, after all, promised to "consider any financing proposals that
might develop as a result of joint planning" and make available any technical help
needed to get a settlement [IBRD-15/8/51; 6/9/51]. Thus, the Government of India
stated: "We can agree to any reasonable proposal which has as its objective that the
whole Indus system should be considered and examined as a single unit, and which aims
at its cooperative development" [IBRD-25/9/5 lb].
7.2.1.2 Perceptions
"Our society tends to discount the psychological, even though we know
from common experience that changes in perception and attitude can
seem to alter an environment more markedly than if it had been
physically changed." [Yi-Fu, 1991: 689]
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It can be argued that at the base of any conflict, especially on water, are the perceptions
of the decision-makers [de Bono, 1985]. Firstly, to determine whether there is a problem
with the national water supply, then who is to blame for it, and what can be done to
resolve the issue. Sometimes, for other contingent reasons such as domestic politics, it is
pertinent to rescind responsibility for the problem, and blame a co-riparian. Nonetheless,
what emerges is that perceptions form the conflict, and therefore, by changing
perceptions cooperation may be possible. As Kliot points out, it is not a matter of images
and perceptions being of importance "even" to power politics but especially to all
politics, since politics is but perceptions manifested [1991: 10].
Ury and Smoke believe that a "[c]risis exists ultimately in people's heads" [1985: 94].
In particular the decision-makers' perceptions are key to any crisis. By changing these
perceptions, the crisis can either be defused or escalated. Four variables that contribute
to the perception of a crisis are: options, uncertainty, time and stakes [Ury and Smoke,
1985: 99]. The disputants have many views as to what the conflict is about, and people
standing on the periphery of the conflict may have even more [Mitchell and Banks,
1996: 100].
There is a danger that an intervening third party may confuse matters further by adding
its own version of what it regards as the real issues in conflict. Therefore, it is important
for the third party to talk to the disputants to understand what are the issues, "but
particularly to gain some empathy for the perceptions and emotions of those actually
involved in the dispute" [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 99]. Perceptions are important in
creating the space for cooperation; but how to change these perceptions which are
subjective and not objective, is the challenge [Ury and Smoke, 1985: 94].
Boulding believes that "[h]uman decisions are not formed in total knowledge of reality
but rely upon perceptions of reality which are always incomplete and inaccurate" [in
Kliot, 1991: 8]. The means by which people, including politicians, then communicate
their perceptions of the[ir] social world is, Painter argues, through language [1995: 148].
Language, he continues, is a social construct and therefore very important in conveying
a particular power structure. During the mediations, the Bank's representatives were
careful to use language that sought to diffuse rather than exacerbate the inherent
difficulties of the situation. Thus, the Indus Basin dispute was referred to not as the
"problem" but as the "issue" [IBRD-6/7/54].
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As Colosi points out, "negotiators during the negotiation process rely upon their own
perceptions" [1986: 248]. Therefore, the mediating body must take care to demonstrate
its impartiality. As Bailey, correctly, states "[i]t is not simply a matter of being impartial:
one must also be seen to be impartial" [1985: 209]. The World Bank was careful to
demonstrate its impartiality. It did this, for example, by explicitly informing Prime
Ministers of India and Pakistan that each had been sent a similar, or identical, letter to
the one they were receiving [IBRD-15/8/51; 6/9/511.
Drucicman believes the composition of the delegations sent to represent all the parties,
can be an indicator of the participants' commitment to the mediation process. Therefore,
the representatives sent to the mediating table need to be of comparable stature and
expertise [1993: 190]. The perceptions of all the participants in the mediation process
are important, including the mediator. For example, at the time of its offer of good
offices, the World Bank doubted whether the Indian Prime Minister would accept the
intervention. The institution's representatives thought the conditions in the Indian
Subcontinent would need to change before third party intervention in the water dispute
would be accepted [IBRD-7/8151].
7.2.1.3 Space to Cooperate
"The precise way by which the human presence, human feelings, and
human communication add to the warmth and aliveness of a place, or,
to the contrary, drain it of warmth and meaning is little understood:
indeed, social scientists and cultural geographers have taken little notice
of the fact itself - the fact that the quality of human communication,
including (preeminently) the kinds of words and the tone of voice used,
seems to infect the material environment, as though a light - tender,
bright, or sinister - has been cast over it." [Yi-Fu, 1991: 689]
A conflict becomes intractable when the disputants begin to question whether any
benefit is to be gained from cooperating having, they feel, already reached their
maximum gain [Ross and Stillinger, 1991: 390]. Ury and Smoke's characterisation of a
crisis based on the variables - options, uncertainty, time and stakes - suggests how a
crisis is escalated. The psychological feature of crises is the constriction of these
variables, as the decision-makers become more inflexible, and close windows of peace.
Furthermore, as the sense of crisis increases so do the decision-makers' sense of what is
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important and desired as an outcome. Therefore, by reversing the trends that lead to
escalation, the crisis can begin to be defused [1985: 94-98].
Therefore, to create space for cooperation, amidst the prevailing discourse that
surrounds a conflict, entails physical and psychological factors. An intervening party
can assist in the creation of this space by supplying provisions that encourage the
disputants to feel safe. On a physical level, it can provide a location for the mediated
talks. The location should be neutral, easily accessible, and removed from the dispute
[Druckman, 1993: 195]. Mitchell and Banks suggest the atmosphere and connotations
sought are one of professionalism, dispassionate scholarship and analysis [1996: 89].
The aim is to limit the political overtures that hover vulture-like ready to feed upon
fragile moves being made towards cooperation. "Merely suggesting a negotiating venue,
for instance, seems minor enough in light of great issues like survival or sovereignty.
But it is something that disputants cannot propose nonstrategically" [Princen, 1992b:
44]. The World Bank recommended the Indus Basin talks should be held in Washington,
"to avoid delegates being subjected to political pressure all the time and to avoid
tendentious press propaganda in the sub continent" [IBRD-12/8/54].
By creating a physical space "so the participants may feel themselves to be on a mental
'island' [Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 88], a psychological space may open up as the
conflict discourse begins to be examined, and hopefully changed. A symbiotic
relationship exists between the physical and the psychological spaces; the creation of the
former can assist the creation of the latter. The psychological space allows the
disputants' representatives to explore, safely, alternatives to the prevailing discourse.
They can test whether cooperation is possible, and how their individual domestic
audiences would react. The most important virtue to arise, if successful, would be the
building of trust between the intervenor and each disputant, and between the disputants
themselves.
When the decision-makers of disputing parties adhere to rigid images of each other,
cooperation is made more difficult. However, images are based upon socialisation and
can, therefore, change by altering the images formerly adhered to and attendant
perceptions [Kliot, 1991: 9]. Thus, by giving the disputants the space to cooperate, or at
least to gauge the costs of cooperation, it can change the parties' perceptions of each
sufficiently to work out an acceptable solution. In 1951, Pakistan was quoted as saying
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that it believed India was trying to destroy Pakistan by any means [IBRD-28/8/51].
Though India refuted this suggestion [IBRD-119/51], Pakistan adhered to its belief. Yet,
Pakistan was willing to negotiate with India over the Indus basin's waters.
Though the mediator manages the process by which the disputants interact, the
disputants retain control over decision making. Thus, the World Bank gave the
disputants opportunities to vent their opinions and feelings, without commenting on
them [IBRD-4/10/56]. The impartial listening tactic was to ensure the Bank did not enter
into a slanging match with a disputant, or have to legitimise one side's view over
another, and therefore compromise the third party's impartiality. The Bank also sought
to reduce the number of issues being considered, to ensure that the procedures did not
get 'bogged down' [IBRD-31/1/55].
Druckman believes that ambiguity can be a useful tool for all parties in negotiations, as
"[it can be used tactically to avoid making premature commitments and to preserve
options" [1993: 200]. Though, he adds, "[i]t is not, however, necessarily a good strategy
for communicating progress to or for seeking instructions form the bureaucracy" [ibici].
The Bank's President, had a policy, during the Indus Basin talks, of only putting the
minimal amount of discussion on paper so as to allow more flexibility:
"People like Gene Black felt, as I do, that if you want to have a difficult
negotiation avoid writing too much down. You may write down some basic
facts like the flow of water of the rivers and things like that, but don't write
down, he wants this and he wants that and he's willing to concede, I think you
have to do it...(a) you have to do it without being too clear about
everything...that guides you, and secondly, one of the principle things in the
Bank meditation role was no publicity... .no body make any statements outside"
[Sommers interview, 30/4/96].
An example of this policy's implementation by the World Bank, is a meeting between
the institution and the Pakistani delegation [IBRD-2/7/56]. The Bank's representative at
that meeting wanted a Pakistani delegate to feel free to talk without restraint, and so did
not take notes during the meeting.
7.2.1.4 Specificness
"I might make one point clear. The Canal Waters dispute between India
and Pakistan has nothing to do with the Kashmir issue; it started with
and has been confined to the irrigation systems of East and West
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Punjab. So far as the rivers flowing into Pakistan from Kashmir are
concerned, there is no question of reducing the quantity of water which
they carry into Pakistan by diversion or any other device" [Prime
Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru in IBRD-25/9/51b].
International relations theories, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques and
international law appear to regard conflict and cooperation as absolutes. Countries are
either fighting, or cooperating; and once agreement has been reached the dispute is
solved. This thesis would suggest that cooperation, like conflict, is a continuum in that
there are 'degrees' of cooperation from tacit understandings to full-blown treaties.118
Moreover, cooperation, again like conflict, can occur over specific issues.
Realism, by comparison, argues that since all states are in conflict, cooperation is
unlikely. Liberalism regards the interdependent nature of the international system to lead
to cooperation in every field, and conflict not to occur. International law, full of
prescriptive advice for states, and ADR regard the final stage of a dispute as reaching
agreement. Therefore, once a treaty has been signed or some equivalent action taken, the
wounds should also have been healed.
Unfortunately, neither scenario appeared in the Indus Basin. India and Pakistan were
neither cooperating over all Indo-Pakistani issues, or engaging in blanket warfare over
these same issues. What appeared to happen instead was selective and specific
cooperation in the midst of rising and falling tensions. Moreover, the Indus Water
Treaty's signing and later ratification did not automatically heal the wounds each side
had incurred during the course of the dispute. Relations remained tense between the two
countries, leading to war in 1965 and again in 1971 (and in 1998 to the testing of nuclear
devices). These wars highlighted the specific nature of cooperation over water in the
Indus Basin. Despite the war in 1965, India maintained its obligations under the Treaty
and continued to pay the agreed instalments to Pakistan.
As Druckman points out holding discussion on one topic does not resolve all the issues
that surround the negotiations [1993: 204]. This was verified by the Government of
Pakistan in a letter to the World Bank [IBRD-25/9151a]. It pointed out that Lilienthal
118 This thesis would contend that fear is also a continuum. Governments feel more
or less afraid, rather than a complete and absolute absence of fear. As security is seen
to be a feeling of freedom from fear, it is a very subjective entity. Art concurs that
"[i]n this sense security depends on the perceptions people have of their
environment, not on an objective view of that environment." [in Krieger, 1993: 820].
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had hoped that settlement of one Indo-Pakistani dispute would promote progress in other
disputes. This would only be possible if all sides to the talks tackled water dispute as a
separate question, and would "refrain from using the negotiations in one dispute to delay
progress in solving any other" [ibid].
In the Indus Basin dispute, there is little evidence of the cooperative spillover with
which the talks had first been proposed by Lilienthal. Functionalism which would expect
a spillover reasons that even if matters such as technical data and welfare are not
apolitical they do constitute, at the very least, low politics. Whereas high politics
comprises, for example, matters such as military security and decisions involving a
country's foreign policy. One manner of documenting this divide in politics is the ease
with which hostile countries are said to interact. Enemies are expected to be able to
cooperate on matters of low politics because these do not affect national security. It is
then hoped that by such cooperation, enemies will be able to find ways to cooperate,
eventually, over matters of high politics.
There are two problems suggested with this functionalist perspective. Firstly, the
artificial divide between low and high politics. Painter suggests that politics pervades
and fashions all issues. Therefore matters that would otherwise be designated 'low'
politics can be as contentious and difficult to resolve as matters of 'high' politics are
thought to be [1995]. This is further validated by the tenacious grip India and Pakistan
each maintained on collecting and interpreting data, often leading to cognitive disputes.
Secondly, the cooperative spillover that is thought to happen was not seen in the Indus
Basin. Agreement on the Indus waters did not lead to talks and cooperation on wider
Indo-Pakistani issues such as Kashmir, though that had been the initial hope of the
intervenors. Cooperation instead of snowballing, remained specific and muted.
7.2.1.5 Cognitive Disputes
"Analysis requires data and the data consist mainly and most
importantly of the perceptions and experiences of the parties
'represented' by the participants present at the workshop. By
definition, the perceptions of the two sides will differ in any conflict."
[Mitchell and Banks, 1996: 97, emphasis in original]
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There remains a basis assumption amidst observers of water disputes that cooperation
over technical issues is possible when perhaps other more 'political' issues cannot be
broached. This assumption is based upon the idea that "small conflicts are easier to
resolve than large ones, and the early resolutions provide evidence of progress necessary
to sustain the process" [Drucicman, 1993: 197]. As McDonald points out, however,
technical issues cannot be separated from the politics surrounding them [McDonald
interview, 25/4/96].
As Wolf points out, the most common route suggested in the literature is to cooperate in
collecting, and sharing, the necessary data [1995: 96]. The underlying implication is that
data is somehow apolitical or 'safe'. Yet data can be manipulated to suit the preferences
of the parties involved, thereby providing the rationale for making a particular decision
[Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 25]. "Indeed, one strategy in competitive negotiations is to
become the arbiter of what is factual" [Lamb and Taylor, 1990: 974].
Scientists are believed to be rational actors, who stand unmoved by the political
considerations of their sponsors, the decision-makers and politicians. However, "values
influence how evidence is interpreted by experts, their sponsors and other key actors.
Values also affect the research agendas of experts, including which problems they
choose to study and the methods selected to study them" [Auer, 1995: 37].
Deconstructionism would, therefore, suggest that the perspective taken of the question
means that not only does 'pure' data not exist, but that these adulterated data are then
analysed subjectively [Ozawa and Susskind, 1985: 26]. Winham suggests that the
attitude of the disputants towards data collection is an indication of their commitment to
the mediation process, especially if the act of collecting data, and the methods of doing
so are political and contested since they could have consequences, later, for national
interests [1986: 87].
Iliff recalls the attitude of the Indian and Pakistani delegations during the mediated talks:
"But I mean, one got into questions for example of how much rainfall was there
in this little particular area of about seven square miles, and can't you, with all
that rainfall coming down there, do you need any irrigation water at all? And so
on. Days were consumed in studying these rainfall statistics, and also statistics
of transpiration, as they call it. Oh, it was all a highly technical process" [1961].
Political decision makers juggle technical information with political considerations in
arriving at a decision. Usually, political factors will outweigh any technical factors,
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which will only be used to garner support for a politically favoured outcome. If technical
opinion is divided, it is an excuse for heavier reliance upon any political factors [Ozawa
and Susskind, 1985: 26].
For example, the figures India and Pakistan each presented for irrigable areas in the
Indus Basin differed considerably in both the actual total and the distribution of this
land. India believed the total irrigable land in the Basin to be 65 million acres, with 26
million acres in India and 39 million acres in Pakistan. Pakistan by comparison
estimated that there were 82.4 million acres in total with, only, 7.6 million acres in India
and the remaining 74.8 million acres in Pakistan [Shivananda, 1961: 6].
This thesis believes the reasons for this marked difference, especially in distribution, is
political. India was trying to demonstrate to the World Bank that its need for the Indus
waters was equal to Pakistan's. The figure probably included areas that could be argued
to be extra-basin, such as the desert state of Rajasthan, which ultimately did receive
water from the Indus system. Pakistan, by comparison, was desperate to illustrate its
complete reliance upon the Indus Basin, and India's marginal reliance. Thus, the
Pakistani figure probably included all the areas that the Government would hope to
develop within Pakistan, and only the areas adjacent to the rivers in India.
Ozawa and Susskind suggest disagreements over technical information can arise
between 'experts' in four situations [1985: 27-29]: [i] Miscommunication whereby
information is used intentionally to confuse opponents; [ii] different research questions
are being asked and answered; [iii] errors during the research process; and [iv]
interpretation of the data and the implications drawn from the results, especially if there
is a conflict over policy issues, which is more a matter of politics than science.
Therefore, to reiterate, data is not objective and can lead to what Vlachos calls
'cognitive disputes' [in Anderson, 1994]. The collection, verification and interpretation
of data, generally, have political implications and can, therefore, be an additional matter
for conflict.
Examples of difficulties with data in the Indus Basin are numerous. There was a dispute
between India and Pakistan over the method of collecting, and handling, the data
[IBRD-15/2/55; 16/2/55]. The manner in which the data was presented was used by both
parties to emphasise what was seen as inequitable water allocations [IBRD-12/8/59;
11/3/60]. India wanted the World Bank to put in writing, and therefore on record, what it
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was interpreting from a piece of text so as to ensure Pakistan did not put interpret it
differently [IBRD-13/7/54d]. The Bank was also to question, at one stage, the quality of
data being collected by Pakistan [IBRD-13/7/54b].
Data sharing can also be problematic, and an indication of the party's commitment to the
process. As Beaumont point outs with regard to Israel, "[t]he actual capacity of the
National Water Carrier has never been disclosed for strategic reasons" [1994: 16].
During a visit to the Indian Subcontinent the World Bank's General Counsel had
arranged for Pakistan and India to share certain data. Pakistan was to report later to the
Bank that despite repeated requests for this data, India had not furnished it, even though
it would allay Pakistan's fears [IBRD-16/7/54b]. And therefore, Pakistan felt
"constrained to stop giving the data" [IBRD-11/10/54].
7.2.2	 Procedural Matters
The manner in which space for cooperation can be created during the mediation process
includes ensuring confidentiality. The advantage of keeping talks secret, or at least the
topics discussed confidential, are that the participants are encouraged to explore options
that are publicly untenable. Agreement is also encouraged if each participant's agendas
are met. This can involve many aspects. For example, the reasons for attending the talks,
the options that are considered, and the issues that are agreed upon. Agreement can be
assisted by selective linkages, so that there is an exchange of benefit. But the final
criteria, and herein lies the advantage of the mediated process, is the implementation of
the agreement. This will only be possible if the disputants regard the outcome as
beneficial to their interests.
7.2.2.1 Confidentiality
"Communication is extremely delicate. Public pronouncements,
especially those aimed at one's constituency and other third parties,
tend to obscure rather than clarify intentions" [Princen, 1992b: 225].
In attempting to create space for cooperation, the mediator has at least two fronts to
consider. Events happening within the mediations, and influences encroaching upon the
mediations from the outside. A key tool in clearing the jungle of influences and interests
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is confidentiality which, in turn, engenders trust. Furthermore, by maintaining
confidentiality the mediator helps change the disputants' focus away from their domestic
audiences, towards the issues in dispute and ways of resolving them.
All the participants, disputants and mediator alike, have to account for their actions to
certain audiences [Drucicman, 1993; Princen, 1992b]. Usually these audiences want to
be reassured that their representatives are not compromising their interests which, in
turn, can result in negotiating tactics that are "designed to prove resolve and are aimed at
constituencies and third parties, not opponents" [Princen, 1992b: 225]. Who comprise
these audiences ranges far and wide. People representing the disputing parties will have
their own governments, public, bureaucracy and remaining political interests to answer
to. The international community may also be observing events and have interests that
prefer particular outcomes.
The mediating body will also have to explain its actions to the participants, its governing
authority and the international community. The result of such scrutiny is the resort to
posturing by the participants, especially the disputants, who are probably anxious to
reassure their respective audiences. "The resort to public statements leads to a hardening
of the parties' positions and restricts not only their freedom of action but also that of the
mediator" [Bindschedler, 1981: 724]. Therefore, secrecy is vital to the success of
difficult negotiations [Colosi, 1986; Druckman, 1993; Bailey, 1985].
Interpretation by the media, both domestic and international, and manipulation of the
media can be problematic in adding to the difficulties already existing in a mediation.
De Bono gives an example of media interpretation:
"There is a apocryphal story about an American ambassador who had a race
with a Russian ambassador. The American ambassador won. The race was
reported in the local press to the effect that there had been a race and the
Russian ambassador had come second and the American ambassador had come
just one before the last person in the race. There was no mention that this was a
two-person race." [1990: 46].
Clearly, the suggestion to keep mediations secret contravenes the current trend to
encourage stakeholder participation and transparency. Ideally, all the people affected by
a conflict especially one over a primary resource would have the opportunity to state
their perspective and needs. Unfortunately, such participation can itself, at times, impede
cooperation.
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If the disputants cannot even be seen to be talking to one another, let alone exploring
cooperative avenues, the involvement of all stakeholders would close any windows to
cooperation that may exist. Therefore, such transparency needs to be demanded, and
applied, cautiously taking into regard the dispute's specific characteristics. As Princen
points out, "[f]or most disputants, there is a big difference between negotiating under the
watchful eye of the public and negotiating in secrecy" [1992a: 1711.
This thesis believes there are certain advantages in keeping difficult negotiations away
from the public eye. Firstly, it allows exploratory talks to occur, to see if any
cooperation is possible, without injuring the disputants' position vis-a-vis their domestic
audiences. Secondly, though the talks may not yield substantive benefits immediately,
they will have allowed the disputants to have made contact with their counterparts.
Should an opportunity later arise for cooperation, then the disputants know who to talk
to, thereby speeding up the process. And lastly, however reluctant the interaction may
be, each side can begin to see the other as human and not an abstract caricature. This
might even lead to each side appreciating that the demands they are making on the other
might simply not be possible, in particular on a political level, and therefore, the
demands are reduced.
Admittedly the major disadvantage in secret negotiations, is the potential exclusion of
relevant stakeholders. Though this is undesirable, any mediator must seek to use means
that are appropriate to the dispute's specific situation. There has to be a consideration of
'appropriateness'. For example, the secret intervention of the Norwegian Government in
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Oslo Channel, was appropriate to starting the cooperative
process. If there had been public knowledge of these talks, the Madrid Agreement would
probably not have been arrived at and signed.
Though the Olso Channel is one example of a mediation, and the next example is also an
instance of mediation, the appropriateness of action is different. Thus, in water disputes
in the western part of the USA, public participation is necessary to ensure that all the
users are accommodated in the water allocation calculation. In this instance secret
negotiations would be damaging to the overall process of good water management.
The World Bank when it intervened in the Indus Basin dispute was clear that it wanted
to minimise publicity for the duration of the talks. For example, the Bank wanted to
prevent discussion of the negotiations that might prove inflammatory, such as happened
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with a broadcast of the Information Service of India: "The broadcast kept pretty well to
the facts but put a very tendentious and highly controversial interpretation on the facts
which greatly annoyed the Pakistanis". Though the Government of Pakistan refrained
from any official comment, the Pakistani press were in uproar, and attacked India
bitterly [IBRD-13/7/54b].
Sommers describes the difficulties with having 'open' negotiations:
"Yeah, as far as I know, that was what Black believed in very s...you're going to
have these negotiations, you're going to make them public and every time you
say something, somebody in Congress or somebody in the Legislature or the
journalists put you in a position where you can't negotiate any further. And you
can see that now in Israel and Lebanon, but you can see it very strongly in the
United States, we try to do everything openly and it restricts our ability to
mediate" [Sommers interview, 30/4/96].
In October 1951, after the Bank had stated its interest in being a good officer, but all the
necessary details of engagement had not yet been worked out, the Management was
concerned that any leaks from either side "might endanger all chances of progress"
[IBRD-3/10/51]. This concern, and policy, was reiterated in November 1951, with the
Bank's President stating: "I feel strongly that publicity should be avoided at least until
an agreement on procedure has been reached by the working party at the initial meeting.
Whether any public statement should be made after a working procedure has been
decided upon would be a matter for discussion between the two Governments and the
Bank" [IBRD-8/11/51].
Though, Pakistan through its representatives assured the Bank that "there would be no
leaks from the Pakistan side" [IBRD-3/10/51], it was to use publicity to garner support
for its position in the dispute. In March 1951, the Government of Pakistan published, "A
Review of the Efforts made to Settle the Irrigation Water Dispute between Pakistan and
India" [IBRD-23/3/51]. This action was, obviously, not appreciated by India since
Pakistan had given an undertaking to not publicise events for the duration of the Bank's
good offices.
Other than secrecy, confidentiality also comprises the issue of trust. Within the
mediating room confidentiality is vital in letting trust enter quietly, with minimal
resistance from the disputants. Mediator-disputant, disputant-disputant relationships
involve varying degrees of mistrust. To begin the process of changing the atmosphere to
one of more trust, the mediator needs to allow each disputant a forum to voice its anger
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and opinions without detriment to its position vis-à-vis its opponent. This the World
Bank did, by seeing the disputants separately at times [IBRD-16/11/56; 3/12/58].
"Confidentiality is an important asset for mediators. It makes face-to-face encounters
easier. It makes creative alternatives easier to explore and concessions easier to
disguise" [Princen, 1992a: 170]. Therefore, by maintaining each disputant's confidence,
the mediator can get them to move from their adopted positions to reveal their interests.
Bailey warns mediators, however, that though they might not need to "tell the whole
truth" they should ensure that they "tell nothing but the truth" to keep the disputants'
trust [1985: 210].
In addition, it is important to realise, this thesis believes, that trust is not something that
can be built once, and then needs no further tending. Rather, trust is not an absolute
entity, but a perception that fluctuates and therefore needs to be maintained at a
sufficient level to get agreement. An example of the absence of fluctuation of trust in the
Indus Basin talks was Pakistan's attitude to India. Though, Pakistan had developed some
level of trust in the process and the mediator, it remained wary of its opponent even
towards the end of the negotiations and wanted to incorporate some means of policing
India's actions vis-a-vis its commitments under the proposed Treaty [Iliff, 1961].
The World Bank was clearly aware of this factor because it sought to assure India and
Pakistan in the beginning that "[b]efore selecting its representative, the Bank would
ascertain that he would be acceptable to the two Governments" [IBRD-8/11/51]. Then
throughout the negotiations, whenever the World Bank sent out a communiqué to both
India and Pakistan, it would inform both parties that either an identical letter had been
sent to the other party. This was to allay any suspicion the disputants' might have
regarding the Bank's impartiality, or that they were not receiving all the information
[IBRD-13/3/52].
7.2.2.2 Agendas
"The incongruous thing is that while the storm clouds continue to
gather over the Indus, the U.S., the World Bank and several
Commonwealth nations are giving economic aid to both parties to the
dispute. It is this very support, actual and prospective, that enables India
to press ahead with its Five Year Plan, which threatens to sharpen the
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controversy still more. It would seem only common sense for the U.S.,
as well as the other lenders, to withhold further aid from both India and
Pakistan until the two have agreed on a common plan for development
of the river basin on which the economy of both depends" [Perham,
1952].
Disputants have agendas they each wish to satisfy. These agendas, as well as those of
the mediator, have to be met for the mediation process to succeed. What these agendas
are will most probably vary, but it is not the variety that is of consequence, but the
existence of the issues. Thus, as Sand point out, "[i]n negotiating international rules for
pollution control and rights to common property resources, treaty-makers tend to adopt
the lowest common denominator of possible obligations" [in Auer, 1995 :50].
The benefit of the mediation process is that the parties can begin to be more direct in
asserting their agendas without having to return to conflict. Moreover, the mediator can
assist the parties in reaching an outcome that best fits these agendas. Ideally, a mediator
will be impartial and only intervene in the process for the benefit of the disputants. This
is not to say that the mediator does not have reasons for having entered in the process,
and then staying. But simply that these reasons should not be imposed upon the final
agreement, if one arises.
The World Bank made an effort to know the agendas of India and Pakistan, and to state
its own interests clearly [IBRD-31/1/51; 15/8/51; 6/9/51]. The latter policy was to help
remove any suspicion the disputants' may have in the third party's reasons for
intervening, and to build trust in the mediator. In order to safeguard their interests and
agendas, disputants might choose to "[p]reserve negotiating options by avoiding
premature commitments to proposals made in the formal negotiations" [Druckman,
1993: 203]. This, Pakistan, did with respect to the Bank's 1954 proposal, and the result
was the 1956 Aide Memoire. The details of the issues and interests of each party have
already been dealt with in Chapter Four.
7.2.2.3 Selective Linkages
Linking different issues together can simultaneously assist or hinder cooperation
depending upon the issues involved. Lowi believes that linkages, in light of a larger
conflict, are obstructive to settlement in the water dispute. Therefore, she argues that the
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water dispute cannot be settled until the larger conflict is resolved [1993]. However, in
the Indus Basin dispute, examples of selective linkages were found to have a positive
affect upon the talks' progress.
Herein lies one of the advantages of using mediation to resolve an international water
dispute. The process encourages bringing to the fore the issues involved, and explores
any possible links. Selective linking can work either by preventing a link being made, or
making the link. An example of not linking issues to make progress is the attitude India
and Pakistan had towards their dispute over Kashmir. If by agreeing to mediation on the
Indus Basin dispute, India and Pakistan were obliged to similar talks on the issue of
Kashmir, it is unlikely that the Indus dispute would have reached the mediating table.
An example of positive linking is the possibility of help in financing any agreement.
Another example, stands in the reaction of the World Bank to India and Pakistan's
failure to negotiate an ad hoc agreement for rabi 1957. The Bank's representative
simultaneously told the delegates that the institution was rethinking its involvement in
the talks, and pressured them to work out a year-long ad hoc agreement [IBRD-
21/8/57a].
7.2.2.4 Implementing the Agreement
"The experts have identified a range of shortcomings in treaties and
treaty-making. Agreements are often designed to satisfy the
requirements of the least ambitious participants; enforcement
mechanisms are lax; non-state interest groups are under-represented;
implementation is costly; and scientific evidence of risk is frequently
underutilized" [Auer, 1995: 50] .
"If words are less important than actions during the process of negotiating, they are not
less important when the agreement is being drafted. The distinction is between words as
tactical devices and as reflections of real interests" [Druckman, 1993: 205]. The ultimate
success and aim of a dispute resolution process, is not to have a nice piece of paper with
good intentions scattered in regimented lines, but to implement the agreement.
Unfortunately, "[e]xisting accounts of environmental mediation tend to stress settlement
as the primary goal of the process" [Dryzek and Hunter, 1987: 90]. Unless the abstract
ideas represented on paper, are rooted in reality and practicality, they will float away.
Gone will be all the effort and trust that the disputants' built grudgingly and laboriously.
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There appear to be two broad criteria to getting implementation. Firstly, that the
disputants should want the outcome reached and have the political will to implement it
[Nakayama, 1997: 379]. Secondly, that the practical steps to making the outcome
concrete should be spelt out step by step. It is here, Druckman argues, that lawyers have
a special role to play in the negotiation process, to ensure the correct blend of ambiguity
and precision necessary to the agreement [1993: 206]. As Dryzek and Hunter point out,
"[t]he content of any mediated agreement is important, but only insofar as it responds to
the immediate concerns of each party in a way that promotes the likelihood of assent and
compliance on the part of the actors involved" [1987: 91]. Without the details of who is
doing what, when and where, the agreement can flounder in principles that signify grand
ideas but are little more than general guides and rhetoric.
The World Bank's care to ensure that the Treaty that was signed had every chance of
being implemented is evident in the text of the Indus Waters Treaty (Appendix 7). The
main theme to these articles appears, to this thesis, to be to prevent any future disputes
between India and Pakistan from obstructing the implementation of the Treaty.
Therefore, any terms that were used, such as agricultural and domestic uses, were given
exact definitions in Article I. In Article IV matters relating to the financial arrangements
between India and Pakistan were detailed, stating how much money India was to give
Pakistan, and when. Details of a possible extension to the transitional period was also
worked out, and the conditions under which Pakistan would be able to use it in Article
X. Finally, not only did the Treaty make provisions for cooperation between the two
signatories in Articles VI and VII, but it also made detailed provisions for future dispute
settlement Article IX. The Permanent Indus Commission was also set up to address any
future complaints.
7.2.2.5 Institutional Competence
"Because the process of mediation is so politically fragile, especially
during its earliest stages, it is important that the proper auspices be
selected, that all stakeholders be consulted, and that the high quality of
mediation services be maintained" [Susskind and Babbitt, 1992: 44].
The World Bank entered into the Indus Basin talks, in part, to establish a credible
reputation with the American financial market. To have any leverage and credibility
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within the talks, the Bank's reputation would depend upon its professionalism and
impartiality. One of the key factors upon which the institution's professionalism would
be based was the presentation of an united front to the disputants. An additional factor
that would influence the Bank's reputation would be the quality of expertise it used in its
representation to the disputants.
As Druckman points out, the mediator must "[e]nsure that decisions made by
policymaking agencies are coordinated with proposals made and tactics employed by the
negotiating team; lack of communication between the bureaucracy and team can result
in retractions, premature commitments, and impasses" [1993: 203]. This entailed
keeping all Bank representatives informed of events, decisions and policy as they
happened, and sorting out any internal divisions privately. The latter issue is important
because "[d]ivisions within delegations can lead to problems...unresolved internal
differences cause delays and make a delegation vulnerable to exploitation" [ibid: 191].
Sommers describes the decision making process within the World Bank regarding
matters to do with the Indus Basin dispute:
"I think they were made on one level by Black, but to the extent that Iliff felt he
had Black's approval, he wouldn't need to go back and consult with him on
every single individual step but items like the dam and things like that were, and
I'm sure, the ultimate formula had to be approved by Black. But Black was
interested, but Black wasn't an expert on the merits of the deal, he was an
expert on the technique of negotiation and mediation" [Sommers interview,
30/4/96] .
Examples of the Bank keeping its representatives informed include: [i] When the
Government of Pakistan accepted the Bank's good offices in 1952, this information was
relayed to the relevant people in the Bank [IBRD-18/10/54]. [ii] Prior to the Bank's
intervention, in January 1950, discussions with the Indian Executive Director, involving
the River Sutlej Dispute, were also relayed [IBRD-2/3/50]. [iii] During Black's time as
President of the Bank, he improved the atmosphere within the institution by keeping the
directors informed of operations, rather than just presenting them with afaits accompli
as had happened under the previous administrations, which Sommers believes was
"vastly overdone" even if it was necessary [1961].[iv] In October 1951 at a weekly
meeting of the Bank's Staff Loan Committee (SLC) there was a consensus on the
approach the World Bank should take. "It was generally realised that it is of great
importance that the Bank should write the terms of reference as far as general principles
are concerned" [IBRD-16/10/51]. And [v] the Bank's Management believed that the
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American Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, should also be informed of the Bank's
involvement in the water dispute, so that they did not work at cross purposes [IBRD-
9/10/511
The World Bank, as a mediator in a highly technical dispute resolution process, had to
have sufficient technical expertise to understand the concepts involved, and assess the
solutions being proposed. As Iliff points out there were a number of "rather complicated
engineering and hydrological points" [1961]. The Bank was well equipped with internal
staff, and consultants to supplement in any areas needed. With knowledge of the
technical matters involved, the Bank could then also be demonstratively impartial in its
dealings, as it would not need to rely upon any one disputant's explanation of the details.
But impartiality was more importantly demonstrated in the Bank's interaction with India
and Pakistan. For example, in January 1950, the World Bank informed India that it was
not judging which party was right or wrong, but that it would not fund water projects
using the disputed River Sutlej [IBRD-11/1/50].
7.2.2.6 Leverage
"Influence, in turn, relies on the judicious application of some kind of
interpersonal power. That is, by relying on one of several possible kinds
of resources, the mediator must be able to leverage disputants into
behaving differently than they would otherwise" [Rubin, 1992: 254].
The World Bank's leverage as a third party in the Indus Basin talks came principally
from its status as an international financier. Kraske argues differently, claiming that the
Bank does not, in fact, have a strong position. The most the institution can do is not give
a loan, and it can only do that once. And if the Bank is not involved in the situation, it
cannot influence the parties any further. He admits this is in contrast to the external
perception of the Bank's strength, which regards it as powerful because it can withhold
financial aid [Kraske interview, 3/6/96].
However, Kraske's argument does not account for the continued relationship a country
will have with the Bank. So though, the Bank may reject one loan application, it does
not mean that other applications will be as • unsuccessful. Therefore, it is this ongoing
relationship that contributes to the World Bank's leverage as an international actor.
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The Bank had clearly stipulated that it was willing to fund any agreement arising out of
the talks [IBRD-8/11/51]. However, as long as the dispute remained, the Bank would
refuse to consider any loan application for projects using the disputed waters [IBRD-
9/1/50; 11/1/50]. Clearly, with India and Pakistan keen to protect and develop this water
resource, this added to the Bank's leverage. Admittedly, India was progressing
unilaterally with its construction on the River Sutlej, but the costs were high and foreign
exchange assistance would be welcome.
The World Bank was simultaneously providing ongoing assistance to India and Pakistan
for other development projects, for the duration of the mediations. Though the
disputants were wary of having the Bank look upon them with disfavour, it did not mean
that they did not contest plans and proposals they considered unacceptable.
As Sommers points out:
"Iliff had to keep very closely in touch with Black all the time because Black
was the real heart and soul of these negotiations, his ability as a 'good officer'
and his, it was not Iliff's personality but it was the influence of the Bank as an
institution and the fact that its future attitude towards these two countries would
be very important to both of them. I'm sure they didn't want to, they wouldn't
mind turning off Iliff but they wouldn't want to disgust Black, make him hostile
to either Pakistan or India because that would be a source of alot of funding for
them" [Sommers interview, 30/4/96].
Yet Kraske believes that these other loans the Bank was making did not influence the
Indus Basin talks [Kraske interview, 3/6/96]. Though the actual loans may not have
been linked to the Indus Basin talks, India and Pakistan were interested in retaining an
ongoing relationship with the Bank. Thus, the Bank's threat of walking away from the
talks gave it added leverage [IBRD-21/8/57a]. Probably the most influential element that
increased the Bank's leverage was, not its capacity to be involved and to finance any
agreement but, its will to be involved and to finance any agreement. Though there had
been internal divisions regarding the Bank's involvement, the institution had, in the end,
stayed the course till agreement was reached [Iliff, 1970].
In the Indus Basin talks, the World Bank used the conceptual underpinnings and
procedural matters described above to create space for the disputants to cooperate. In
other words, the Bank was trying to: [i] build trust in the institution, the process, and the
disputants; [ii] prevent any party from losing face; [iii] prevent the disputants from
posturing because this would only delay progress and divert attention from the main
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focus of the process - getting and implementing agreement; [iv] encourage the
disputants to think about the details of implementation rather than getting bogged down
in the detail of which party was to blame; [v] to move the parties beyond the naming-
blaming-claiming stage to exploring possible solutions; and [vi] to be a fair and
impartial mediator. Thus, having succeeded once the World Bank can, if it wishes, find
ways to assist other riparians to reach agreement over their shared water resources.
7.3	 SUGGESTIONS FOR THE BANK'S FUTURE ROLE, AND POSSIBLE
APPLICATION TO ANOTHER INTERNATIONAL BASIN.
"Riparian countries are also aware that there is no third party as well
placed as the Bank to assist them in addressing international inland
water issues, finding fair and equitable solutions, and mobilizing the
resources to implement such solutions. The United Nations has not
played a major role in negotiating the settlement of transboundary water
disputes although some of its agencies are involved in water
development activities that facilitate riparian cooperation" [Kirmani and
Rangeley, 1994: 11].
The bulk of the loans the World Bank has made through its history have been for water-
related projects, and it seems unlikely that this trend will change in the near future with
the importance of water becoming ever more apparent. The Bank has a significant role
to play in the sustainable development of global water resources in both infrastructural
and dispute resolution processes [Frederiksen et al, 1993; Kirmani and Rangeley, 1994].
The Bank can offer substantial technical and financial assistance to countries looking to
develop their water resources [Kirmani and Rangeley, 1994].
In the event that these water resources are in dispute with a co-riparian, then the Bank
can also offer its good offices. The herculean effort by the World Bank in bringing India
and Pakistan to the mediating table, and keeping them there until the Indus Waters
Treaty was signed, is a testimony to the Bank's commitment to its member countries,
and to resolving international water disputes. The institution was willing to intervene in
other such disputes, after the success of the Indus Waters Treaty. However, the riparians
of the Rivers Nile, Tigris-Euphrates and the Ganges-Brahmaputra all refused the Bank's
offer to intervene [Kirmani and Rangeley, 1994].
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Naturally whatever the Bank's will and capacity to intervene, it is the disputants'
decision as to whether the institution does or does not intervene. Given the labour
intensive example of the Indus Basin, and there is little to suppose that other
international water disputes will be any different, intervention in a dispute is a daunting
task to undertake. Thus, if the World Bank is unwilling to entertain full responsibility for
intervention, it could jointly intervene with another international agency.
The agencies could delegate the daily mediator tasks to the non-financial partner which
would still have considerable leverage since the Bank would be supporting any
successful outcome from the talks. The Bank's role could then be to supplement any
technical expertise required, and devise the financial arrangements needed to implement
any agreement. The World Bank could, potentially, intervene in the any number of
international water situations, including the situation between Spain and Portugal.
This thesis believes there are some parallels to be drawn between the situation in Spain
and Portugal and the Indus Basin. Spain, like India in the Indus Basin, is upstream of
Portugal on all their shared rivers. Portugal, like Pakistan, relies heavily upon these
rivers because they form the bulk of surface water available to the country. Spain,
however like India, has other rivers to draw upon. Spain is the more powerful country of
the two, and is planning to increase its withdrawals from the international rivers to the
detriment of Portuguese uses. Though, there is not the same hostility between Spain and
Portugal as between India and Pakistan, there is considerable rivalry.
As described already in Chapter Six, the Iberian Peninsula has been the setting for some
water rational policies between Spain and Portugal, in the form of international water
agreements. Despite these agreements, and those presently being proposed, there is a
real issue of water scarcity between the countries which remains unsettled. Both
countries rely heavily on agriculture and tourism for income generation. As elsewhere in
the arid world, Spanish irrigated agriculture consumes approximately 80% of the annual
water supply, with increased use during the summer [The Economist, 1995d: 52]. In
addition, commenting on the whole Mediterranean, Hamdy et al point out, that
"Nourism on the coast during the summer can double and triple withdrawals and lead to
crisis situations" [1995: 177].
Yet the Iberian Peninsula has a finite amount of water for which there is growing
competition, as both Spain and Portugal seek to develop their economies. Water stress is
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at its highest during the summer months when reduced rainfall is coupled with increased
demand. The Portuguese are, therefore, "extremely sensitive to the question of how
much water the country receives and is set to receive in future, its quality, and the
potential damage its exploitation may have on the environment" [The Economist,
1995e].
However, the problem is not just one between the sovereign nations of Spain and
Portugal, but also an issue within Spain [Wheeler: 1988]. For example, there is talk of
transferring water from the Ebro basin in the north to the south [The Economist, 1995d:
52]. This has, understandably, met with considerable opposition from farmers and other
users in the north, as has the plan to introduce water pricing.
But, if a draft agreement is already before the governments of Spain and Portugal, what
possible role could the World Bank, or the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, have in the Iberian Peninsula? The draft agreement even after ratification
will require implementation. Evidence from other international basins has shown that
agreements can fall at this hurdle. The Bank can intervene to assist the parties to build
capacity and infrastructure that will facilitate implementation. This will by necessity
include addressing the demand for water in Spain's regions.
SUMMARY
"Indeed, without the aid of good offices such as you have offered, little,
if any, progress toward a constructive solution could be anticipated.
Three years of direct negotiations have failed to achieve agreement
even on a procedure for reaching a solution" [Government of Pakistan
in IBRD-25/9/51a; 27/9/51].
India and Pakistan had realised, before the World Bank's intervention, that in order to
sustain their long term water supply in the Indus Basin they would need to resolve their
water dispute. Thus, through a series of bilateral negotiations attempts were made to
come to an acceptable understanding, but unfortunately, resulted in a politically
motivated stalemate. Accepting the Bank's good offices was, therefore, a water rational
act by both India and Pakistan as they both continued to try find ways to cooperate.
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As the mediator, the World Bank's primary aim was to give India and Pakistan the space
to cooperate and to assist them in their communications. The means by which the Bank
created this space are seen by this thesis as comprising two sections - the conceptual
underpinnings and the procedural matters. Five conceptual issues were identified
dealing with the ideas that are useful outside the mediating room. And six procedural
matters were identified that dealt with the actual process inside the mediating room.
The conceptual underpinnings are: One, the political will of all the participants is crucial
at every stage of the mediation process, from engaging to acceptance of proposals. Two,
the conflict is formed by the perceptions of the disputants, therefore, if these perceptions
are changed then the nature of the dispute will also change. Three, disputants need to
have a 'safe' space to explore means of non-violent interaction, away from excessive
external pressures. Four, in resolving, or managing, a dispute any agreement is specific
to that particular dispute and will probably not result in cooperative spillover. Also
cooperation and conflict are continuums rather than absolutes, therefore, parties are not
engaged in either full-scale war or peace. And five, data is not apolitical as collection,
interpretation and sharing of data all entail political aspects and can lead to cognitive
disputes.
The procedural matters are: One, confidentiality is important to the process in two ways,
no publicity and trust. The disputants can communicate more freely if they do not have
worry about their audiences. Also the mediator needs to maintain an adequate level of
trust throughout the negotiations, in order to move towards an agreement. Two, all the
parties in a mediation process have their own agenda, which a successful settlement will
incorporate. Three, selective linkaging can assist or hinder cooperation. Four, the final
result of a mediation process is not just to get an agreement, but to have this agreement
implemented. Implementation can be assisted by a detailed treaty outlining each party's
responsibilities. Five, disputant trust of the mediator is based partly upon the mediator's
competence, both in terms of professionalism and expertise. And six, different types of
mediators have different types of leverage in the mediation process.
The World Bank has throughout its history invested heavily in water related projects
around the world. With water set to continue to play a significant role in economic
development, and supply of fresh water being stretched, there is plenty of work for the
Bank if it wishes to involve itself. The Bank can participate in the sustainable
development of water, by providing its technical and financial assistance. Or it can
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intervene, subject to disputant acceptance, in international water disputes by offering its
good offices again. The World Bank and other international agencies could even
collaborate, and intervene jointly. The former providing the financial backing, and the
latter facilitating the daily negotiations. A potential application of the water rationality,
and irrationality, concept, and future Bank involvement, is the water situation between
Spain and Portugal.
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8CONCLUSION
There is an expectation in hydropolitics that water scarcity can lead to international
conflict between the riparians of a shared watercourse. This is especially true if the
supply is finite, demand is high due to the arid nature of the environment, and relations
between these countries are already tense due to an existing conflict unrelated to water.
This is the situation in the Middle East with its aridity and long-standing Arab-Israeli
conflict amidst other tensions.
The region, more than any other, has in turn influenced the field of hydropolitics.
Therefore, the field has been influenced not only by the nature of the environment in this
region, both physical and political, but also by the theoretical framework that has
dominated outside perceptions of the Middle Eastern countries. But opinion is beginning
to change regarding the response to water scarcity, and with it the expected outcome.
War and conflict are no longer proposed to be the most probable outcome, rather the
odds are on cooperation.
Though obvious, it is of sufficient importance to reiterate that water is a primary
resource. Life is, quite simply, impossible to sustain without access to fresh water. The
demand for fresh water is growing, especially in arid areas where there is a finite supply
that has already been extensively exploited. Factors influencing the increase in demand
include: increasing population whether through a growing birth-rate, or migration;
increasing consumerism whereby as the standard of living rises so do expectations of
convenience; increasing industrialisation which, of all the uses, pollutes the heaviest;
and also urbanisation, since city dwellers are known to use more water per capita for
their domestic uses than their rural counterparts.
Linked, obviously, to a growing population is the need to feed them, with the resultant
focus upon increasing agricultural output. Since in the semi-arid climate of the Middle
East, agricultural products can only be grown with irrigation, this sector of most
economies consumes the lion's share of fresh water. Figures are estimated to be as high
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as 70-90% of all fresh water available to water managers on an annual basis. Expanding
the food basket to meet the needs of the increasing population can be achieved in three
ways.
One approach is to expand the amount of land being irrigated. This is a popular
approach for some governments, as it has high public visibility. Showing areas of land
that once lay 'barren' now producing food, is good publicity for governments. Such
projects also can employ large numbers of people, thereby providing an added bonus to
the actual production of food. The difficulty with this approach is to find additional
sources of fresh water that can be used. One solution is to use recycled water.
Another approach is to improve the efficiency with which the existing water supply is
used. Different irrigation techniques are considered to have different efficiencies. One of
the most inefficient techniques, and that can lead to considerable additional problems
such as waterlogging and salinisation, is flood irrigation. By contrast, micro-irrigation is
one of the most efficient. And as the name suggests, the amount of water required to
irrigate crops is small in comparison. Though there are additional benefits to be had by
using micro-irrigation, the biggest drawback is the initial investment needed to set up the
infrastructure to supply water in this manner to the plants.
Using the notion of efficiency once more, is the approach to increasing food supply by
buying grains and cereals on the international market rather than growing them in semi-
arid areas that are ill-equipped to produce food. Importing food is akin to importing
'virtual water'. Though this option is used in the Middle East, the position of agriculture
and food security in national politics can discourage governments from relying heavily
upon this approach. An issue that is linked to the economy of importing food, is the
notion of pricing water and charging those users, usually in agriculture, who have been
subsidised thus far. However, there are political problems with water pricing that make
application of this approach a particular challenge for governments.
Overlying all these practical problems with water supply and use, are the political
tensions of the Middle East. There are three major international river basins in the
region: the Nile, Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates. In all three basins, relations between all or
some of the riparians was, or is, uneasy. In the Nile Basin, Egypt is wary of its upstream
co-riparians diverting water away from the Nile and its tributaries. In the Jordan Basin,
Israel's peace with Jordan has not led to an equal situation with the Palestinians, who
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also depend upon water within the Jordan Basin. In the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, Turkey,
Syria and Iraq regard each other with suspicion. But as downstream riparians, Syria and
Iraq are especially wary of Turkey's monumental project in Southeast Anatolia (GAP),
which will give Turkey considerable control over the waters of this basin.
Aside from the region's characteristics, another factor that has influenced the
expectation of conflict and war over scarce shared water resources is the theoretical
framework used in looking at the region. The assumption that two states with hostile
relations would not choose to cooperate with one another over a primary resource, such
as water, appears to be reasonable. Since there is no supra-national authority to
safeguard a country from hostility, it would appear prudent to maintain full control over
those resources that are of national importance.
This issue of autarky, necessary in an anarchic international system, derives from the
realist analysis of international politics. Realism regards power as the primary
motivation for state action, and assumes that the survival of a state depends upon it
being able to impose its will upon weaker states. Strength comes, therefore, from being
invulnerable and is based upon controlling resources, and being independent.
Cooperation is regarded as the act of weak states because the strong do not need to look
to other states as they possess all the resources they need for their national security.
Subsumed in the notion of strategic resources, is the perception that access to certain
resources is vital to a nation's security. And that when access is either restricted or
denied, the result can be to put the nation's security and interests in jeopardy. Therefore,
to prevent such a situation from arising, or to rectify it, violence is regarded as a
legitimate means of securing supply. This theme has, under the concept of water wars,
been extended to securing a nation's fresh water supply.
Other power-based approaches share the assumption that a powerful actor will not only
be able, but willing to impose its will on other less powerful actors. How these
approaches differ is in their definition of power. Liberalism regards individual states as
being less powerful than groups of states, and therefore encourages cooperation in what
it sees as an interdependent international system. Game theory does not expect
cooperation, though it regards it as the optimal strategy, as a probable outcome. Power is
defined as wit and time. Geopolitics recognises that the geographic components of a
state can add to its level of vulnerability, and defines power in terms of geographic
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resources and access. Critical geopolitics, however, questions not the definition of
power but the knowledge upon which those definitions are based.
Another approach within the framework is international law, which regards disputes to
be about the 'rights' of the parties involved. International law is, therefore, applied to
cases where a conflict already exists. How this conflict is defined may vary from the
traditional image of war, but a conflict is expected to exist nonetheless. In addition to
this expectation, international water law's principles of equitable use and appreciable
harm are inadequate in prioritising uses and, therefore, the claims based upon these uses.
This difficulty with prioritisation, can lead to further problems between the disputants as
both can cite legal justifications for their positions.
Therefore, if water scarcity is set to increase, alongside water demand, adding to
existing tensions then perhaps water conflicts, and even war, are a possibility in the
future. Such a possibility has, clearly, to be circumvented. One approach of the many
that are possible, is the studying of successful international water treaties, in the hope
that something may be gleaned and emulated, thereby preventing a future water war. Of
the international treaties that exist on matters dealing with international fresh water, the
Indus Waters Treaty is notable for its durability in an admittedly hostile environment.
The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty has its origins in an international water dispute that
would be expected, under the water war concept, to lead to war. India and Pakistan
were, and still are, enemies. As with the Arab-Israeli dispute in the Middle East, the
Kashmir dispute has acted as a constant thorn in their relations. Regarding the Sutlej
River both countries wanted to make use of the finite amount of water therein. Pakistan
wanted to maintain its existing uses, and India wanted to develop new uses. As the
upstream riparian, India had a geographical advantage and could enforce its will upon
Pakistan, the downstream riparian. In addition the Delhi Agreement signed in 1948 on
the River Sutlej, only acted to exacerbate tensions, and complicate subsequent
negotiations. Thus with relations hostile overall, and the Kashmir issue souring any
Indo-Pakistani interaction, the River Sutlej dispute seemed ripe for a water war.
However, what arose was cooperation. India and Pakistan negotiated terms and
conditions under the aegis of the World Bank for approximately nine years, before
finally signing and ratifying the Indus Waters Treaty. With all this expectation of
conflict, it begs the question: how did India and Pakistan cooperate, and why? The
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process of cooperation was choreographed by the intervening mediator. The reasons
why India was willing to have multilateral talks over the River Sutlej differed to
Pakistan's reasons for joining the discussions.
The process that led to the Treaty fits the general framework of mediation comprising
four segments: engaging, issues, options and agreement. The World Bank was able to
engage in the River Sutlej dispute because India and Pakistan were willing to allow it to
intervene. At this point the voluntary nature of the process is important. Should the
presence of any of the participants be involuntary, then the subsequent talks would fail
at the first obstacle. Once the third party is allowed to intervene, and the talks begin,
attention is focused upon the issues characterising the dispute. In order to keep the talks
on track, all three participants needed to know what were the issues in dispute. Not only
was it important for the Bank to understand what each disputant felt was involved, but
the disputants themselves needed to be aware of each other's perceptions.
Once the issues were clear, the exploration of acceptable options could begin.
Obviously, solution to a dispute would necessitate meeting the criteria that the disputants
held as important. The World Bank, India and Pakistan drew up a number of plans to
allocate the waters of the Indus Basin between them. The negotiations dragged on for
many years, because the plans did not fit the criteria India and Pakistan had at those
times. Agreement finally came when political changes in Pakistan allowed the
politicians to make the decision to agree, and when India's financial liability was
clarified by the Bank. Though described here as a linear process, mediation is in fact a
cyclical process. Agreement is needed throughout the four stages, as are the functions of
clarifying the issues and exploring acceptable options.
Certain points have emerged from the study of the Indus Waters Treaty's negotiations
relating to the mediation process. Most of these points are interlinked, but for clarity are
explained separately. However, a broad grouping has been given to these points upon
the basis of whether they can be termed conceptual or procedural. The conceptual points
are ideas and awareness with which the participants can approach the mediation room.
Procedural points are those used by the mediator, in the room, to assist the disputants in
finding an acceptable resolution.
There are five points that are assigned as conceptual: [i] The political will of the
disputing governments is important in making significant decisions, such as allowing the
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initial intervention of the third party. [ii] The perceptions these governments have of the
dispute, the intervening body and any possible solutions will influence the outcome of
the settlement process. [iii] Disputants, and in particular their representatives, need
space to cooperate. This means that there is a safe environment within which the parties
can explore the idea of cooperating, and what it will mean to them. The mediator can
address this need by providing the physical location, and minimising publicity to allow
for 'mental' space. [iv] Cooperation and conflict are continuums, whereby there is more,
or less, cooperation over certain features. In addition, cooperation in the Indus Basin
was specific to water, and did not lead to a cooperative spillover and congenial Indo-
Pakistani relations such that resolution of the Kashmir dispute became possible. And [v]
data is not a neutral area upon which there is complete and automatic consensus. Data
collection and interpretation can lead to cognitive disputes.
There are six points that are considered to be more procedural: [i] Confidentiality is vital
to keeping the talks alive. Confidentiality means both building trust into the process, and
ensuring the participants, and talks, are subjected to the minimal publicity possible. [ii]
For a plan to be acceptable to the disputants, it must meet their agendas. But the
disputants are not alone in having an agenda, the mediator has one too, but related,
often, to reasons for engaging in the process rather than criteria to get agreement. [iii]
Meeting these agendas can involve selectively linking items together. The emphasis is
upon being selective, as otherwise it may forestall agreement. [iv] Having finally
reached agreement, it is a matter of implementing it. This is made easier by ensuring that
the responsibilities of each signatory are clear and accounted for in a detailed agreement.
[v] Institutional competence affects the way in which the disputants perceive the
mediator, therefore it is important for the third party to be professional and impartial.
And [vi] the leverage a mediator has in the talks depends upon what it is that this party
can offer the disputants.
Regarding the agendas of each participant, the World Bank became involved in the
River Sutlej dispute for two reasons. Firstly, as member countries India and Pakistan
had applied for loans to construct projects using water from the river. But in line with
Bank policy, these loans had to be refused for no other reason than the existing dispute.
Clearly this was a frustration to all parties concerned, especially since they were
interested in making progress with the economic development of the Indian
Subcontinent. Secondly, the Bank was, at the time, keen to make a name for itself, and
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believed that successful intervention in this dispute, leading to resolution of the problem
would establish a reputation for the new institution.
In observing the situation in the Indus Basin at the time of the World Bank's offer of
good offices, it is unsurprising to note Pakistan's acceptance of such international
intervention. Pakistan had long pressed India to put the dispute before a third party,
though it had in those suggestions envisaged a legal entity such as the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). India was to refuse these suggestions repeatedly. Pakistan's
position as the downstream riparian appeared more vulnerable, especially when the
extent of Pakistan's dependence upon the River Sutlej became clear. Thus, though
Pakistan was to accept the Bank's intervention, it was cautious in committing itself to
any agreement that did not meet all the uses it presently had, and had planned. Pakistan
having been burnt once with a quick agreement with India, over water in 1948, was
wary of repeating the experience.
India's position stood in clear contrast to Pakistan's. As the upstream riparian with
minimal, if any, existing uses dependent upon the River Sutlej, what India wanted was
to use the water for further development. In addition, the livelihood and ability of the
country to feed itself, did not lie with this particular river as it did for Pakistan. Yet India
was not expected to be amenable to third party intervention. But acceptance did come,
and it appears the decision was based not only on the desire to improve Indo-Pakistani
relations but also because India had 'nothing to lose', Michel concurs with this point
[Michel interview, 16/5/96]. For the duration of the talks, India maintained its
construction schedule on the River Sutlej. If the talks failed to resolve the dispute, India
would still be able to withdraw and use the water it had claimed. If an acceptable
outcome did emerge, then it would resolve the dispute and still allow India to use the
waters it wanted.
With hindsight it is possible to construct reasons for the cooperation in the Indus Basin.
But at the outset of the talks in 1951, much was made of the potential, and expectation,
of conflict over the shared waters of the Basin. Though international conflict over fresh
water is no longer an expectation within the Indus Basin, it remains an expectation in
other international river basins around the world. Yet this expectation of conflict over
scarce water supplies does not appear to correlate with the examples that are emerging
in the literature of hydropolitics. In fact, there is considerable evidence that rather than
go to war over water, countries, even enemies, are cooperating to ensure the security of
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their long-term supply. This has led to doubts being raised in other works regarding this
expectation of conflict.
Why then does it appear that countries are choosing to cooperate, and that the
expectation of conflict should be changed to one of cooperation? (Cooperation is
regarded as having a broad definition, and one that ranges from data sharing and flood
warning to integrating basin management between riparians.) This dissertation proposes
the idea of water rationality, whereby countries enact policies that promote the long-
term security of their fresh water supply. These policies are effective in their national
water management strategies, and also in their foreign policy vis-à-vis other riparians.
Taking its cue from the expectations of the World Bank in the Indus Basin dispute,
water rationality also suggests that any interested third parties, observing an
international fresh water dispute, should also be prepared to expect cooperation.
The overall theme of this thesis rests with the concept of water wars. The concept
derives from the assumption that scarcity in a primary resource, such as water, would
lead competing users to conflict. The water war concept, therefore, expects conflict at an
international level between co-riparians. Though water disputes may, and do, occur at a
national level there is limited evidence of water wars at the international level. What has
emerged, in fact, is a picture of cooperation over shared water by international actors.
Thus, the suggestion of this thesis is not that water wars between international actors are
impossible, but that these wars are not probable given the historical and present day
evidence being gathered. What is regarded as probable, is that co-riparians will be
willing to cooperate in some manner rather than fight over their shared watercourses,
even in the situation of scarcity. Therefore, the expectation of conflict should perhaps be
an expectation of cooperation.
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER WORK
This thesis has highlighted the process by which India and Pakistan were able to reach
sufficient agreement over the Indus Basin to sign an international water treaty. It has
described the intervention of the World Bank in the international conflict, and how the
third party circumvented the considerable difficulties obstructing agreement. Naturally,
the process of enquiry has also raised a number of questions that cannot be fully
explored in the confines of one thesis. For the most part these questions focus upon the
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mediation process, and the effect of the Indus Waters Treaty upon the signatories,
though other questions linked to the broader topic of water are also asked.
As recognised in Chapter Four, this thesis treats India and Pakistan as monoliths.
Though this reductionist consideration of the disputants is undesirable overall, since it
would appear to nullify the complex characteristics of the countries and the consequent
influence upon their societies and politics, it has been necessary for the duration of this
thesis. However, questions remain that would seek to unpack the reductionist monoliths
and examine the interactions therein. This, clearly, would lead enquiry to enter the realm
of domestic politics and its influence upon foreign policy.
Pakistan and India were treated as single units, which operated in complete harmony
internally though there was external discord vis-a-vis the other disputant. This implied
not only coherent policy and practice between the Government and its representative
delegation, but also complete compliance between the different provinces and states
comprising these countries. The implication of coherence continued all the way through
these societies coming to rest, finally, with local water users in agriculture, industry and
the municipalities.
However, there are suggestions that this coherence did not exist, to different degrees, in
either country. For example, the Head of the Pakistani delegation confided to the World
Bank opinions that were in marked contrast to the position his Government was taking;
the political instability that Pakistan experienced as different groups within the country
vied for political power and office; the rivalry between the East and West wings of
Pakistan. In India, though the political instability was not as pronounced, there were
squabbles for power and influence. This was apparent, for example, with the demand for
linguistic unity in the organisation of the Indian states, which led to a restructuring of the
political map of India.
What, therefore, was the effect of these disparate groups upon the negotiating position
the disputants took? How did the interests of those in power and able to influence the
mediated discussions, effect these talks? What was the internal dynamic between the
Government and its representative delegation? What was the structure of command, and
how did this influence the negotiations? For example, were a number of parties involved
in making a decision, no matter how small, before the negotiations could progress
further? What factors of the internal political make-up of the countries either spurred on
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discussion, or acted as an obstacle to international cooperation? To what extent, if any,
did the individual personalities of the decision-makers effect decisions made during the
mediated talks?
Regarding the international rivalry between India and Pakistan, did the Governments of
the day have to 'sweeten' constituents to allow the talks to continue on the Indus Basin?
What forms of political discourse was necessary to reassure the public that cooperation
was a 'safe' option? Considering the internal rivalry between East and West Pakistan,
did the talks with India on the Indus Basin, influence the talks with India for the Ganges-
Brahmaputra Basin with its dispute over the Farakka Barrage? Going one step further,
how did the rivalry between the provinces in West Pakistan affect not only the
negotiations, but also the public perceptions of the mediated talks' efforts?
At the start of the mediations, when the World Bank was offering its good offices, the
Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan were categorical in pointing out the
limitations of the proposed talks. Discussions pertaining to the Indus Basin would have
no bearing on the Kashmir dispute, nor would they discuss possible solutions to that
tenacious dispute. Naturally, this conferred upon the subsequent Indus Basin discussions
a very narrow remit. But it also questions the position of the international water dispute
with the national priorities of the two countries. Did the water issue only serve as
rhetoric used periodically at the whim of politicians in both domestic and foreign policy
matters? Was it a pawn, used as a bargaining tool between different actors within the
countries, especially in Pakistan? Therefore, what was the role of water in the relations
between the Centre and the Provinces, and between the Provinces themselves? And
what was the effect of the assigned positioning in priorities upon the negotiations in
progress?
Internationally the Indus Waters Treaty was, and still, is regarded as a success. However
this sentiment appears not to be shared in the Indian Subcontinent. The international
community, the World Bank included, see the signing of the Treaty as a watershed,
successfully transforming dispute into peace. The implementation and maintenance of
the Treaty for almost forty years is also seen, internationally, as reaffirming its success.
Indian and Pakistani attitudes differ somewhat to the international community's. Though
the incumbent Governments were happy to sign the Treaty, and ratify it in 1961, public
perception of the Treaty was very different to the official reception. Both Governments
were chastised for having 'sold-out'. Opinion in Pakistan decried the loss of the three
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Eastern rivers, despite the vast sums of financial aid Pakistan was receiving in lieu of
this 'loss'. In India, public opinion decried the loss of its claims to the Western rivers.
What then marks an international water treaty as a success in the eyes of not only the
international community, but the countries involved? And what is the role of the national
media in influencing perceptions of a treaty? Does this influence change if the media is
state controlled, or free to make and display its enquiries as it wills? How do politician
and bureaucrats make use of the national media to further their own interests vis-à-vis a
treaty? Having suggested that publicity is of limited use during the negotiations, is it
prudent for an intervening body to then inform the public of the disputants of the aims of
any treaty? How would this effect the issue of national sovereignty?
The mediation training that was undertaken with UNITE, suggests that delay is an
inevitable part of the mediation process, and has to be expected and accepted as such.
The delay refers mainly to the time between the presenting of an option, and its
acceptance much later in the process. This was witnessed in the Indus Basin talks, with
the presentation of the World Bank Proposal in 1954 and the Aide Memoire in 1956 but
a clear acceptance of these plans not being made by Pakistan until December 1958.
Therefore, the question arises as to whether this delay can be avoided either by better
information about the disputants' interests, or by designing an alternative resolution
process? Or is delay and perhaps loss of opportunity an unavoidable hazard of mediated
talks? Related to this notion of delay and designing resolution processes, is the question
of encouraging disputants to relinquish their positions, and look more towards their
interests. Is there a way of improving the process without creating more problems as
happened with the World Bank and the issue of status-quo?
The World Bank has shown itself to be interested in playing a more active role in
international water dispute resolution. Historically, this has been demonstrated in the
Indus Basin, and though it was not asked to intervene it was, for example, prepared to
offer its services in the Jordan Valley and the Ganges Basin. With the present interest in
international fresh water, the Bank appears to be looking once more for an active role in
encouraging peace. This raises the question of the role third parties can play in
smoothing tensions over shared watercourses. What are the criteria needed for a
successful intervention, and what type of actors are suited to meet these criteria? Are
international institutions better suited to intervene between sovereign nations, or would
another sovereign nation be more effective in bringing the dispute to an end?
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During the mediations, the Bank continued to finance other development projects in the
Indian Subcontinent. But from the Indus Basin Files it is not clear whether this had an
affect on the role of the Bank as a mediator in the Indus Basin talks. Therefore, what
influence, if any, did the continued supply of finance from the World Bank have upon
India and Pakistan's decision making process?
The Indus Waters Treaty's significance comes from the fact that it was not only
negotiated but that once the negotiating process was over, it was implemented. And once
implemented, the decisions and principles the Treaty embodies have been maintained.
Implementation appears to be a three-stage process. The first stage involves the
assembling, in minute detail, of an international water treaty and is obviously done
during the negotiations. The second and third stages occur after the treaty has been
ratified, and entail the practical realities of transferring abstract plans on paper into
physical units on the ground. Not only is it asked, how were the plans implemented, but
also what lessons can be learnt from the process that can act as feedback to improve the
first and subsequent stages?
Therefore, how was the Indus Waters Treaty implemented in India and Pakistan? Who
was responsible for the implementation? Were the different provinces in each country
represented in the management of this stage, or was there a central body responsible for
it? Did public perceptions of the project change as work progressed? Who benefited
from the project? Was corruption an issue at this stage, if ever? And regarding
maintenance of the procedures outlined in the Treaty, which have been most effective
and useful? How does the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) function? And have
further disputes over shared Indus Basin water been put, by India and Pakistan, before
the PIC?
Almost forty years have passed since the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960.
What has been the effect of the Treaty upon the agricultural sectors of India and
Pakistan? With the availability of a more uniform supply of water, has there been any
interest in the efficiency with which the water is being used? What manner of irrigation
is being practised in the Indus Basin? For example, have the benefits of micro-irrigation
been adopted or is flood irrigation still the principle method of applying water to the
land? What is the awareness and perception of water as a finite resource in the Basin
amongst local users and the political framework?
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Does this awareness, if it exist, alter with location? For example, do local users in
Karachi, a urban area with use principally concentrated in the industrial and domestic
sectors, have a different perspective to those in the villages of the Punjab, with
agricultural use dominating local demand? What would be the effect of water pricing
upon these users, if they do not already pay for water use? And is awareness changing
with the quality of water available? Finally, what are the water resources of the Indus
Basin at present, and how effectively are they being used with attention to
environmental needs?
All these questions arise out of research into the Indus Basin dispute as detailed in this
thesis. The nature of a thesis obligates a restricted, and selective, recounting of the
research undertaken in answering certain key questions. Naturally, as is the case with
the research process, more questions have arisen than can be answered by one thesis.
These questions have been highlighted above. The author hopes that in undertaking
research into more of the influences, and issues, affecting disputants at the negotiating
table more can be known about the costs of negotiating to the disputants. This, it is also
hoped will lead to an expanded understanding of international water disputes, and the
means by which third parties can assist the disputants in achieving resolution.
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APPENDIX 1
Letter from the World Bank President, Eugene Black, to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan; 6 September 1951.
IA similar letter was sent to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.]
There appeared in the popular American magazine "Colliers" of August 4, 1951, an
article by Mr. David E. Lilienthal proposing a cooperative regional approach to the
development of the water resources of the Indus Basin. Because of the wide circulation
of this magazine and Mr. Lilienthal's reputation as an authority in the field of regional
development, this article has attracted a great deal of interest in the United States. I
assume that copies of Mr. Lilienthal's article have been brought to the notice of the
Government of Pakistan.
Mr. Lilienthal's proposal contemplates meeting the requirements of both countries for
expanded irrigation through the cooperative construction and operation of storage dams
and other facilities to be financed in part perhaps by this Bank. It is the essence of the
proposal, as I read it, that the development of the Indus water resources should be dealt
with on an engineering basis and it appears to be Mr. Lilienthal's belief, after visiting
both countries and talking with the highest personalities in the governments, that it is
within the realm of practicability to treat water development as a common project that is
functional, and not political, in nature and that could therefore be undertaken separately
from the political issues with which Pakistan and India are confronted.
As you may be aware, both Pakistan and India have from time to time raised with the
Bank the possibility of financing irrigation and hydroelectric works in the Indus Basin
and in each case the international water-rights problem has been an obstacle. A
constructive programme for the effective use of the water resources would, moreover,
have important implications for the economic development of both countries in other
fields. Since the matter is therefore of interest to the Bank and since the Bank's name
has now been publicly mentioned in this connection, I should like to ask you whether
you are disposed to look with favor upon Mr. Lilienthal's proposal. If so, I can assure
you that, if your Government and the Government of India desired to approach the
development of the Indus water resources along the lines suggested by Mr. Lilienthal, I
should be most happy to recommend that the Bank lend its good offices in such
directions as might be considered appropriate by the two governments, make available
qualified members of its staff and consider any financing proposals that might develop
as a result of joint planning.
I am sending a letter in similar terms to the Prime Minister of India.
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APPENDIX 2
Letter from the World Bank President, Eugene Black, to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin; 8 November 1951.
[A similar letter was sent to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.]
I have previously expressed my profound regrets on learning of the death of Mr. Liaquat
Ali Khan. I must now revert to the subject of my correspondence with him which was
interrupted by that tragic event.
I was much gratified to receive, in Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's reply of September 25, 1951,
to my letter of September 6, 1951, assurance that the Pakistan Government favours
looking at the Indus basin water resources from a regional viewpoint with the objective
of cooperative development and that he welcomed my proposal along the lines indicated
in his letter, which I have carefully studied.
The Prime Minister of India has also sent a favourable reply.
These two letters have convinced me that a solution to the problem of using the water
resources of the Indus basin in such a way was to make a maximum contribution to the
development of both countries is well within the bounds of practicability. I am therefore
encouraged to suggest to the two Governments a procedure which seems to me to afford
the best prospects of accomplishing that objective.
I shall base my suggestions on the essential principles of Mr. Lilienthal'sproposal which
are, as I understand them, the following:
(a) The Indus basin water resources are sufficient to continue all existing uses and to
meet the further needs of both countries for water from that source.
(b) The water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed and used
in such manner as most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus
basin viewed as a unit.
(c) The problem of development and use of the Indus basin water resources should be
solved on a functional and not a political plane, without relation to past negotiations and
past claims and independently of political issues.
I assume that, in indicating their willingness to proceed on the basis of Mr. Lilienthal's
proposals, the two Governments have accepted these principles. My suggestions as to
procedure, which I believe faithfully reflect these principles, are based on that
assumption.
I should perhaps add that, through its contacts with the two countries, the Bank is
convinced that the engineers and other technicians of Pakistan and India are fully
qualified to provide the principal technical and planning skills needed to develop, for
submission to the two Governments, a comprehensive program for the utilization of the
Indus basin water resources. That has been a major consideration in my formulation of a
suggested procedure.
My proposal is as follows:
(a) Pakistan and India would each delegate a qualified engineer of high standing to
prepare, jointly with the designee of the other, a comprehensive long-range plan for the
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most effective utilisation of the water resources of the Indus basin in the development of
the region. Each designee would be instructed to govern himself by the principles stated
above and to approach the problem on its merits in the interest of economic
development of the Indus basin viewed as a unit. Each designee would have such
technical assistants as he might desire and as might be available, and the two together
would be authorized to retain the services of such engineers, agricultural technicians,
economists and other experts, from either or both of the two countries of from other
countries, as they might mutually find desirable.
(b) An engineer selected by the Bank would be continuously available during the
planning stage to work with the designees of the two countries. He would keep himself
informed of the planning in view of the Bank's previously expressed readiness to
consider financing proposals and would participate in the working party as an impartial
adviser, free to express his views on any aspects of the matter and available to perform
such other services as might be mutually determined to be appropriate. He could thus
assist in solving problems without being in the position of an arbitrator. Before selecting
its representative, the Bank would ascertain that he would be acceptable to the two
Governments. There would be available to him, and through him to the entire working
party, such technical assistance furnished by the Bank as might be needed to supplement
the resources otherwise available.
(c) The working party would hold an initial meeting for the purpose of determining the
procedure to be followed in working out the plan, the steps needed to be taken, the order
and manner in which those steps would be undertaken and the persons by whom they
would be undertaken, and would set target dates for completion of the various steps. On
reaching agreement on these matters, the working party would promptly, without the
need of any further authorization, put the agreed procedure into effect and begin work
on the plan.
I suggest that this initial meeting take place on January 3, 1952, at the Bank's
Washington Office.
I feel strongly that publicity should be avoided at least until an agreement on procedure
has been reached by the working party at the initial meeting. Whether any public
statement should be made after a working procedure has been decided upon would be a
matter for discussion between the two Governments and the Bank.
If I assume, the Governments of Pakistan and India are in agreement on the principles
underlying Mr. Lilienthal's proposal, as I have set them forth above, I anticipate fruitful
results from this suggested procedure. At the present stage I have not felt free to bring
this matter before the Executive Directors of the Bank but I believe that I can assure you
that if the two Governments are prepared to proceed, the Executive Directors, as well as
the management and staff, will be happy to cooperate with them in facilitiating a
solution to this vital development problem.
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APPENDIX 3
Letter from the World Bank President, Eugene Black, to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, 1Chwaja Nazimuddin; 13 March 1952.
[A similar letter was sent to the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru.]
I refer to the conversation we have had about the Indus Basin water problem and to
similar conversations I have had with the Prime Minister of India. I am happy to say that
I have found common understanding as to the bases on which we can go forward under
the Lilienthal proposal.
We all agree that the function of the working party is to work out, and the ultimate
objective is to carry out, specific engineering measures by which the supplies effectively
available to each country will be increased substantially beyond what they have ever
been. Except as the two sides may hereafter agree, legal rights will not be affected and
each side will be free to withdraw at any time; but while the cooperative work continues
with the participation of the Bank neither side will take any action to diminish the
supplies available to the other side for existing uses.
It should be understood that the three main principles set forth in my letter of November
8, 1951 provide the broad basis on which the engineers will meet but are not intended as
rigidly fixed terms of reference. Within the broad outline of the basic framework the
engineers should be free to put forward or consider proposals in pursuance of the
general objective.
With these clarifications both Governments are ready to go forward in accordance with
my letter of November 8, 1951, the first meeting of the working party to be held on
April 7, 1952 [April is crossed out, replaced by May]. I am therefore happy to invite the
designee of your Government, and his technical assistants, to be present at the Bank's
Washington office on that date.
I am sending an identical letter to the Prime Minister of India.
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APPENDIX 4
Inter-Dominion Agreement Dated The 4th May 1948 On The Canal Water Dispute
Between The East And West Pun,jab
A dispute has arisen between the East and West Punjab Governments regarding the
supply by East Punjab of water to the Central Bari Doab and the Depalpur canals in
West Punjab. The contention of the East Punjab is that under the Punjab Partition
(Apportionment of Assets and Liabilities) Order, 1947, and the arbitral award the
proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers in East Punjab rest wholly in the East
Punjab Government and that the West Punjab Government cannot claim any share of
these waters as a right. The West Punjab Government disputes this contention, its view
being that the point has conclusively been decided in its favour by implication of the
Arbitral Award and that in accordance with international law and equity, West Punjab
has a right to the waters of the East Punjab rivers.
2. The East Punjab Government has revised the flow of water into these canals on
certain conditions of which two are disputed by West Punjab. One, which arises out of
the contention in paragraph 1, is the right to the levy of seignorage charges for water and
the other is the question of the capital cost of the Madhavpur Head Works and carrier
channels to be taken into account.
3. The East and West Punjab Governments are anxious that this question should be
settled in a spirit of goodwill and friendship. Without prejudice to its legal rights in the
matter the East Punjab Government has assured the West Punjab Government that it has
no intention suddenly to withhold water from West Punjab without giving it time to tap
alternative sources. The West Punjab Government on its part recognise the natural
anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligation to develop areas
where water is scarce and which were under-developed in relation to parts of West
Punjab.
4. Apart, therefore, from the question of law involved, the Governments are
anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit on the basis of the East Punjab
Government progressively diminishing its supply to these canals in order to give
reasonable time to enable the West Punjab Government to tap alternative sources.
5. The West Punjab Government has agreed to deposit immediately in the Reserve
Bank such ad hoc sum as may be specified by the Prime Minister of India. Out of this
sum, that Government agrees to the immediate transfer to East Punjab Government of
sums over which there is no dispute.
6. After an examination by each party of the legal issues, of the method of
estimating the cost of water to be supplied by the East Punjab Government and of the
technical survey of water resources and the means of using them for supply to these
canals, the two Governments agree that further meetings between their representatives
should take place.
7. The Dominion Governments of India and Pakistan accept the above terms and
express the hope that a friendly solution will be reached.
Signed in New Delhi:
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For India - Jawaharlal Nehru, Swaran Singh, N V Gadgil.
For Pakistan - Ghulam Mohammad, Shaukat Hyat Khan, Mumtaz Daultana
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APPENDIX 5
Proposal by the International Bank Representative for a Plan for the Development
and use of the Indus Basin Waters, 5 February 1954
Introduction
The Indus Basin Working Party, consisting of engineers designated by India and
Pakistan and their advisors assisted by the Bank Representative and consultants, have
for almost two years worked at their task of preparing a comprehensive plan for the
utilization of the waters of the Indus system, in accordance with the suggestion made by
Mr David E Lilienthal in August, 1951. Over a year was spent in compiling and
analyzing data in a field trip of more than 9000 miles in the basin. Efforts to agree in
advance on a common approach having proved fruitless, the two Designees, at the
suggestion of the Bank Representative, each proposed a comprehensive plan.
As presented the plans differed widely in concept and in substance. Subsequent
discussions have produced substantial concessions, but these have not been enough to
bring about an agreement and the margin of difference between the two plans remains
wide. In rough approximation, the two plans (as modified by recent concessions)
provide for the following division of usable supplies of water:
Indian Plan	 Usable supplies allocated to
India	 - all of the Eastern rivers and 7% of the Western rivers
Pakistan	 - none of the Eastern rivers and 93% of the Western rivers
Pakistan Plan Usable supplies allocated to
India	 -30% of the Eastern rivers and none of the Western rivers
Pakistan	 - 70% of the Eastern rivers and all of the Western rivers
In quantitative terms, the division of the usable supplies of water may be approximately
shown as follows (in millions of acre-feet):
Total uses excluding losses and unusable supplies
For India For Pakistan Total Usable
India 29 90 119
Pakistan 15.5 102.5 118
The present status is that it has not yet been possible to reach agreement and that, in the
absence of some new development, there is no prospect of further progress in the
Working Party. Before considering what step should next be taken, it will be useful to
analyze the reasons that have so far prevented agreement.
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Essential Elements of the Problem
The inability to agree in the Working Party has not been due to the technical difficulties
or inability to devise appropriate engineering works and measures to make the most
effective use of the waters. If this were the whole problem, a solution would doubtless
have been found before now.
The available technical resources are impressive. The proficiency of the Indian and
Pakistani engineers in canal irrigation techniques is unsurpassed, and perhaps
unequalled, anywhere in the world. Abundant technical data is at hand. It is doubtful
whether such complete recorded flow data exists for the Indus system of rivers and
canals could be duplicated for any comparable river system in any other country.
Moreover, there is a large measure of accord between the two Designees on certain
fundamentals. The Working Party are in agreement that the average annual flow is not
sufficiently dependable to be taken as a basis for planning and that some more
conservative figures must be used. For the most practical purposes, they are in
agreement on the amount of unusable supplies in the rivers, on the amount that can be
developed through storage, on the sites and capacities of possible storage facilities and
on the technical feasibility of proposed engineering works. They agree that existing uses
of water must be respected (although they differ as to the meaning of "existing uses").
They agree that surplus usable supplies, including supplies that can be developed
through storage, must be equitably apportioned among the potential new uses in the
interests of the economic development of the basin as a unit (though they differ in
defining the boundaries of the basin). They agree that existing inundation canals should
be replaced by weir-controlled. canals. Finally both sides appear to accept the concept
that the cost of the new works should be allocated to the two countries in the proportion
in which they derive benefit therefrom.
The extensive compilation of data and the large area of agreement that already exists
provide firm foundations for a settlement, and thus represent most valuable
contributions by the Working Party to an ultimate solution. Unfortunately, they are not
enough in themselves to bring about an agreement. What hampers further progress in
the Working Party is no matter of engineering complexity, but rather a combination of
three basic difficulties which have so far prevented the Working Party from reaching the
heart of the problem - a fair division of the waters between the two countries.
The first difficulty lies in the fact that water supplies and storage potentialities are
inadequate to the needs of the basin. The Indus is one of the world's greatest river
systems. With proper development by engineering works, it is capable of providing
substantially more irrigation to each country than has ever been enjoyed. But even after
full development, there will not be enough water to supply all the needs of the water.
This means that there can be no ideal plan which will fully satisfy both sides. Any plan
must involve a large element of compromise under which each country will have to
forego some of the irrigation uses that it would wish to develop if adequate supplies and
storage were available.
The second difficulty is that although the Working Party are planning on the basis of the
development of the Indus Basin as an economic unit, two sovereign states are involved.
This greatly limits the practical potentialities of planning. A comprehensive plan can
achieve maximum efficiency, economy and usefulness when it is developed and
administered by a single authority. Under such an authority, decisions can be made
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promptly, plans can be readily changed to meet new circumstances and accommodations
made to meet emergencies.
When two sovereign authorities are concerned, it is difficult to use resources to the
greatest advantage. Problems must be solved by negotiation and agreement rather than
by decision. Minor questions of planning and operational detail must be referred to high
authority and dealt with, perhaps, through diplomatic channels. Moreover the two
countries may follow different development policies, or may have unequal resources
available for development. They may also (as has been evident in the present
discussions) be reluctant to have works regulating water supplies on which they depend
constructed in territory controlled by another country. All these factors make agreement
difficult.
In the present case, it would be unrealistic to ignore this difficulty. The prospects of
being able to establish an efficient and smooth-running joint administration are not
favorable. At present, any comprehensive plan must be framed with this limitation in
mind.
The third difficulty, the most serious of all, has arisen in the course of discussions. The
plans put forward by the two sides differ fundamentally in concept. An essential part of
the Pakistan concept is that existing uses of water must be continued from existing
sources. Moreover "existing uses", in the Pakistan plan, include not only the amounts of
water that have actually been put to use in the past, but also the allocations of water
which have been sanctioned prior to partition, even though the necessary supplies have
not been available for use. This concept protects Pakistan's actual and potential uses on
the Eastern rivers and reserves most of the water in the Western rivers for use in
Pakistan.
The corresponding concept of the Indian plan, on the other hand, is that although
existing uses (here defined to include only actual historic withdrawals) must be
continued, they need not necessarily be continued from existing sources. This concept
permits the water in the Eastern rivers which is now used in Pakistan to be released for
use in India and replaced by water from the Western rivers.
The basic divergence of concept, together with the other two difficulties mentioned
above, effectively blocks progress towards a settlement. As long as it persists, there is
no prospect that further discussions will prove fruitful.
The Bank Proposal
Both sides have repeatedly stated that they sincerely desire a settlement and that in this
they reflect the desires of their Governments. It is vital that a settlement be reached.
Moreover, after two years' concern with the problem, the Bank is convinced that,
despite the difficulties mentioned above, no insurmountable obstacle exists to a
settlement which will benefit both countries. On the contrary, there is no doubt that this
dispute can be settled on terms by which 'the supplies effectively available to each
country will be increased substantially beyond what they have ever been.'119
In the circumstances, the Bank Representative feels that he has the responsibility to put
forward a proposal for the consideration of both sides to serve as the basis of a
' 19 Letters of President Black to the Prime Ministers, March 13, 1952.
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comprehensive plan. The proposal has the concurrence of the engineering consultants to
the Bank Representative and is put forward with the full support of the management of
the Bank.
This proposal has been framed in complete realisation of the nature of the Bank's role in
these discussions. Though the Bank Representative is 'free to express his views on any
aspect of the matter,' 120 neither he nor the Bank is in the position of a judge or
arbitrator. The Bank cannot, therefore, pass upon any of the legal contentions that have
been put forward by the parties in the past. The proposal here made does not express,
and is not intended to imply, any opinion on those contentions.
The Bank proposal is no arbitrary compromise, arrived at by mathematically splitting
the differences between the two sides. It is a plan based on concepts of its own, which
produce a fair and economic result.
In the formulation of the Bank proposal, the divergence of concept in the Working Party
as to treatment of existing uses had to be faced at the outset. The Bank proposal
embodies the principle that historic withdrawals of water must be continued, but not
necessarily from existing sources. This principle allows water to be used so as most
effectively to promote development. A requirement that existing uses must be supplied
from existing sources would unduly limit the flexibility of operation needed for the
efficient use of waters. In fact, no fair and adequate comprehensive plan could, in the
opinion of the Bank Representative, be devised under such a requirement.
The Bank proposal also embodies the principle that, in view of existing circumstances,
allocation of supplies to the two countries should be such as to afford the greatest
possible freedom of action by each country in the operation, maintenance and future
development of its irrigation facilities. It is desirable, so far as practicable, to avoid
control by India over waters on which Pakistan will be dependent, and to enable each
country to control the works supplying the water allocated to it and determine in its own
interests the apportionment of waters within its own territories. This principle has not
merely the negative advantage of minimizing friction between the two countries (a
matter of some significance in view of the disputes that have arisen from sharing waters
from the same river) and of avoiding the necessity of a costly and perhaps ineffective
permanent joint administration. It also has a positive advantage. There is every reason to
believe that leaving each country free to develop its own water resources in the light of
its own needs and resources, and without having to obtain the agreement of the other at
each point, will in the long run mostly effectively promote the efficient development of
the whole system.
This does not mean that the Bank proposal places any obstacle in the way of cooperation
between the two countries. On the contrary, it encourages cooperation and permits full
advantage to be taken of any willingness to cooperate. But it is capable of bringing
benefits even if a full degree of cooperation does not develop as rapidly as might be
hoped.
Statement of Bank Proposal
The Bank proposal is that there be taken as a basis for agreement between India and
Pakistan a plan under which the waters of the Western rivers would be reserved to
12° Letters of President Black to the Prime Ministers, November 8, 1951.
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Pakistan and the waters of the Eastern rivers would, subject to a relatively short
transition period, be reserved to India. The plan may be summarized as follows:
The entire flow of the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) would be
available for the exclusive use and benefit of Pakistan, and for development by
Pakistan, except for the insignificant volume of Jhelum flow presently used in
Kashmir.
The entire flow of the Eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) would be available
for the exclusive use and benefit of India, and for development by India, except
that for a specified transition period India would continue to supply from these
rivers, in accordance with an agreed schedule, the historic withdrawals from these
rivers in Pakistan.
The transition period would be calculated on the basis of the time estimated to be
required to complete the link canals needed in Pakistan to make transfers for the
purpose of replacing supplies from India. A temporary cooperative administration
would be needed to supervise the carrying out of the transitional arrangements.
Each country would construct the works located on its territories which are
planned for the development of the supplies. The costs of such works would be
borne by the country to be benefited thereby. Although no works are planned for
joint construction by the two countries, certain link canals in Pakistan will, as
stated above, be needed to replace supplies from India. India would bear the costs
of such works to the extent of the benefits to be received by her therefrom. An
appropriate procedure would be established for adjudicating or arbitrating
disputes concerning the allocation of costs under this principle.
Some additional explanation may be helpful to a consideration of the Bank proposal.
The entire flow of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab Rivers (Western rivers) would be
allocated to Pakistan. These rivers are now used within Pakistan, except for the
insignificant volume of the Jhelum that is used in Kashmir. Although the Indus River
has its source outside Pakistan in Tibet and flows for a considerable length before
entering Pakistan, the mountainous topography is unfavourable for irrigation
development. Therefore, unhindered use by Pakistan of its waters seems assured. The
Jhelum River rises and flows for some distance in Kashmir and, although here also
reasons of topography limit the opportunities for irrigation diversion, there should be
agreement that the flow will not be disturbed. The Chenab River rises in India and
before it enters Kashmir, provides a substantial flow that could be diverted for use in
India. Assurance by India that the flow of this river will not be disturbed is essential.
The entire flow of the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi Rivers (Eastern rivers) would be allocated
to India when the necessary works have been completed to permit transfers of supplies
from the Western rivers to replace historic withdrawals in Pakistan from the Eastern
rivers. At present, India is not receiving the entire flow of these rivers but is supplying
therefrom a substantial amount for canals in Pakistan, principally in the Sutlej Valley.
The works that are necessary to replace supplies from India consist of link canals
connecting the Western to the Eastern rivers. Several such link canals have already been
constructed by Pakistan, one is nearing completion and some additional canals will
undoubtedly be necessary. As the necessary link canals are to be constructed in
Pakistan, their integration with present planning there must be determined by Pakistan.
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Since any plan for transfer of supplies is susceptible of various modifications, accurate
determination of costs must await completion of engineering studies.
It is proposed that the costs of these works will be borne by the two countries in
proportion to the benefits. Thus, the cost of a canal in Pakistan of the capacity required
to replace supplies from India would be borne by India; but if Pakistan decides, in its
own interests, to increase the capacity beyond what is needed for such replacement, the
cost would be shared proportionately by the two countries.
It will be necessary, under the Bank proposal, for India to continue to supply the
Pakistan canals until the necessary works are completed by Pakistan for transfer of
supplies from the Western rivers. This will involve preparation of a construction time
schedule and of a time schedule for actual transfer of supplies.
These schedules would allow the actual transfers of supplies to come into effect
progressively and the deliveries by India to diminish accordingly. They must be
prepared cooperatively and agreed to by both countries. The period required for
completion of the necessary link canals is roughly estimated to be about 5 years.
As indicated in the summary, temporary cooperative administrative machinery would be
needed in the transition period to facilitate the carrying of the time schedules. There
would be exchange of data on river discharges and withdrawals and on construction of
interest to both countries. Joint observations would be provided for. Arrangements for
settling disputes concerning allocations of cost by arbitration or adjudication would also
be needed.
The Bank proposal contemplates that no reservoir storage (aside from the Bhakra dam
which should be completed by the end of the transition period) will be required to
supplement flow water in continuing the historic withdrawals. The inter-connected
system which the link canals would provide could be so operated as the meet the
existing requirements of the Sutlej Valley lands except, perhaps, in small amounts in a
few canals in exceptional years.
Even without further storage construction, the Bank plan would permit the following
uses after the transition period:
Pakistan could supply her historic withdrawals and could bring most of the Sutlej
Valley Canals up to allocation. She could also meet the requirements of projects in
progress on the Indus.
India could supply her historic withdrawals and meet the requirements of projects
in progress except that some modifications of the Rajasthan Canal project would
be required, at least until further reservoir capacity is available.
There can be no doubt, however, that additional reservoir storage is necessary for the
full development of the system and such storage is contemplated by the Bank plan. Any
further storage capacity would greatly reduce the possibility of shortages and would
support substantial new irrigation uses.
So far as is now known the potential storage capacities which could be developed by the
two countries under the Bank plan would be about equal. However, no thorough
engineering studies have been made and accordingly storage capacity (except for
Bhakra) cannot be definitely determined. Further studies may well disclose additional
reservoir possibilities not now known. Costs can obviously not be estimated at present
and construction time can be only approximated.
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The following table gives a rough quantitative comparison (in millions of acre-feet of
usable supplies) between the Indian and Pakistan plans, as modified by recent
concessions, and the Bank plan:
Plan	 Total Uses Excluding Losses and Unusable Supplies
For India For Pakistan Total Usable
Indian 29 90 119
Pakistan 15.5 102.5 118
Bank 22 97 119
Comments on Bank Proposal
An essential test of a comprehensive plan is its fairness. The Bank proposal provides a
fair division of the waters. It protect existing irrigation uses from disturbance and
allocates surplus supplies, those already developed and those that may be developed, in
accordance with the principle of equitable apportionment.
The Bank Representative is aware that certain minor adjustments would make the plan
more economic if there were a sufficient assurance of cooperation between the parties to
permit these measures to be planned and carried out.
At the present time, however, no such adjustments are recommended. If in the course of
the transition period the prospects for long-term cooperation appear favorable enough,
there will then be ample opportunity to agree on adjustments. But in present
circumstances, their disadvantages appear to be greater than their benefits. Most such
adjustments would require the establishment of a permanent joint commission.
Administrative arrangements of that kind are costly, and the costs recur annually. More
significantly, joint commissions are likely to be inefficient except in extremely
favourable conditions.
One of the merits of the Bank proposal is that, unlike the plans of the two Designees, it
avoids the complexities that would require the establishment of a permanent joint
commission.
A further advantage of the Bank proposal lies in the fact that, after transfer works are
completed, each country will be independent of the other in the operation of its supplies.
Each country will be responsible for planning, constructing and administering its own
facilities in its own territories as it sees fit. This should provide strong incentives to each
country to make the most effective use of water, since any efficiency accomplished by
works undertaken by either country for storage, transfer, reduction of losses and the like
will accrue directly to the benefit of that country. The same will be true of efficiency
achieved in operations. Pakistan, for instance, will be able to take full advantage of the
flexibility afforded by an inter-connecting system. As the flow of the rivers varies with
the seasons, and from year to year, supplies that are surplus in one river can be
transferred to a river in which supplies are low. Likewise India will be able to operate
Bhakra so as to meet the varying requirements of different areas. By contrast, if the
supplies from particular rivers were shared by the two countries, the administrative
complexity of arranging necessary adjustments to meet variations in flow and
scheduling for crop needs would be formidable.
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The mutual independence afforded by the Bank proposal would also bring benefits of a
different kind. The location of works serving each country on territories under its
control, and the assurances against interference by either country with the supplies on
which the other depends, should reduce the chances of disputes and tension and
contribute to improved relations.
All these factors should serve to promote the development of the entire basin.
A number of contentions have been made in the Working Party discussions which need
not be resolved by agreement if the Bank proposal is adopted. There has been discussion
about the location of the easterly boundary of the Indus Basin, a question which is
difficult to settle since the area is a desert with no discernible watershed. Under the
Bank proposal, the question need not be settled by agreement. Each country will be free
to use the waters allocated to it as it sees fit.
There has also been discussion about the proper allowance for gains and losses, for
salinity repulsion and for tubewell supply. It is not possible to answer these questions
precisely at this time; nor will it be possible for some years until upstream storage and
use permits much less wastage to the sea. The best method of dealing with these
questions is to let each country make such provision out of supplies allotted to it, or take
such engineering measures, as it deems wise.
It might perhaps be said that the allocation of the waters of a river to lands far removed
from its banks, rather than to adjacent lands, is abnormal. But the practice is not new; it
was well-known in the Indus Basin before partition and has been followed since
partition. Besides, recent history of the Indus Basin has not been normal. It is unusual, to
say the least, to find an elaborate irrigation system, originally planned and operated
under a single political regime, suddenly cut in two by a new political boundary.
It might also be said that the Bank proposal differs from pre-partition plans in that it
contemplates irrigation of lands for which irrigation was not formerly planned. There
would be substance in such a statement. The justification is that social and economic
conditions have changed. Political developments have shifted large masses of population
to new homes and these people now need irrigated land. No comprehensive plan would
be realistic that failed to take account of the changed situation.
Conclusion
The Bank proposal is simple, workable and fair. It will effectively promote the
economic development of the Indus Basin and will benefit both countries by
substantially increasing the amount of usable water available to each of them. The Bank
Representative recommends its acceptance as the basis of agreement.
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APPENDIX 6
Aide Memoire, 21 May 1956
1. Cooperative work on the Indus Basin question was resumed in November 1954 on
the basis of "Terms of Reference and Procedure" proposed by the Bank and accepted by
the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. The objective of this latest
phase of the cooperative work has been to prepare 'a comprehensive plan for the
consideration of Governments, on the basis of the Bank proposal of February 5, 1954,
taking as a starting point the division of waters envisaged therein.'
2. The Delegations of India and Pakistan, together with the Bank Group, have now
been at work for almost 18 months. During this time a series of studies have been
carried out by both Delegations and numerous memoranda have been submitted by each
side bearing on the various issues arising out of Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Terms of
Reference. The Bank has also arranged for the Bank Consultants (TAMS) to carry out a
series of independent studies of the same nature.
3. The present status of the discussions can be summarized as follows:
[a] It has not been possible to secure full agreement between the two Delegations
on:-
[i] the quantitative aspects of certain of the uses specified in Paragraph 2 and in
Paragraph 3 of the Terms of Reference.
[ii] certain technical considerations involved (e.g. the effect of the proposed
changed regime of the rivers on "Gains and Losses")
[b] In the absence of agreement on the points mentioned in [a] above, it has not
been possible to secure a common approach to the actual engineering features of a
"Comprehensive Plan."
4. The Bank continues to hold the view that the "division of the waters" contemplated
by the Bank Proposal of February 1954 affords the best prospects for a settlement of the
Indus Waters question; that out of the flow-cum-storage potential of the rivers allocated
to them, India and Pakistan could each develop very substantial irrigation uses,
additional to those that they now enjoy; and that no insuperable engineering difficulties
are likely to arise in either country in constructing the physical works necessary to
develop these additional supplies. The works would, however, be costly; and their
financing would present a serious financial problem.
5. The Bank is of the opinion that no useful purpose is likely to be served by
continuing to devote the cooperative work to an attempt to obtain agreement of the two
Delegations on the issues arising out of Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 3 of the Terms of
Reference. The Bank, however, feels it desirable, at the stage which the discussions
have now reached, that the Bank should consider, in the light of the studies made by the
consultants, whether any "adjustment" in the Bank Proposal of February 1954 is called
for; and also to make proposals to the two Governments with regard to future Bank
participation.
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Paragraph 2 Uses and Surplus
6. [a] The Bank's consultants have studied the extent to which the flow of the Western
Rivers will meet the uses envisaged in Paragraph 2 of the Terms of Reference, and the
nature and extent of any surplus.
[b] For this purpose, the Bank asked its Consultants to adopt the following quantum
of uses:-
[i] Historic withdrawals of all canals (except the Pakistan Sutlej Valley
Canals);
[ii] Allocations for the Pakistan Sutlej Valley Canals (11.1 MAF)*;
[iii] 3.6 MAF for Thal;*
[iv] 9.5 MAF for Kotri.*
(* With distribution shown in Appendix A).
[c] These studies have led the Bank Group to the conclusion that, after taking into
account the possibilities of the transfer of flow supplies of the Indus, Jhelum and
Chenab by a system of link canals:-
[i] There would be no shortages in Kharif, except for occasional 10-day
periods in April and September in occasional years.
[ii] There would be consistent surpluses in ICharif, significant in quantity,
duration and frequency.
[iii] There would be consistent shortages in Rabi, occasionally beginning in late
September of extending into early April (see [i] above), of a degree,
duration and frequency which the Bank Group could not regard as
"tolerable".
Paragraph 3 Uses
7. [a] Additional Requirements of Sukkur and Gudu
Pakistan has claimed for Suklcur substantial additional uses both in Rabi and in
Kharif, and for Gudu substantial additional uses during Kharif only. If the pre-partition
regime of the six rivers were to continue undisturbed, no significant additional Rabi
irrigation at Suklcur could be developed on any dependable basis, from flow alone.
Consequently, none could be developed only from the flow of the Western Rivers. So
far as Kharif uses at Sukkur and at Gudu are concerned, the Kharif surplus referred to in
Paragraph 6[c] [ii] above is available to allocate to new Kharif uses at these two
projects, and to employ as a substitute for "Sailab."
[b] Future Development in the State of Jammu and Kashmir
India has claimed that some part of the flow of the Jhelum and Chenab should be
reserved for future development in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It has been stated
by India that this development would involve "relatively insignificant consumptive
uses." This question should, in the Bank's view, be postponed until the point has been
reached when the provisions of an international water treaty might be under
consideration.
"Adjustments" to the Bank Proposal
8. [a] In the light of the conclusions at which the Bank has arrived, as set out in
Paragraphs 6 and 7 above, the Bank feels that an adjustment in its Proposal of February
1954 is called for. This adjustment should, in the Bank's view, assure to Pakistan
"timely" water sufficient to eliminate the shortage referred to in Paragraph 6[c] [iii].
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[b] The adjustment referred to in [a] above might take any of the following forms,
or a combination of any two or all of them:-
[i] Supplies from tubewells.
[ii] Continued deliveries to Pakistan of "timely" water from the Eastern Rivers.
[iii] Construction of storage on the Western Rivers.
[c] When the Bank made its proposal of February 1954, the possibility, both in
India and in Pakistan, of supplementing flow by supplies from tube-wells, was realized.
But this source of supply is not, in the Bank's view, an appropriate means, over the long
term, of eliminating any part of the disclosed shortage. Accordingly, and if the Division
of Waters contemplated by the Bank Proposal is maintained, the adjustment should be in
the form of storage on the Western Rivers.
9. The system of works to implement the Bank Proposal, as adjusted, should,
therefore, in the Bank's view, be based on the principle that, for the purpose of meeting
the "Paragraph 2 Uses," flow of the Western Rivers (Indus, as well as Jhelum and
Chenab) should be exploited to the maximum possible extent, and that the minimum
inroads should be made on Pakistan's limited storage capacity. In the Bank's view, the
cost of this system of works should be the basis of the calculation of India's financial
liability.
10. The Bank now wishes to propose to the two Governments the following course of
action:-
[a] The completion of negotiations with the two Delegations of  ad hoc amounts for
Indian withdrawals from the Eastern Rivers during the period 1st April 1956 to 31st
March 1957.
[b]A continuance of the period of the cooperative work until 31st March 1957.
[c] After the two Governments had agreed to [b] above, the conclusion of an inter-
Governmental Agreement to cover [a] above.
[d]That the Bank should then proceed to use its good offices to bring about
acceptance of an appropriate adjustment of the Bank Proposal of February 1954, along
the lines indicated.
11. The Bank feels that if, by 31st March 1957, the Bank should see no reasonable
prospects for a settlement on the basis of the Bank Proposal, with an appropriate
adjustment, the Bank would have to consider whether the employment of its good
offices could make any further contribution to a solution.
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APPENDIX 7
The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960
Preamble
The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being equally desirous of
attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilisation of the waters of the Indus system
of rivers and recognising the need, therefore, of fixing and delimiting, in a spirit of
goodwill and friendship, the rights and obligations of each in relation to the other
concerning the use of these waters and of making provision for the settlement, in a
cooperative spirit, of all such questions as may hereafter arise in regard to the
interpretation or application of the provisions agreed upon herein, have resolved to
conclude a Treaty in furtherance of these objectives, and for this purpose have named as
their plenipotentiaries:
The Government of India:
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Ministerof India,
and
The Government of Pakistan:
Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, HP., H.J.,
President of Pakistan;
who, having communicated to each other their respective Full Powers and having found
them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles and Annexures:-
Article I
Definitions
As used in this Treaty:
[I] The terms 'Article' and `Annexure' mean respectively an Article of, and an
Annexure to, this Treaty. Except as otherwise indicated, references to Paragraphs
are to the paragraphs in the Article or in the Annexure in which the reference is
made.
[2] The term 'Tributary' of a river means any surface channel, whether in continuous
or intermittent flow and by whatever name called, whose waters in the natural
course would fall into that river, e.g. a tributary, a torrent, a natural drainage, an
artificial drainage, a nadi, a nallah, a nai, a khad, a cho. The term also includes
any sub-tributary or branch or subsidiary channel, by whatever name called,
whose waters, in the natural course, would directly or otherwise flow into that
surface channel.
[3] The term 'The Indus', 'The Jhelum', 'The Chenab', 'The Ravi', 'The Beas' or
'The Sutlej' means the named river (including Connecting Lakes, if any) and all
its Tributaries: Provided however that
[i] none of the rivers named above shall be deemed to be a Tributary;
[ii] The Chenab shall be deemed to include the river Panjnad; and
[iii] the river Chandra and the river Bhaga shall be deemed to be Tributaries of
The Chenab.
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[4] The term 'Main' added after Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas or Ravi means
the main stem of the named river excluding its Tributaries, but including all
channels and creeks of the main stem of that river and such Connecting Lakes as
form part of the main stem itself. The Jhelum Main shall be deemed to extend up
to Verinag and the Chenab Main up to the confluence of the river Chandra and the
river Bhaga.
[5] The term 'Eastern Rivers' means The Sutlej, The Beas and The Ravi taken
together.
[6] The term 'Western Rivers' means The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab taken
together.
[7] The term 'the Rivers' means all the rivers, The Sutlej, The Beas, The Ravi, The
Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab.
[8] The term 'Connecting Lakes' means any lake which receives water from, or yields
water to, any of the Rivers; but any lake which occasionally and irregularly
receives only the spill of any the Rivers and returns only the whole or part of that
spill is not a Connecting Lake.
[9] The term 'Agricultural Use' means the use of water for irrigation, except for
irrigation of household gardens and public recreational gardens.
[10] The term 'Domestic Use' means the use of water for:
[a] drinking, washing, bathing, recreation, sanitation (including the conveyance
and dilution of sewage and of industrial and other wastes), stock and poultry, and
other like purposes:
[b] household and municipal purposes (including use for household gardens and
public recreational gardens); and
[c] industrial purposes (including mining, milling and other like purposes);
but the term does not include Agricultural Use or use for generation of
hydroelectric power.
[11] The term Non-Consumptive Use' means any control or use of water for
navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection or flood control,
fishing or fish culture, wild life or other like beneficial purposes, provided that,
exclusive of seepage and evaporation of water incidental to the control or use, the
water (undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement)
remains in, or is returned to, the same river or its Tributaries; but the term does not
include Agricultural Use or use for the generation of hydroelectric power.
[12] The term Transitional Period' means the period beginning and ending as provided
in Article II [6].
[13] The term 'Bank' means the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development.
[14] The term 'Commissioner' means either of the Commissioners appointed under the
provisions of Article VIII [1] and the term 'Commission' means the Permanent
Indus Commission constituted in accordance with Article VIII [3].
[15] The term 'interference with the waters' means:
[a] Any act of withdrawal therefrom; or
[b] Any man-made obstruction to their flow which causes a change in the volume
(within the practical range of measurement) of the daily flow of the waters:
Provided however that an obstruction which involves only an insignificant and
incidental change in the volume of the daily flow, for example, fluctuations due to
afflux caused by bridge piers or a temporary by-pass, etc., shall not be deemed to
be an interference with the waters.
[16] The term 'Effective Date' means the date on which this Treaty takes effect in
accordance with the provisions of Article XII, that is, the first of April 1960.
Article II
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Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers
[1] All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of
India, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article.
[2] Except for Domestic Use and Non-Consumptive Use, Pakistan shall be under an
obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters of the
Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main in the reaches where these rivers flow in Pakistan
and have not yet finally crossed into Pakistan. The points of final crossing are the
following: [a] near the new Hasta Bund upstream of Suleimanke in the case of the
Sutlej Main, and [b] about one and a half miles upstream of the syphon for the B-
R-B-D Link in the case of the Ravi Main.
[3] Except for Domestic Use, Non-Consumptive Use and Agricultural Use (as
specified in Annexure B), Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and
shall not permit any interference with, the waters (while flowing in Pakistan) of
any Tributary which in its natural course joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main
before these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan.
[4] All the waters, while flowing in Pakistan, of any Tributary which, in its natural
course, joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi Main after these rivers have finally
crossed into Pakistan shall be available for the unrestricted use of Pakistan:
Provided however that this provision shall not be construed as giving Pakistan any
claim or right to any releases by India in any such Tributary. If Pakistan should
deliver any of the waters of any such Tributary, which on the Effective Date joins
the Ravi Main after this river has finally crossed into Pakistan, into a reach of the
Ravi Main upstream of this crossing, India shall not make use of these waters;
each Party agrees to establish such discharge observation stations and make such
observations as may be necessary for the determination of the component of water
available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid deliveries by
Pakistan, and Pakistan agrees to meet the cost of establishing the aforesaid
discharge observation stations and making the aforesaid observations.
[5] There shall be a Transition Period during which, to the extent specified in
Annexure H, India shall
[i] limit its withdrawal for Agricultural Use,
[ii] limit abstractions for storages, and
[iii]make deliveries to Pakistan from the Eastern Rivers.
[6] The Transition Period shall begin on 1st April 1960 and it shall end on 31st March
1970, or, if extended under the provisions of Part 8 of Annexure H, on the date up
to which it has been extended. In any event, whether or not the replacement
referred to in Article IV [1] has been accomplished, the Transition Period shall
end not later than 31st March 1973.
[7] If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of
Article V [5] shall apply.
[8] If the Transition Period is extended beyond 31st March 1970, the provisions of
Article V [5] shall apply during the period of extension beyond 31st March 1970.
[9] During the Transition Period, Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use the waters
of the Eastern Rivers which are to be released by India in accordance with the
provisions of Annexure H. After the end of the Transition Period, Pakistan shall
have no claim or right to releases by India of any of the waters of the Eastern
Rivers. In case there are any releases, Pakistan shall enjoy the unrestricted use of
the waters so released after they have finally crossed into Pakistan: Provided that
in the event that Pakistan makes any use of these waters, Pakistan shall not
acquire any right whatsoever, by prescription or otherwise, to a continuance of
such releases of such use.
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Article III
Provisions Regarding Western Rivers
[1] Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers
which India is under obligation to let flow under the provisions of Paragraph [2].
[2] India shall be under an obligation to let flow all the waters of the Western Rivers,
and shall not permit any interference with these waters, except for the following
uses, restricted (except as provided in item [c] [ii] of Paragraph 5 of Annexure C)
in the case of each of the rivers, The Indus, The Jhelum and The Chenab, to the
drainage basin thereof:
[a] Domestic Use;
[b] Non-Consumptive Use;
[c] Agricultural Use, as set out in Annexure C; and
[d] Generation of hydro-electric power, as set out in Annexure D.
[3] Pakistan shall have the unrestricted use of all waters originating from sources
other than the Eastern Rivers which are delivered by Pakistan into The Ravi or
The Sutlej, and India shall not make use of these waters. Each Party agrees to
establish such discharge observation stations and make such observations as may
be considered necessary by the Commission for the determination of the
component of water available for the use of Pakistan on account of the aforesaid
deliveries by Pakistan.
[4] Except as provided in Annexures D and E, India shall not store any water of, or
construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.
Article IV
Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers and Western Rivers
[1] Pakistan shall use its best endeavours to construct and bring into operation, with
due regard to expedition and economy, that part of a system of works which will
accomplish the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other sources, of water
supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August 1947, were
dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers.
[2] Each Party agrees that any Non-Consumptive Use made by it shall be so made as
not to materially change, on account of such use, the flow in any channel to the
prejudice of the uses on that channel by the other Party under the provisions of
this Treaty. In executing any scheme of flood protection or flood control each
Party will avoid, as far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party, and
any such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve any
use of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III.
[3] Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as having the effect of preventing either
Party from undertaking schemes of drainage, river training, conservation of soil
against erosion and dredging, or from removal stones, gravel or sand from the
beds of the Rivers: Provided that
[a] in executing any of the schemes mentioned above, each Party will avoid, as
far as practicable, any material damage to the other Party;
[b] any such scheme carried out by India on the Western Rivers shall not involve
any use of water or any storage in addition to that provided under Article III;
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[c] except as provided in Paragraph [5] and Article VII [1] [b], India shall not
take any action to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the Effective
Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain which crosses into Pakistan, and
shall not undertake such construction or remodelling of any drainage or drain
which crosses or falls into a drainage or drain which crosses as might cause
material damage in Pakistan or entail the construction of a new drain or
enlargement of an existing drainage or drain in Pakistan; and
[d] should Pakistan desire to increase the catchment area, beyond the area on the
Effective Date, of any natural or artificial drainage or drain, which receives
drainage waters from India, or, except in an emergency, to pour any waters into it
in excess of the quantities received by it as on the Effective Date, Pakistan shall,
before undertaking any work for these purposes, increase the capacity of that
drainage or drain to the extent necessary so as not to impair its efficacy for dealing
with drainage waters received from India as on the Effective Date.
[4] Pakistan shall maintain in good order its portions of the drainage mentioned below
with capacities not less than the capacities as on the Effective Date:-
[i] Hudiara Drain
[ii] Kasur Nala
[iii] Salimshah Drain
[iv] Fazilka Drain.
[5] If India finds it necessary that any of the drainages mentioned in Paragraph [4]
should be deepened or widened in Pakistan, Pakistan agrees to undertake to do so
as a work of public interest, provided India agrees to pay the cost of the deepening
or widening.
[6] Each Party will use its best endeavours to maintain the natural channels of the
Rivers, as on the Effective Date, in such conditions as will avoid, as far as
practicable, any obstruction to the flow in these channels likely to cause material
damage to the other Party.
[7] Neither Party will take any action which would have the effect of diverting the
Ravi Main between Madhopur and Lahore, or the Sutlej Main between Harike and
Sueimanke, from its natural channel between high banks.
[8] The use of the natural channels of the Rivers for the discharge of flood or other
excess waters shall be free and not subject to limitation by either Party, and
neither Part shall have any claim against the other in respect of any damage
caused by such use. Each Party agrees to communicate to the other Party, as far in
advance as practicable, any information it may have in regard to such
extraordinary discharges of water from reservoirs and flood flows as may affect
the other Party.
[9] Each Party declares its intention to operate its storage dams, barrages and
irrigation canals in such manner, consistent with the normal operations of its
hydraulic systems, as to avoid, as far as feasible, material damage to the other
Party.
[10] Each Party declares its intention to prevent, as far as practicable, undue pollution
of the waters of the Rivers which might affect adversely uses similar in nature to
those to which the waters were put on the Effective Date, and agrees to take all
reasonable measures to ensure that, before any sewage or industrial waste is
allowed to flow into the Rivers, it will be treated, where necessary, in such manner
as not materially to affect those uses: Provided that the criterion of reasonableness
shall be the customary practice in similar situations on the Rivers.
[11] The Parties agree to adopt, as far as feasible, appropriate measures for the
recovery, and restoration to owners, of timber and other property floated or
floating down the Rivers, subject to appropriate charges being paid by the owners.
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[12] The use of water for industrial purposes under Articles II [2], II [3] and III [2]
shall not exceed:
[a] in the case of an industrial process known on the Effective Date, such
quantum of use as was customary in that process on the Effective Date;
[b] in the case of an industrial process not known on the Effective Date:
[i] such quantum of use as was customary on the Effective Date in similar or
in any way comparable industrial processes; or
[ii] if there was no industrial process on the Effective Date similar of in any
way comparable to the new process, such quantum of use as would not have a
substantially adverse effect on the other Party.
[13] Such part of any water withdrawn for Domestic Use under the provisions of
Articles II [3] and III [2] as is subsequently applied to Agricultural Use shall be
accounted for as part of the Agricultural Use specified in Annexure B and
Annexure C respectively; each Party will use its best endeavours to return the
same river (directly or through one of its Tributaries) all water withdrawn
therefrom for industrial purposes and not consumed either in the industrial
processes for which it was withdrawn or in some other Domestic Use.
[14] In the event that either Party should develop a use of the waters of the Rivers
which is not in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, that Party shall not
acquire by reason of such use any right, by prescription or otherwise, to a
continuance of such use.
[15] Except as otherwise required by the express provisions of this Treaty, nothing in
this Treaty shall be construed as affecting existing territorial rights over the waters
of any of the Rivers or the beds or banks thereof, or as affecting existing property
rights under municipal law over such waters or beds or banks.
Article IV
Financial Provisions
[1] In consideration of the fact that the purpose of part of the system of works
referred to in Article IV [1] is the replacement, from the Western Rivers and other
sources, of water supplies for irrigation canals in Pakistan which, on 15th August
1947, were dependent on water supplies from the Eastern Rivers, India agree to
make a fixed contribution of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 towards the costs of
these works. The amount in Pounds Sterling of this contribution shall remain
unchanged irrespective of any alteration in the par value of any currency.
[2] The sum of Pounds Sterling 62,060,000 specified in Paragraph [1] shall be paid in
ten equal annual instalments on the 1st of November of each year. The first of
such annual instalments shall be paid on 1st November 1960, or if the Treaty has
not entered in to force by that date, then within one month after the Treaty enters
into force.
[3] Each of the instalments specified in Paragraph [2] shall be paid to the Bank for the
credit of the Indus Basin Development Fund to be established and administered by
the Bank, and payment shall be made in Pounds Sterling, or in such other currency
or currencies as may from time to time be agreed between India and the Bank.
[4] The payments provided for under the provisions of Paragraph [3] shall be made
without deductions or set-off on account of any financial claims of India on
Pakistan arising otherwise than under the provisions of this Treaty: Provided that
this provision shall in no way absolve Pakistan from the necessity of paying in
other ways debts to India which may be outstanding against Pakistan.
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[5 ] If, at the request of Pakistan, the Transition Period is extended in accordance with
the provisions of Article II [6] and of Part 8 of Annexure H, the Bank shall
thereupon pay to India out of the Indus Basin Development Fund the appropriate
amount specified in the Table below:-
Table
Period of Aggregate Extension of Transition Period
Payment to India
One year	 iStg.
3,125,000
6,406,250
9,850,000
Two years	 £Stg.
Three years	 £Stg.
[6] The provisions of Article IV [1] and Article V [1] shall not be construed as
conferring upon India any right to participate in the decisions as to the system of
works which Pakistan constructs pursuant to Article IV [1] or as constituting an
assumption of any responsibility by India or as an agreement by India in regard to
such works.
[7] Except for such payments as are specifically provided for in this Treaty, neither
Party shall be entitled to claim any payment for observance of the provisions of
this Treaty or to make any charge for water received from it by the other Party.
Article VI
Exchange of Data
[1] The following data with respect to the flow in, and utilisation of the waters of, the
Rivers shall be exchanged regularly between the Parties:-
[a] Daily (or as observed or estimated less frequently) gauge and discharge data
relating to flow of the Rivers at all observations sites.
[b] Daily extractions for or releases from reservoirs.
[c] Daily withdrawals at the heads of all canals operated by government or by a
government agency (hereinafter in this Article called canals), including link
canals.
[d] Daily escapages from all canals, including link canals.
[e] Daily deliveries from link canals.
These data shall be transmitted monthly by each Party to the other as soon as the
data for a calendar month have been collected and tabulated, but not later than
three months after the end of the month to which they relate: Provided that such of
the data specified above as are considered by either Party to be necessary for
operational purposes shall be supplied daily or at less frequent intervals, as may be
requested. Should one Party request the supply of any of these data by telegram,
telephone, or wireless, it shall reimburse the other Party for the cost of
transmission.
[2] If, in addition to the data specified in Paragraph [1] of this Article, either Party
requests the supply of any data relating to the hydrology of the Rivers, or to canal
or reservoir operation connected with the Rivers, or to any provision of this
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Treaty, such data shall be supplied by the other Party to the extent that these
available.
Article VII
Future Co-operation
[1] The two Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum
development of the Rivers, and, to that end, they declare their intention to co-
operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest possible extent. In particular:-
[a] Each Party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement by the
other Party to pay the costs to be incurred, will, at the request of the other Party,
set up or install such hydrologic observation stations within the drainage basins of
the Rivers, and set up or install such meteorological observation stations relating
thereto and carry out such observations thereat, as may be requested, and will
supply the data so obtained.
[b] Each Party, to the extent it considers practicable and on agreement by the
other Party to pay costs to be incurred, will, at the request of the other Party, carry
out such new drainage works as may be required in connection with new drainage
works of the other Party.
[c] At the request of either Party, the two Parties may, by mutual agreement, co-
operate in undertaking engineering works on the Rivers.
The formal arrangements, in each case, shall be as agreed upon between the
Parties.
[2] If either Party plans to construct any engineering work which would cause
interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would
affect the other Party materially, it shall notify the other Party of its plans and
shall supply such data relating to the work as may be available and as would
enable the other Party to inform itself of the nature, magnitude and effect of the
work. If a work would cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers but
would not, in the opinion of the Party planning it, affect the other Party materially,
nevertheless the Party planning the work shall, on request, supply the other Party
with such data regarding the nature, magnitude and effect, if any, of the work as
may be available.
Article VIII
Permanent Indus Commission
[1] India and Pakistan shall each create a permanent post of Commissioner for Indus
Waters, and shall appoint to this post, as often a vacancy occurs, a person who
should ordinarily be a high-ranking engineer competent in the field of hydrology
and water-use. Unless either Government should decide to take up any particular
question directly with the other Government, each Commissioner will be the
representative of his Government for all matters arising out of this Treaty, and will
serve as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the
implementation of the Treaty, and, in particular, with respect to
[a] the furnishing or exchange of information or data provided for in the Treaty,
and
[b] the giving of any notice provided for in the Treaty.
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[2] The status of each Commissioner and his duties and responsibilities towards his
Government will be determined by that Government.
[3] The two Commissioners shall together form the Permanent Indus Commission.
[4] The purpose and maintain co-operative arrangements for the implementation of
this Treaty, to promote co-operation between the Parties in the development of the
waters of the Rivers and, in particular,
[a] to study and report to the two Governments on any problem relating to the
development of the waters of the Rivers which may be jointly referred to the
Commission by the two Governments: in the event that a reference is made by one
Government alone, the Commissioner of the other Government shall obtain the
authorization of his Government before he proceeds t act on the reference;
[b] to make every effort to settle promptly, in accordance with the provisions of
Article IX [1], any question arising thereunder;
[c] to undertake, once in every five years, a general tour of inspection of the
Rivers for ascertaining the facts connected with various developments and works
on the Rivers;
[d] to undertake promptly, at the request of either Commissioner, a tour of
inspection of such works or sites on the Rivers as may be considered necessary by
him for ascertaining the facts connected with those works
[e] to take, during the Transition Period, such steps as may be necessary or sites;
and
for the implementation of the provisions of Annexure H.
[5] The Commission shall meet regularly at least once a year, alternately in India and
Pakistan. This regular annual meeting shall be held in November or in such other
month as may agreed upon between the Commissioners. The Commission shall
also meet when requested by either Commissioner.
[6] To enable the Commissioners to perform their functions in the Commission, each
Government agrees to accord to the Commissioner of the other Government the
same privileges and immunities as are accorded to representatives of member
States to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations under Sections
11, 12 and 13 of Article IV of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations (dated 13th February, 1946) during the periods specified in
those Sections. It is understood and agreed that these privileges and immunities
are accorded to the Commissioners not for the personal benefit of the individuals
themselves but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in
connection with the Commission; consequently, the Government appointing the
Commissioner not only has the right but is under a duty to waive the immunity of
its Commissioner in any case where, in the opinion of the appointing Government,
the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without
prejudice to the purpose for which the immunity is accorded.
[7] For the purposes of the inspections specified in Paragraph [4] [c] and [d], each
Commissioner may be accompanied by two advisers or assistants to whom
appropriate facilities will be accorded.
[8] The Commission shall submit to the Government of India and to the Government
of Pakistan, before the first of June of every year, a report on its work for the year
ended on the preceding 31st March, and may submit to the two Governments
other reports at such times as it may think desirable.
[9] Each Government shall bear the expenses of its Commissioner and his ordinary
staff. The cost of any special staff required in connection with the work mentioned
in Article VII [1] shall be borne as provided therein.
[10] The Commission shall determine its own procedures.
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Article IX
Settlement of Differences and Disputes
[1] Any question which arises between the Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Treaty or the existence of any fact which, if established, might
constitute a breach of this Treaty shall first be examined by the Commission,
which will endeavour to resolve the question by agreement.
[2] If the Commission does not reach agreement on any of the questions mentioned in
Paragraph [1], then a difference will be deemed to have arisen, which shall be
dealt with as follows:
[a] Any difference which, in the opinion of either Commissioner, falls within the
provisions of Part 1 of Annexure F shall, at the request of either Commissioner, be
dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of
Annexure F;
[b] If the difference does not come within the provisions of Paragraph [2] [a], or
if a Neutral Expert, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 7 of Ann exure
F, has informed the Commission that, in his opinion, the difference, or a part
thereof, should be treated as a dispute, then a dispute will be deemed to have
arisen which shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph [3],
[4] and [5]:
Provided that, at the discretion of the Commission, any difference may either be
dealt with by a Neutral Expert in accordance with the provisions of Part 2 of
Annexure F or be deemed to be a dispute to be settled in accordance with the
provisions of Paragraphs [3], [4] and [5], or may be settled in any other way
agreed upon by the Commission.
[3] As soon as a dispute to be settled in accordance with this and the succeeding
paragraphs of this Article has arisen, the Commission shall, at the request of either
Commissioner, report the fact to the two Governments, as early as practicable,
stating in its report the points on which the Commission is in agreement and the
issues in dispute, the views of each Commissioner on these issues and his reasons
therefor.
[4] Either Government may, following receipt of the report referred to in Paragraph
[3], or if it comes to the conclusion that this report is being unduly delayed in the
Commission, invite the other Government to resolve the dispute by agreement. In
doing so it shall state the names of its negotiators and their readiness to meet with
the negotiators to be appointed by the other Government at a time and place to be
indicated by the other Government. To assist in these negotiations, the two
Governments may agree to enlist the services of one of more mediators acceptable
to them.
[5] A Court of Arbitration shall be established to resolve the dispute in the manner
provided by Annexure G
[a] upon agreement between the Parties to do so; or
[b] at the request of either Party, if, after negotiations have begun pursuant to
Paragraph [4], in its opinion the dispute is not likely to be resolved by negotiation
or mediation; or
[c] at the request of either Party, if, after the expiry of one month following
receipt by the other Government of the invitation referred to in Paragraph [4], that
Party comes to the conclusion that the other Government is unduly delaying the
negotiations.
[6] The provisions of Paragraphs [3], [4] and [5] shall not apply to any difference
while it is being dealt with by a Neutral Expert.
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Article X
Emergency Provision
If, any time prior to 31st March 1965, Pakistan should represent to the Bank that,
because of the outbreak of large-scale international hostilities arising out of causes
beyond the control of Pakistan, it is unable to obtain from abroad the materials and
equipment necessary for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of that part of the system
of works referred to in Article IV [1] which relates to the replacement referred to
therein, (hereinafter referred to as the "replacement element"), and if, after consideration
of this representation in consultation with India, the Bank is of the opinion that
[a] these hostilities are on a scale of which the consequences is that Pakistan is unable
to obtain in time such materials and equipment as must be procured from abroad
for the completion, by 31st March 1973, of the replacement element, and
[b] since the Effective Date, Pakistan has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the said
materials and equipment and, with such resources of materials and equipment as
have been available to Pakistan both from within Pakistan and from abroad, has
carried forward the construction of the replacement element with due diligence
and all reasonable expedition,
the Bank shall immediately notify each of the Parties accordingly. The Parties
undertake, without prejudice to the provisions of Article XII [3] and [4], that, on being
so notified, they will forthwith consult together and enlist the good offices of the Bank
in their consultation, with a view to reaching mutual agreement as to whether or not, in
the light of all the circumstances then prevailing, any modifications of the provisions of
this Treaty are appropriate and advisable and, if so, the nature and the extent of the
modifications.
Article XI
General Provisions
[1] It is expressly understood that
[a] this Treaty governs the rights and obligations of each Party in relation to the
other with respect only to the use of the waters of the Rivers and matters
incidental thereto; and
[b] nothing contained in this Treaty, and nothing arising out of the execution
thereof, shall be construed as constituting a recognition or waiver (whether tacit,
by implication or otherwise) of any rights or claims whatsoever of either of the
Parties other than those rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived
in this Treaty.
Each of the Parties agrees that it will not invoke this Treaty, anything contained therein,
or anything arising out of the execution thereof, in support of any of its own rights or
claims whatsoever or in disputing any of the rights or claims whatsoever of the other
Party, other than those rights or claims which are expressly recognized or waived in this
Treaty.
[2] Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed by the Parties as in any way establishing
any general principle of law or any precedent.
[3] The rights and obligations of each Party under this Treaty shall remain unaffected
by any provisions contained in, or by anything arising out of the execution of, any
agreement establishing the Indus Basin Development Fund.
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Article XII
Final Provisions
[1] This Treaty consists of the Preamble, the Articles hereof and Annexures A to H
hereto, and may be cited as "The Indus Waters Treaty 1960."
[2] This Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged in
New Delhi. It shall enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications, and will
then effect retrospectively from the first of April 1960.
[3] The provisions of this Treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified
treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.
[4] The provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of this Treaty as modified under
the provisions of Paragraph [3], shall continue in force until terminated by a duly
ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty
and have hereunto affixed their seals.
Done in triplicate in English at Karachi on this Nineteenth day of September 1960.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA:
(Sd) Jawaharlal Nehru
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN:
(Sd) Mohammad Ayub Khan
Field Marshall, HP., H.J.
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT for the purposes specified in Articles V and X and Annexures
F, G and H:
(Sd) W. A. B. Iliff
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APPENDIX 8
Chronology of the Indus Basin Dispute and Mediations
1947 Aug 14	 Pakistani independence and the Arbitral Tribunal dealing with
the partition of the Punjab comes into effect.
Aug 15 Indian independence, and India inherits automatic membership
of international organisations from British India. Indian states
are obliged to accede to one dominion or other by this date.
Aug 17 Radcliffe's Boundary Awards are published for the provinces of
Punjab and Bengal, delinating the international boundary
between India and Pakistan.
Sept	 Pakistan applies for and becomes a member of the United
Nations.
Oct 26 Jammu and Kashmir accede to India. The next day starts an
undeclared war between India and Pakistan in which Pakistan is
contesting the accession.
Nov	 The province of Junagadh after having first acceded to Pakistan,
now joins India.
Nov 30	 5 references are made to the Arbitral Tribunal to do with
financial adjustments arising out of Punjab's partition.
Dec 20 A Standstill Agreement is signed by the Chief Engineers of
divided Punjab. They agree to continue the supply of water to
UBDC and Dipalpur canals from Ferozepur Headworks, at pre-
partition levels. (The Agreement is due to expire on 31 March
1948, the same day the Arbitral Tribunal expires.)
Dec 22 A sixth reference is made to the Arbitral Tribunal regrading
West Punjab's (Pakistan) claim to the Mandi hydroelectric
scheme.
1948 Jan 30	 Gandhi is assassinated.
March 17	 Arbitral Tribunal makes its awards regarding all 6 referrals.
March 29	 East Punjab (India) notifies West Punjab (Pakistan) of the
Standstill Agreements' expiry on 31 March 48.
March 31	 Arbitral Tribunal and Standstill Agreements cease to exist.
April 1	 East Punjab (India) stops supply of water from the Ferozepur
Headworks to the Dipalpur and Upper Bari Doab canals.
April 15 Chief Engineers of West and East Punjab meet in Simla to
resolve the water problem. The Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Liaquat Ali Khan, telegrams the Prime Minister of India,
Jawaharlal Nehru requesting immediate action to restore the
water; and expressing his regret that before India and Pakistan
have had the time to settle their existing problems East Punjab
has created new ones.
April 16 Prime Minister Nehru telegrams Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
Khan, to say that he trusts the Simla conference between the
Chief Enginners will reach a solution.
April 17	 In the meantime the West Punjab Government suspends the
issuing of permits to remove valuables from bank lockers, and
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orders bank managers to stop any transfer of securities from
West Punjab to India.
April 18 2 Simla Agreements signed by the Chief Engineers of West and
East Punjab, on the Dipalpur canals and CBDC. But it is not
ratified by West Punjab.
April 24 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan telegrams Prime Minister
Nehru saying that an Inter-Dominion conference is needed to
discuss the Simla Agreements; so can he please fix a date and
place as soon as possible.
April 30 Prime Minister of India orders the East Punjab Government to
resume the supply of water to West Punjab on the basis of the
Simla Agreement, subject to variations from the forthcoming
Inter-Dominion conference to be held on 3 May 48.
May 3-4	 Inter-Dominion Conference held in New Delhi.
May 4
	
Inter-Dominion (Delhi) Agreement signed by Pakistan and
India.
July 21	 Lahore Conference, India and Pakistan meet again to discuss
water.
Sept	 The State of Hyderabad joins India after its decision to accede
to Pakistan was thwarted by India.
Sept 11	 The Governor General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah dies.
1949 Jan 1	 UN ceasefire from midnight in Jammu and Kashmir.
June 16 Pakistan writes to India saying its is unhappy with the Delhi
Agreement and wants another Inter-Dominion Conference. If
this conference fails to get agreement, then Pakistan would want
to take the Sutlej water dispute to the International Court of
Justice. India refuses to countenance submitting the case to the
ICJ.
Aug 4-6	 The Indian proposed Inter-Dominion conference is held in New
Delhi.
1950 Jan 9 The World Bank tells India to resolve its water dispute with
Pakistan over River Sutlej before it will finance the Bhakra and
Nangal dam projects.
Feb 14 The Prime Minister of Pakistan writes to the Prime Minister of
India stating that they have to settle the Canal Waters dispute
(over use of water from the River Sutlej) before anything else
can be done.
March 27-29 The Inter-Dominion Conference proposed at the conference in
August 1949, is held in Karachi.
May 29-31	 A second Inter-Dominion Conference proposed at the
conference in August 1949, is held in New Delhi.
May 10 India registers the Delhi Agreement with the Secretariat of the
United Nations, as Treaty No. 794. Pakistan counters by
registering a certified statement disclaiming this treaty's
validity.
Jun-July
	 Pakistan stops paying disputed seignorage charges to India.
Oct 8 The Prime Minister of India writes to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan offering to set up a tribunal to settle the Canal Waters
dispute. The international tribunal would comprise four judges,
two each from Pakistan and India. Pakistan refuses saying this
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would only lead to stalemate and India is trying to gain time by
proposing such a tactic.
1951 Feb	 David Lilienthal tours the Indian Subcontinent.
March 23	 There is a strong chance that Pakistan would take the Canal
Waters dispute to UN's Security Council.
Aug 4	 Lilienthal's article is published in Colliers, "Another Korea in
the Making?"
Aug 8 Lilienthal meets with members of the World Bank
Management: President Black, General Counsel Sommers and
Assistant to the President Ilif.
Sept 6 The President of the World Bank writes to the Prime Ministers
of India and Pakistan offering its good offices in settling the
Canal Waters dispute.
Sept 25	 The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan accept the World
Bank's good offices, writing separately to President Black.
Oct 8 Lilienthal meets again with members of the World Bank
Management: Vice-President Gamer, General Counsel
Sommers and the Bank's engineer General Wheeler. Lilienthal
warns the Management against taking an engineering approach
to the dispute before there is clear political agreement upon the
principles to settle the dispute.
Oct 16 The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, is
assassinated. Khwaja Nazimuddin is appointed the new Prime
Minister.
Nov 8 President Black writes again to the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan suggesting setting up a Working Party. The Working
Party would work out the procedure to start creating a
comprehensive plan using Lilienthal's principles as a basis.
These principles, as Black sees them, are: [i] there is enough
water for all existing and future needs in the Indus basin for
both countries; [ii] unitary development is needed, therefore all
the rivers in the basin are to be considered in finding a solution
and not just the Sutlej alone; [iii] talks will be conducted on a
functional plane in which past claims and disputes will be
avoided. Black's Working Party was to have indigenous
engineers from India and Pakistan who would be assisted by the
World Bank's Designee engineer. This latter engineer would
only be available to advise the parties, not to arbitrate between
them. Furthermore, the Bank's engineer was also to ensure that
the plans being suggested were financially viable. Once the
Working Party had decided upon the initial procedures, it would
implement them to start creating the comprehensive plan
without the need for further authorisation from the Indian and
Pakistani Governments.
1952	 India completes the Harike Barrage.
Jan-Feb
	
President Black visits India and Pakistan, and tries to get
complete commmitment to the method outlined by the Bank.
March 13 President Black writes to the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan outlining terms under which the agreed Working Party
would proceed. Black also requests that for the duration of the
Bank's good offices, neither side would diminish supplies to
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existing uses. It is agreed that the shared objective is to increase
water to both countries substantially. Black invites India and
Pakistan to send their Designee engineer and party to meet in
Washington DC in May 1952 to start discussions.
May 7	 The Working Party holds its first meeting in the World Bank's
headquarters in Washington, DC.
Nov	 The Working Party meet again in Washington, DC.
Dec 16 The Pakistani Foreign Minister and representative to the UN's
Security Council, Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, mentions the
Canal Waters dispute (Indus Basin Dispute) to the Security
Council.
1953 Jan	 The Working Party meet again in Washington, DC.
April 17 Pakistan's Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, sacks
Khwaja Nazimuddin as Prime Minister, and appoints
Mohammad Ali Bogra instead.
April India appoints G R Garg to ensure compliance with President
Black's stipulation in his letter of 13 March 1952, to not
diminish supplies. However, the initial title of this appointment
causes some controversy with Pakistan as it refers to ensuring
compliance with the disputed Delhi Agreement. The World
Bank refuses to endorse this appointment until India changes
the title. The Bank explains that though the appointment is a
good idea, the effect of this action is lost through reference to
the disputed agreement. India changes the title to the "Special
Commissioner for Canal Waters".
May 13 Pakistan confirms to the World Bank, that it has appointed K A
Ghafoor as its Irrigation Commissioner to partner India's
Special Commissioner, and ensure compliance with President
Black's letter of 13 March 1952.
May 21 India opens a new distributary system near the towns of Mudki
and Golewala, drawing water from the Sutlej river above
Ferozepur. The Pakistani Irrigation Commissioner protests
against this opening to the Indian Special Commissioner for
Canal Waters.
June 27	 N D Gulhati replaces Dr Khosla as Indian Designee Engineer to
the Working Party.
Oct 6 India and Pakistan submit their proposals for the comprehensive
plan to the World Bank. The Indian Plan calculates the total
water suply in the Indus Basin to be 119 MAF. Out of this the
plan allocates to Pakistan 90 MAF (93% of the western rivers),
and to India 29 MAF (all of the eastern rivers and 7% of the
western rivers). The Paksitani Plan calculates the total water to
be 118 MAF. Pakistan allocates itself 102.5 MAF (all the
western rivers and 30% of the eastern rivers), and India 15.5
MAF (70% of the eastern rivers). Neither party accepts the
other's plan.
1954 Feb 5 The World Bank presents its own proposal in which the division
of the Indus Basin that was implicit in the Indian and Pakistani
plans, is made explicit: Pakistan would get the entire Western
rivers except for small uses in Jammu and Kashmir and India
would get all the water in the Eastern rivers. Since India was the
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principle beneficiary, it would pay for the link canals taking
water from the Western rivers to areas previsously dependent
upon the Eastern rivers. A transitional period was envisaged
during which India could progressively withdraw water from
the Eastern rivers as long as Pakistani existing uses were not
reduced and the link canals were built according to schedule.
The World Bank was giving India its historical withdrawals,
and surplus water for future development. Pakistan was getting
its historic withdrawals; the Sutlej Valley Canals would be
brought upto allocation in all but unusually bad years; enough
water would be available to meet the planned Thal and Kotri
projects offtaking the River Indus; and in an average year
Pakistan would have enough surplus water to meet additional
needs planned on the Indus at Sukkur and Gudu.
Feb 8	 President Black writes to the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan putting forward the World Bank proposal.
March 22-25 India accepts the World Bank proposal, and emphasises the
need to protect existing uses within the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, and future development which would probably
involve small consumptive uses. Pakistan does not give a clear
commitment to the Proposal. It believes the Sukkur and Gudu
irrigation schemes should be taken into account, which would
then show the Proposal to have significant shortages, unless
Pakistan is guaranteed a substantial portion of the Eastern
rivers.
April 2	 Pakistan opens the Balloki-Suleimanke Link.
May	 Pakistan accepts military aid from the USA.
May 10
	 India announces to Pakistan and the World Bank, that it intends
to open the Bhalcra Main Line Canal in June 1954.
May 14 The Prime Minister of Pakistan condemns the World Bank
proposal as unfair, and sends Pakistani representatives to
negotiate the necessary adjustments. Indian representatives see
this as Pakistan rejecting the Bank's Proposal, whereas the
Bank itself awaits clarification of Pakistan's message before
passing judegement.
May 21 The World Bank informd the Pakistani Government that its
message has not been seen as acceptance of the Bank's
Proposal, nor can it be regarded as the basis for further joint
discussion. It emphasises that Pakistan must accept the division
of rivers as the starting point. If then during negotiations it
becomes clear that Pakistan's envisaged irrigation uses would
not be met by such division, then the World Bank would offer
its good offices to bring about acceptable adjustments.
May 27
	 The Pakistani Government propose to hold discussions with the
World Bank.
June Pakistan's new team arrives in Washington, DC headed by
Ghulam Mueenuddin and includes Mohammad Shoaib (the
World Bank Executive Director for Pakistan, and later the
Minister of Finance under Ayub Khan).
June 15 The World Bank start discussions with the Pakistani Foreign
Minister Sir Zafrulla Khan who is visiting Washington, DC,
regarding Pakistan's acceptance of the World Bank proposal.
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July 28 The Pakistani Foreign Minister accepts the World Bank
proposal in principle, as long as the plan that is worked out so
that Pakistan's uses can be met from the Western rivers.
Aug 8 The Prime Minister of India writes to the World Bank
expressing reservations regarding Pakistan's acceptance of the
Proposal, and wants to hold clarificatory talks with the Bank's
representatives, meeting in the Indian Subcontinent.
Aug 13 President Black writes to the Prime Minister of India and the
Pakistani Foreign Minister suggesting that instead of holding
clarificatory talks with either side in the Indian Subcontinent,
their representatives meet in Washington DC to resume work on
creating a comprehensive plan. The starting point though should
be the division of the rivers. And if Pakistani needs are not met
by the Western rivers alone, then other means may be
introduced.
Aug 19 The Prime Minister of India accepts President Black proposal
some with qualifications but still wants to hold talks, on
transitional arrangements, in India.
Aug 24	 The Pakistani Foreign Minister agrees to President Black's
proposal but also with qualifications.
Sept 1-16	 World Bank representatives, General Wheeler and General
Counsel Sommers, go to India and Pakn for discussions.
Oct	 Pakistan's Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad, appoints
General Ayub Khan as Minister of Defence.
Oct 4	 World Bank representatives hold discussions with Indian
representatives in Washington, DC.
Oct 7 President Black writes to the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan that the Bank has taken note of the Indian and
Pakistani comments. The bank willnot consider either side to be
bound by them, and is willing to resume cooperative work
under the terms of reference already suggested. Black invites
the Indian and Pakistani representatives back to Washington,
DC on that basis. Both Governments accept the invitation.
Dec 6	 Talks to work out a comprehensive plan resume.
1955 June 2 The World Bank brings about interim arrangements that keep
the situation in the Indus Basin under control while work to
create a comprehensive plan continues. Pakistan and India enter
ad hoc transitional agreement for 1 April - 30 Sept 1955. The
agreement allows Pakistan to withdraw ad hoc amounts from
the Eastern rivers during the agreed period, after Pakistan has
transferred whatever amount of water its can from the Western
rivers. Efforts in 1954 to arrange such an agreement had failed
despite prolonged negotiations.
Aug	 Pakistan devalues its currency, the rupee.
Oct	 The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Bogra, resigns
and is replaced by Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali.
Oct 14	 One Unit Rule is established in West and East Pakistan.
Oct 31	 Another ad hoc transitional agreement covering the period 1
Oct 1955 -31 March 1956, is signed by India and Pakistan.
1956 Spring	 Discussions continue between the Indians and Pakistanis under
the good offices of the World Bank. The issues involved are
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studied, and agreement cannot be reached on two points: [i] the
amount of water needed for some uses specified in the terms of
reference prescribed by the Bank; and [ii] certain technical
considerations especially the effect of dividing the Basin's
water upon the gains and losses experienced in the rivers. The
absence of agreement implies that the disputants still do not
have a common approach to the actual engineering features of a
comprehensive plan.
March 23	 Pakistan's first constitution is passed by the Constituent
Assembly.
May 21 Consultants, employed by the World Bank, decide that the
Western rivers not inadequate to meet Pakistan's needs
envisaged under the Bank's Proposal of February 1954. The
Bank, based upon these studies, draws up an Aide-Memoire.
This amendment envisages constructing storage facilities on the
Western rivers to make up any deficit. The Aide Memoire also
offers the Bank's good offices to get agreement upon any
adjustments to the original proposal that may be required.
June 1	 The World Bank proposes the continuance of cooperative work
until 31 March 1957.
June 18 India agrees to the continuance, but asks Pakistan to accept the
principle of division without any qualification before
proceeding with negotiations.
June 27	 Pakistan agrees to continue cooperative work, but with provisos
re: any ultimate plan.
June 30 The World Bank does not regard the Indian and Pakistani
replies as adequate to continuing the cooperative work, but
recommends continuing work based upon the Bank's 1954
Proposal and Aide Memoire.
Sept	 India and Pakistan agree to continue cooperative work on the
proposed basis.
Sept 24	 Another ad hoc transitional agreement, 1 April 1956 - 31 March
1957, is signed by India and Paksitan.
Oct	 The Pakistani Prime Minister, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali,
resigns and is replaced by H S Suhrawardy.
Nov	 Members of the World Bank Management are involved in
trying to resolve the Suez Crisis.
Sept 56 - March 57
1957 April 11
Talks continue and the plans that emerge are vastly different in
concept and cost. The Indian plans is too 'tight', since their
main concern is the size of their financial liability to Pakistan to
cover the cost of the replacement works. By contort the
Pakistani plan is too grandiose, prompting the World Bank to
urge Pakistan to look, seriously, into its irrigation planning.
President Black writes to the Prime Ministers of India and
Pakistan proposing a formal extension of cooperative work until
30 Sept 1957. The Indian and Pakistani delegates are not
needed in Washington, DC for the duration. In the meantime,
the World Bank will review the progress to date and determine
what future action is needed. This proposal is agreed to by the
two countries.
327
1958
Spring
May 13 The World Bank gives the delegations a draft of the "Heads of
Agreement" as a basis to resolve the dispute on the international
waters. The Agreement reiterates the division of water, a
transitional period, and setting up a commission with
responsibilities that include preparing the plan that is needed to
implement the proposed water division.
May 27	 Vice-President Iliff discusses the Heads of Agreement with the
Indian delegates.
June 10 Vice-President Iliff has further discussions regarding the Heads
of Agreement, in New Delhi, with representatives of the Indian
Government.
June 11-14 Iliff discusses with representatives of the Pakistani Government
in Lahore, the Heads of Agreement. No tangible progress is
made as Pakistan's main objections are based upon the absence
of any agreed plan to implement the works arising out of the
division, and the unsettled matter of financial liability for the
works.
June 24 The World Bank makes the Heads of Agreement more general,
and asks the delegates whether it is now acceptable as the basis
for further discussions.
July 13
	
Pakistan gives its view.
July 25	 India gives its view.
Aug 21 Vice-President Iliff meets separately the representatives of the
Indian and Pakistani Government. He suggests that each
country submits in writing its opinion on the Heads of
Agreement. And then to meet separately with the World Bank
for oral discussions, and to give its opinion on the written views
of the other Government. The purpose of this excercise is to
allow the World Bank to make up its mind regarding its future
involvement, if any, in the dispute. Iliff, also, suggests that the
disputants attempt to negotiate another ad hoc agreement for the
period from 1 October 1957 - 30 September 1958.
Oct	 The Pakistani Prime Minister, H S Suhrawardy, is dismissed
and replaced by I Chandrigar.
Nov-Dec	 Negotiations in Karachi and New Delhi fail to reach agreement
regarding an ad hoc agreement.
Dec	 The Pakistani Prime Minister, I Chandrigar, resigns and is
replaced by Firoz Khan Noon.
April
West Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA) is established.
India puts forward Marhu Tunnel Plan: taps Chenab for use in
India, gives same water amount in fixed deliveries to Pkn from
eastern rivers. Plcn rejects plan cos: (i) Indian interference in
Chenab waters (ii) increase Pkni dependence on India for water.
Pim says will present own plan soon which preserves
independence from India.
The Marhu Tunnel Plan is discussed in Rome. No Pkni
alternative discussed, but using information given by Pkn re:
storage possibilities on Jhelum, IBRD suggests using such
storage to replace SVC supplies, this would be cheaper than
link canal replacement from Indus. Pkn agrees to look at idea
and prepare plan on this basis.
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April 17
May 13
July Pkn presents London Plan, in London. Proposing series of dams
(i) Tarbela, Indus and 600,000 kw power plant (ii) Mangla,
Jhelum in Azad Kashmir and 300,000 kw power plant (iii) 3
subsidary dams on Jhelum and 10 link canals. Discussions
adjourned to allow India to study plan in detail.
Oct 7-8 night In Pakistan the democratically elected government is
overthrown by a coup d'etat that installs General Ayub Khan as
President.
Oct	 The World Bank discusses with India the policy decisions
needed to get agreement.
Dec The World Bank holds discussions with India and Pakistan in
Washington, DC on the Pakistan's London Plan, and the Indian
Plan (which is in effect a revised Marhu Tunnel Plan). Pakistan
does not accept the Indian Plan, and India does not accept the
London Plan saying it is too big, too costly, and the transitional
period is too long.
Dec 22 In a dramatic turn around, the Pakistani representatives accept
the World Bank's 1954 Proposal and Aide Memoire,
unconditionally, as the basis upon which to continue
cooperative work.
1959 March 26 The World Bank present its Settlement Plan incorporating the
principles of the 1954 Proposal and Aide Memoire. The Plan
provides for irrigation replacement in Pakistan and the
development of irrigation and power in Indian and Pakistan.
Regarding the financing of the Plan, the World Bank suggest
the following guidelines to working out each country's liability:
[a] the replacement works should not be a financial burden
upon Pakistan; [b] but the Indian contribution should reflect the
real cost of implementation and its ability to pay; and [c] the
country benefitting from a particular scheme should pay for its
construction through loans. The Plan's implementation would
see an international water treaty being signed by India and
Pakistan. This treaty would in turn set up an Indus Development
Commission which would exist for, at least, the transitional
period.
Another year long ad hoc agreement is signed for the period 1
April 1959 - 31 March 1960.
President Black and Vice-President Iliff meet the Prime
Minister of India and other governmental representatives in
New Delhi. Discussion focuses upon India's possible financial
contribution, the arrangements for hte transitional period and
the Indian Government's opinion regarding the inclusion of a
reservoir at Mangla as part of the replacement plan.
Understanding is reached that the Indian liability to Pakistan
would be limited to $175 million, the transitional period would
last for 10 years, and Paksitan would incur financial penalties if
it went beyond this time, though a 3 year extension had been
envisaged. India would also get the foreign exchange costs of
building the Beas dam in India. This dam and a 200,000 kw
power plant would be part of the Settlement Plan's projects in
India. And finally Indian claim to sovereignty over Jammu and
Kashmir would be protected by a suitable formula.
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May 18 World Bank representatives get Pakistan to agree to amended
works in Pakistan under the Bank's Settlement Plan. New works
include 2 reservoirs at Tarbela and Mangla; 8 link canals
transfering water from the Western rivers to the Sutlej Valley
canals; a 300,000 kw hydroelectric power station at Mangla and
tubewells to promote drainage. Pakistan agreed to absorb costs
already incurred in constructing the existing link canals, and
withdraws any claims for compensation for operation and
maintenance of these replacement works. The World Bank
would be willing to seek funds from friendly Governments, to
finance the amended works' system. Further negotiations were
still needed for Indian uses on the Western rivers regarding
additional consumptive uses, and hydroelectric uses.
June	 The Pakistani established Indus Basin Advisory Board (IBAB)
holds its first meeting in Lahore.
Aug 5 Talks are held between the Bank, India and Pakistan in London
regarding the transitional arrangements; Indian rights on the
Western rivers; and drafting the Heads of Agreement for the
international water treaty. These talks and others during
September reach agreement on the Heads of Agreement: [i] the
division of the Indus rivers' water; [ii] the transitional
arrangements; [iii] Indian hydro-electric and non-consumptive
uses on the Western rivers; [iv] financial provisions involving
the Indian and Pakistani Governments; [v] the exchange of
hydrological data regarding the rivers; [vi] future cooperation;
[vii] further discussion of proposals to establish a routine to
resolve future disputes; and [viii] some general matters.
Sept	 IBAB's second meeting in London.
Oct Discussions are held in Washington, DC regarding detailed
transitional period arrangements, and Indian consumptive uses
on western rivers. Drafting of the water treaty's text begins.
Dec 9 The water treaty's main text is drafted. The more important
articles provide for: [a] allocation of the Eastern rivers to India
after the transitional period; [b] Western rivers allocation to
Pakistan with provision for Indian hydroelectric and non-
consumptive uses; [c] Indian payment into the Indus Basin
Development Fund for the replacement works; [d] the exchange
of hydrological data between India and Pakistan; [e] future
cooperation between India and Pakistan; [f] the establishment of
the Permanent Indus Commission who's purpose and function
is to establish and maintain a cooperative implementation of the
Treaty, and promote cooperative development of rivers; [g]
establish a procedure to resolve future differences and disputes.
Still to be resolved are the annexes regarding the transitional
period, and Indian consumptive uses on western rivers. Draft
copies of the text are sent to the Indian and Pakistani
Governments.
1960 Jan 6 The Indus Basin Development Fund draft is completed, and
copies are sent to the Pakistani Government and the
contributing 'friendly' Governments. The Fund will be
administered by the World Bank, and all contributions will first
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Jan 18-20
Sept 19
be paid into the Fund from which the Bank would disburse
upon receiving the receipts.
Engineering consultants meet in Washington, DC regarding the
implementation of the Settlement Plan in Pakistan.
The Indus Water Treaty is signed in Karachi by the Pakistani
President, Ayub Khan, the Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, and
the World Bank Vice-President, Iliff.
1961 Jan	 The Indus Waters Treaty is ratified by both countries in New
Delhi, bringing into effect the Indus Basin Development Fund.
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3/6/49	 IBRD memo written by Beescroft, "India-Pakistan Water-Rights
Problem".
28/9/49	 Letter India —› IBRD, "Canal Water Dispute Between India and
Pakistan".
9/1/50	 IBRD memo written by Hoar, "India".
11/1/50	 IBRD memo written by Hoar, "India".
2/3/50	 Letter within IBRD, Iliff —> Rucinski.
22/6/50	 IBRD memo written by Iliff, copied to Hoar, Rucinski, Burgess,
"Pakistan".
24/10/50	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, Laylin to Sommers.
31/1/51	 Letter IBRD: Rucinski —> Lilienthal.
23/3/51	 IBRD memo from Iliff —> Rucinski, "Water Dispute between Pakistan
and India".
2/8/51	 Letter Pakistan —› IBRD, Laylin to Black.
7/8/51	 Letter USA: Assistant Secretary of State, George C McGhee —>
Lilienthal. [Lilienthal sent copy to IBRD: Iliffl.
13/8/51	 Letter from Lilienthal —> IBRD: Black.
15/8/51	 Draft letter from IBRD —› India and Pakistan, from President Black to
the Prime Ministers.
28/8/51	 The Washington Post, "Pakistan Envoy rejects view his Nation, India
will unite".
1/9/51	 The Washington Post, "Mme Pandit denies saying India Pakistan will
unite".
6/9/51	 Letter IBRD —› India and Pakistan, from President Black to Prime
Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan.
18/9/51	 Letter India —> Pakistan, from the Ministry of External Affairs, New
Delhi to the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi.
25/9/51a	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to President
Black.
25/9/51b	 Letter India —> IBRD, Prime Minister Nehru to President Black.
27/9/51	 Letter Pakistan —› IBRD, from Ambassador to Washington, DC, M A H
Ispahani, to President Black.
3/10/51	 Letter IBRD: Sommers —> Lilienthal.
9/10/51	 IBRD memo from Sommers, "India and Pakistan Water Rights".
12/10/51	 Draft letter IBRD —> India and Pakistan, from President Black to Prime
Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan.
16/10/51a	 Letter Lilienthal —› IBRD: Black.
16/10/5 lb	 Internal IBRD letter to Loan Director, A S G Hoar.
22/10/51	 Draft letter IBRD —> India and Pakistan, from President Black to the
Prime Ministers.
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24/10/51	 IBRD memo from Sommers —> President Black, Vice-President Garner,
General Wheeler, Loan Director Hoar, and Rist.
8/11/51	 Letter IBRD —> India and Pakistan, from President Black to Prime
Ministers Nehru and Khwaja Nazimuddin.
16/11/51	 Letter USA —> IBRD, from the Director, Office of South Asian Affairs,
US State Department, Donald D Kennedy to Vice-President Garner
13/12/51	 Letter Lilienthal —> India: A N Khosla, Additional Secretary, Ministry
of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, Indian Government.
ND1951	 Note, "Note on Mr. Black's letter of November 8, 1951".
19/12/51	 Telegram within IBRD, from Iliff in Karachi --> Garner in Washington,
DC.
21/12/51	 IBRD memo written by Allan Christelow --> President Black with
telegrams from Iliff.
14/1/52	 IBRD memo written by Sommers —> Joseph Rucinski, Chief of the Asia
and Middle East Division.
18/1/52	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from the Ambassador in Washington, DC, M
A H Ispahani to President Black.
23/1/52	 IBRD notes from Sommers --> President Black's Party and copied to
Rucinksi, "India-Pakistan Water Rights".
24/1/52	 Letter from IBRD: Iliff —> Lilienthal.
25/1/52	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston —> Rucinksi.
29/1/52	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston —> Rucinksi.
10/2/52	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston —> Rucinksi.
20/2/52	 Letter IBRD --> USA, from Sommers to Donald D Kennedy, US State
Department.
4/3/52	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
8/3/52a	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi --> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
8/3/52b	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
8/3/52c	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
8/3/52d	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
8/3/52e	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Black in
Australia.
9/3/52	 Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
10/3/52a	 Telegram within IBRD, from Sommers in Washington, DC —> Bengston
in Karachi.
10/3/52b	 Telegram within IBRD, from Sommers in Washington, DC —> Black in
Australia.
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12/3/52a
12/3/52b
13/3/52a
13/3/52b
13/3/52c
13/3/52d
14/3/52a
14/3/52b
15/3/52a
15/3/52b
16/3/52a
16/3/52b
16/3/52c
20/3/52
16/6/52
Telegram within IBRD, from Black in Australia —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
Telegram within IBRD, from Black in Australia —> Bengston in
Karachi.
Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in New Delhi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in New Delhi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in New Delhi —> Black in
Australia.
Letter IBRD —> Pakistan and India, from President Black to Prime
Ministers Khwaja Nazimuddin and Nehru respectively.
Telegram within IBRD, from Sommers in Washington, DC —> Black in
Australia.
Telegram within IBRD, from Sommers in Washington, DC —> Bengston
in New Delhi.
Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in New Delhi —> Black in
Australia.
Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in New Delhi —> Black in
Australia.
Telegram within IBRD, from Black in Australia —> Bengston in
Karachi.
Telegram within IBRD, from Black in Australia —> Bengston in
Karachi.
Telegram within IBRD, from Bengston in Karachi —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
Telegram within IBRD, from Black in Australia —> Sommers in
Washington, DC.
Memo written by Pakistan —> IBRD, from Laylin to Iliff, "Indo-
Pakistan Water Dispute". The memo was sent to Black, Garner and
Hoar by Iliff.
15/8/52
	 IBRD memo written by Fontein, "Pakistan - Proposed Warsak
Hydroelectric Power Project".
5/1/53	 Telegram within IBRD, from Wheeler in Lahore —> Black in
Washington, DC.
24/3/53	 Letter within Pakistan, from Legal Counsel, John G. Laylin, to the
IBRD Executive Director for Pakistan Mohammad Shoaib.
26/3/53 Letter IBRD —> Pakistan, from Assistant to the President Iliff to the
IBRD Executive Director for Pakistan, Mohammad Shoaib, copied to
Sommers.
28/3/53a
	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from the Embassy in Ankara, Ghazanfar Ali
Khan, to President Black.
28/3/53b	 Telegram IBRD —> Pakistan, from President Black to the Deputy
Minister of Economy, Nasir Ahmad.
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31/3/53	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from the Embassy in Paris, Habib Ibrahim
Rahimtoola, to President Black.
6/4/53	 Letter India —> Pakistan, from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime Minister
Nazimuddin.
7/4/53	 IBRD memo written by Sommers and copied to Wheeler, Bengston, Iliff
and Prud'homme.
8/4/53 IBRD memo written by Hector Prud'homme to General Counsel,
Sommers, "Notes on Mr.Black's Conversations with Representatives of
Pakistan and India during his Middle East Trip on the subject of the
Indus River Water Dispute."
9/4/53	 IBRD memo written by Sommers to the Indian Executive Director, B K
Nehru.
10/4/53	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from Legal Counsel Assistant, C F Barber, to
General Counsel Sommers.
13/4/53	 IBRD memo, from the Indian Executive Director, B K Nehru to General
Counsel Sommers, "Indus Basin Water Problem".
15/4/53 Letter IBRD —> Pakistan, from Assistant to the President, Iliff to the
Ambassador in Washington, DC, Mohammad Ali; and copied to
Bengston.
17/4/53	 Agenda of a meeting between India and Pakistan.
21/4/53	 Letter IBRD —> Lilienthal, from President Black and copied to Cross,
Wheeler, Sommers and Iliff.
29/4/53 a	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from the Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
Shafqat, to Iliff.
29/4/53b
	
Note within the IBRD, from Iliff to Sommers.
1/5/53	 Draft IBRD letter written by Sommers to Iliff, Wheeler, Gregh and
Bengston.
4/5/53	 IBRD memo written by Wheeler —> Sommers, "Indus Water Dispute".
8/5/53 Letter IBRD —> Pakistan, from Assistant to the President, Iliff, to the
Charge d'Affaires ad interim, M.Shafqat, copied to Sommers, Cross and
Gregh.
13/5/53	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from the Charge d'Affaires ad interim,
Shafqat, to Iliff.
22/5/53	 IBRD memo written by Sommers and copied to Iliff, Wheeler,
Bengston, Gregh, Garner and Black, "Indus Water Dispute".
25/5/53	 Letter Pakistan —> India, from the Irrigation Commissioner, Ghafoor, to
Special Commissioner for Canal Waters, Garg.
6/6/53	 Letter India —> Pakistan, from Special Commissioner, Garg, to Irrigation
Commissioner, Ghafoor.
28/7/53	 Letter Pakistan —> India, from the Irrigation Commissioner, Ghafoor, to
Special Commissioner for Canal Waters, Garg.
12/10/53
	
Report for Pakistan by Tipton, "Comments on India's Draft Outline of
Plan".
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14/10/53	 Telegram within Pakistan, from Irrigation Commissioner Ghafoor,
"Cable report for 1-10 October 1953 ".
21/10/53a	 Routing slip within IBRD, from Pakistan Executive Director, Shoaib to
Bengston.
21/10/53b Letter within India, from Special Commissioner for Canal Waters, Garg
to the Deputy Secretary to the Indian Government in the Ministry of
Irrigation and Power, Shri Vidya Ratna.
24/10/53	 Telegram within Pakistan, from Lahore, Punjab to Parep in Washington,
DC.
28/10/53a	 IBRD memo from Sommers and copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin".
28/10/53b
	
Letter Pakistan -4 India, from Prime Minister Mohammed Ali to Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
2/11/53	 Telegram India -÷ Pakistan, from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime
Minister Ali.
4/11/53	 Note [probably Pakistan], "Assuring Compliance with 13 March 1952
Agreement".
5/11/53
	 Letter within India, from Special Commissioner for Canal Waters, Garg,
to Gulhati.
10/11/53
	
Telegram India -> Pakistan, from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime
Minister Ali.
23/11/53	 IBRD memo from Sommers, "Indus Basin Water Dispute".
ND1954a	 Memo Pakistan -> IBRD, from Laylin to Sommers, "Supplementary
Conversations to Break the Deadlock in the Working Party".
ND1954b
	
IBRD note. [Estimated to have been written by Sommers, in May 1954.]
5/2/54	 IBRD Proposal.
8/2/54	 Letters IBRD -> India and Pakistan, from President Black to Prime
Ministers Nehru and Mohammed Ali.
22/3/54
	
Letter India -> IBRD, from Prime Minister Nehru to President Black.
25/3/54
	
Letter India -> IBRD, from Khosla to General Wheeler.
23/4/54
	
IBRD memo from Iliff -> Wheeler, copied to Bengston, "Indus Basin".
10/5/54a	 Letter India -> Pakistan, from Ministry of External Affairs to the High
Commission in New Delhi.
10/5/54b	 IBRD memo from Iliff -> Black copied to Wheeler, Bengston and
Garner, "Indus Basin Discussions".
14/5/54
	
Letter Pakistan -> IBRD, from Prime Minister Mohammed Ali to
President Black.
18/5/54a	 Extracts from Debates in the Indian Council of States on Foreign
Affairs, with comments by the Prime Minister.
18/5/54b	 Telegram within IBRD, from Vice President Garner in Washington, DC
to President Black in London.
20/5/54
	
Telegram UK -> Pakistan.
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21/5/54	 Letter IBRD —> Pakistan from Vice President Garner to Ambassador to
Washington, DC, Syed Amjad Ali.
25/5/54	 Newspaper report in the Pakistan Times.
27/5/54	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from Ambassador to Washington, DC, Syed
Amjad Ali to President Black.
7/6/54	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin: Ad
hoc Agreement".
9/6/54	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin".
10/6/54	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from Designee Engineer Mueenuddin to Vice
President Garner.
11/6/54a	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin - Ad
Hoc Agreement".
11/6/54b	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin - Ad
Hoc Agreement".
11/6/54c	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin - Ad
Hoc Agreement" .
15/6/54	 IBRD notes of meeting at 11.30am. Present: Pakistan - Zafrulla Khan,
Mueenuddin and Shoaib; and IBRD - Black and Sommers.
17/6/54a	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin: Ad
hoc Agreement".
17/6/54b	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Garner and Wheeler,
"Indus Basin: Ad hoc Agreement".
19/6/54	 Letter within Pakistan, from Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan ---> Prime
Minister Mohammed Ali.
21/6/54	 Letter India --> IBRD, from Prime Minister Nehru to President Black.
6/7/54	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler.
7/7/54a	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Basin:
Interim Arrangement".
7/7/54b	 IBRD memo written by Sommers, copied to Wheeler, "Draft Pakistan
Acceptance".
7/7/54c	 IBRD note.
12/7/54	 Letter draft by IBRD Executive Director Shoaib.
13/7/54a	 Telegram within IBRD, from Iliff in Washington, DC to Black in
Amsterdam.
13/7/54b	 Letter within IBRD, from Iliff to Black, copied to Wheeler.
13/7/54c	 IBRD memo written by Iliff, copied to Wheeler, "Indus Waters".
13/7/54d	 IBRD memo written by Iliff, copied to Wheeler.
16/7/54a	 Letter draft by IBRD Executive Director Shoaib.
16/7/54b	 Letter Pakistan --> India, from Irrigation Commissioner, Ghafoor to
Special Commissioner, Garg.
19/7/54	 IBRD memo, from Shoaib ---> Iliff, "Pakistan".
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20/7/54 Confidential letter draft, IBRD's President Black —> Indian and
Pakistani Prime Minsters, Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra
respectively.
21/7/54a	 Telegram draft, IBRD's President Black —> Indian and Pakistani Prime
Minsters, Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra respectively.
21/7/54b
	
IBRD note.
21/7/54c	 IBRD note written by Iliff, "Indus Waters - Procedure for Next Move
(as seen on July 21, 1954)".
21/7/54d	 IBRD note written by Iliff.
28/7/54a	 Letter Pakistan ---> IBRD, Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan to President
Black.
28/7/54b	 Letter IBRD —> India, Vice-President Garner to Prime Minister Nehru.
11/8/54
	
Letter India —> IBRD, from S N Haksar to Vice President Garner.
12/8/54	 Telegram Pakistani delegation head, Mueenuddin —> IBRD.
13/8/54	 Letter IBRD —> India and Pakistan, from President Black to Prime
Minister Nehru and Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan.
19/8/54	 Letter India —> IBRD, from Prime Minister Nehru to President Black.
24/8/54	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from Foreign Minister Zafrulla Khan to
President Black.
7/9/54	 Telegram within IBRD, from Wheeler and Sommers in New Delhi —>
Black, Iliff and Garner in Washington, DC.
16/9/54	 Telegram within IBRD, from Sommers in Karachi —> Black in
Washington, DC.
20/9/54
	
IBRD notes on Sommers and Wheeler mission to the Indian
Subcontinent, 1-16 September.
11/10/54	 IBRD memo written by Pakistan Executive Director, Shoaib —>
Sommers, "Canal Waters".
15/10/54	 IBRD note, from M T Flett —> Iliff.
18/10/54a	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra to
President Black.
18/10/54b	 Telegram within IBRD, from Iliff in Washington, DC —> Garner in
Pakistan.
20/10/54a Letter within Pakistan and copied to the IBRD. From the Chief Minister
of Punjab, Malik Feroz Khan Noon to the Minister for Interior, Mushtaq
Ahmad Gurmani; copied to Vice President Garner.
20/10/54b	 IBRD meeting of the Bank team, held in Iliff's office: Iliff, Sommers,
Wheeler, Colquhoun, Bengston, Bass and Guinness.
22/10/54a	 Telegram within IBRD, from Iliff in Washington, DC —> Garner in
Bombay.
22/10/54b	 Telegram within IBRD, from Garner in New Delhi —> Iliff in
Washington, DC.
22/10/54c	 Telegram within Pakistan, from Shoaib in Washington, DC —> Karachi.
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26/10/54	 Telegram within IBRD, from Iliff in Washington, DC —> Garner in New
Delhi, copied to Wheeler.
29/10/54	 Letter India —> IBRD, from Ambassador in Washington, G L Mehta to
President Black.
4/11/54	 Telegram within IBRD, from Gamer in Colombo —> Iliff in Washington,
DC.
9/11/54	 Letter India —> IBRD, from Prime Minister Nehru to President Black.
12/11/54a	 Letter Pakistan —> IBRD, from Shoaib to President Black.
12/11/54b	 IBRD memo written by Shoaib —> Mendels copied to Iliff, "Indus Basin
- Pakistan Delegation".
15/11/54	 IBRD memo written by Iliff, copied to Wheeler and Sommers, "Indus
Basin".
19/11/54	 IBRD memo written by Iliff —> Wheeler, "Indus Basin Discussions".
3/12/54	 IBRD note, "Indus Basin Discussions".
6/12/54a	 Meeting at 10.30am between whole Indian and Pakistani delegations,
and IBRD group excepting Bashore and Bass.
6/12/54b	 Meeting at 4.30pm in Shoaib's office between Mueenuddin, Shoaib,
Iliff and Bengston.
6/12/54c	 IBRD note on the Indus Basin Discussions Meeting, Dec 6, 1954.
Black's opening remarks.
7/12/54	 Meeting at 10am in Iliff s office between Gulhati, B K Nehru, Iliff and
Bengston.
9/12/54	 Meeting at 1 lain in Iliff's office between Gulhati, Malhotra, B K Nehru,
Iliff and Bengston.
14/12/54 Meeting at 10.30am in Iliff s office between Iliff, Bengston, Wheeler,
Colquhoun, Griffin, Drisko (who joined later), Guinness and Pakistan's
consultant engineers, Tipton and Hilliard.
31/1/55 Meeting at 3pm in G Street office between India, Pakistan and IBRD.
Present were IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Griffin, Drisko, Guinness;
Pakistan: Mueenuddin, Mahbub, Dr Quraishy, Khalil; and India:
Gulhati, Jaini, Malhotra, Vasudeva.
15/2/55 Meeting at 1 lam in G Street office between India, Pakistan and IBRD.
Present were IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Griffin, Drisko, Guinness; Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Mahbub, Khalil, Kirmani, Altaf; and India: Gulhati, Jaini,
Malhotra, Vasudeva, Lala.
16/2/55 Meeting in G Street office between India, Pakistan and IBRD. Present
were IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Griffin, Drisko, Guinness; Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Mahbub, Dr Quraishy, Khalil; and India: Gulhati, Jaini,
Malhotra, Ram, Vasudeva.
1715155 Meeting at 3pm in G Street office between India, Pakistan and IBRD.
Present were India: Gulhati, Jaini, Malhotra, Ram, Vasudeva; Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Mahbub, Dr Quraishy, Khalil, Altaf, Memon; and IBRD:
Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness.
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27/6/55	 Telegram IBRD	 India and Pakistan, from President Black to Prime
Ministers Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra.
22/11/55 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD: Iliff,
Sommers, Wheeler, Bengston, Griffin, Drisko, Guinness, Russler,
Rowland, and Lorber; India: Gulhati, Jaini and Malhotra
2/7/56.	 IBRD memo from J B Drisko —> Indus Group of the IBRD, "Pakistan
group visit, June 28, 29".
28/3/56	 Letter from IBRD --> India, President Black to Prime Minister Nehru.
21/5/56	 IBRD memo written by Iliff, "Indus Basin".
5/6/56	 Telegram within IBRD. From Iliff in Washington --> President Black in
London.
18/6/56	 IBRD meeting between Iliff, Bengston and Wheeler, with the minutes
copied to Drisko of TAMS.
2/7/56 IBRD memo written by J B Drisko --> Indus Group of the IBRD,
"Pakistan group visit, June 28, 29". Pakistan: Hamid, Quaraishy, and
Kirmani met with TAMS: Drisko, Russler, Rowland.
19/9/56 Joint meeting held at 4pm between IBRD, Pakistan and India. Present
were IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Mahbub, Quraishy, Kirmani, Niaz, Soonra and
India: Gulhati, Jaini, Malhotra, Ram, Vasudeva.
28/9/56 Meeting held at 10.30am between the IBRD and India. Present were
IBRD: Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and India: Dr Berber,
Gulhati.
2/10/56 Meeting held at 10.30am between the IBRD and India. Present were
IBRD: Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and India: Dr Berber,
Gulhati, Dr Malhotra.
4/10/56 Meeting held at 10am between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD:
Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and India: Dr Berber, Gulhati, Dr
Malhotra.
10/10/56 Meetings held over three different days, 10th, 12th, 16th October at
10.30am, between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD: Wheeler,
Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and India: Dr Berber, Gulhati, and Jaini.
16/10/56 Meeting at 2.30pm between IBRD and India. Present were IBRD:
Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and India: Gulhati, Jaini, Malhotra, Ram,
Vasudeva.
22/10/56 Meeting at 3pm between IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and Pakistan: Mueenuddin,
Hamid, Mahbub, Quraishy, Kirmani, Niaz.
16/11/56 Meeting held at 10.30am between the IBRD and India. Present were
IBRD: RAW, LHB, Griffin, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Rowland; and
India: Gulhati, Jaini, Malhotra, Ram, Vasudeva.
23/1/57 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
Iliff, Bengston, Griffin, Guinness; and Pakistan: Mueenuddin, Hamid
and Tipton.
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10/6/57 IBRD note regarding a meeting in New Delhi, Monday 11.30am.
Present were India: Minister, Deputy Minister, Secretary, Khosla,
Gulhati, Jaini, Kalra; and IBRD: Iliff, Bengston, Guinness.
11/6/57 IBRD note regarding a meeting in Lahore, Tuesday 5pm. Present were
Pakistan: Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Governor of West Pakistan;
and IBRD: Iliff. They were later joined by Pakistani engineers, and
Bengston and Guinness.
24/6/57 Letter from IBRD—*India, Pakistan. From Vice-President Iliff to Indian
Designee Engineer Gulhati, and Pakistan Designee Engineer
Mueenuddin. Containing Heads of Agreement in appendix.
14/7/57	 Extracts of interview of Prime Minister of Pakistan, H S Suhrawardy, in
USA, "Face the Nation".
25/7/57	 Statement by Indian Minister of Irrigation and Power, on Indus Basin
Dispute in Lok Sabha.
21/8/57a	 IBRD memo written by Iliff copied to DS, RAW, LHB, "Indus Basin
Water Dispute".
21/8/57b	 Statement by Indian Minister of Irrigation and Power, on Indus Basin
Dispute in Rajya Sabha.
ND1958a	 IBRD note, "Marhu" listing the advantages of the Marhu Scheme over
other proposals to date. [Date estimated around March 1958.]
ND1958b IBRD report, "An Approach Towards a Settlement of the Indus Basin
Dispute through Replacement Works Partially in India". [Date
estimated around March 1958.]
ND1958c	 IBRD note written By R A Wheeler —> K L Guinness. [Date estimated
after 4 March 1958.]
15/5/58 IBRD memo written by B H Russler, "Report of Indus Basin
Conference, Rome, Italy - April 16th to May 5th, 1958". Attended by
IBRD: Iliff, Bengston, Guinness; TAMS: Russler, I Lorber; India:
Gulhati, Malhotra, Khalra, Berber; and Pakistan: Mueenuddin, Hamid,
Khalil-ur-Rahman and Kirmani.
29/7/58 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD, Pakistan and India. Present were
IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Guinness; and Pakistan: Mueenuddin;
joined later by India: Gulhati.
2/12/58 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD and India. Present were India:
Gulhati, Malhotra, Ram; and IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko,
Guinness, Russler and Lorber.
3/12/58 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD: Iliff,
Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; and India:
Gulhati, Malhotra, Ram.
5/12/58 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD and India. Present were India:
Gulhati, Malhotra, Ram; and IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko,
Guinness, Russler and Lorber.
9/12/58 Meeting at 10.30am between the IBRD, Pakistan and India. Present
were India: Gulhati, Malhotra, Ram; and IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler,
Bengston, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; and Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani and Manzoor Ahmed.
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16/12/58 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
Iliff, Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; and Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani and Manzoor Ahmed.
16/1/59 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD, Pakistan and India. Present were the
IBRD: Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; Pakistan: Mueenuddin,
Hamid, Niaz, Ahmed; and India: Gulhati, Malhotra, Kalra and Ram.
19/1/59 Meeting at 10ain between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were the
IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; and
Pakistan: Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani, Niaz, Ahmed and
Malik.
3/2/59 Meeting at 1 lam between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
fluff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness, Russler; and Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani, Niaz, Malik and Manzoor
Ahmed.
5/2/59a Meeting at 10.30am between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were the
IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Bengston, Drisko, Guinness; and Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani, Niaz, Manzoor and Malik.
5/2/59b	 Document prepared by the Pakistani delegation for the IBRD, "Cost of
the London Plan and the Indian Plan".
5/3/59	 Meeting between the IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Guinness, Drisko; and India:
Gulhati, Malhotra, Kalra, Ahuja and Ram.
16/3/59	 Meeting between the IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Guinness, Drisko; and India:
Gulhati, Malhotra, Kalra and Ram.
5/8/59	 Meeting at 4pm between the IBRD: Iliff, Guinness; Pakistan:
Mueenuddin; and India: Gulhati.
6/8/59 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD, Pakistan and India. Present were
IBRD: Iliff, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; Pakistan: Mueenuddin, Hamid,
Khalil, Kirmani, Altaf, Soomro; and India: Gulhati, Malhotra, KaIra.
10/8/59 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD, Pakistan and India. Present were
IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani, Altaf; and India: Gulhati,
Malhotra and KaIra.
12/8/59 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD: Iliff,
Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; and India: Gulhati,
Malhotra and Kalra.
14/8/59 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
Iliff, Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Russler, Lorber; and Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani, Altaf, Soomro.
1718/59 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
Iliff, Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Griffin, Russler, Lorber; and Pakistan:
Mueenuddin, Hamid, Kirmani, Soomro.
8/9/59 Meeting at 10am between the IBRD, India and Pakistan. Present were
IBRD: Iliff, Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Griffin, Russler, Lorber; India:
Gulhati, Kalra; and Pakistan: Mueenuddin, Hamid, Khalil, Kirmani,
Altaf and Soomro.
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8/2/60 Meeting at 4pm between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD: Iliff,
Wheeler, Guinness, Drisko, Russler, Lorber; and India: Gulhati,
Malhotra, KaIra, Ahuja and Sengupta.
10/2/60 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD and India. Present were IBRD: Iliff,
Wheeler, Guinness, Drisko, Russler, Lorber; and India: Gulhati,
Malhotra, KaIra, Ahuja and Sengupta.
17/2/60	 IBRD document, "Indus Basin Settlement Plan", sent to the US
Development Loan Fund.
11/3/60 Meeting at 3pm between the IBRD and Pakistan. Present were IBRD:
Iliff, Wheeler, Drisko, Guinness, Russler; and Pakistan: Mueenuddin,
Hamid, Kirmani, Khalil and Altaf.
26/8/60	 Telegram IBRD —> India, from Iliff to the Governor of the Reserve
Bank in Bombay.
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